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summed up and edited without leaving out any important point of fact or view, was generally through the medium of the paper; however, in cases of exceptions it has been translated in the language of the paper and a note (tr) to this effect has been given at the end of each such case.

The Seminar was acclaimed a grand success academically and organisationally. This was so due to enlightened participation and active co-operation of eminent Professors and scholars of Sanskrit, English and Hindi. Academic success was due mainly to the General President of the Seminar, Dr. K. C. Pandey, to the Chairmen of its Sessions : Dr. P. L. Bhargava, Dr. R. S. Tripathi, Dr. A. P. Mishra and Dr. A. N. Jais, to Shri Bhim Sen who presided over the General Lecture delivered by Dr. K. C. Pandey, and to Shri Laxmi Lal Joshi who was in the Chair at the concluding session. I am deeply and most sincerely grateful to them.

I should not forget to express my gratitude to my colleagues in the Department of Sanskrit: Shri V. R. Nagar, Shri M. C. Pathak, and Dr. G. C. Tripathi (who also prepared draft of the discussion on the papers), who toiled bravely and unceasingly for organising the seminar. I am equally thankful to Dr. K. L. Sharma, Shri V. C. Shrivastav, Shri B. L. Samdani and Shri S. N. Joshi of the Department of English, to Shri D. N. Chaturvedi, Department of Geography, Head of the Department of Geology, to Shri Nandmurti, Department of Music, and to my Post-graduate students, and Research Scholars, Shri Bihari Lal Jain and Shri C. S. Purohit, for their enthusiastically active help in doing all sorts of jobs.

During my long stay in Delhi in May and June, 1969, to see the book published I enjoyed rich hospitality of my publishers M/s Motilal Banarsidass and benefited from inspiring association with Lala Shri Sundarlal Jain and smiling and affectionate company of Shri Shantilal Jain and his wife Smt. Lilavati Jain. I can hardly pay back my debt of gratitude to them and theirs, more particularly to Shri Prakash and Smt. Anurādhā. Credit for possibly correct printing is shared by Shri Jagdish Lal Shastri who spared no pains in correcting the proofs. I am sincerely thankful to him and to Shri M. R. Suri, energetic Manager of the Press, and

Supreme is the *poetic principle*, namely, the poet-critic, which creates novel object without operation of causal law, renders the stone-like world soft and soothing with its *rest* and lights it through the flash of imagination and creative self-expression.

कवेरभिप्रायमशब्दगोचरं

स्फुरन्तमाद्रूपं पदेषु केवलम् ।

पदद्विरङ्गैः हृत्तरोमविक्रियै-

र्जनस्य तूष्णीं भवतोऽयमञ्जलिः ॥

[Vijñā]

Beyond reach of words is the meaning of a poet, which bristles in words brimming with sentiment; Salutations to him (the critic) who keeps silence while his limbs eloquently express the meaning through horripilated limbs.

सरस्वती श्रुतिमहता महीयताम् ।

[Kālidāsa in the Śakuntalā]

Let the words of the learned flourish !

all recall what MaCaulay once observed - '*As science advances, poetry declines*'. The age of epics is past. We may find in modern times a near-epic like *Testament of Beauty*, but it will be a miracle if an epic like '*Mahābhārata*', '*Rāmāyana*' or '*Paradise Lost*' were to be now composed. When humanity was young and its sense of wonder was not blunted by science, imagination was more active and heated to produce great epics.

4 Take again our attitude to tragedies. I have no precise information if before the Greeks, tragedies were written. Bharata's *Nāṭya-veda* ruled them out. It is interesting to note that even after the Greeks introduced tragedies, Bharata's view found support in the West. There is a fine passage in Bacon which has a bearing on this point. "The principal modification that history undergoes when dramatised by Shakespeare are due to the tendency to idealisation which forms the great distinction between poetry and history." Bacon calls poetry 'feigned' history and well remarks that 'the use of this feigned history has been to give some satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature of things doeth deny it, the world being in proportion inferior to the soul, by reason whereof there is agreeable to the spirit of man a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness and more absolute variety, than can be found in the nature of things. Therefore, because the acts or events of true history have not the magnitude which satisfies the mind of man, poetry feigneth acts and events greater and more heroical; because true history propoundeth the successes and issues of actions *not so agreeable to the merits of virtue* and vice, therefore poesy feigneth them more just in retribution and more according to revealed providence, because true history representeth actions and events more ordinary and less interchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness and more unexpected and alternative variation; so as it appeareth that poesy serveth and confereth to magnanimity, morality and delectation. And therefore, it (poetry) was ever thought to have some participation of divineness, because it doeth raise and erect the mind by submitting the show of things to the desires of the mind, whereas reason doeth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of things."

5 In early dramatic literature we were transported to some setting far-removed from reality—a sort of ideal, imaginary

8 Lastly, there is the time-worn question of the objective—the purpose of literature poetic, dramatic or prose Does Art exist for the sake of Art only or should it have a didactic aim ? Should literature depict and reflect all what one sees in the contemporary society, or should it adopt ways to correct and remove the evils and at least rise above them ? What does literary criticism say about the writings of D H Lawrence ?

9 Criticism is often rendered by the word *Tīkā*. But today we do not limit literary criticism to only *Mallināthī Tīkā*. We rather have to keep to the expanded meaning in which Bradley's 'Shakespearean Tragedies' was written *Ghaṭa-paṭāḍi* discussion is indeed helpful, a close study of *Mammātā's Kāvya-prakāśa* is certainly delightful Nevertheless a search for literary principles which govern literature of many countries, many languages and many ages, is an exciting adventure.

and poetry of these two great movements of India, namely Jainism and Buddhism, were composed in Sanskrit. Even the faith of Sikhism, Brahmo Samaj, Arya Samaj and so on was expressed through this language of immortality, precision, and sanctity. Sanskrit has played effectively its role of understanding new movements of intellect and giving them a composed, graphic and classical expression. It has been thus a repository of all expressions of Indian consciousness. It could achieve this magnificent result by honouring the sentiments of the linguistic temper of the people. Like Dandin, Ānanda-Vardhana, Mammaṣa, and Rūpaṅgaśvamin of the past, the modern scholars of Sanskrit criticism, owe a responsibility to this sensible tradition and thus bring under their analytical lens the literature of contemporary India.

Non-Sanskrit critics of contemporary literature of India which is imbued with modern sensibility, complain that the principles of literary criticism enshrined in old Sanskrit texts, though sacred yet largely ambiguous and unintelligible, are inadequate and even invalid to evaluate the new literary consciousness. They argue that an ultimate sense of despair, helplessness and alienation that permeates the creative writing of today cannot be properly evaluated by the canons of criticism which are largely based on a philosophy of ultimate hope and a vision of the quietude. The philosophy of Absolute and a religious morality sanctioned by Smritis, which provide a broad framework for the literary criticism in Sanskrit have no relation with the modern literature that has lost faith in the absolute and has discovered a new sense of morality. In this world of relativity absolute has no place. However, the contemporary critics of *akavitā*, *alahānī* and what not, have not formulated so far any objective principles for the judgment of modern literature, which could be acceptable to all concerned. Interpretations and critique of old principles don't satisfy them. Strong impact of science & technology has shrunk the world and brought our contact with the moon. Change of social and economic forces has brought about a new structure of morality; faith in the old order of things, thoughts and patterns stands mutilated. Modern stage of the world has no room for outworn plays of old characters. New literary consciousness needs its understanding and critical evaluation in its own context. In the

SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF LITERARY CRITICISM

(General President's Address)

Dr K C Pandey

It is customary for the president of a Seminar to speak on the subject, on which it is held. I shall, therefore, confine myself to a Bird's-eye view of the subject and leave the rest for the learned specialist, who can deal with it with an intimacy of knowledge and expert touch, which I cannot hope to emulate.

In the course of my summary, I shall deal with :—

- (i) Meaning of the principles of literary criticism
- (ii) Seven principles of literary criticism
- (iii) The relation of the first six principles to the seventh.
- (iv) Conclusion

(i) *Meaning of Literary Criticism*

Criticism is the judgement on the form of a literary work, saying that it causes certain experience, has a certain effect on the mind, and that this experience is due to special peculiar features of the literary piece. From the point of view of the critic, Principles mean the essential elements which determine a result. From the point of view of the producer of a literary piece, principles are the laws which have to be followed in producing a work of art.

Thus 'principles of literary criticism' means the essential elements, present in a literary piece, which form the basis of judgement that a critic pronounces, whether it is good or bad, according as they produce a certain effect on his mind, i.e. cause a certain experience in him.

Literary criticism is an objective and analytical approach to poetry. It is based on certain principles, which have been discovered through close analytical study of literary works. The artistic medium of poetic presentation is articulate sound. The

(ii) Seven Principles of Literary Criticism

There are seven essential elements or principles which the analytical approach to poetry has revealed. (i) the characteristic (Lakṣaṇa), (ii) embellishment (Alaṅkāra), (iii) quality (Guna), (iv) defect (Dosa), (v) style (Rīti), (vi) suggestion (Dhvaṇi), (vii) aesthetic configuration (Rasa).

I THE CHARACTERISTIC (LAKṢAṆA)

If we confine ourselves to the available literature, we may say that the idea of the characteristic marks of poetry first arose in the mind of Bharata. To him, they are distinct from embellishments, figures of speech or Alaṅkāras. While the former are in the body itself, like slenderness of waist or plumpness of breasts, the latter are external additions, like necklace and bracelet. The conception is based on the analogy of lines in the shape of a lotus, flag, or disc, on palm or sole of foot, which are to a palmist unmistakable marks of greatness of the man (Mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇa) and because of which he can recognize the man as such even in the absence of all external paraphernalia. Bharata definitely distinguishes thirty-six such marks, adding that there are many more which a close analytical study can reveal. Some of the important ones among them are : compactness, excellence, logicity and wit. His pupil, Kōhala, and followers discovered more. King Bhoja traced out many more and in his *Sarasvatī-Kaṇthābharana* declared them to be sixtyfour.

II. ALAṅKĀRA OR EMBELLISHMENT

The analytical approach to literary art was made from two points of view, that of the dramaturgist and that of the poetician. The former distinguished between characteristic and embellishment. And Bharata admitted only four embellishments or figures of speech, though he mentioned thirty-six characteristics as stated above.

The poetician, however, abolished this distinction, holding that a mark is a mark whether in the body, like lines in the palm, or added to it, like a badge. Thus Bhāmaha (600 A.D.)

III QUALITY (Guna) Quality belongs to a body, a substance. Words and meanings constitute the body of poetry (*Śabdārthau sahitaṁ Kāvyaṁ*). Poetic qualities inhere in the body of poetry much as heat inheres in fire. There is a difference of opinion about the number, functions, and relation of the qualities. Bharata admitted ten and recognized them to be means of presenting *Rasa* - (i) sweetness (*Mādhurya*) (ii) forcefulness (*Ojas*), (iii) perspicuity (*Prasāda*)—such a clarity in thought and expression as leads to the arousal of unexpressed ideas, (iv) the pun (*Śleṣa*), (v) smoothness (*Samādhi*)—proper adjustment of ascent (high-flown language) and descent (simple language), (vi) magnificence (*Udātātā*)—fanciful grouping of words, (vii) clearness of meaning (*Arthavyakti*), (viii) uniformity (*Samatā*)—sameness of style, (ix) softness (*Saukumārya*)—absence of harshness, (x) polish (*Kānti*)—brightness of style.

Bhāmaha accepted the first three only. The reason is obvious. Some of them can be classed as verbal figures of speech—the pun, for instance, others may be looked upon as mere absences of defects—softness and polish, for instance, which consist respectively in the mere absence of harshness and vulgarity, both well-recognized defects. As an exponent of the view that the embellishment, the distorted utterance (*Vakrokti*) is such a characteristic (*Laksana*) as gives sufficiency to a composition to be recognized as poetic, he subsumed many of the above qualities under embellishment. Vāmana (Eighth century A.D.) denied that the poetic embellishments are of primary importance, held that poetry is like a picture, and asserted that the comparative importance of embellishments and qualities in it is the same respectively as that of paints and lines in a picture. Just as the beauty of a picture depends on the lines, of which the sketch is made, while paints simply enhance it, so the beauty of a poetic production depends upon the poetic qualities, and embellishments simply enhance it. Accordingly he accepted all the ten qualities mentioned by Bharata.

Ānanda Vardhana (Ninth century A.D.) realized the force of the argument against the acceptance of the ten qualities, asserted that the distinction between qualities and figures of speech is, that though both add to the charm of poetic com-

Pradesh, and Gujarat, and, named after them, called Vaidarbhī, Gaudiyā, Pāñcālī, and Lāṭī (i) Vaidarbhī is characterised by sweetness, abounds in sounds, is sweet to the ear, and has very few or no compounds (ii) The characteristic of the Gaudiyā is presentation of a heroic disposition in the forceful sounds in long compounds and alliterations. (iii) Pāñcālī is marked by the use of natural sounds, and by fewer and smaller compounds than are found in Gaudiyā (iv) Lāṭī is simply a mixture of the two styles, Vaidarbhī and Pāñcālī.

Vāmana studied the styles exclusively from the point of view of the qualities. He found Vaidarbhī, to possess all the ten, Gaudiyā only two, forcefulness and brilliance, and Pāñcālī also only two, sweetness and tenderness. He raised the question, 'what is the soul of poetry?' the first time and declared that style is the soul of poetry (Riturātmā Lāvyaśya). For a proper understanding of his analysis of styles it is important to take into account his wider conceptions of qualities, which include even the presentation of Rasa, e.g., brilliance (Kānti).

DIVERGENCE EXPLAINED Abhinavagupta noted the divergence of views about the characteristic, embellishment, and quality, referred to in the preceding sections, and consequently asserted that it is impossible to draw a very clear line of demarcation among them. The distinction which Bharata drew, however, is based on the analytical study of the process of the externalization of poetic vision, as well as of that of apprehension. That it has an educational value is assumed, because of its utility in educating a would-be-poet as regards the steps, by which he should proceed in creating a work of art and a connoisseur as regards the various elements which he ought to take into consideration in judging a work of art. Abhinavagupta attempts to show the mutual relation and comparative importance of these elements by analogy with an architectural work. The characteristics are like walls in the absence of which no architectural work can have being. Qualities are like smooth plaster, and embellishments or figures of speech are like painting, drawn on the smooth surface. The defects may belong to any of the above three. And style is nothing but the manner of organizing matter in such a way as to give due place to the qualities and embellishments.

constituents, it is not a mere jumble. The precise nature of the relation of the constituents is conceived on the analogy of a juice that an expert cook prepares by putting together in due proportion various things of distinct tastes, sweet, bitter, astringent, sour, and saltish, in water, cooking them properly, and then filtering them. The analogy implies that the constituents of the aesthetic configuration have to be well refined, they have to be in right proportion and have to be so related that they present a unity which has an aesthetic value, distinct from that of each constituent separately. It means that the aesthetic experience at the emotive level, is not the experience of a basic emotion in isolation from other constituents of the configuration, but in harmonious union with them, and that it is poetic genius alone which can conceive such a configuration and present it in such predominantly suggestive language that a connoisseur can get the same experience from it as that presented by the poet.

(iii) *Relation and Comparative Importance of the Seven Principles of Literary Criticism*

The relation of the first five *Laksana*, *Alankāra*, *Guna*, *Dosa* and *Rīti* has been pointed out on the basis of analogy of work of Architecture in an earlier section: the four meanings of the word 'Dhvanī' have been given, two meanings of the word 'Rasa' have been referred to; and words and meanings have been declared to constitute the body of a literary piece. *Laksana*, *Alankāra*, *Guna* and *Dosa* are all related to the body, which is made up of words and meanings; and style is nothing but mode of utilising them so as to present a poetic vision effectively. *Dhvanī*, in the sense of that from which the suggested meaning arises, is nothing more than the body of a poetic work, because it is nothing more than word and meaning; and *Dhvanī*, in the sense of that which can never be presented by word primarily, secondarily, implicatively, but can only be suggested, is nothing more than *Rasa*, which is recognised in Indian tradition to be the soul of poetry and, therefore, most important of all of them. The relation of the six essential elements of poetry to the last, the *Rasa*, is similar to that of the body, which is well ornamented, possesses excellent qualities

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE SANSKRIT AND THE GREEK DRAMATIC THEORY

Dr P L Bhargava

The art of dramatic composition and representation has been practised in India and Greece since very ancient times and a comparison of the dramatic theory of the two countries has often attracted the attention of scholars. Yet there are a number of points which call for a fresh appraisal. The authority for the Greek dramatic theory is the *Poetics* of Aristotle, whereas for the treatment of Indian dramaturgy three works stand pre-eminent viz. the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, ascribed to Bharata, the *Daśarūpaka* of Dhanañjaya and the *Sāhitya Darpana* of Viśvanātha.

A comparison of the two dramatic theories shows that though the scope of Aristotle is much narrower than that of Bharata and his successors, the fundamentals of the two theories show a remarkable agreement, despite equally remarkable differences in certain details.

Aristotle has mentioned only two types of drama viz. the Tragedy and the Comedy. According to the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (Ch. XX) there are ten types of drama. The tragedy of Aristotle as we shall show later is much in common with the *Nāṭaka* and the *Prakarana* of Bharata, while the one-act plays called *Vyāyoga* and *Utsrstikāṅka* agree with the definition of tragedy in a still greater measure. As for Aristotle's comedy it corresponds to the *Prahasana* and *Bhāna* of Bharata. The other types mentioned by Bharata have no parallel in Aristotle.

Coming to the definition of drama, Aristotle, strangely enough, regards not only tragedy and comedy but also epic and other kinds of poetry as well as music as modes of imitation.¹ The means and manner of imitation differs in different arts but the objects which the imitator represents are actions.² The *Nāṭyaśāstra* (Ch. I) defines the drama alone as imitation of

1. Aristotle on the Art of Poetry translated by Ingram Bywater, p. 23.

2. Aristotle, P. 23.

of junctures which carry each of the stages of the action to its natural close. They are the mukha or opening, pratimukha or progression, garbha or development, vimarśa or pause and nirvāhana or conclusion (N. S. Ch. XXI)

As regards unity of time Aristotle says: Tragedy endeavours to keep as far as possible within a single circuit of the sun or something near that¹. Bharata, however, wisely limits the unity of time to individual acts. Says he, "An act should cover events that can take place in the course of a single day." (N. S. XX, 23) But it was not considered necessary by him that act should follow act without interval, on the contrary anything upto a year was allowed to intervene between the action of one act and that of the next. To reveal to the audience the events during such intervals the Nāṭyaśāstra (Chapter, XXI) gives a choice of five scenes of introduction.

As for the unity of place Aristotle hardly mentions it. He merely says that tragedy cannot represent actions which happen simultaneously in *different places*. This statement is applicable to all dramas, be they written in Greek or Sanskrit.

According to Aristotle the first essential of a tragedy is plot. It is defined by him as the combination of the incidents of the story and regarded as the most important element of the drama². It can be either simple or complex. It is simple when the change in the hero's fortune takes place without peripety or discovery and complex when it involves one or the other. A peripety is the change from one state of thing to its opposite, while a discovery is a change from ignorance to knowledge.³ The second element consists of the characters or agents represented who must be either above our own level of goodness, or beneath it or just as we are.⁴ Third comes the element of thought i.e. the power of saying what is appropriate to the occasion.⁵ Fourth among the literary elements is the diction of the personages.⁶ The fifth element is *song which is the greatest of the pleasurable accessories of Tragedy*.⁷ The last

1. Aristotle p. 31

2. Aristotle p. 36

3. Aristotle pp. 46-47

4. Aristotle p. 26

5. Aristotle p. 38

6. Aristotle p. 39

7. Aristotle p. 39

the costumer alone in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata. Dresses and make-up constitute only one of the four elements of histrionic representation, the other three being that by gestures, that by words and that by manifestation of involuntary states like tears, tremor etc. Bharata gives elaborate description of these four elements of the spectacle. Not only this, Bharata gives interesting rules about the construction of the play-house and mentions the various conventions which enable the actors to surmount difficulties inseparable from the dramatic form. He deserves high praise for his sense of decency in prohibiting certain acts. Thus he says. (N. S. XXIV, 292-95) No kiss or embrace or any other private acts should be presented on the stage. As a *Nāṭaka* is to be witnessed by the father and the son, the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law all sitting together these acts should be carefully avoided.

The most important object of the drama according to Bharata and indeed all Indian writers is to evoke rasa or sentiment in the readers or spectators. According to the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (Chapter VI) sentiment is produced from the union of the determinants, or causes, which give rise to an emotion, the consequents or external manifestation of emotion and the transitory feelings. There are eight sentiments which are reducible to four according to Bharata (N. S. Ch VI).

Two of these are the erotic and the heroic sentiments. About the other two Bharata seems to have erred. The entire Sanskrit dramatic literature provides proof of the fact that the most important sentiments after the two enumerated above are the pathetic and the comic. In fact the pathetic and the comic are the predominant sentiments in two of the ten types of drama viz. the utkrāntikāṇḍa and the prahasana respectively. The question which naturally comes to the mind while making a comparative study of the Indian and Greek dramatic theory is whether there is anything corresponding to rasa in the Greek dramatic theory. The answer must be given in the affirmative. The very definition of tragedy given by Aristotle lays emphasis on the arousing of the sentiment of pity or what is called karuṇa-rasa by Indian authors of poetics. This is what Aristotle says: "A tragedy is the imitation of an action that is serious and also as having magnitude complete in itself; in language with pleasureable accessories, each kind brought

the Greek drama viz characters and plot and see in what categories the Indian dramas fall according to Aristotle's views. It will be seen that judging from what Aristotle says about these two elements in the tragedy and the comedy respectively the best Indian dramas are certainly not comedies as they have been hitherto called but tragedies pure and simple, while the only types of Indian play which can be given the designation of comedy are the Prahāsana and the Bhāna. As regards the characters of the tragedy Aristotle lays down that tragedy is an imitation of personages better than the ordinary man. In the Sanskrit drama also the chief characters are supposed to be better than the ordinary man, barring the characters of the Prahāsana and the Bhāna. Let us now hear what Aristotle has to say about the plot of the tragedy. "In a perfect plot", says Aristotle, 'the change in the hero's fortunes must be not from misery to happiness but on the contrary from happiness to misery and the cause of it must be not in any depravity, but in some great error on his part.'¹ As for the tragic deed which brings about a change in the hero's fortunes from happiness to misery Aristotle says: "When enemy does it on enemy there is nothing to move us to pity and the same is true when the parties are indifferent to one another. Whenever the tragic deed, however, is done within ^{the} family—when murder or the like is done or meditated by brother on brother, by son on father, by mother on son, or son on mother—these are the situations the poet should seek after.....The deed of horror may be done by the ^{deed} knowingly and consciously....or he may do it, but in ignorance of his relationship and discover that afterwards....A third possibility is for one meditating some deadly injury to another, in ignorance of his relationship, to make the discovery in time to draw back. The ¹ worst situation is when the personage is with full knowledge on the point of doing the deed and leaves it undone. Next after this comes the actual perpetration of the deed meditated. A better situation than that, however, is for the deed to be done in ignorance and the relationship discovered afterwards. But the best of all is the last (where the person meditating some deadly injury to another makes the discovery in time to draw

worse, however, not as regards any and every sort of fault but only as regards one particular kind, the ridiculous. The ridiculous may be defined as a mistake or deformity not productive of pain or harm to others; the mask, for example, that excites laughter, is something ugly and distorted without causing pain.¹ It is clear from this description that the comedy of Aristotle corresponds to the *Prahasana* and *Bhāna* of Bharata. There can be no greater travesty of truth than to use the word comedy for the Sanskrit *Nāṭaka* or *Prakarana*.

DISCUSSION

V. C. Shrivastava : Cannot our dramas be called "Tragi-comedies" following the term used for the later Shakespearean comedies as *Winter's Tale* and *Tempest* etc. ? Indian dramas are hardly comparable to Greek tragedies as Indian and Greek views of life are essentially different. We believe that the gods are fundamentally noble, the good ultimately prevails and destruction is followed by regeneration, consequently the hero meets with a happy end. Whereas the Greek conception of divinity makes some supreme supernatural power responsible for the conduct of men under whose unchallengeable sway a hero is crushed.

P. L. Bhargava : I agree that so far as the objects are concerned they differ in most cases. However, judging from what Aristotle says about Comedy, the Indian dramas can certainly not be stamped as 'Comedy' since a Comedy contains characters inferior to common men, which is not the case in Sanskrit dramas. The definition of Tragedy comes very close to our dramas since the best kind of tragedy according to Aristotle is one where a person perpetrates an act of violence but draws back in time. This is exactly what happens in *Mṛcchakaṭika*, where the situation is very tense as the hero Cārudatta is being taken to the gallows and

- P L Bhargava* : There are other kinds of tragedy also. Aristotle enumerates four of them; among them one is where the action has actually been carried out. However, he says the best is one where a person draws back in time.
- G S Mahajan* : If the action of 'drawing back' is considered to be the most important element in a tragedy then most of the Shakespearean tragedies, which Bradley considers to be the best cannot be adjudged as the best since dreadful deed is always shown to be carried out in them.
- K C Pandey* : There has been an evolution in the conception of tragedies. Aristotle's remarks are based on Greek tragedies existing in his time. By the time of Shakespeare the conception of tragedy underwent change and his tragedies should be evaluated according to the conception of his time.
- G S Mahajan* : Aeschylus' *Antigony* is a Greek tragedy, is it best or not ? — — —
- P L. Bhargava* : It would be a tragedy but not the best one.

do not actually find the word *araṅkāra*, we have the expression *aramkṛt*. The rhotacism is very common in the oldest Vedic language as well as in its sister language, the old Persian of Avesta, especially of Gāthās. In fact all the l-sounds of Indo-European language have invariably become r in its Āryan branch and if in some cases l still remains or rather has been reverted to, it is to be ascribed to the later influence of the Prākṛta-dialects upon the Vedic. I would just cite only one example of the Vedic word *ūrṇā* with Lat. *lana* and Eng. *wool*.

Now, the word 'ara' is derived from the *guna* form of the root *r* with the versatile *a* suffix added to it. The root *r* in the Rgveda means as an intransitive verb *to move*, to come fast, to ascend etc. and as a transitive verb *to set in motion*, to bring or to send and to stir up. The verb is mainly conjugated according to either the third (*juhotyādi*) group with reduplicated vowel as *iyarti*, *iyarmi* etc. or according to the fifth group (*svādi*) with infix *nu*, *rnoti* *rnomi* etc. Forms like *rechati* (**te*) are however also found especially in the Brāhmanas. The causative of this verb is *arpayati*, formed with *pa* infix as *dāpayati*, *snāpayati* etc. which would literally mean to let go something (to somebody). The transitive meaning 'to set in motion' is clearly discernible in the word *arani*, meaning firewood, literally 'those two pieces of wood which are moved or rubbed against each other.' As far as its intransitive meaning is concerned the sense of 'to move fast' soon attracts an object to itself and the sense becomes somewhat like 'to move towards a certain goal' or 'certain object' which further develops a slightly different nuance of meaning i.e. to move or go *into* something. Here I remind you of the word 'ara' meaning the spokes of a wheel. Etymologically it simply means 'a thing which moves or rather shoots from the hub *into* the rim of the wheel.'

This 'arā' has the main accent on the second syllable, that is on *rā*. But there is one more 'āra' in the Rgveda having *udātta* on the first syllable i.e. *a*. This second 'ara' is an adjective and it denotes a characteristic, a quality which a thing attains after having got into something, i.e. to be *fit*. We can say that a particular object *fits in* a certain thing if it goes into it and sits there smoothly. But as in English this concrete picture has developed an abstract sense of fitting or befitting,

sūktaiḥ" . . what propriety is there in connection with you through hymns? . . meaning that the hymns, the speech cannot express the greatness of Indra. The words of the hymns are just not *sufficient*

And exactly this sense, the sense of being sufficient has preserved itself in classical Sanskrit with the word, 'alam' which is used adverbially without the root kr either with instrumental or with dative case . 'alam vivādena' means— it is sufficient, enough with discussion which suggests that no discussions should be made now; alam Śramena—it is enough with your efforts, do not try any more. This is the prohibitory sense, of alam the Vāraṇa. And in dative in the expressions like alam Rāmo Rāvanāya, the meaning enough, sufficient is too obvious to be elaborated.

There is a very short leap from 'fit'—the original meaning of alam in the Rgveda—to "sufficient". The transition is not at all difficult to understand if one thinks that if some thing fits in a particular object, it is exactly 'sufficient' for it. A very similar semantic development is seen in the Hindi word *bhara* which means enough, sufficient as well as whole : mujhe ekā gilāsa pāni bhara cāhiye, a glass of water would be *sufficient*. Vaha rāta bhara jagatā rahā—he kept awake the *whole* night. This word comes from the root bhr—which means to carry (bharati, bibharti), then to carry in or fill in (bharanā, bhara—filled up). Bhar is an adverb meaning "in a way that a particular thing is filled up" i.e. sufficiently or wholly.

As far as the third usage of alam is concerned with which we are mainly concerned here, it is evident from the foregoing passages of Rgveda that 'āra' in its abstract adjectival sense simply means appropriate, proper, 'as it should be like' and arañkṛti (or let us put alaṅkṛti which is the same as alankāra) the appropriateness, propriety.

Alankāraśāstra is therefore the science which tells *what a kārya should be like* and judges as well evaluates it with certain canons of propriety.

The title Kāvyaālankāra given by Bhāmaha to his work simply means the appropriateness, *propriety pertaining to kārya*. And I confess, I cannot think of a better expression for Poetics in Sanskrit. In fact the word alankāra comprises not only the elements of Poetics but also of Aesthetics in it.

R. P. Dwivedi : You say that Alankāra means 'propriety' which should be rendered as *aucitya* in Sanskrit as far as I understand. Now *Aucitya* is not identical with Alankāra since the former is an effect of employment of the alankāras. (tr.)

A. N. Jani : Dr. Tripathi has pointed out the very core of the meaning of the word Alankāra and it should not be confused with the later or the present day usage of the word. The words have their own history and they develop themselves not only phonetically but also semantically. The meaning "appropriateness", "propriety" etc. etc. is true with regard to Rgveda and ancient Literature only and not to its later concept.

himself in the Rāmāyana, dimly formulated by Kālidāsa in a rather casual manner in his reference to Vālmīki in the Raghu-vamśa and deftly employed by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta to support the theory that *rasadhvani* constitutes the quintessence of poetry, provides us with a clue to understand the nature of the poet's experience as envisaged by Sanskrit critics. We are clearly told by Abhinavagupta in unmistakable terms that the *śoka* referred to by Ānandavardhana should not be taken to mean what it usually denotes in ordinary usage. The *śoka* spoken of here is the *sthāyin* of *Kaumarasa* and is clearly distinct from the earthy sorrows, which human flesh is heir to. And it is this *sthāyibhāva*, transmuted into the *rasa* state in the heart of Vālmīki that found expression in Vālmīki's immortal song. The various stages of this aesthetic experience of the poet ultimately blossoming forth as beautiful poetry, are also indicated by Abhinavagupta in the same context. Abhinava writes—

स एव तथानूतविभावतदु-
त्पाकन्दाद्यनुभाववर्णयः हृदयमवादतन्मयीमवननमादाम्नाद्यमानता प्रतिपन्न
कश्चररूपता . प्रतिपन्न . The sequence of the stages involved in
this experience is set forth in the Kaumudī as follows—
प्रथम प्रागुक्तलक्षणमहृदयत्वविशिष्टस्य प्रतिपत्तुः हृदयमवाद, ततस्तन्मयी-
भावलाभ, तदनन्तरमसृष्टी रसात्वाद इत्ययम् ।

Abhinava employs the analogy of a jar filled with a liquid overflowing when it becomes full (रसपरिपूर्णकुम्भोच्चलनवत्) to elucidate the effusion of poetry from the emotion-filled heart of the poet and adds that his idea of this emotional overflow is supported by the *Hṛdaya-darpana* too, where it is clearly affirmed that the primary pre-condition for the genesis of poetry is that the heart should be full to the brim with *rasa*—
यावत् पूर्णो न चेतन तावन्नेव यमत्यमुम् .

The above analysis of the psychology of the poet's creative moment makes one thing abundantly clear that the poet goes through the complete process of *rasanumūti* before he creates his poem. The terms of this description of the poet's aesthetic experience are identically the same as those of the sahrdaya's aesthetic experience when he enjoys the poet's artistic creation either as a spectator or as a reader. There is nothing here to warrant the conclusion that Abhinavagupta conceived of any difference between the poet's creative mood and the con-

to a view, attributed to an anonymous Ācārya that such distinction is unwarranted and that the two should be taken as identical, this view is refuted by citing the view of Kālidāsa that *kavītra* and *sahajayatra* are two distinct, mutually exclusive phenomena. No reason for such a conclusion is given, beyond saying that the stone that yields gold and the stone that can test it are quite different. वा शब्दग्रामम्, अप्रयत्नम्, बलद्वारात्तन्, उत्तिमार्गम्, अन्यदपि तपाविषम् अधिहृदयं प्रतिभासयति सा प्रतिभा ।
सा च द्विधा कारयित्री भावयित्री च । कवेरपकुर्वाणा कारयित्री
 भावकस्योपकुर्वाणा भावयित्री । सा हि कवेः धनमनिप्रापं च भावयति । तथा खलु फलितं कवेर्यापारतरं ।
 'न इति कालिदासः । पृथगेव हि कवित्वाद् भावकत्वं, नादकत्वाच्च कवित्वम् स्वरूपभेदाद्विषयभेदाच्च । यदाह —

कविश्चात्र रचयितुमलं श्रोतुमेवापरस्ता
 कल्पापी ते मतिरुपयया विस्मयं नस्तनोति ।
 न ह्येकस्मिन्निशयवता मन्त्रिपात्रो गुणाना-
 मेव सूते कनकमुपलस्तत्परोक्षास्तनोज्यः ॥

The author of the anonymous Tīpṇya on Hemacandra's Kāvyañuśāsa also declares *kavītra* to be different from *sahajayatra* and quotes Abhinava's own benedictory verse in support :

कवेरपि भावनावस्थानामेव रसाम्बादः संपद्यते । पृथगेव हि कवित्वाद् भावकत्वं । यदाह—सरस्वत्यास्तत्त्वं कविमहृदयस्य विवक्षते ।

Though the necessity to make some kind of distinction between the creative and the appreciative attitudes cannot be ruled out, it should, at the same time, be admitted that the conclusion of the identical nature of the *rasānubhūta* of the poet and the connoisseur, which is an inevitable corollary of the *śloka-śloka* equation can not be disputed. The only way out of the tangle will be to deny *rasānubhūta* to the poet while he is in the creative mood. This is obviously the stand taken by Rājasekhara and the commentator of Kāvyañuśāsa mentioned above. But Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, to whom poetry is the effusion of the rasa-filled heart of the poet,

poet. The fact is the germ of the poet is in the sahrdaya too. The creative faculty, which is the distinguishing mark of the poet is to be found in the sahrdaya too, with just a little difference. Whereas the poet creates a world of his own and shapes it in words the sahrdaya re-creates from those very words the poet's world once again. The creations of both are purely subjective, but again there is a difference. The poet imports objectivity to the subjective world of his creation through his words. Consequently, the creation of the poet is *mainly intended for others*, though he too does incidentally share it with them. On the other hand, the sahrdaya recreates the poet's world *all for himself*. In spite of these differences, it can not be denied that the sahrdaya too is a creator, in his own right.

The distinction between the poet's creation and that of the sahrdaya can well be appreciated by an analogy from Vedānta. Advaita Vedānta postulates two different categories of empirical reality, the *vyāvahārika* and the *prātibhārika*. Of these the *vyāvahārika* world is the world we live in, which is created by Īsvara and the experience of which is shared by one and all Jīvas alike. As opposed to this, the *prātibhārika* is the dream world or the world of illusion which an individual Jīva creates for himself and the experience of which is confined absolutely to himself. The position of the kavi and the sahrdaya is closely similar to this. Like Īsvara the poet creates a world, which like the *vyāvahārika* world is shared by all. The sahrdaya, on the other hand, is like the Jīva and creates a little world, which, like the *prātibhārika* creation, is limited to his experience. Even as the Jīva is the creator of his dream-world in spite of its limitations, there should be no difficulty in conceding that the sahrdaya is the creator of his world, for which he draws his materials from the world created by the poet. The parallelism is, in fact, complete. In the universe of नमस्तुते the kavi and the sahrdaya bear identically the same relation towards नमस्तुते as Īsvara and Jīva bear to सृष्टि.

The above Vedāntic analogy, though it can not prove anything, is adequate to elucidate my stand-point that the sahrdaya is also a creator in a limited sense. I shall now further elaborate my contention that "the germ of the poet is in the sahrdaya" and that the sahrdaya can be equated with a kavi.

Vijikā preserved for us in the Subhāsitāvali runs as follows :—

कवेरभिप्रायमसद्व्योचर

स्फुरन्तमाद्रेषु पदेषु केवलम् ।

वदद्भिरङ्गै कृतरोमविक्रियै-

र्जनस्य तूष्णीमवसोयमञ्जलि ॥

This much should suffice, I believe, to explain the latter part of my hypothesis, namely that the sahrdaya has in him "the germ of the poet" This relationship of the sahrdaya with the kavi may be expressed as the sahrdaya-kavi equation

This near identity between the kavi and the sahrdaya becomes apparent from one more consideration. The make-up of the kavi and the sahrdaya as described or hinted at by Sanskrit critics also points to their identical nature. The three factors, प्रतिभा, व्युत्पत्ति and अभ्यास which are enumerated in the case of the poet are implied in the case of the sahrdaya too. Pratibhā, in the case of poet is described as पूर्ववासनागुणानुबन्धि. In the case of the sahrdaya too, this *pūrvā-sāna* is mentioned as an essential precondition for *sahrdayatva*. With reference to the spectators of the play it is said—

सवामनाना मन्याना रमस्यास्वाङ्गं भवेत् ।

निर्वासनास्तु रङ्गान्तरा काण्डे, इत्यादिमग्निभा ॥

Similar statements like वासना चेदानीन्तनी प्राक्तनी च रसा-स्वादहेतु and गुण्यवन् प्रमिष्वन्ति योगिवद् रससन्ततिम् also point to the fact that पूर्ववासना is an essential factor for aesthetic relish. Likewise the reference to काव्यानुशीलनान्यास in his definition of the sahrdaya touches upon the other two factors namely व्युत्पत्ति and अभ्यास in the equipment of the poet. This shows that the equipment required of the sahrdaya is not far different from that of the poet. Likewise, the very concept of *hrdayasamsāda*, which is the final determinant of *sahrdayatva* and which implies a kinship of hearts between the kavi and the sahrdaya (समान हृदय यस्य स) also provides further support to my stand. Thus the parity of equipment and the kinship of hearts of the kavi and sahrdaya provide interesting confir-

only it had been चिरन्तनकाव्यरक्षणविधायिनाम् अपोयन्मिररि बुद्धि-
निरनुभोयितपूर्वं The benedictory verse of Abhinavagupta in his
Locana, in my opinion contains this very idea. Thus runs the
verse :—

अपूर्वं यदस्तु प्रययति विना कारणवला

लगद्भावप्रत्य निजरननरात्सारयति च ।

कमात्प्ररूपोपास्याप्रनरनुभवं भानयति त-

त्परस्वत्पास्तत्त्व कविसहृदयाख्य विजयते ॥

The whole verse in my opinion, deserves to be reinter-
preted in the light of what I have said above about the basic
identity of the *kavi* and the *sahrdaya*. The last quarter of this
verse सरन्वत्पान्तत्त्व कविसहृदयाख्य विजयते provided a hard nut to
the commentators as the preceding lines apparently fitted well
only with the *kavi* and not the *sahrdaya*. In fact, the author
of the *Kaumudī* has directly raised this question as follows :

ननु काव्यात्मकत्वं कविसहृदयोदात्तेनैव सेत्स्यति, किमर्थं सहृदयपदोपादानमिति
चेत्; सहृदयकृतं कविनिष्ठविचारक्रियागोचरीभूतस्यैव काव्यत्वं मुख्यतया
काव्यरूपत्वादिति सूच्यते । अत एव वचनम्—कविरपि विदग्धोऽपि मूर्खतया
विचारकः इति । तथा चाचार्यैर्णव 'या व्यापारवती रसान् रसयितुम्' इत्यत्र
श्लोके 'ति द्वे अप्यवदम्भ्य' इति । तथा नमानकार्यं (यां) निर्वर्तयत्वेन ननु-
वि(त्वि) तस्यैव दृष्टिद्वयस्य विश्वनिर्णयने हेतुत्वं अपिसन्देहोक्तम् ।

This should explain why the commentary *वातप्रिया* and the
commentary *कौमुदी* should have suggested in all more than
half a dozen alternative explanation for this line.

In my opinion, all these difficulties can be resolved by
resorting to *कर्मधारय* for *कविसहृदय* instead of *इन्द्र*.
In the light of the *kavi-sahrdaya* equation, there should be no
difficulty in explaining this as *कर्मधारय* compound. The
compound may be split either as *कविरेव सहृदय* or *कवि सहृदय*
एव or *कविरिव सहृदयः* ।

It is interesting to note that Ānandarādhana too appears
to be thinking of this unity as the vision of the poet and the
sahrdaya in his verse :—

circles of the city by his pseudonym 'Sahrdaya'. In the course of the discussion, I affirm that the Kavi and the sahrdaya are fundamentally one in so far as the kavi is fundamentally a sahrdaya and vice versa, "The germ of the poet is in the sahrdaya" On being questioned whether sanskrit critics have said so anywhere, I premonitorily quote Abhinavagupta's सख्यत्वास्तत्त्व कविमहृदयाश्च विजयते and add that the compound कविमहृदय here should be explained as Karmadhāraya (not Dvandva) so as to signify their mutual *abhedā* (कविरेव महृदय) or *sādharmya* (कवि महृदय इव and कविरिव महृदय)

At this stage the dream ends. The previous night just before retiring to bed, I had read an article in the Dharmayuga dated 8th December, 1968, which gave an interesting account of a remarkable dream seen by Sir E. A. Wallace, in which he had seen the full question paper of a test that he was to write the next day. The coincidence might have been a mere accident, but to me it was meaningful. The dream put an end to my vacillation. I promptly decided to make this the central theme of my paper for this seminar.

DISCUSSION

R. G. Divedi : It is a very interesting paper, which proceeds on philosophical distinction between the *vyārahārika* and the *prātibhāsika* *sattā* according to Vedānta. The *sahrdaya* is the author of the *prātibhāsika* poetry and the poet is that of the *vyārahārika* poetry. I raise one doubt. It has been stated in the paper that the *sahrdaya* re-creates with those very words the poet's world once again. It means that the world of the *Sahrdaya* is no longer the world of the poet, he has his own world, secondly the world of the poet is not *vyāvahārika* since to be so it should be the same as the world of the *sahrdaya*.

P. Venkatachalam : I have drawn the above example from Vedānta in order to make my point clear. I mean to say that fundamentally both worlds are the same. So far as the nature of the world or its content is concerned, the world of the *sahrdaya* is

tions are present in the latter. It is the idea of the poet which is presented in the medium and in such a way that it is capable of giving rise to a mental picture in the heart of a *Sahṛdaya* which is in all respects almost the same which arose in the mind of the poet. The *sahṛdaya* too is common, i.e. as Croce has said, in both cases there is 'intuition'. However, the distinction between the poet and the *sahṛdaya* is that the former is capable of presenting intuition through the medium, the latter is not, i.e. if नैमग्निको च प्रतिमा etc. are present one is able to produce and if these are absent, he is unable to create the medium which is common to all, i.e. *Vyāvahārika*.

Venkatachalam : I think Dr Dwivedi understands my point. I try to explain my view point through one more illustration. A musician sings a particular Rāga to his audience. The audience re-creates it in its own mind though it is incapable of presenting it.

R. C. Dwivedi : There is a maxim - देवो भूत्वा देवं वरेत् which sufficiently explains that only by becoming a sort of poet that one can evaluate or appreciate literature. There is a verse in the Rāmāyana which may be interpreted to mean that only the inhabitants of Ayodhyā who have passed through the actual experience of separation from Rāma can have the real aesthetic experience of the Rāmāyana. So I perfectly agree with what you say. The tradition is there in the above-quoted maxim. My point of objection was only limited to those two sentences where you say that the worlds of the poet and the *sahṛdaya* are of two different kinds—the former is the *vyāvahārika* and the other is the *prātibhāsika* even when they are the same because the *sahṛdaya* according to you re-creates the poet's world.

R. S. Tripathi : Vāmana who has been quoted in the Abhinava-bhāratī (Ch. VI), Gaudavaho and V. Raghvāna's Śrngārapralāsa may be referred to

you assume for a critic cannot be one with the practical reality of the poet. The apparent reality is always marked by subjective elements. Rasānubhūti is possible when individuality is cast off and subjective elements don't mar the relish of *rasa* and there is a perfect harmony of the poet, the hero and the spectator, which is hardly possible if you contend that the world of the spectator, or *sahṛdaya* is only *prātibhāṅka* i.e. apparent, unreal .
(tr)

Venkatachalam I never say that the world of the *sahṛdaya* is really apparent (*prātibhāṅka*) I used this term and the analogy from the doctrine of Vedānta simply to illustrate my point.

Shame is another powerful factor which excites blushing. It has within its orbit two types of causes. moral causes and some improper behavioral patterns. The second one has no connection with the moral sense. If a man of conscience commits a crime in solitude, he may sincerely regret or suffer deep remorse for his guilt, but certainly not blush until his crime is detected, specially by those whom he holds in high esteem. Breach of the laws of etiquette : i.e. impoliteness, any impropriety or an inappropriate remark, quite commonly seen and regarded improper behavioral patterns, are the second type of causes which excite intense blushing of which a man is capable. In both the cases mentioned above, the same fundamental principle, namely the regard for the opinions of others, is involved.

Modesty is another powerful agent that excites blushing. A modest man always has an humble opinion of himself and is extremely sensitive about an indelicate word or deed. The modest person readily blushes at slight praise, any indelicate word uttered or such a deed narrated before him is bound to crimson his face, because his humility and extreme sensitiveness to indelicacy make him so.

Whatever may be the real cause, whether due to shyness, to shame for real crime, to shame for the breach of the laws of etiquette, to modesty from humility or—indelicatecy, blushing depends in all cases on the principle of regard for the opinions of others. The cases mentioned above affect the cardiovascular system in such a way that blood-vessels at the body-surface are dilated, and more blood flows into the capillaries that crimson the face.

As it has already been stated above that blushing is an effect of shyness, shame or modesty and it is the most peculiar and the most human of all expressions, innumerable fascinating examples of it can be seen in every literature where the causes of blushing with all its accompanying movements and gestures are depicted wherefrom blushing as an effect emanates. The cause and effect theory is thoroughly maintained. But in Sanskrit literature the case is otherwise. There is hardly any example where the said cause and effect theory is handled as it ought to be. This is not to say that Sanskrit literature is devoid of such situations. It rather abounds in it, but the

“Evam vādim devarsau pārśve pituradhomukhi
Lilākamalapatrāni ganayāmāsa Pārvaṭi”¹

Griffith translates it thus —

“Thus While he spake the lady beat her head
To hide her cheeks, now blushing rosy red
And numbered over with seeming care the while
Her lotus petals in sweet maiden guide”²

In the original verse besides the context i.e. the proposal for Umā's espousal, there are only two indications that complete the sense of blushing. They are ‘Pārśve pituradhomukhi’ and ‘Lilākamalapatrāni ganayāmāsa’. These are the movements and gestures which accompany blushing. These are really accessories—subsidiary factors. The thing in question for which these subsidise, is missing.

The other examples from the same context will also justify my assertion. When the proposal for the marriage was accepted, Himavān bade her daughter bow before the Seven Saints to have their fullest blessing. This must have put her out of countenance. Kālidāsa describes her state excellently in the following verse :

“Tām pranāmādarasrasta-jāmbūnadavatamsakām
Ankamāropayāmāsa lajjamānām muhurmuḥuḥ”³

Griffith translates it thus —:

“So low she bowed, the gem that decked her hair
And sparkled in her ear all loosened there.
Then with sweet modes and joy oppress
She hid her blushes on the Lady's breast”

The original verse has some points in favour of blushing. They are ‘Muhurmuḥuḥ lajjamānām’ and ‘Arundhatī ankamāropayāmāsa’. Umā was really dreading the notice of the Seven Saints who were strangers to her and were looking at her at this solemn occasion. This must have covered her with confusion. Noticing this the lady Arundhatī came to her rescue and hid her face on her breast. It will, thus, be seen that the

1. Kumārasambhavam, 6/84

2. Ibid, p. 76

3. Kumārasambhavam : Edited by S R Sehgal (Trans. Poruor

Lajjānamramukhi priyena hasatā bālā ciraṁ cumbitā.¹
 Mahamahopadhyaya Dr Ganga Nath Jha translates it thus —

“Finding the love-chamber empty the girl rose gently from the couch and having intently gazed at the face of her husband who was feigning sleep, she kissed him with confidence, but noticing a tremor in his cheeks, she hung her head through shame and was repeatedly kissed by her smiling lover”²

This is a situation where the excitation of blushing is a must. The movements and gestures which accompany blushing are here. She is unable to meet the gaze of her lover, casts down her eyes due to shame. The reported kissing by the smiling lover is a further heightening of her state. This is almost a “made to order” situation for blushing. But all this has been conveyed by only one word “*Lajjānamramukhi*”—(hanging her head through shame). The original verse mentions the cause—shame—clearly, but the term that conveys the effect of it i.e. blushing is totally missing.

On the grounds of the examples discussed above from different sources the conclusion can safely be drawn that nowhere in Sanskrit literature has ‘blushing’ or a ‘blush’ been expressed or stated though the expression has been a natural and inescapable necessity. The cause and effect theory has nowhere been maintained in the case of *Lajjā* and all its synonyms. Only the use of *Lajjā*, *Trapā*, *Vridā* etc. was considered enough without caring to express the various types of effects caused by them. Consequently it was not possible for Sanskrit intelligentsia to evolve a commonly accepted term for blushing. And so it may be averred that the word with all its effects was perhaps unknown to Sanskrit scholars. But with the readers of today the case is quite different. These days medical sciences and Psychology with all its branches are so advanced and have become so popular that the knowledge of emotions, psychosomatics and the general principles of expression have become essential material for the students of literature. They are familiar with the major physiological changes, which accompany emotions. So whenever the con-

1. Amarśatakam, verse No. 82

2. Kāvya-prakāśa (Dr Ganganath Jha's English Trans.) Chapter IV, p. 56 (a)

tion leaves no doubt that the Ācārya has no idea of blushing and therefore, it was not possible for him to handle it in his colour-scheme. This justifiably leads to the conclusion that *Vairāgya* or blushing was perhaps not known to our Sanskrit Ācāryas.

But the description of *Vaivarnya* in the context of '*Vṛidā-vyabhichārīn*'—the feeling of shame—attaches weight to the interpretation of the term as blushing. The change of colour caused by *Vṛidā* may be blushing as well. It is, therefore, proper to tackle and critically examine *Vairāgya* in the context of *Vṛidā* and do justice to the subject. Bharata says that *Vṛidā* has improper action as its basis. It is caused by *Vibhāras* (Determinants) such as humiliation, repentance on account of transgressing words of superiors or disregarding them, non-fulfilment of vows and the like. It is to be represented on the stage by *Anubhāras* (consequents) such as covered face, thinking with downcast face, drawing lines on the ground, touching clothes and rings and biting the nails and the like.¹ In the opinion of Viśvanātha Kavirāja *Vṛidā* is the absence of boldness causing the face to hang down in consequence of misconduct.² Dhanañjaya first of all adds *Vaivarnya* to the definition of *Vṛidā*. He says that *Vṛidā* is a lack of boldness in consequence of misconduct and so forth. It can be inferred from keeping the body averted, from concealment, change of colour, lowering of the head and the like.³ In the said definition *Vṛidā* has received only a partial treatment. It has been defined in the context of *Durācāra*—(misconduct) only. Moreover the *Vṛidā* caused by *Durācāras* (actions against the set code of behaviour) can excite *Vairāgya* of pallor-type, not of blushing-type, which is an ornamentation of the face. Hemacandra defining *Vṛidā* mentions *Vairāgya* as its consequent. He also treats the subject on the same lines.⁴ The definition of *Vṛidā* given by Panditarāja Jagannātha is really striking. He treats the subject in a comprehensive manner. According to him *Vṛidā* is a particular disposition of mind which is occasion-

1. Nāṭyaśāstra—Vol I, P. 363 Pub. Oriental Institute, Baroda.

2. Sāhityadarpaṇa—3, 165

3. —Śāstra, 4/24

4. —Śāstra, 2/23 (edited by Ramlal C. Parikh).

“Nirudhya yāntim tarasā kapotīm
 Kūjākapotasya puro dadhāne
 Mayī smitārdram vadanāravindam
 Sā mandamandam namayāmbabhūya”¹

‘When I placed before the cooing pigeon, his mate that was going away by stopping her forcibly, she (my beloved) slowly bent down her smiling lotus-like face towards me.’²

Here ‘*smitārdram*’ and ‘*Vadanāravindam mandamandam namayāmbabhūya*’ suggestive of *Vṛiddā bhāra* mixed with pleasurable sensation, create appropriate atmosphere for blushing. ‘*Smitārdram*’ is a sure indication of that. An intense blush is sometimes accompanied by a slight effusion of tears and this is due to lacrimal glands partaking of the increased supply of blood which rushes into the capillaries of the adjoining parts including the reuna. Blushing being an involuntary expression : *Sāttvikabhāra*, which serves the purpose of *bhāra* and *anubhāra* both, it must have an external manifestation, otherwise it will lose its charm. *Sāttvikas* must be dealt with as *Sāttvikas*. In such cases the application of the theory of suggestion is meaningless. It is, therefore, obvious that blushing could not get its proper place in Sanskrit Poetics also.

In sum, it can be confidently asserted that the concept of blushing was almost unknown or very vaguely known to Sanskrit poets and Ācāryas. Sanskrit poets did often create such situations, where *Vṛiddā* with all its finest shades of import is beautifully suggested and its various effects—voluntary or involuntary—are excellently expressed, but this most important effect, i.e. blushing remained unmanifested. *Alankāraśāstra* also did not do justice to it. Our Ācāryas who had very shrewd eyes and were very fond of or rather crazy about classifying dividing and sub-dividing the topic in hand and discussing it threadbare did not handle *Vaivarnya* exhaustively by including blushing in its fold.

1. Bhāmanivilāsa, Śṛṅgāra Vilāsa, 28 (Pub. Oriental Book Agency, Poona)

2. Ibid

(Translated Portion)

देवर्ष्यं स्वरभगमञ्चतितमा भन्दाशनम्रानना

कष्ट भो प्रतिनावरोज्यधिसुन वाणी नवोद्गायते ॥

Here the expression *lawayya* may include blushing, the reddening of the cheeks. Thus we can say that though blushing has not got its fair deal, it has not been completely ignored.

R. G. Divedi : As far as literature is concerned it is actually not a missing link since, one could recall or search a number of ślokas in Sanskrit, as the one which Mr. Venkatachalam has quoted, where the situation of blushing has been described and almost any body can reproduce one or two of such verses. This temptation at least I should resist following the embarrassment of a damsel who had to stop the parrot from repeating the sweet talks with her lover in the night : व्रीडार्ता प्रकरोति दाडिमफल-
व्याजेन वादव्यनम्. Secondly Vidyācakravartin in his commentary on the *Alaṅkārasarvasva* gives description of changes in colour due to blushing etc. on the basis of some lost work named *Bharatasamgraha*—which may either be a metrical summary of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* or his own commentary on this work Thus as far as literature goes, blushing is not unknown. Now as far as the field of poetics is concerned, I think there can be two reasons for its non-inclusion in the *sāttvikabhāvas*. Firstly, the later writers on poetics were perhaps so obsessed by the authority of Bharata that they did not increase the number of the *sāttvikas* given by Bharata but treated these as *upalaksana* so as to enable them to include other *bhāvas* also as the need arose. The second strong reason for not mentioning blushing directly is to my mind, the feeling of suggestibility about it. Blushing is an internal state of embarrassment and shyness involving the whole personality, and it is not restricted to the face or cheeks only. It can, therefore, be better felt than expressed externally.

writer, but would like to point out that it was really very vaguely known to them. In fact the śloka that they have quoted describe the situation of shyness and embarrassment and not the blushing itself. Shyness is a cause and blushing is the effect of it. The effect should be described as such and not left to be guessed by the reader by simply describing the cause of it. Since blushing is an involuntary action, a *sāttvikā bhāva*, which comprises not only *bhāva* but also *anubhāva* in it, it must be clearly indicated and can never be suggested. Anubhāvas are never implicit, they are explicit. What surprises me is that Sanskrit poets create and critics describe situations where shyness—the cause—is present, but instead of giving crimsoning of the cheeks as its logical effect, they are waylaid to describe fear (*bhaya*) and nervousness (*trṣṇa*) etc. and never mention the crimsoning of the cheeks. Panditarāja Jagannātha nicely defines shyness :

स्त्रीणां पुरुषमुखावलोकने पुमाश्च प्रतिशमनमपराधवादेः सौम्यो
वैवर्ण्याधोमुखत्वादिविकारः ॥ अर्गचित्तवृत्तिविरोधो व्रीडा but
he mentions only *śeṣa* and downhanging of the face as its effect, and does not include the reddening of the cheeks. That on comparatively dark faces of Indians such crimsoning is not visible is also not true. Blushing is visible even on the faces of Negroes. Charles Darwin has given several pictures of the Negroes while blushing with the remark that the dark colour of a Negro becomes still darker when he blushes.

It is difficult to agree with the view that blushing is included by our ācāryas in *Vairagya*. With our so well known tendency for minute hair-splitting—going into divisions and sub-divisions and further divisions of the sub-division—it would really be surprising if the crimsoning of the cheeks were to be included in such a general term as *Vairagya*. Besides *Vairagya* is only of one kind. If the ācāryas had hinted at the possibility of many more varie-

exact synonym for the English word "blushing" in Sanskrit. Which word, Dr. Jaitly, would you like to use or coin for it in Sanskrit ?

R. S. Jaitly : Well, it is for the scholars present here to decide. I do not have any ready word in my mind

R. S. Tripathi : To my mind blushing was included in Sanskrit Poetics in *lajjā*. Abhinava-gupta associates *lajjā* with sex and observes like Freud : लज्जा हि मन्मद-विजृम्भारूपेव । सा हि भन्तु अवस्था तान् तान् विकारान् करोति which clearly means that the *lajjā* as well as its effects, i.e. blushing etc. were both included in the term *lajjā*. Just as there is non-difference between *śakti* and *śakti-rāśi* so also both cause and effect may be referred to as one and the same. In the *Abhinavabhāratī* Abhinavagupta remarks that the previous ācāryas have well counted all the *bhāṅgas* and no others are possible. If there be any other they are of minor nature and must be included in *bhāṅgas* already known. I, therefore, think that blushing should be included in the *lajjā*.

Finest Art. From Hindu point of view aesthetics is the science and philosophy of Fine Arts. Drama, the *Drśya-kāvya* is intimately connected with Dance or vice versa. Similarly poetry and drama are equally intimately connected. We know poetry or *Kāvya* is three-fold, *Drśya*, *Śravya* and *Mīśra*. This is an ordinary or limited classification, but if we view all the arts, we may formulate the theory that appreciation or realisation of arts depends on only two senses, those of sight and those of hearing. On the basis of these senses the works of the independent arts and the arts themselves have been divided into three classes, those addressed (i) to the sense of sight (*Drśya*), to that of hearing (*Śravya*) (iii) to both (*Drśya-Śravya*). To the first class belongs architecture, with sculpture and painting as its subordinate arts, to the second belongs poetry and music, and to the third drama which is nothing but the highest form of poetry.

Now the question is how can we afford to ignore the historical elements of development or views on poetry or more appropriately the poetic categories. These may be enumerated as follows. There are seven poetic categories under which the results of the analytical approach have been placed (i) the characteristic (*Laksana*) (ii) Embellishment (*Alaṅkāra*), (iii) Quality (*Guna*), (iv) Defect (*Dosa*), (v) Style (*Rīti*), Suggestion (*Dhvani*), (vi) Aesthetic configuration (*Rasa*). Of these the first five are objective and the last two are subjective. This is the analysis of Dr. K.C. Pandey whose contributions to aesthetics are well known to the world.

Aesthetics is the soul of the Dramatic art which is its supreme development as well as its fundamental characteristic. According to Hindu view, aesthetics is the science and philosophy of Independent Arts. Bharata, the father, the founder and the exponent of this art, seems to have divided the art into principal and the subordinate ones. For he holds that all arts occupy a subordinate position to the dramatics in as much as they find due place in it. It is with this fundamental background of dramatic art that I have somewhere remarked that Muses of Fine Arts did not descend one after another, Poetry; Drama, Dance, Music, Painting all these Fine Arts are interrelated like Kith and Kin.

Svarga and Apavarga Naturally, therefore, all arts, be it poetry or music, painting or dance, are to be viewed from this lofty idealism of aestheticism.

In nearly all the phases of Indian art, the Rasa (or impassioned feeling) has played a very prominent role. The Indian belief is that the supreme being is Rasa-Svarūpa (cf the Indian theory of Rasa-Brahma-Vāda: रसो वै सः Again image-worship, for which icons used to be made of the manifold materials with manifold symbols, to be worthy of desired end, has to be done in a manner of accomplished art. In dance and drama there is identification of the spectator with the nāṭa, actor. A similar identification is essential between the worshipper and the worshipped. This is possible only through the arousing of rasa, the aestheticism in art. The scriptural monuments in our possession do corroborate this dictum and there we find a number of different Rasas which the artists endeavoured to chisel upon the dry stones and metals.

Thus aestheticism in art becomes instrumental in producing the bhāvavyākṣaṇa and this in its turn is dependent on the rasas or rasadrśyaḥ. The following lines of the Samarāṅgaṇa make this clear:

रसानामयं वक्ष्यामी दृष्टीनामिह सक्षपम् ।

सदयता यतश्चित्रे नावयन्ति प्रकाशते ॥

Citra in this text stands for pictorial images and sculptural ones, but Bhoja was equally gifted with poetic insight (vide his two remarkable treasures—the Śṛṅgārapra-lāsa and the Sarasvatī-Kaṇṭhābharana), hence to my mind this term, Citra, also stands for embellished poetry, but unless it arouses some 'Bhāva' or 'rasa' it is no Citra at all. Hence the previous doctrines as advocated by the early reputed authors on Alankāraśāstra, like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Rudraṭa, there is no alankāra in poetry unless it arouses some bhāva and it is just a question of degree only whether it is predominant or secondary. In the end I hope to expound and illustrate this point.

I think in this very advanced stage of re-thinking we cannot afford to be dogmatic. We have to cultivate a more

always aimed at this great Ideal. Any creation, unless it is conducive to the well being of life, unless inspiring and ennobling, and unless high enough for creative urge, is not worth the ideal. It is from this fundamental angle that aesthetics in iconographical art is to be viewed and purviewed.

The following lines from the Samarāṅgana-Sūtradhāra will suffice to illustrate this theme

हस्तेन मूचयन्नर्थं दृष्ट्या च प्रतिपादयन् ।
 मशोव इव दृश्येन सर्वाभिनयदर्शनाम् ॥
 वागिके चैव चित्रे च इदं मायनमुच्यते ।
 तस्मादनयोद्विचित्रमाश्रितम् ॥

The Viṣṇudharmottara lines विना तु नृत्यशास्त्रेण especially 'त एव चित्रे विज्ञेया नृत्त चित्र पर मत्' etc. also propound the same truth.

The Samarāṅgana-Sūtradhāra recognises as many as eleven Rasas and eighteen Rasadr̥ṣṭis, Lalitā, Hr̥ṣṭā, Vikasitā etc., etc.

The important points in relation to the aesthetics in the pictorial art still need to be expounded. Firstly, all these rasas, though characteristics of only human beings, men, women and children and in their likeness the anthropomorphic forms of the gods and demigods or demons have an application to all sentient creations 'पुरस्कृत्य सर्वमन्त्रेषु योजयेन्'. This statement goes to the very core of the art and shows that if birds and animals in paints could be shown manifesting the sentiments, it is really the master-piece, the supreme achievement of the artist, it becomes a new creation, superior creation to that of Brahmā, the Primordial Creator Himself. It is through the symbolism of Mudrās, hand-poses, bodily poses and the postures of the legs, that the mute gods speak to us giving vent to the sublimest of thoughts and noblest of expressions, these so-called brutes can also share our experience. There is nothing extra-ordinary nor supernatural about it. It is the marvel of the art. If poetry can create an idealistic world, full of beauty and bliss, the painting, her sister, must also follow the suit.

society and what was our society in India at the time of Ānandavardhana ?

The massive impact of monistic doctrine of the Advaita Brahma, as promulgated by the great Śaṅkara was being felt and cultivated in practically all the spheres of life and doings. Kashmir, the birth-place of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta could not afford to neglect to feel this impact. Kashmir Śaivism is an aftermath of Śaṅkarācārya's influence. According to my thesis no thought and deed in India is bereft of its metaphysical and spiritual content. The fundamental postulate of our society was Dharma and there can not be a better definition of Dharma than what is given by our Ācāryas

यतोऽभ्युदयनि श्रैयससिद्धिः स धर्मः ।

Dharma does not mean dogma or ritual, it means the sustaining factor of life in its most complete aspect. Abhyudaya stands for material prosperity and Niśkreyasa for Moksa, the release of the soul from bondage. These are two cardinal postulates which have perfected our culture. Thus we can appreciate the balancing of materialism and spiritualism in our culture.

With this introduction to the impact of the philosophy on practically all the Fine Arts in India, let me come to present a new dissertation that if such a matter of fact science and art, the Vāstu and Śilpa, are guided by lofty ideals of monistic principle, the poetry in India cannot be overestimated when we say that its highest development was perfect in the womb of philosophical speculations of Hindus.

In our traditions Sāhitya Panditas have always regarded themselves as brother followers of Vaiyākaranas. The learned scholars are surely conversant with the Sphoṭa doctrine or Śabda-Brahma-theory of Grammarians. The credit for this goes to one of the most reputed grammarian philosopher, Bhartrihari, the celebrated writer of the Vākyapadiya, on which Dhvani doctrine has been evolved. Ānandavardhana himself admits that this doctrine was borrowed from the Vaiyākaranas :

Thus sphota, like Nāda, Vāstu and Brahman, is all-pervading, eternal and indestructible word-principle.

The principle that word is vested with a power which is different both from Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇā and by which it manifests 'Rasa' 'Vastu' or 'Abhidhā', is based on the principle of the manifestation of 'Śabda' technically called, 'Sphota' of the Vākya-pāṇīya. Sphota, as explained in this work, is something eternal like 'Brahman'. It is this sphota which being itself a 'Dhvani' is also the cause of 'Dhvanis' as the light existing in an 'Ārani' gives rise to other light. The 'Sphota' is like the fine air which pervades all the concrete objects and like the same becomes perceptible when manifested by its own means.

Ānandavardhana in his Dhvanyāloka contends that a word is capable of expressing more than one idea at one and the same time. Similarly according to Bhartṛhari a word can simultaneously express several ideas.

In the Dhvanyāloka, the example of the jar and the candle has been cited to prove that 'Vyāṅgya' (suggested) sense is perceived alongwith the perception of the denoted sense, i.e. Vācya. It does not disappear when 'Vyāṅgya' is perceived just as the light of the candle does not exist when it makes the jar manifest. In other words, the contention of the propounder of Dhvani is that a word is capable of expressing more than one idea at one and the same time. Now, according to Bhartṛhari a word simultaneously expresses several ideas. The word 'cow', though used simply to mean an animal and nothing else, will express something else also :

घटादिषु यदा दीपो येनार्थेन प्रयुज्यते ।
ततोऽन्यत्वापि नाविद्यात् स करोति प्रकाशन् ॥
सत्त्वेषु तदाद्येषु शब्दो येन प्रयुज्यते ।
तस्मान् प्रयोजकान्यत्वापि शब्दावदवयवौ ॥

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa also supports this foundation of Dhvani :

यदा घटादेर्दीपादिशब्दो व्यञ्जक इत्यन्ते ।
तत्ततोऽन्यत्वादेवं च निःस्पन्दोऽवयवमव्युत्ते ॥

not perceived at all when it manifests *sphoṭa*. Ānandavardhana seems to have taken the hint from the second view which regards sound to be independent of *sphoṭa* but imperceptible at the time of manifestation of the *sphoṭa*.

The *sphoṭa* theory as fully propounded and established by Bhartrhari in the *Vākya-Padīya* is probably older than Pāṇini. Pāṇini himself mentions a predecessor, *Sphoṭāyana*. The clear object of the Founder of *Dhvani* doctrine is to bring the impact of the philosophy of *Rasa* Theory (*Raso Vai Sah*) as enunciated in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* which was later adopted by many *Ālankārikas*, esp. the famous aesthetician Pt. Jagannātha, the author of the *Rasagangādhara*. Mammāṭa's elucidations of this theory, in a more profounder and illustrative as well as systematic way, is a second landmark in the history of Indian Aesthetics. These writers regard *Rasa*, *Ānanda*, and *Ātman* as identical.

Now let me come to Abhinavagupta in a brief review. Abhinavagupta, the greatest gift of Kashmir, has been able to bring the East and West to one amalgamated plane. His psychological approach is a landmark in Indian Aesthetics. Abhinavagupta was a rational mystic. Accordingly the essential constituents of aesthetic personality consist and presuppose the following :

(i) Taste, *Rasikatva* (ii) Aesthetic Susceptibility, *Sahridayatva* (iii) Power of Visualization, *Praubhā* (iv) A contemplative habit, *Bhāvanā* or *Carvanā* (v) The capacity to identify, *Sādhāranīkaraṇa*. (vi) Psycho-physical condition, *Anubhūti*, *Vyakti*.

Hindu aestheticians have no doubt recognised five levels of aesthetics experience (i) sense, (ii) imagination, (iii) emotion, (iv) catharsis and (v) transcendency, but the greatest emphasis as laid down by this great philosopher and poetician Abhinavagupta-Pādācārya, is on the transcendency. This transcendental level is recognised by him as the highest. Thus the final stage in aesthetic experience, according to Abhinavagupta, is of supreme bliss (*paramānanda*). Aesthetic experience therefore in its final stage belongs to the level of *Vyatireka-turiyātīta*, in which all objectivity merges in the subconscious and the subject, the self, shines in its *Ānanda*.

Vāmana says that 'aujvalya' is that quality of the colouring of a picture which makes the picture look new and fresh. Aujvalya is brilliancy which ensures the life of a picture. Otherwise the picture fades and looks very old. This quality is borrowed by him in poetry and says that poetry looks brilliant and preserves brilliancy by the quality of Kānti in the chosen words.

ओज्ज्वल्य कान्ति ।

Ibid. III 1.25

ओज्ज्वल्य कान्ति । वन्यस्य उज्ज्वलत्वं नाम यत् अमो कान्ति-
रिति, तदभावे पुराणच्छायेत्युच्यते ।

ओज्ज्वल्य कान्तिरित्याहुर्गुणान् गुणविभारक्ष ।

पुराणचित्रस्थानीय तेन वन्य कदेर्बच्च ॥

Ibid. III, I

A similar idea of an old picture is visualised by Rājasekhara, the dramatist, in a fine description of Nature in the fading twilight and approaching darkness in the prologue to his drama, the *Bāla-bhārata*. He compares Nature at dusk to an old picture dulled by smoke :

किञ्च स्तोक्तम कलापकलनस्यामायमान मनाक्
धूमस्यामपुराणचित्ररचनारूपं जगज्जायते.

Vāmana in his *Kāvya-lankāra-sūtra* (I, iii, 30-31) compares drama to picture and calls drama as literature *par excellence* because of its likeness to a picture.

सन्दर्भेषु दशरूपक नाटकादि श्रेय तदि वित्र चित्रपःवत् विद्येय-
सावल्यात्.

Bhaṭṭa Tauta, as he has been quoted by his pupil, Abhinava in his *Abhinavabhārati*, says that Rasa realisation or emotional response is easily and excellently got only from a drama. That is, there poetry attains the visual state when one can realise through the eye what one can only imagine otherwise. It is because of this quality that drama is called picture by Vāmana—a series of pictures before our eyes. It is because of this quality also that drama is called *Rūpa*.

his *Abhilasitārthacintāmaṇi* (Mysore ed.), king Someśvara speaks of one type of picture called *Bhāva-citra*:

शृंगारादिरसो यत्र दर्शनादेव गम्यते ।

भावचित्रं तदाख्यातं चित्रकौतुकवारकम् ।

Jayadeva, author of the *Candrāloka* and his commentator, Vardyanātha, apply the *Rasa* theory to *Citra*.

काव्ये नाट्ये च काव्ये च विभावार्थविभावित ।

आम्बाधमानकतनुः स्यायो भावो रसः स्तुतः ॥

The application of the *Dhvani* theory to *Citra*

The application of the *Rasa* theory of drama and poetry to picture means that in pictures also *Rasas* are to be depicted by conditions which rouse them, viz the object of emotions, the excitements of emotions, the effects of emotions and the minor emotions which can be called fleeting feelings and which are accessory to the major emotional mood. This means the application of the *Dhvani* theory to *Citra* also. It certainly means so. For, in an artistic presentation, it is the suggestion that forms the very life of that artistic expression. This can also be proved by taking the canons given by the *Vṛnūdharmottara* for depicting things like evening etc. A perusal of the verses in chapter 24, which show how mountains, sky, earth etc. must be depicted, will prove the truth of this statement. The subjects e.g. gamblers should be suggested by depicting them as bereft of their upper cloth—'उत्तरोपविहीनारश्च घृतानक्ताग्रदग्नेन्'; a highway must be suggested by portraying a caravan of camels, etc. carrying articles of transport (युक्तं मनारैरुद्वाहैः मार्गं नार्यं प्रदग्नेन्). The night must be suggested by drawing a thief walking stealthily, by an *Abhisārikā* hurrying to meet her lover in her secret meeting place and so forth. Rather it is in picture that this principle of *Dhvani* which according to modern English critics, is 'Symbolism' in poetry, applies excellently. For here, in picture, there is no scope for the word which can name the subject depicted. In poetry, it is a fault to mention anything by its name. The mention of their names will never arouse

VAKROKTI AND LITERARY CRITICISM

Dr (Mrs) Hemalata R. Taitoti

Vakrokti, for the first time in Sanskrit Poetics, got a very important and highest position as the all-pervading poetic concept in Kuntaka's Vakroktijivita. Vakrokti is the very life of poetry according to Kuntaka and not a mere Alankāra of Śabda or Artha. Innumerable alankāras of Śabda and artha are discussed by the earlier rhetoricians but according to Kuntaka they are not having as much striking beauty as his Vakrokti has, hence the necessity of discussing this apūrva alankāra.

Kuntaka is influenced by Bhāmaha who says,

सैषा सर्वत्र वक्रोक्तिरनयाज्यो विभाव्यते ।

यत्नोऽस्या कविना कार्यं कोऽपि कारोऽनया विना ॥

(Kāvyaalankāra, II, 85)

Following Bhāmaha Kuntaka has revived again the old school of Alankāra. For Bhāmaha, Vakrokti is the underlying principle of all the alankāras, but Kuntaka's treatment of Vakrokti is very broad to include all other poetic concepts in it. It is the principle of Beauty underlying the poetic language itself. He defines Vakrokti as,

“वैदग्ध्यमयीमणिति” (V. J. I, 10) .

Vakrokti decorates the vācya and the vācaka and is inseparable from them. All the three Vācya, Vācaka and Vakrokti, together make a pleasant poetic composition which delights the connoisseurs. For the first time in Alankāraśāstra Kuntaka defines Sāhitya as the combination of beautiful and competent Śabda and artha with Vakrokti or Strikingness as its essential embellishment. He shows his independent genius in defining Sāhitya. Later rhetoricians like Bhoja and Rājasekhara follow him but the originality and the modern approach is found only in Kuntaka's treatment of it.

“सातिशयत्वदून्यवमंयुक्तस्य वस्तुनो विभूषितस्यापि पिनाबादेरिव
तद्वदाह्लादकारित्वविरहादनुपादेयत्वमेव ॥”

(V J P. 303, Dr Nagendra's Edn.)

Kuntaka does not admit Svabhāvokti, Rasavat, Preyas, Urjasvin, Udātta and Samāhita as alankāras. According to him Vastu-Svabhāva and Rasa, Bhāva etc are always alankārya and can never be called Alankāras. His treatment of Svabhāvokti as an alankārya is novel and unique in the history of Alankāra-Śāstra. There cannot be any existing Vastu without Svabhāva, and if Svabhāva itself is called an alankāra there will be no alankārya in Svabhāvokti. And the alankārya cannot be one and the same.

Kuntaka mistakes the Svabhāvokti alankāra of earlier rhetoricians as a *lokokti* or a common speech of ordinary people. So while proving Svabhāvokti as an alankārya he stresses on the striking Vastu-Svabhāva having poetic imagination.

In the same way, like Svabhāvokti, Kuntaka strongly protests to admit Rasavat as an alankāra. He criticises the definitions of all earlier rhetoricians, including that of Ānandavardhana, to prove rasavat as an alankārya. The term rasavat, though split into various Samāsas, does not indicate any other Vastu except poetry. And the rasavat alankāra cannot be called as a whole poetry, because embellishment is a part of poetry and not the whole.

Rasa is always alankārya according to Kuntaka, so he criticises Ānandavardhana for giving rasa a subordinate position in the rasavat alankāra. Rasa is always Pradhāna and it can never be subordinate to any other Vastu. It cannot have a double position to be alankārya and alankāra both. Ānandavardhana's treatment of Rasa in the rasavadalankāra as a *gunībhūtavyangya kāvyā* is a self contradiction when he gives highest position to *rasadhvani* as the soul of poetry in his theory of *Dhvani*. Kuntaka has correctly pointed out the mistake and has tried to correct the same in his own way.

Rasavat, as alankāra, can be explained as the alankāra getting the equal position and importance with rasa in

most superior and consider other ritis as less superior or inferior. According to Kuntaka geographical differences cannot explain the ritis or differentiate them from one another. Moreover, there cannot be an inferior way of poetic expression. If it is not beautiful and superior it cannot be called poetry at all and so it will be useless and futile to discuss the ways of expression which are not admissible to poetry. The main purpose of poetry is to please the rasikas by beautiful and artistic way of expression which gives the supreme delight. So the Rīti cannot be classified as Uttama, Madhyama and Adhama as the adhama rīti will be a poetic flaw.

Kuntaka includes his mārgas in Vākyavakratā. Though he generally classifies mārgas in three categories, namely, Sukumāra, Vicitra and Madhyama, he admits that there are infinite artistic ways of poetic expression as the Kavi-praubbhā is endless. The mārgas are completely dependent on Kavisvabhāva according to Kuntaka. A poet adopts a mārگا according to his Praubbhā, Vyutpatti and abhyāsa.

In Sukumāra mārگا the power of alaṅkāra praubbhā is seen and the importance is given to rasa, bhāva or svabhāva, hence naturally the use of alaṅkāras is less. This is a pleasant and delicate way of expression and the famous poets like Kālidāsa have followed it. In vicitra mārگا the fascination for alaṅkāras is seen. The poet wants to show his artistic skill and the power of imagination by using a series of striking figurative expressions in poetry. Of course, these alaṅkāras mainly reveal the beauty of alaṅkārya and the composition is not bereft of rasa. Vakrokti is the life of this mārگا and it is very difficult to follow as it requires eminence and lot of practice along with the power of imagination. Poets like Bāṇa have followed this way of expression. Madhyama mārگا is a combination of su-kumāra and vicitra mārugas and the poets having taste for novelty in expression follow this mārگا. All these three mārugas are delightful. Thus Kuntaka justifies all the beautiful poetic ways of expression giving all of them the equal importance.

Kuntaka has shown originality and novelty in adopting gunas depending on mārugas. The four gunas, Mādhurya, Prasāda, Lāvanya and Ābhujātya belong to all the three

1. Varnavinyāśavakratā which includes anuprāsa, Vṛtta and Yamaka in it.
2. Padapūrvārdha-Vakratā, and
3. Padaparārdhavakratā which includes the beauty of Subanta and tñanta words. Kuntaka has discussed many varieties of using the striking and fit words to beautify the whole Kavi-vākya.
4. Vākya-vakratā or Vastu-Vakratā includes all the alankāras, mārgas, gunas and rasa.
5. Prakaraṇavakratā includes striking conversations in the work, beautiful nature descriptions, changes made in the incidents from that of the main source according to the theme of the concerned work, for the sake of propriety, development of the main character and rasa. All sandhis and their aṅgas also are included in this classification.
6. Prabandhavakratā is a total effect of all these five varieties of Vakratā. It also includes the change of rasa in a literary work from its original source, the proper arrangement of the whole work to help the full development of rasa and bring propriety in the work. The fit title indicating the main theme of the work, and the phalaprāpti by the hero at the end come under this variety of Vakratā.

Kuntaka includes all the varieties of Dhvani in these six varieties of Vakratā making Vakratā a most broad and all-pervading concept. Both the Dhvani and the Vakrokti theories are finally related to the Kavipratibhā. But the medium of approach of both the rhetoricians is different from each other. Ānandavardhana reaches Pratibhā of the poet through rasa which is suggested. His treatment is subjective, guiding the critics to appreciate the best poetry and get the highest delight. Kuntaka reaches Pratibhā through Vakrokti which is an alaūlika abhidhā including other śabdavyāpāras like Vyañjanā etc. and is found only in the best poetry and not in the ordinary language. His treatment of the poetic concepts is objective, guiding the new practitioners in poetry, as well as helping the critics to

AN EXPOSITION OF THE RASA-THEORY IN THE RASAKAUMUDĪ OF ŚRĪKANTHA

Dr. A. N. Jani

Śrīkantha, a Kannada musicologist was patronised by the Jain King Śatruṣālya of Navanagar near Dvārakā in Saurashtra. He wrote his work Rasakaumudī¹ during the reign (1569-1608 A.D.) of his patron to harmonize the theory and practice of the Northern Indian music.

The work is divided into two parts. The first half consisting of five chapters deals with music and the latter half, also consisting of five chapters, deals *en passant* with some topics of literature connected with music.² Thus the latter half seems to be an appendix of the earlier part which forms the main theme. He tries to justify the superiority of music over literature³ and for giving precedence to music in the treatment. However, he prefers to call his work Rasakaumudī rather than Sangītakaumudī probably to suggest to the readers that the latter half of his work is also equally important and that he is not only a musicologist but also a poet and a rhetorician.

1. Published in the G O Series, Baroda, 1963, can be had of the Sangeet Natak Akademi, Rabindra Bhavan, Ferozeshah Road, New Delhi, Price Rs 13. It was submitted to the University of Bombay for the degree of D Litt for which Dr. Jani was declared eligible in July 1968.

2. cf. सङ्गीतशास्त्रे किल पूर्वखण्डे

विधाय साहित्यमयोत्तरेण ।

विरच्यते भूरिगुणैकनाम

तदगमूत हि गुरूपदिष्टम् ॥ ६-२

3. cf. मणीनसाहित्यमिति प्रयोग

प्रयोगविज्ञा प्रवदन्ति नित्यम् ।

तथाविधा नो वक्ष्यन्ति मिथ्या

मणीनमाहात्म्यमत्रोक्तविकं स्यात् ॥

the *rasa* becomes manifest through the *ālambana vibhāvas* e.g. the beloved, and the *uddipana vibhāvas* e.g. garden, notes of cuckoos etc., it being discernible in the form of the *anubhāvas* e.g. the movements of the neck, the eyebrows, the eyes and the hands etc., and being enhanced by the *sañcāri-bhāvas*, the *mr̥ta* etc.

In the third and the fourth stanzas¹ he repeats the idea expressed in the second stanza and holds further that this *rasa* is ascertained in the actor who cleverly imitates the hero

These two stanzas (3-4) are nothing but versification of the view of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa as recorded by Mammaṭa in his *Kāvya-pralāpa*²

In the first quarter of the fifth verse the view of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is given without mentioning his name explicitly as he is referred to only by the word *lecit*³ The second quarter seems to represent the view of Śaṅkuka as the expression '*sāmājikaprakara-sādara-carvyamānaḥ*' reminds us of the words '*ratyādir bhāvas tatrāsannapi sāmājikanām vāsanayā carvyamāno rasa ity Śrīśaṅkukah.*'

The last two quarters of the fifth verse and the sixth verse represent the view of Abhinavagupta⁴

1. vide Note 2, p 93 above.

2. cf. 'विभावर्त्तल्लोचानादिभिरासम्बन्धोद्दीपनकारणं रत्यादिको भावो जनितः, अनुभावः कटाक्षमुज्ज्वलप्रभृतिभिः कार्यः प्रतीतियोग्य इतो, व्यभिचारिभिरिवेदादिभि सहचारिभिरुपचितो मुख्यया वृत्त्या समादाबनुकाये तद्रूपतानुमन्थान्तर्तवेऽपि प्रतीयमानो रसः' इति भट्टलोल्लटप्रभृतयः।

3. cf. भोगेन भुज्यते इति प्रवदन्ति केचित् (७५ अ)

4. लोके प्रमदादिभि स्यान्मनमानेऽभ्यामपाटववता काव्ये नाट्ये च तरेव कारणत्वादिरिहारेण विभावनादिव्यापारवत्त्वादलौकिकविभाषादिभ्यस्त्ववहायेः
..... सम्बन्धविशेषस्वीकारपरिहारनियमानध्यवसायात् साधारण्येन प्रतीतिरभिव्यक्तः सामाजिकमात्रा वामनान्मनया स्थित स्यासी रत्यादिको नियतप्रमानुगतत्वेन स्थितोऽपि साधारणोपायवत्त्वात् तत्रालविगन्तिद्वपरिमित-प्रमानुभाववशोन्मिषित्वेद्वान्तरसम्पदंशुन्यापरिमितभावेन प्रमात्रा मुदलहृदय-मवादमात्रा साधारण्येन स्वाकार इकाभिन्नोऽपि गोचरोद्भूतश्चक्षुर्मापतवप्राप्तो विभावादिजीवितावधि. पानकरसव्यायेन चक्षुर्मात्र. पुर इव परिस्फुरन्

These varieties are illustrated in 11-18.

Remaining rasas are illustrated one by one in one stanza each - hāsyā (19), karuṇā (20), raudra (21), vīra (22), bhayāṇaka (23), bībhatsa (24), adbhuta (25) and śānta (26)

Thus the overall pattern of this chapter shows the author's close study of the Kāvya-prakāśa and the above comparative study makes it evident as to what extent Śrī-kanṭha presses Kāvya-prakāśa into service

Incidentally, this throws light on the popularity and hold of Kāvya-prakāśa over the rhetoricians of Gujarat even during the 16th century when the present work was composed.

DISCUSSION

V Venkatakṣaṇa The expression सामाजिकप्रकरमादिवर्ण्यमाण in 5b has been interpreted by you to contain a reference to the theory of Śaṅkuka on the Rasa-sūtra as reproduced by Mammāṭa in his Kāvya-prakāśa But I think this line cannot be detached from the preceding line (5a) in which the view of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka has been explained Both lines form a composite unit and if you take out सामाजिक etc. there is no subject left and the sentence is hardly complete In fact Śrīkanṭha makes no mention of the view of Śrī Śaṅkuka and goes straight over to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka after giving a summary of the view of Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa Not only in view of Śaṅkuka but also in the exposition of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka the Sāmājika has his share—which he gets out of his own *Vāsanā*.

R C Dwivedi There arises one difficulty if we assume that the line 5b has a reference to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka We should not be oblivious of the fact that Śrīkanṭha is not only trying to give a summary of the four theories regarding Rasa as contained in the Kāvya-Prakāśa but also to reproduce the language of Mammāṭa as is perfectly clear from the whole stanza No 4 and the line 5b Now, if

CONCEPT OF RASA IN THE BHATTI-KĀVYA

Dr Satya Pal Narang

Bhaṭṭi, the author of the Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya, is an important figure not only in the history of Sanskrit Grammar but also in the history of Sanskrit poetics. He was the author of a Śāstra-Kāvya which aimed at illustrating grammar, alaṅkāras, poetics as well as conjugational forms in various tenses and moods. Thus, in practice, Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya is an important link between the Nāṭyaśāstra, and the Kāvyalāṅkāra of Bhāmaha.

A question arises, when the grammar, alaṅkāras and the gunas like Prasāda and Mādhurya were illustrated by Bhaṭṭi, why did he not illustrate Rasa? The answer striking to my mind is that he deliberately did not want to illustrate it. As the trend of poetry during his contemporary period (6th Cent. A.D. last part) had changed, so every poet aimed at writing such a poem which could excel another in its scholarly approach. Bhaṭṭi could not escape that trend. He asserts 'my work is like a lamp to those who possess grammatical sight, but it is useless like a mirror for a blind person, who is not proficient in grammar'. In this respect, Bhaṭṭi can be compared to Subandhu, who boasts to have composed a Kāvya which contains Ślesa in each and every word (प्रत्यक्षरश्लेषमयप्रबन्ध....).

Even the poet like Kālidāsa who is said to be the foremost of the Indian poets could not escape this tendency as he has employed Yamakas in the Raghuvamśa Canto IX. Bhaṭṭi also adopted the same trend to write a poem which serves two-fold purposes. Bhāmaha seems to take notice of such a tendency when he says that 'if poems were to be explained like a scripture (Śāstra), ah! the dull-witted are killed.'¹ In fact,

1. Kāvyalāṅkāra II 20

वाक्यान्वयि यदीमानि व्याख्यागम्यानि नास्त्वन् ।

तन्त्रव मुषिरानेष हन्त दुर्मेषो ह्यहम् ॥

tional characteristics of a Mahākāvya and has thus written some verses which can be said to be the examples of various Rasas. Both Bhāmaha and Dandin have accepted Rasa as one of the characteristics of a Mahākāvya.

In the description of the physical beauty of Śūrpanakhā and Sītā, the poet has tried to dwell upon Śrngāra Rasa. Vipralambha Śrngāra is found in about twelve verses in the Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya (VI 73-84) which is mostly blended with grammatical illustrations and appears like a catalogue of suffixes rather than genuine Vipralambha Śrngāra in particular. But in the eleventh canto of the Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya, an excellent picture of the Sambhoga Śrngāra is found. In fact this canto is named as Mādhurya Guna which again shows that Bhaṭṭi wanted to incorporate Rasa in a Guna.

In about 50 verses (I.20, III.20-22, 49-50, V.95-96; VI 831, 124-125, XIV. 55-60) sentiment of pathos is found in the Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya. In fact, all these verses are scattered in various cantos and are not the examples of a systematic sentiment of pathos which again shows that Bhaṭṭi had no consistency with regard to Rasa (Rasabhāva-nairantarya) like later poets (Mahākāvya-kāras).

Similarly, in about five verses each Raudra, Bhayānaka and Bībhatsa Rasa are also found but they are not very important to show the existence of respective Rasa in theory or practice.

Heroic sentiment (Vīrarasa) is dominant in the Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya. Being a heroic poem, it was difficult for the poet to avoid the physical description of various individuals and battle-fields. But in most of the descriptions it is completely blended with illustrations of rules and conjugational forms which apparently appear to be adequate to enhance the beauty of the Vīra Rasa. But it is only with a motif of illustrating grammar. On the whole, the Vīra Rasa is merely outer physical expression of various heroic activities.

Thus, having examined the Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya both in theory and practice, it appears that all the contemporary rhetoricians were stressing upon either Alankāra or Guna.

BHĀVA IN SANSKRIT POETICS : A HISTORiette

Basant Jaitly

The word Bhāva has acquired various meanings in Sanskrit literature. However, if we examine it from the standpoint of poetics we shall have to admit that it is the soul of poetry. The other three elements of poetry viz. imagination (Kalpanā) perception (Buddhi) and style (śilpa) are in fact based on the Bhāva. This is the element which clearly draws the line of demarcation among poetry, science and history. Bhāva is born of feeling, therefore, it is related with the mind. Mind may be taken as an executive power of the soul and Bhāva is described as the agitation or Vikāra in the mind. The word Bhāva is often used at the ends of compounds which stand for situation and mimetic changes but even then they cannot be placed under the heading 'Bhāva' because it has been used in a technical sense and the number of Bhāvas has been fixed by the acāryas.

Bharata, as usual, is the first aesthetician who has dealt with Bhāva in details. The problem is, why the Bhāvas are given this particular name? Whether this name is given because of their happening or the quality of effecting?¹ Bhāvas are called dispositional in nature (Cittavṛtu Svarūpa) and therefore the etymology of the word may be the first situation in which Bhāva is taken to the peak and is never found in a static state. Secondly, Bhāva takes place in the Cittavṛttis Bhāvana Prakriyā through the media of experience and knowledge in the least possible time and by mingling in to the heart provides pleasure as sentiment. That is why Bharata has used two verbs Bhavanti and Bhāvayanti simultaneously. It is to be noted here that both the verbs used by him have a causal sense—one that happens or one that causes something to be. He further clarifies his stand in the three Ānuvamsya slokas which convey three different meanings of the word.

1. Nāṭyaśāstra, 7 p. 405. Motilal Banārsidās Ed.

with the help of his treatment of Bhāvayitṛ Pratibhā. He holds that the Bhāvayitṛ Pratibhā forces one to evaluate the point taken by the poet and his purpose at large. It is under the shadow of this pratibhā only that the tree of Kāvyaavyāpāra flourishes and without its help remains unfruitful¹. The description forces us to conclude that Rajaśekhara considers Bhāva to be of great importance, as it is with the assistance of the Bhāvayitṛ Pratibhā that the poet succeeds in fusing his emotional experience into a poem and thus making it full with life. But it is to be admitted that this description more or less shows the importance of Bhāva in general and does not throw any light as far as its specific qualities or definition part is concerned.

Dhanañjaya and Dhanika come forward with a new approach. The Kārikā of Daśrūpaka states that when the heart of the spectator is fully associated with the pleasure, pain, joy and sorrow of the substratum (Āśraya) that stage is Bhāva². Dhanika, commenting on the Kārikā, emphasizes that when the emotions of the Anukārya are manifested in the the spectator, then this Vāsanā or Bhāvanā is called Bhāva.³ The conclusion may, easily be drawn that Dhanañjaya and Dhanika take Bhāva as the feeling of pleasure or pain in the spectator and thus look at the problem from the spectator's view-point only. Their analysis is narrow in comparison to that of Bharata. While in Bharata's analysis all the Sthāyins Vyabhicārins and Sāttvikas are included, the approach of Dhanañjaya and Dhanika is upto Sthāyins and Vyabhicārins only. Sāttvikas have been referred to and dealt with separately in nature and it is only for the sake of being in accordance with the convention that they have been entitled 'Bhāva'.

It has been stated previously that Bharata does not consider Bhāva as Cittavṛtti only. Abhinavagupta disagrees with Bharata and accepts it only as a Cittavṛtti or emotion⁴. The stand of Abhinava clearly shows that his analysis of Bhāva includes Sthāyins, Vyabhicārins and Sāttvikas and excludes all

1 Kāvyaśikṣasā p. 34, Chowkhamba Ed.

2 Daśrūpaka, 4 verse 3, Ibid.

3 The same (Avalokaportion), 4 p. 187, Ibid.

4 Abhinavabhāratī p. 342, Gackwad's Ed.

a tree and the tree gives birth to the flowers and fruits, in the same way Rasas are the root cause of the Bhāvas and Bhāvas are caused by the Rasas¹ Bhoja, too, considering the evolved Ratyādi Rasa as Bhāva supports the stand of Bharata, Abhinava and many other ācāryas² Anyway this is not the definition of Bhāva. Ramsingh the commentator on *Sarasvatikanthābharana* brings out the definition of Bhāva commenting on Bhoja's Śabdaguna, bhāvika, which is nothing but the expression of Bhāva. He writes, the vr̥tta of that citta || Bhāva which is entangled in an emotional crisis.³ This definition is very much akin to that of Abhinava and it would need no support if we observe that the Cittavyūti-Viśeṣa of Abhinava has acquired here the shape of Bhāvanā-dasāpanna

Further, clarifying the nature of Bhāva, Bhoja explains that all the Bhāvas are fundamentally of the form of love. A warrior fights because he loves fighting, the clown laughs because he loves laughing and so on. But this too is not an original stand. The difference occurs when he recognizes as many Rasas as there are Bhāvas. He believes that all the Bhāvas are equal in the middle stage of Ahankāra (madhyamāvasthā), previous being the parā stage. In this second or middle stage the basic Ahankāra Rasa reveals itself as Abhimāna for many external objects with which it has come in contact. At this stage the basic or one Rasa multiplies into several Bhāvas and these Bhāvas which rose out of the Ahankāra reach the climax being attended by their particular evoking conditions. These Bhāvas, though at climax, are in fact Bhāvas but may secondarily be called Rasas because the Ahankāra Rasa provides its character to these Bhāvas also. This is the same stage where Ratu, Hāsa etc. come to the mature stage of Śṛṅgāra, Hāsyā etc. It is due to this analysis that Bhoja, in his Śṛṅgāraprakāśa, accepts no division among them as eight or nine Sthāyins, thirtythree Vyabhicārins and eight Sāttvikas. Every Bhāva, for him, is

1 Abhinavabhāratī, p 249, Ibid

2 *Sarasvatikanthābharana* 5 verse 13, Pandurang Javaji Ed

3 *Sarasvatikanthābharana* p 63, Ibid

cannot be external only Bhānumisra takes Sattva to be the body of living beings or Jīva Śarīra¹ and explains Sāttvikas in terms of external manifestations This is really wrong to the extent that the absurdity of his statement may be realised through the appliance of simple logic The emotion, which is in no way present inside, cannot be externally manifested in the true sense This is the main reason which has forced the Ācāryas to submit that Sāttvikas at the first stage emerge as Bhāvas and later on they are manifested as Anubhāvas Why Bhānumisra has taken this one sided view regarding Sāttvikas is still a puzzle which awaits an answer However, if we interpret the term 'Rasānukūla Vikāra' as indicating all the internal and external changes this definition of Bhāva becomes specifically broad

Viśvanātha Kavirāja gives a more lucid definition of Bhāva According to him the principal accessories, love concerning a deity, teacher, sage, king or the like and the Sthāyi Bhāva not properly awakened are denominated Bhāva². The definition of Viśvanātha makes it clear that the Bhāva has been given a broader perspective in his Sāhityadarpana While in Mammata's definition the case of improperly awakened Sthāyin was just inferred, Viśvanātha has given it full treatment by mentioning it clearly and thus he has stolen a march over Mammata

Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha starts with a discussion. He comments, if we accept Bhāva as different from dependents, excitants and ensuant emotions but at the sametime suggestive of Rasa, it will be victimised by ativyāpti because Śabda and Artha are necessarily suggestive of Rasa Besides it will only be applicable to the Rasavyaṅjaka Bhāvas and not to the self-suggested ones³

He further argues, if we define Bhāva to be that Citta-vṛtti which expresses Rasa, even then the situation does not alter as this definition too is a victim of Ativyāpti For example if a Virahini has taken Kālāgaru liquid as poison a garland of blue lotuses as snake, it is her false knowledge of the objects which is born of separation In fact it is an

1. The same 4 p 38, Ibid

2. Sāhityadarpana, 3 260, Motilal Banarasidas Ed

3. Rasagaṅgādhara, 1 p 277, Banaras Hindu University Ed

ticians, he does not philosophise the problem concerning the root cause of the Bhāvas and takes it in an easy way. He simply says that the Vibhāvas are the root cause of the Bhāvas and Anubhāvas are their Kārya¹. His definition does not provide any new ground for the analysis of Bhāva as he has repeated the view of Abhinava and many others who take it to be a Manovikāra or disposition only.

The Bhakti Cult dealt with the Bhāvas in its own way and provided a new dimension for its analysis. The treatment, as found in the Bhakti Cult, is lucid and convincing but requires a separate article for a proper exposition of the subject. At present we would have to keep ourselves content with the above estimate of the Bhāva which points out how it has developed in Sanskrit Poetics and acquired various shapes in the hands of different Ācāryas. Further, this analysis makes it clear that there are three main elements in it. Firstly, that which remains in the shape of congenital instinct i.e. Vāsanā. Secondly, that which causes something to be and resides in our consciousness i.e. Bhāvanā of Ālambana etc. Finally, that which is externally manifested through the behaviour or figure of a person, i.e. Anubhāvas. If we look at the above mentioned elements in the context of modern Psychology it would be quite easy to draw the conclusion that the first seems to contain a synthetic form of instincts and dispositions. The second rightly deals with the emotions and the third indicates towards the physical expression of emotions. Though deviations may be found here and there yet on the whole the deviations do lose their importance if we keep in our mind dates of these works when they were composed.

DISCUSSION

V C Shrivastava Suppose a person, for example a Westerner, does not believe in impressions of former birth will he be able to accept this analysis of bhāvas (which is based largely upon a belief in former birth) because I think that congenital instincts

¹ The same, p. 2

are called *bhāvas* and as soon as they become externally manifested they are called *anubhāvas* (tr)

R P. Dwivedi One more question arises here The *Anubhāvas* are of two types, those caused by *Sāttvika-bhāvas* and those caused by *Saiṅcārī bhāvas* It means that the mental state in the *anubhāvas* is not independent from that of the *sthāyin* or *saiṅcārībhāvas* Since they are caused by either *sthāyin* or *saiṅcārī*, they are obviously effects—i.e. external I, therefore, think that since *sāttvikas* cannot exist without *sthāyin* etc they are only external i.e. *kṛyārūpa* and they do not possess any internal nature about themselves, as propounded by Dr R S Jaitly yesterday; otherwise we will have to assume that the *sāttvikas* are not only caused by *sthāyins* etc but that they exist in the *atma* independently also

R S Jaitly. I never said that the *sāttvikas* are only external and not internal. In fact I always emphasized the internal as well as external aspects of them The one is unmanifested, the other manifested Every *Sāttvika* can be found in the same person in its unmanifested form as *bhāva* before it is externally manifested as *anubhāva* (tr)

R P Dwivedi Is this internal state of *sāttvikas* different from that of *saiṅcārīns* and *sthāyīns*?

R S Jaitly: Yes, it is decidedly different from that of the *Saiṅcārīns* and the *sthāyīns*. How and where would you otherwise accommodate the *bhāvas* like *stambha* etc? (tr.)

R P. Dwivedi The ācāryas consider the *anubhāvas* of two types according to their origin, of these the first type emanates from the *sthāyībhāvas* and the other from the *Saiṅcārībhāvas*. Except these two there is no other cause of *anubhāvas* But you accept the internal state of the *sāttvika* which means that there is also third type of the *anubhāvas* (*sāttvikas*) which have their own internal latent state as their

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEFINITION OF POETRY

Dr T G Mankar

It can be safely asserted that though many like Poetry, *Kāvya*, few are able to define it. When about to define, they often end by unsatisfactorily describing it. The difficulty is really inherent in the problem itself. There are many words as well as concepts, familiarity and understanding of which is usually taken for granted but a deeper examination of which reveals that there is only a vague awareness of the meaning and content of the same. One may refer in this context to the words and concepts like the Beautiful, Good and the like. Familiarity breeds contempt, the saying goes, and one might add in matters like these, familiarity ignores ignorance, is often unaware of the same. It is an awareness of such a situation that makes men to attempt to define such concepts and thus try to be as precise as possible and have as close an understanding as possible in the use of such words and concepts. *Kāvya* has such a powerful sway over the human mind that cultured minds like those of Bhartrhari have scorned kingdoms in exchange of poetry, '*śukavilāśaśi rājyena kim*'. It is no wonder then, that those given to a study of poetry should start with an attempt at defining it. So all rhetoricians, both in the east as well as the west, are seen from quite early periods in poetic studies, devoting much time and energy to the problem of defining poetry in as satisfactory a manner as is possible.

What is *kāvya* and why we like it are questions which are often asked and rarely answered satisfactorily. Hence fresh attempts and a discerning criticism of the earlier attempts become a sheer necessity. It would be no exaggeration if it were said the science of rhetorics is nothing but an attempt to arrive at a new and satisfactory answers to these questions of the definition of poetry, *kāvya*, and the poetic experience and its precise way of affecting the reader. A definition by itself is a difficult problem and it has been rendered

too include all that is so denoted. Such a harsh logical insistence also adds not a little to the difficulties of the problem. One can be justified in thinking that poetry is an art and that since the main purpose of an art is to give delight; *sakala-prajayara-maulibhūta*, *vigalita-vedyāntaram*, *Brahmāśrīśāhā-daravā* etc.—the definition should have a reference to these excellent pieces rather than to the ordinary ones which are regarded as poetry only through sheer generosity and courtesy. A definition that covers all the specimens, from the best to the worst may perhaps satisfy a strict logician but rarely one who is a *rastika*, a *sa-hrdaya*, a lover of poetry. A definition should not exclude anything that is good but at the same time it should not land us into the difficulty of calling even the bad piece as a work of art. Rhetorics is primarily discussion of good literature and not of its lowest variety, which has no pretence whatsoever to art, or to anything that art implies.

As soon as Poetry, *Kāvya*, is regarded as an art, its relation with the other arts comes to the mind, for all these other arts too are seen as having the same main purpose of giving highest delight to man. It therefore becomes necessary to distinguish *Kāvya* from the other arts which having a common purpose differ between themselves because of the medium they use. This medium is the chief distinguishing factor, *vyavacchedaka*, and hence ought to be given in a definition for thereby the art stands separated from the group. Word is the medium of *Kāvya* and hence almost each and every definition of *Kāvya* in Sanskrit refers to the *śabda* which is the base. It is therefore that Bhāmaha defines *Kāvya* as '*śabdārthau sahitaḥ kāvyam*' and Dandin defines it as '*īśārtha-vyavacchinā padārtho*'. Vāmana defines it as '*rīti ātmā kāvyasya*' yet his *rīti* is '*śloka padaracana*'. Rudraṭa's definition is '*śabdārthau kāvyam*' while Mammata's definition is '*śabdārthau saguṇau anantarīti panchaśloka*'. Viśvanātha, who defines *Kāvya* as '*vākyam rasātīkari*', cannot resist the temptation of telling that it is a '*vākya*'. Jagannātha too has to observe that the *Kāvya* is '*ramayīrtha-pratīpādaka śabda*'. All these writers lay stress on the *śabda* because of its being the medium of this art.

Yet it would be improper to stop at this mention of

but it is common knowledge that this is not poetry. It therefore becomes necessary to distinguish the *rākya* or the *śabdārthau* as used in day to day life and as used in poetry.

In poetry the *śabdārthau* or the *rākya* are used by an artist to say something significant in a deliberately chosen manner and he therefore seeks it to make more powerful *alankr* or add something to its bare form so that they become significant and evoke from us a response that the sentence or the words in our day to day life used, seldom do. It is to convey this distinction that Mammaṭa adds the words *sagunau* and *adoṣau* by way of giving the necessary qualifications of *śabdārthau* in poetry. Jagannātha also clearly adds '*ramanīya-artha-pratīpādaka*' as a qualification of *śabda* and also gives the explanation that *ramanīyatā* is the power to give delight that is unique and wonderful, *loko'tara*. To stress the fact that a sentence in poetry appeals to emotion, Viśvanātha informs us that it is '*rasātmaka*' and takes for granted that the sentence contains a *sthāyībhāva* that can develop into a *rasa*. To Dandin also the '*īśīrtha*' appears to be a common property of the body, *śarīra*, of the words in life and in poetry, but in poetry, the *alankāras*, the *dehasobhākara dharmas*, the properties that decorate the *padārthāḥ*, are of supreme importance. Vāmana's word *kāvyā* refers to *śabdārthau* while his '*rītiś ātmā kāvyasya*' points out this distinction between ordinary language and poetry. Ānandavardhana also in his celebrated '*sa-hrdayālīhādī śabdārthamangalam*' clearly points out this very pertinent power of poetical language. It will thus be seen that all these critics appear to suggest that the medium of poetry is words but these have a special power by which they affect emotion, convey a charming meaning and cause delight. It should not be understood that words here are *alankṛta* while those in day to day use are not so. In our day to day life also *Upamā*, *Amoṣī*, *Īyāśruti* are used and in poetry at times *alankāras* as such may be absent altogether. It is therefore that Mammaṭa observes '*analankṛtī krāpī*'. We are all familiar with poetry that is without any *alankāras* and one which appeals through its emotional purity, intensity and simplicity and one may refer in this context to verses like '*mātrbhīḥ cīntyamānāsām te hī nah divasāḥ gatīḥ*' '*Duḥkha-samredanājyauva rūpe caṣṭanayam āhitam*' and so many of this class.

and has not the very 'वचनं श्रेष्ठं' to do much with these?

One would be justified in thinking that since poetry all over the world and in any language is the same, any definition worth the name should refer to this universal element in poetry. Thus we see poetry being defined as 'best words in best order' and an analysis reveals that 'best words' are very much the same as 'सङ्गता' and 'वचनं श्रेष्ठं-प्रतिपदितं'. The adjective 'best' has obviously a reference to *sangata*, *surita* and *samavahya*. Similarly 'best order' would suggest exactly what Vāmana desires to suggest by his *śīla* and '*śīlāḥ padā-rasatā*', for '*śīlāḥ*' could be perfectly understood as 'best' since Vāmana himself tells us *śīlāḥ guṇāḥ*. In both these views what is contemplated is the beauty and perfection in style and also implies singular capacity to convey a charming meaning. All this discussion recalls to our mind the words of Daṇḍin '*śīlāḥ-guṇāḥ-padā-rasatā*'. One might also be justified in thinking that the definition of Viśvanātha, '*nāḥyaṁ rasāḥ-rasatāḥ kāvyam*', makes one think of the celebrated words in the context of poetry that it is 'spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings' and 'emotion recollected in tranquillity'. The only difference that one is likely to be aware of is that while Wordsworth appears to think primarily of the origin of poetry and from the point of view of the poet Viśvanātha appears to have the *rasika* before him. But when it is remembered that the *rasa* is nothing but the *śīḥyāhāra* in the composition, it becomes clear that ultimately Viśvanātha leads us to the 'emotion' in poetry that is capable of being 'relished' by a *sa-bhāṣya*.

Two things strike one when one looks at these definitions of *kāvya* that these Sanskrit rhetoricians give us. Firstly, it is to be noted that none has 'condemned' poetry as it makes people dream, it entices with words, it creates illusions and ultimately makes inactive and so on or that it inherently rests on a falsehood. Similarly one does not come across 'didactic' definitions like the one that Poetry is criticism of life and so on. Daṇḍin, Bhāmaha, Vāmana, Ānandavardhana, Mammata, Viśvanātha, Jaganmūḥa, none of these adopts this point of view while speaking of poetry or when defining it. Though one might say that there is a reference to the *apadāḥ* in '*kāvīśvarīḥ-śīlāḥ śāśvataḥ*' but it is clear that this

śṛṅgāra and *raśi*. Life is so full of incidents or mirth and sorrow and experiences of various types more meaningful, when a person is compelled to come out with an expression that is highly significant as well as charming. Sanskrit dramas themselves are full of so many utterances of this type, which convey something deeper, more valuable and of more lasting value in life. Yet Mammata, leaving everything else should have thought of this 'double-dealing' and *vyājanā* through the word '*adhama*' and the objectives that cleverly suggest the other meaning either as charming or as one deserving to be classed as the best '*uttama*' is something which one cannot easily comprehend. Indeed, what has this verse in it that could be compared with the 'Ode to Nightingale' or 'Ode to the West Wind,' or the 'Sky-lark' or 'the Ode to the Intimations of Immortality,' to name at random? In fact, one feels tempted to observe that as a matter of fact the verse that Mammata himself has quoted to illustrate the '*asphuta alaukāratva*' is a far better piece of literary art than this one which he regards as one of the '*uttama*' type. Judged by all the canons of poetry the verse :

"Yah kaumāraharah sa eva hi varah tā eva caitraksapāḥ
te conmīlita-mālatiśurabhayaḥ praudhāḥ kadambānilāḥ
sā caivāsmi tathāpi tatra surata-vyāpāra-līlā-vidhau
revā-rodhasi vetasī-taru-tale cetah samutlanṭhate"

is a superior piece of art. The emotional quality makes it a comparable lyric with any other lyric in any language. The keen and familiar intense longing of the human mind for joys once experienced has found a very eloquent yet poetic expression here. The very happy choice of words, the soft alliteration and the predominance of soft sounds, y, v, r, l and t, the long metre—all these have combined effectively to give a fine expression to the longing and the awakening of the mind into that heaven of experience in the green cane-thicket bowers on the bank of the river Revā on the night in Caitra fragrant with the intoxicating aroma of the Mālatīs. There is an effort to catch the magic of the atmosphere and experience that once was and in this effort, the element of love or of *śṛṅgāra* has become subordinate or further sugges-

touches the life itself. Suggestions that one gets after reading the sonnets of Shakespeare, Odes of Wordsworth and Shelley and Keats and the thrill that one receives after it is the real pleasure in poetry and deserves to be considered as *dhvani* or *Vyāñjanā*. Neither the definitions nor the illustrations of Sanskrit rhetoricians indicate anything that they ever thought of poetry or the *dhvani* in this manner. On the other hand one notices the anxiety and care with which they desire to see that a composition without emotion and embellishment is not excluded from the definition of '*kāvya*' and one is surprised to find Viśvanātha also to be following the traditional way, after having properly realized the great importance of *rasa* in poetry. It is very difficult to see either force or reason in the argument that when a '*prabandha*' is '*sarasa*' then the verses in it or sentences in it also are '*sarasa*'. One will readily grant that the *Mṛcchakaṭika* is '*sarasa*' but one would not agree to the view that the verse of Cārudatta, 'Maitreya, kṣipa nigadam purānakūpe' is '*sarasa*'. What is commonplace and bad must be so termed.

These limitations of the Sanskrit rhetoricians in a way explain to us the limitations of Sanskrit criticism and literature. This also to a certain extent explains to us the criticism that is levelled against them. (Both these by modern students of literature and those whose vision has been widened on account of their study of western criticism and western literature.) Śṛṅgāra and Alankāra appear to be the weak points of these writers. It is also difficult to understand why should have they spent so much energy in discussing whether the *doṣa* could be present in a *kāvya*, if so to what extent, could a human composition be free from all the *doṣas* and so on. In the context of real poetry all these appear to be not important at all. These writers themselves have shown that flaws like *ridhijācīmarṣa*, *pravarṇa*, do not seriously affect the quality of a piece. Generations of critics and lovers have accepted Shakespeare with his so-called obscenity, Lawrence, Joyce and Pound with their 'faults'. It is often interesting to think what would be the estimate of these writers according to the canons of these rhetoricians.

When one considers all these definitions and the ingenuity shown in all these discussions and also the final out-

total of these factors. Even if all these factors are understood, there will always remain something that eludes our grasp and it is really this 'eluding' part that bestows the individuality on the mind. The individual fights hard to maintain this distinctness and logic is only a maid, an instrument in the struggle for a preservation of this aspect. This will serve to explain the futility of discussions and deliberations in this matter. The individual mind tries to preserve its own empire intact. But this does not mean that the mind does not seek any contact with other minds. The fact is just the other way. This individual mind, so anxious to retain its individuality intact is also 'extremely curious and eager' to know about the world and the self. This keen desire, a fundamental trait, establishes a contact between an individual mind and the other minds with whom it likes to have a discourse. It is eager to 'listen' to other minds. Reading literature is, as a matter of fact, listening to other minds. It is only when a proper communication is established that an experience of one mind can be transferred into the mind, can be appreciated by it, can be allowed to enter the erstwhile closely and zealously guarded empire of the mind. Experiences that do so enter are honoured and preserved as precious possessions. The empire of the mind expands, for it does not know the bars of culture, country, or time. These are experiences that are eternal and universal.

Poets use images to convey what they want; they want to invade these individual empires of the readers, or of the 'sahridayas'. It at once does strike a chord of sympathy in experience and reveals to us something unperceived hitherto. The more we think on it, the more it expands and its content assumes universality and depth. The image is the spell, the charm of a magician, since it conjures up the universe of experience and content before us. The beauty of this image has little or nothing to do with the constituents of the image, for its beauty lies in its content, in its rich ever-expanding suggestion. It is this suggestion that is really the *Dhāri*, the *Vyañjanā*, in poetry. This meaning differs from the grammatical meaning and the scholarly interpretations. This

that desired such dialogues realized all this and it is through their dialogues that our minds today have attained that culture that they seem to possess today. The mind today is the creation of this ancient literary tradition. It is because of this tremendous impact and power of literature, that it is of urgent importance that it is properly read, understood and appreciated. Rhetoricians help us in some measure no doubt but their limitations in this matter also should be understood.

Bharata is returning to Ayodhyā from the home of his maternal uncle. He has learnt of the serious illness of his royal father; but does not know that he has died. He stops for a while in the vicinity of Ayodhyā and enters into the memorial of kings (Pratimāgrha) where the statues of the past kings of the dynasty of Ikṣvāku, beginning with Dilīpa, are kept. He admires the excellence of sculptured images in the pillars, in which divinity and humanity are thoroughly harmonised. He is wonder-struck at the expression of life and emotion in them. The keeper of the memorial recognises the family resemblance between the statues of the past kings and the physical frame of Bharata. And Bharata, when he comes to the statues of Daśaratha, immediately recognises his father in it, though terribly shocked at such a sight, he refuses to believe his eyes and asks the keeper "*Whose statue is this?*"

There is a reference to imitative painting in Bhāgavata, Section 10 and subsection 62. This reference occurs in connection with the marriage of Usā, daughter of Bāna, and Aniruddha, grandson of Kṛṣṇa and son of Pradyumna.

Usā beheld Aniruddha in a dream and became passionately enamoured of him. She took her friend Citralekhā, daughter of a minister, into confidence. Citralekhā was such an expert in imitative painting and was so familiar with the figures of all the past and present kings and princes, that she could draw such pictures that the original could be recognised in the pictorial presentation. She offered her help and to enable Usā to recognise her object of love among the kings or princes, she started drawing their imitative pictures. When she drew the picture of Aniruddha, Usā recognised her object of love in the pictorial presentation, smiled and exclaimed "This is that".

Imitation as a principle of presentation of drama on stage, was well-recognized in India at the time of Patañjali (3rd c B C). For, commenting upon Pāṇini's aphorism (3-1-26) "हेतुमति च" he refers to it as follows:—

A scene, presenting the killing of Kamsa by Kṛṣṇa, is being staged. The stage-manager is directing it personally. Some one enquires, "What is the stage-manager doing?" The reply is that "He is directing the killing of Kamsa by Kṛṣṇa." The objection to the use of the present tense is raised:

imperfectly impressed by the world of ideas, are both irrational (II) since one of the component parts of human being, the body, to which all impulses, passions and feelings belong, is irrational (III) since out of the three forms of human knowledge (a) comprehension of ideas (b) sense-perception and (c) opinion, the last two are irrational and (IV) since imitative art is confined to partial copying of the object of phenomenal world, is the object of sense perception and arouses passions and feelings, it is irrational all round. It does not, therefore, strengthen the mind but corrupts it. Hence it should have no place in the ideal Republic.

The theory of imitation in art has been criticised and rejected in India also, but not because of any metaphysical bias and political consideration like those of Plato. It is rejected on the logical and aesthetical grounds. There are two Indian Aestheticians, Bhaṭṭa Lollata and Śrīaṅkura, both belonging to Kashmir, who are said to have propounded the theory of imitation in art. (I) One says that imitation is to create illusion of the historical and (II) the other says that it is to make the inference of the imitated basic mental state, the central fact in the aesthetic experience, possible respectively.

The theory that art creates illusion through imitative presentation of the historical is criticised as follows :—

If art creates illusion, it would arouse ordinary attitudes and responses. And such an admission would mean the denial of an independent value to art. It would also mean condemnation of all tragic presentations. For, we will have to admit the rise of tragic feeling of sorrow from them, which as such is not reliable.

The theory, that art imitates to make the inference of the basic mental state of the imitated possible, is logically and historically subsequent to the theory that art, through imitation, creates illusion. The exponent of the imitation-inference theory raises the question :—

“How can the awareness of the basic mental state be possible from an imitative presentation, which creates illusion? For, the illusion is purely perceptual. It is responsible for taking one perceptible thing for another which is also perceptible. It is incapable of directly bringing about

as to delude the spectator to take it for the real phenomenon and to arouse the same tumult of feelings as does the original. And it was because of such a conception of imitation that he condemned art, the product of imitation, and therefore, illusion and deception. Aristotle improves upon this conception. He discusses the meaning of imitation in respect of the (I) object (II) the means and (III) the manner.

The Object of Imitation

If we remember the metaphysical view of Aristotle there will be no difficulty in understanding and accounting for the difference of Aristotelian conception of imitation from the Platonic. For Plato, the external world was mere irrational matter, on which form was somehow imperfectly impressed. The idea was beyond the world of stars and, therefore beyond the reach of the imitative artist. The objective world, therefore, to him was a mere material symbol of the ideal, a mere reflexion, a pure and simple world of the sense. Imitation therefore, according to him, naturally consists in deceptive reproduction of the sensuous.

According to Aristotle, however, the objective world is idea and matter together. The idea is the soul, the essence, the purpose, the motive force, which determines the direction of the growth, evolution, or development of matter where it inheres. It is not beyond the reach of the creative artist. For, art is one of the two kinds of virtue—moral and intellectual. It is intellectual virtue. It is creative activity under intellectual direction. If, therefore, an artist is not guided by intellect in his creative activity, if he is concerned with the realm of senses only, if he presents the sensuous only and completely ignores the idea, which can be grasped through intellect only, he is no artist at all. Imitation, therefore, according to Aristotle, is idealisation, the presentation of things not as they are, but as they should be; not as they are known to senses, but as they are visualised by the intellect; not as they exist in the external world, but as they are to be under the controlling force of the ideas.

In applying the theory of idealisation to the works of

formed. Therefore, while tragedy is concerned with the presentation of the supremacy of idea over matter, comedy is concerned with the presentation of self-assertion of matter, paying no heed to the commands of reason.

But the principle of 'imitation', which consists in presentation of an advance on the given reality and not as it is, holds good in both the cases. The difference between the tragic and comic presentations lies only in this, namely, while tragedy presents a more advanced stage in the expression of idea in the material medium than we can find in the objective world, comedy presents a more advanced stage in the self-assertion of matter, in utter disregard of the commands of reason, than can be met within the phenomenal world.

But comedy does not cease to please simply because it is the presentation, not of the beautiful but of the ugly. There is an inherent tendency in man to take delight in imitation, irrespective of the fact whether the presented is beautiful or ugly. The mere consciousness that the object, present before us, is an imitation of something that exists in the world of nature, though that object in itself may be ugly, is sufficient to please the human mind. It is the recognition of a natural object in an artistic production "This is that" which is responsible for pleasure. There is a kind of inference and, therefore, some exercise of the intelligence is involved in such a recognition. And as the exercise of reason, the highest aspect of the human soul, is always pleasant to the mind the comedy is pleasant.

It was Aristotle, who first noticed that presentation of ugliness in representative art has its own fascination. He was the first to contradict the Platonic idea that the artistic presentation affects us as does the corresponding reality. According to Aristotle, it is not the content of likeness but the fact of likeness which is the secret of attraction in comedy.

Wider Meaning of Imitation

Imitation, therefore, has a wider meaning to Aristotle than it has to Plato. It is not merely production of thing, so like that, which we perceive in nature, as to create illusion. It is production of things better or worse than they are to be

bringing about purgation, discharge, of the excessive element of emotions, through freeing emotions from the unwanted and thus producing harmony among them i.e. bringing them to 'the mean' Aristotle, thus discovers for the first time that art brings about the elimination of certain elements of personality. He paves the way for the Hegalian conception of Katharsis as complete deindividualisation.

In Indian Aesthetics also, there is the pedagogic view of art, but that is not presented in terms of katharsis. There are two views on the moral end of art, one propounded by the poeticians and the other by the dramaturgists. The former holds that poetry improves her lover morally like a curtain lecture, which proverbially is recognised to be more effective than hundred sermons from pulpit. And the latter asserts that drama improves the spectator morally by bringing about the identification with the focus of the situation and thus making him experience the goodness of the path of virtue and badness of the path of sin.

It may, however, be pointed out here that no Indian Aesthetician maintains the moral improvement of the lover of art as the sole end of art. The end of art is to arouse aesthetic experience. Aristotle was led to the assertion that tragedy has the ethical end, because he wanted to justify the existence of art in an ideal republic, in which Plato had refused a place to it. In the history of Indian Aesthetics, however, there is no such condemnation of art and consequently there is no such counter-assertion as Aristotle made against Plato.

In works on Indian Aesthetics there are references to the values of products of poetic and dramatic arts for the artist or connoisseur. Works of art are thus recognised to have made immortal the names of poets and dramatists, such as Bhāsa and Kālidāsa. They are admitted to have brought royal patronage to the artist, for instance, Dhāvaka, the real author of the *Ratnāvali*, got considerable wealth from King Harsa. They are also known to have won the favour of gods. Poet Mayūra, for instance, is known to have got cured from leprosy, because of the favour of the sun, in praise of whom he wrote the *Sūrya Śataka*. They are also recognised to have educative value. And lastly they are acknowledged to have

with such pleasing sights and sweet sounds, that their bitterness is not felt and they are accepted with delight, much as a bitter medicine mixed up with honey. It covers the apparently unwelcome nature of the moral principle with the agreeably beautiful, as a wise medical man coats a bitter pill with sugar, so that it is taken in with pleasure. Morality is a demand of the beautiful as its ornament. It is a demand of a smiling and lovely darling, which it is difficult to refuse and to meet which is a pleasure. It is such a presentation of the moral principles, which justifies the existence of art as a medium of moral instruction, separate from sacred scripture and history.

There is historical evidence to show that the presentation of dramatic art had such an effect on the spectator. We know that Śāriputta renounced the world and embraced Buddhist asceticism, because of the effect produced on his mind, by a dramatic presentation.

Mysticism of Plotinus and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in the Context of Aesthetics

Plotinus belongs to the line of writers who took certain aspects of the whole of the aesthetic problem, discussed by Aristotle. His predecessors busied themselves with discussion of the means of artistic production, they examined the powers of language which is the means of dramatic and poetic production. Plotinus occupies himself with the end of art. He takes up the problem of experience, for which art is responsible. He attempts the problem from metaphysical, epistemic and psychological points of view. He improves upon the Aristotelian position in this respect. According to Aristotle, aesthetic experience was only an emotive experience, consisting in the "mean" to which an emotion is brought by the kathartic effects of tragedy. According to Plotinus, it is beyond the emotional level, it belongs to the transcendental, the spiritual level. Plotinus thus frees art from subordination to morality and recognises the experience that it arouses as akin to mystic experience of the Ultimate, the One, the God.

Similarity of this view of aesthetic experience to that

SOME THING OF ARISTOTLE

Bhim Sen

Let me first state Plato's position in regard to the poets. He had felt the power of poets to delight and move. He had an affectionate respect for Homer and had read and absorbed him. But he could not approve of them and wanted them to go out of his Republic. He saw the basic truth that art seeks to imitate or represent what he calls phenomena. But then he also felt that it was an imitation of an appearance, a copy of a copy and so twice removed from reality. The abiding reality for him consisted in the ideas, the unchangeable 'forms', of which the material things were an imperfect image. Beautiful objects he saw as having a reflection of the 'absolute beauty' which constituted for him the true reality. This awareness that art was twice removed from reality, was with him one reason for his disapproval of poetry. Secondly, he saw that the appeal of the poets was not to the reason but essentially to the emotional part of our being which he regarded as the most worthless part of the soul. He thus saw an antithesis between art and morality and accordingly spoke disapprovingly of poets and poetry.

Plato confused the study of art with the study of morals. Aristotle with a single lucky stroke of his logical mind removed this confusion, and in writing his 'Poetics' gave to the fine arts an independent place in the scheme of human activity and created the study of aesthetics. He takes for granted that a work of art whether a picture or a poem is a thing of beauty and that it affords pleasure appropriate to its own kind. Mark his definition of tragedy, "It is an imitation of an action that is complete and whole and of certain magnitude....." which means that it is beautiful. Further he makes a clear distinction between the truth of nature and poetic truth. "It is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may happen according to the law of probability or necessity."

pity and fear to a disturbing pitch. The whole emotional state and balance are for some time completely changed. The paradoxical impulses are roused to a climax but in the catastrophe that follows they are reconciled and stilled in the calm of the achieved attitude. There remains none of their emotional agitation; their devastating force is spent, and the mind of the spectator is at rest. This is one part of catharsis.

Another side to it seems to be that the experience is exalting and cleansing. It certainly seems to have a reference to a moral effect which great tragedy produces and which has been accepted by an unbroken tradition through the centuries. Tragedy is a tale of great passions of a noble sufferer. There is greatness and nobility in the suffering. The feelings of pity and fear as they are roused, are both relieved and elevated. It is a chastening calm which finally comes from a sense of the essential breadth and justice of things. There is heightening and widening of consciousness.

It could certainly be maintained that this does not come about merely through an appeal to emotions of pity and fear. Tragedy does evoke other emotions also. Love and admiration are equally important in the effect of tragedy.

Indeed, all this is rendered possible through the profound moral sense of the tragic dramatist. He has his own instinctive sense of joy and sorrow, of pity and terror, of good and evil. He has his perception of the essential meaning of an event and the ability to feel the pathos in human suffering. He has his vision of the sorrow of mortal destiny as also of the awful grandeur and potentiality of the human spirit.

Tragedy true to its grain is essentially spiritual. Its infinite value is in the release of a noble vision and power. It is a vision of man's marvellous spiritual potentialities. We see man invested with the dread awfulness and attributes of Gods. "Even as man perishes he is seen revealing transcendent potentiality for higher and higher attainment in the realm of the spirit. This seems to be at the core of great tragedy and perhaps counts for some part of the experience associated with the word catharsis.

denied it and propounded Rīti instead¹. These words of Ānandavardhana are very important in evaluating the originality and importance of the doctrine of Rīti. The appreciation and estimation of the excellence of poetic compositions through the means of the doctrine of Rīti continued to weigh heavily even though imperceptibly on Ānandavardhana's mind. Although he claims that the rhetoricians like Udbhaṭa and others preceding him have presented a critique of the beauty or excellence of the external (i.e. the vācya) side of Kāvya only, the internal (i.e. the pratīyamāna) side remained untouched or unanalysed². Yet Vāmana must be out of the category of such rhetoricians. Had the fact been otherwise, Ānanda would not have given him credit for visualising, howsoever indistinctly, Dhvani as the essential element of Kāvya. It is to be seen, how far the real or the intrinsic charm of Kāvya can be explained on the basis of Rīti doctrine.

Vāmana is in fact the first rhetorician who first conceived of the soul of poetry. Thought about the soul of poetry was in fact the first attempt to have a vision of the essential or the intrinsic element of poetry. Vāmana propounded Rīti to be the soul of poetry, and defined it as 'Viśiṣṭa padaracana'³. Again he explained the word 'viśiṣṭa'

- 1 Ibid. II 346 and the Vṛtti on it —

मस्कृतस्फुरितं काव्यतत्त्वमेतन्मयोदितम् ।

मरावतुषदभिधायितुं रीतयः सम्प्रवर्तिताः ॥

एतद्ध्वनिप्रवर्तनेन निर्णीतं काव्यतत्त्वमस्कृतस्फुरितं सद् मरावतुषदभि प्रतिपादयितुं वैदग्ध्यं शोडो पाञ्चालो चेति रीतयः प्रवर्तिताः । रीतिरूपविधाविना हि काव्यतत्त्वमेतदस्कृतमरावतुषदस्फुरितमपीदिति स्थयते ।

- 2 Vide Dhvanysloka, II 1 3 —

तत्र वाच्य प्रतिज्ञो यः प्रकाररूपमादिभिः ।

बहुधा व्याख्यतः सोऽर्थस्ततो नेह प्रतन्यते ॥

- 3 Vāmana's Kāvya-lakṣaṇasūtra and its vṛtti —

रीतियामा काव्यम् । विशिष्टा पदरचना रीतिः । विशेषो गुणात्मा ।

How can it be accepted that separate tastes of guda, marica etc., are not different from the one and the only one peculiar taste of the drink called Pānaka? Can any one have the taste of the Pānaka by taking guda, marica etc., separately? Thus it is clear that howsoever the exponent of Dhvani may try to include Rīti in the Gunas, he cannot deny the specific beauty or excellence of a poetic composition produced by Rīti. When the votary of Dhvani-School himself regards the loveliness or the charm (lāvanya) of a beautiful woman, charm which is the collective effect of all the limbs placed or joined together in the body in a beautiful manner, as different from the beauty of the individual, why can't then, the exponent of Rīti-School also regard the excellence of a poetic composition produced therein by the specific employment of Rīti wherein there is assemblage of gunas as different from the excellences of the individual gunas? When the loveliness of the body as a whole cannot be included in the loveliness of the limbs, when the 'vyangya' cannot be included in the 'vācya', how can then the 'Rīti' be included in the 'gunas'?

The history of the evolution of the concept of Rīti is a long one. At first, the excellence of a poetic composition must have been based on different gunas separately. Before rise of the concept of the Vaidarbha and the Gauḍa styles (mārgas) described in the Kāvya-darśa of Dandin, separate gunas would have been representing different poetic styles (Kāvya-mārgas). In later times, these gunas would have collectively formed the specific characteristics of different styles of poets of different tastes and temperaments. Dandin visualised the Vaidarbha and the Gauḍa styles as forms of poetic composition. The ten gunas described as the soul of Vaidarbha style by Dandin were visualised by him in a collective manner and not separately. Only he did not present any analysis of the collective excellence or beauty produced by the gunas collectively. Vāmana recognised this excellence as the effect of the proper employment of Rīti. Thus in the order of evolution, the former concept that the excellence was produced by the proper employment of the individual gunas, achieved climax in the concept of Rīti of Vāmana.

Out of these the first four with different definitions, of course are taken to exist in both the Mārgas, viz., the Sukumāra and the Vicitra. Even though an independent thinker in his concept and analysis of Mārgas, Kuntaka is a strong supporter of Dandin and Vāmana in a different way. According to him the three Mārgas are based on the poet's nature, taste or temperament and not on any geographical divisions or regions as conceived by Dandin. His Sukumāra Mārga is in fact Dandin's Vaidarbhamārga and Vāmana's Vaidarbhi-rīti in a new form. Kuntaka undoubtedly differs from Dandin and Vāmana in atleast one very important point, and it is this. Whereas Dandin and Vāmana consider Vaidarbhamārga or Rīti to be the best of all because of its innumerable gunas, Kuntaka unlike them considers all the three to be equally meritorious or good because if the fact had been otherwise, no poet worth the name would have ever tried to write in the Vicitra (Gaudamārga of Dandin and Gaudī Rīti of Vāmana) or the Madhyama mārga (Pāñcālī Rīti of Vāmana). But the fact remains that even the most illustrious poets like Subandhu, Bāna, Kavirāja and others have written in these styles. In his opinion, therefore, no Mārga or Rīti is inferior to the other two.

Any way, this is an incontrovertible fact that by showing the assemblage of gunas, Rasa, alankāras and praubhā in his mārgas, Ācārya Kuntaka only redeemed or resuscitated Vāmana's doctrine of Rīti. Thus the same doctrine of Rīti first sprouted in Dandin's Kāvyaḍarsa, then developed and twigs in Vāmana's Kāvyaalankārasūtra, finally blossoms and fruits in Kuntaka's Vakroktujivita.

Vide Vakroktujivita, Dr S K De's edition P 71 —

मागेषु गुणानां समुदायमत्र । दद्यान्नेकैर्लक्ष्यैर्द्विभिर्मैत्र्यैर्नदा
सम्पन्नैर्लक्ष्यैर्द्विभिर्मैत्र्यैर्नदा एव प्रतिपादितम् ।

Philosophy? The use of the same term (*gūṇa*) in poetics as well as the number three point towards some such influence

A P Mishra Yes, I do think that there is at least some relation between the two, though at present it is rather difficult to establish the real nature of this relationship

V Venkatachalam Mādhurya can easily be related with *Sattva*, and *ojas* with *rajas*, but what about *Prasāda*?

Basant Jaitly You talked about the importance given to *Rīti*s and *Vṛtti*s by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, what I feel is that both of these Ācāryas gave more importance to *Vṛtti*s and not to *Rīti*s, because Ānanda-Vardhana considers *Vṛtti*s to be a result of *gūṇa*s and the *Kāśikī* has been referred to in terms of ideas suitable to *Rasa*, *uparāṅganā* as words suitable to *Rasa* etc. Abhinava too takes the *Vṛtti*s in the same sense and explains them as रसोचित व्यवहार of the *artha* in the case of the *Kāśikī* etc and of the *Śabda* in the case of *uparāṅganā* etc. Now if meaning and the word thus distributed become *Vṛtti*s the question arises what shall be the place for *Rīti*s? It is true that Ānanda-Vardhana has referred to *Rīti*s but strictly speaking there is no room for them either in his or in Abhinava's scheme since *Rīti*s can only be रसोचित व्यवहार which has already been associated with the *Vṛtti*s. If this be granted, it would be wrong to say that Ānandavardhana and Abhinava have attached great importance to *Rīti*s.

A P Mishra I think, I never said that Ānanda gives importance to *Rīti*. I only meant to say that he gives credit to Vāmana for his flash of *dharma*, i.e. the element of *dharma* flashed first in the mind of Vāmana. There is great misunderstanding about *Vṛtti*s on the basis of the saying: वृत्तयो नाद्वयानर. These *Vṛtti*s are in the sense of *rājaka-rājya-tyāpāra*. The *Vṛtti*s of *Śrīṣaṅkārā* i.e. *uparāṅganā* etc. are totally different from the *Vṛtti*s of drama

स तत्त्वदर्शनादेव शास्त्रेषु कथितं कविः ।

दर्शनाद्वर्णनाच्चायं रुद्धा लोके कविश्रुतिः ॥ Loc. Cit

Even the sage Vālmīki, who had a clear vision of the reality of things, was not acclaimed a poet until his poem emerged to express aesthetically what he had seen or experienced :

तथा हि दर्शने स्वच्छे नित्येज्यादिकवेर्मुने ।

नोदिता कविना लोके यावज्जाता न वर्णना ॥ Ibid

While the conception of poet in India has borne comparison with the philosopher and creator, the literary critics have always asserted independence and freedom of literary creation¹ and have even established its supremacy over the former. The benedictory verse of the *Kāvya-prakāśa* clearly formulates the freedom and supremacy of the poetic creation.

नियतितृप्तनिवमरहिता हृत्प्रादिकमयीमनस्परन्त्राम् ।

नवरसहचिरा निमित्तिमाश्रयती भारती कवेर्जयति ॥

The poet is able to see and express by virtue of his innate faculty called *Pratibhā*. Bhāmaha declares that poetry dawns rarely and on an only person gifted with this faculty :

काव्यं तु जायते जातु कस्यचित् प्रणिभावनः ।

Bhāmahālakāra, 1. 5

Thus rarest gift², an innate faculty³ and the very seed of poetry⁴ is conceived by Rājasekhara as both a creative inspiration (*kārayitṛi pratibhā*) and aesthetic sensibility (*Bhāvayitṛi Pratibhā*)⁵. Bhaṭṭa Tota, the master of Abhinavagupta, has offered best definition of *Pratibhā*. He says :

“*Pratibhā* is a form of intuitive consciousness, *prajñā*, which is an inexhaustible source of exceptionally novel blooms. It is by virtue of this *Pratibhā* alone that

1. Vide Dhvanyāloka III-43. *Ālīkavābhārati*, I 40.

2. Cf. *Agni Purāṇa* quoted in *Sāhityadarpaṇa* Ch. I

3. *Dandina's Kavyādarśa*, I 103

4. *Vāmana KASV* I 3 16

5. See Rājasekhara, *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, pp. 12-14

is present the province of poetry is never exhausted.¹ Similarly Kuntaka, Ruyyaka and later ālaṅkārikas considered it necessary for any description to be called poetic. Ruyyaka has redefined the poetic figures on the basis of the principle of *Pratibhā*—which is, in their opinion, essentially a virtue of creative imagination found in the work of great poets.

Impact of grammar and systems of philosophy on the progressive evolution of the *alankāra* proper is well recognised. Grammar forms the basis of many a variety of *Upaniṣ*. The discussion about the distinction between *śpand* and *śpandya* due to the use of the word *śva*, of that between *śpand* and *rūpaka*, and the emergence of many *alankāras* like *Dipaka* and *āvṛta* betray the obvious influence of grammar. The recognition of figures like *arīṣṭa*, *parīṣṭa*, and *śaṅka* distinctly bear the stamp of the *Mīmāṃsaka*. In the emergence of figures like *amānta*, *kāyānta* (also known as *kāyānta* in old works), *śānta*, *śānta*, *śānta* *śānta* of second variety, and *śānta* as well as in the hair-splitting discussion in neo-terminology of the formulation and exposition of the concepts of the *śānta* the *Naiyāyikas* had a major share. Popular wisdom (*loka-sūtra*) and its tradition of expression were responsible for the formulation of many an *alankāra* such as *śānta*, *śānta*, *śānta*, *śānta*, *śānta*, *śānta* and *śānta*. In fact, classification of the *śāntas* given by Ruyyaka admits, inter alia, chain (*Śrīkṛṣṇa*), reason (*tarka*), sentence (*Vākya*) and popular usage (*loka*) as the basis. Under the impact of Śaivism emerged some new figures such as *Śaiva*, *śaiva*, and *śaiva* and many old *śāntas* for example, *śaiva*, the second variety of the figure *śānta*, *śānta* were given new orientation. The terms of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy, such as *śānta*, *śānta*, *śānta*, *śānta*, and *śānta* were frequently used to discuss the concepts of the *śāntas*.

Ruyyaka has, in fact, treated the whole sphere of the *śāntas* on the basis of the principle of *Pratibhā*. The admission of an *śānta* or its variety is, according to him,

1. न वान्नायदियमोन्नि यदि स्यात् प्रतिपाद्यः ।

the above mentioned flaws and added ten more to the list. I need not go into the details of his treatment but would confine myself to two observations. This is obvious from Bhāmaha's treatment of logical fallacies¹ that logic (Buddhist as well as orthodox) exercised considerable influence on him. This was natural because Bhāmaha belonged to an age which was marked by encounter of ideas and was dominated by the works of Vasubandhu and Dinnāga. However, even when he bases his treatment of the poetic flaws on the way shown by the logicians of the country and constructs the grammar of poetry after the style of the grammarians, he also asserts the independence of the literary criticism from the Śāstras. The logic of poetry is distinct, says Bhāmaha

अपर वक्ष्यते न्यायलक्षणं वाच्यमथयम् ।

इदं तु शास्त्रगर्भेषु वाक्येष्वभिहितं यथाः ॥ KA IV. 30

This is constructed by critics on the basis of the poetic tradition and is based on empirical experience while the Śāstras are concerned with the reality of things:

तज्ज्ञं वाच्यप्रयोगेषु तन्प्रादुर्भूतमन्यथा ।

तत्र लोकाश्रयं वाच्यमागमस्तिरदृशिनः ॥

It was perhaps to underline immanent nature of the poetic meaning that Bhāmaha advised not to believe the transcendental theory of meaning propounded by the grammarians, it would be tantamount to a belief in the reality of a sky-flower.² In his discussion on the correct use of words (*Śabdā-sādhana*) Bhāmaha is indebted to grammar as well as to all other disciplines but when we read the *Kāvya-lankāra* in its proper perspective it becomes clear that according to Bhāmaha it is not *śauṣabdyā* or perfection of the word or its correct cognition that can constitute a poem rather an aesthetic harmony of both the words and meanings: शब्दापौ सहितौ वाच्यम्.

1. Vide KA IV 1-2

2. See also IV 72

3. शरपेरपि चादेयं वचो न स्फोटवादिनाम् ।

नमः कुसुममन्तीति शब्दद्वयात् कः सचेतनः ॥ KA

should not take any independent notice of the grammatical and logical defects unless they are related to the poetic sense (*kāvya-rtha*, the *rasa*). Mahimabhaṭṭa's treatment of the five poetic flaws, borrowed by Mammata later on, is very systematic and is broadly speaking aims at the stylistic perfection through avoidance of impediments to clear grasp of meaning. Mammata followed the Dhvani school in his conception of the poetic blemish as marring the principal sense (i.e. *rasa*) and his broad classification of the blemishes includes *rasa-doṣas* along with the verbal or formal and the material (relating to meaning or content). Progressive evolution of *doṣa-concept* and treatment of its varieties makes it clear that the literary critics concerned themselves more and more with obstacles—formal or material—of the poetic content (*alankāra*, *Guna* or *rasa*) than with the grammar and logic, pure and simple.

Another important principle of Literary Criticism is the *guna* or poetic excellence. Despite many important differences among critics from Bharata to Post-dhvani period about the nature (whether it is positive entity or simply a negation of the blemishes) and number (ten or three) the *guna* principle has concerned itself exclusively with the stylistic perfection through aesthetic mode of arrangement of words of literary creation and was in its final analysis intimately (not indirectly as in Bharata) related to *rasa*, and writers on *dhvani* analysed properly the mental states that *gunas* help to arouse. In their analysis they must have been influenced by the nature of triad of *gunas* admitted in the Sāṃkhya but in any case no writer seems to be obsessed with the śāstric concept, the critic largely on his own analysed the mental states that *gunas* help to arouse.

It is true that Ānandavardhana took the cue from grammatical theory of *Sphoṭa* which treats each letter as suggestive of *sphoṭa*—one, constant and unchanging like Brahman of the Vedānta, but he has himself made it abundantly clear that the *dhvani* as a literary principle was developed by him on the basis of a tradition of critical judgement of the readers. In his auto-comment (*vṛtti*) on 'Kāvyaśyāmā dhvanirīti | budhairyaḥ samāmnāta-pūrvah' and elsewhere also in his epoch-making work, the *Dhvanyā-*

of great repute in literary criticism Abhinavagupta, who has given a solid foundation of Kashmir Śaivism to Sanskrit Criticism, passes strictures on the efforts of over-jealous exponents of philosophical views, as being inspired solely for deluding supple minds (*Sukumāramanomohana*) or mere poses (*bhramanikāmāsa*)¹ Independence of judgment of poetry (*kāvyaadhī*) was brought out on the basis of pre-eminence of poetic function by another critic, Bhaṭṭanāyaka, in his now lost work, the *Hrdayadarpana*

शब्दप्राधान्यमाश्रित्य तत्र साम्प्रतं पृथग्विदुः ।

अयं न त्वेन युक्ते तु वदन्त्याख्यानमतयोः ।

द्वयोर्गुणत्वे व्यापारप्राधान्ये काव्यधीर्भवेत्

Bhaṭṭanāyaka, in fact, did not view highly didactic value or ethical tone in literature. According to him what matters most is intrinsic merit of a poem. Abhinava has similarly questioned the didactic purpose of literary creation in his commentaries on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*² and the *Dhvanyāloka*³ According to him principal element is not knowledge, for in that case there would be no difference of literary work from ethics and historiography. Ānanda had also said न हि क्वचित् विवृत्तमात्रवर्णनेनात्मपदलाभ इतिहासादेरेव तन्मिदं. Dhanañjaya stressed this idea by saying that dramas flow with joy, and knowledge is no fruit therefrom and one who seeks it as from the history etc. must be saluted, as he is hostile to the real taste of literature.

मानन्दनिष्पन्दिषु ह्येकेषु व्युत्पत्तिमात्रं फलमल्पबुद्धिः ।

योऽंगेतिहायादिवदाह साधुस्तस्मै नमः स्वादपराङ्मुखाय ॥

Daśarūpaka, I. 6

Rājaśekhara has stated criticism (discipline of the literature, *Sāhityaśūdrā*) to be the fifth Veda⁴, which asserts its independence

¹ Abhinavabhāratī, III, pp. 176-77

² ननु किं मुख्यदुपदेशं करोति, नेत्याह विन्तु बुद्धिं विवर्धयति स्वप्रतिभायैव तादृशी विनयनिः । Abhinavabhāratī, II, 41

³ Vide Locana on Dhvanyāloka p. 40
KM (G O S)

⁴ पञ्चमी साहित्यविद्येति याज्ञवल्केयः ।

who believed that principles of Criticism are not to be interpreted exclusively on the basis of any particular system, deride at attempts for over-philosophisation of what are essentially literary concepts evolved from the judgment of literature.

Venakatachalam : Before we wind up, I would like to put one question at this stage. You have shown that various themes of the poetics have been influenced by the principles of Indian philosophy yet they have developed themselves independently, but as far the Rasa-theory is concerned, I think that a perusal of various theories on Rasa shows that in this sphere the ācāryas seldom rose above the philosophical tangle in which they had entered perhaps of their own accord. There is, therefore, very little independent development in the field of Rasa-theories. What do you think of it?

R. C. Dwivedi : Rasa-sūtra has been explained in the light of almost all the schools of Indian Philosophy. This very fact *ipso facto* implies that no particular system of philosophical thought can be applied to or held to be exclusively valid in relation to the exposition of the Rasasūtra of Bharata. This makes a particular system of Indian philosophy in relation to rasa-sūtra only incidental and not essential to it.

Moreover I think that Rasa-theory is one of the few topics in Poetics whose development can be persued back to its very inception. The Rasa-sūtra of Bharata is by itself pure and simple and is devoid of every kind of doctrinaire influence of Indian philosophy.

R. P. Dwivedi : The Rasa-Sūtra which is the basis of Rasa-theories that developed later on has been proved to be an interpolation in the Nāṭya-Śāstra (tr.)

R. K. Dwivedi : If this be finally accepted, it would support me in as much as one can hold that the later

tradition ? Is this not an independent contribution of Poetics towards Rasa-theory ? And all the examples of the *rasadharma* which I have quoted towards the end of my paper should also be regarded as complete originality in the Rasa-theory. Bhaṭṭanāyaka conceived two poetic functions, *bhāvanā* and *bhāga* to explain the process and realisation of *rasa*. Both these functions are independent of philosophic impact and were propounded independently. *Dharma*-theorists replace in a way the above two functions by *Īśānjara* which is not only an independent concept of literary criticism but is also staunchly refuted by the philosophers of every shade in India. For example, Jayanta Bhatta, the great *rajyōgī*, clearly controverts its admission to the class of *śabda-vijāpāra*.

of action,¹ and thus enriches and complexes the communicative content of language, it also presents successfully a comprehensive and valid record of experience in relation to the ultimate questions of life

On one side, the symbolic imagination is the symbolising trend, bringing more and more area of experience into formal expression, and thus enlarging the field of aesthetic perceptions, on the other, it is a peculiar and explorative mode leading men forward in various ventures in philosophy, science and general speculation. It provides a breakthrough where other modes of cognition falter or stop. Thus symbolic imagination refers both to the extent and the mode of imaginative pursuit. Its mode of operation is through analogies. Analogies provide a spring-board for knowing the unknown, for realising the un-realizable.

Every artist begins with knowing man, his feelings and emotions, his relations with other men and environment, questions of morality, justice, significance and all the complex problems of living a life. His pride and passions, his struggles with his spirit, truth, and his place in the gamut of creation form the core impressions about life and this world on the consciousness of the artist. During this journey of knowing the world emotionally and imaginatively and discovering himself also in the process, he starts "giving the body of this world" a name, a symbolic interpretation.² It is in this stride of experience that the author of the *Mahābhārata* conceived of the world as a place of action, struggle, actual combat. In a similar spirit the writer of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* remarked that the whole world was a field of action, and exhorted individual human beings, through Arjuna, to work out their destiny through knowledge, devotion or action (*Jñāna*, *Bhakti*, and *Karma*). Tulsidas as the author of the *Rāmacaritamānasa*, looked upon life in terms of ethical and moral values, culminating in a harmonised practice of varying and warring sects (*Saiva*, *Vaiṣṇava*) of religion. The *Upaniṣads* and the *Vedas* symbolise the human quest for

1 Tale, Allen, "The Symbolic Imagination" *The Kenyon Review* XIV 2, Spring 1952, pp. 256-57

2 Ibid.

more ironically disposed soul, the 'President of Immortals' was a very cruel God, and all human beings are dispensed with an inevitably tragic lot.

In comparison with the tragic and ironic view of the artists in the west, the literateurs in India present a blissful, beatific attitude toward life, a bent of spirit that manifested its *prāsāda*' characteristic. Most of the dramas in Sanskrit are neither comic (*S-khīṇa*) or tragic (*D-akṣiṇa*) but ennobling and divinising (*prādīpita*). The same elevating feature may be noted in poetry also. Perhaps this can largely be accounted for in terms of the cultural pattern of society, the preponderance of a religious spirit in life, an unshakable faith in the doctrine of *Karma*, and the concept of God as *Sarvānanda*. The *Vidyas* and the *Upasādhās* conceived of this creation as created in bliss, preserved in bliss, finally dissolved in bliss. Obviously, such a philosophy of life would reflect itself in literature of the period as well. Men steeped in such a faith adopted a happy, stoic attitude which shaped their destiny not so much in relation to one another, as in relation to the ultimate reality or God. The poets and dramatists, fashioned by the strongly religious framework of society, responded harmoniously to the cosmic moral order, the order of *Rita* and *Satya*.

In the *Caṇḍīgya-Upasādhā* Om (ॐ), with its phonetic analysis and in the symbolic and auditory-imaginative sense, is defined as the essence of reality. Here, an infinite reality, the prime cause of this creation, is perceived in visual and sonal terms. Similarly, the phrase *एतद् बहु संतु* symbolises the desire of the One to multiply and diversify itself for the exultation and delight in the many. The phrase has been conceived symbolically, and explains, in one way, one or the many causes of the creation of this universe. Such a summarised and epitomised expression points to the way the world was looked at and interpreted, at one stage of the development of man's mind. In the same way the concept of *Avasthā*, life, death, death-in-life, ages (*Satya-yuga*, *Tretā-yuga*, *Dvāpara*, *Kalī-yuga*) *Avasthās*, and deluge are figuratively, symbolically conceived expressions of realities difficult to grasp and master. Since time immemorial, man has passionately craved for, attempted to go out of and to transcend the limitations of

a co-mixture of various forces and factors operating, affecting simultaneously. In the history of the development of thought in men there was a period or a stage when Synthetic human approach was not split by logical thinking or scientific reasoning. At that time no analytical approach had detailed elaborated, specialised it or misdirected it to a myopic range. At that stage people still enjoyed an elevated and integrated level of thought, experience and ideals. During this period, the period of mythic, metaphoric, pre-scientific non-abstractionist, and undissociated thinking, the mode of symbolic imagination helped people to live an integrated intellectual, aesthetic and spiritual life. They exercised freely in symbolic interpretations and their unified sensibility added to their stature as aesthetes, artists, devouts. In 19th century in the west, symbolic imagination and thinking was revived re-invoked to give an integrated vision of life to the artist and free his consciousness from a dissociative onslaught of science, scientific thought, over-specialisation, and the mass organisation of life. The process continues in the 20th century also.

Different genres of literary expression use various figures of speech as simile, metaphor, personification, myth etc. It may be interesting to study their relationship with symbolic imagination. It is a common notion today that the figures of speech are not the devices of adorning poetry or other branches of literature. They are integral to expression. When a poet employs a simile, or, seems indulging in a metaphor, his is not a forced use, rather this parallel or the transformed image has been suggested to him, as if in a flash by the subject under aesthetic contemplation. As such this facile use of a simile or metaphor gives a clue to the working of the poetic mind which unconsciously jumps at similarities, parallel images, metaphoric transformations. In fact, these things suggest the direction of the symbolic imagination in a poet, and serve as the preliminary stages to its final culmination. Metaphor, in a stanza or in a complete poem, may be one unit of artistic communication in a recognisable form, but it is essentially a mode of thinking and experiencing, working on the principle of 'similitude' and 'dissimilitude'.

and indicative use, give only the literal, the commonly shared or the semantic meaning. But when poet, with his creative power of imagination, used the word in suggestive sense, it shot forth echoes and re-echoes, and further echoes of meaning and sense. In this sense, the suggested meaning of the word took an evocative character which endlessly affected various readers and produced varied literary pleasure. The whole process is described in the term *anuranana*. Just as a pebble cast in calm water sends out rings of waves generated by its plunge, and the circles continue to expand in all directions, showing no end, so is the case with the suggested meaning of words. The poet, the *Pratibhā-ān Puruṣa*, effects this magic with a careful arrangement of *Bhāva*, *Ītibhāva*, *Anubhāva*, and *Sañcārībhāva*. He may use other figures of speech also. Here it should be noted that the various figures of speech are taken as integral ingredients in poetic expression in Sanskrit poetics also as in English. They are not contrived or strained devices embellishing an artificial expression.

Imagination or *Pratibhā* as it is termed in the Sanskrit poetics is a significant term and an essential trait of a poet. Basically it is his experiencing, transforming and creative faculty. Without it a man cannot claim his title to the rank of a poet. Though imagination primarily suggests the faculty for creating images, in a pervasive sense it covers the entire range of creative psyche in the poet. An imaginative poet feels rhythm and rhyme in a novel form; the auditory imagination in him takes him to the forgotten past of language where he invigorates himself with the raw energy of every syllable, accent, beat and other individual components of a word. The visual imagination flashes before the poet continuously new, concrete and pictorial images, and the imaginative lights endow him with a new creative vision, bathing his words and sentiments in fresh and charming forms. In Sanskrit also word the sound and word the sense (both phonetic and visual) are fused by the energy of imagination of the poet. When the poetic imagination works in harmony with *Dhṛam*, it creates a master-piece. An energetic touch of the poetic imagination transmutes the old themes, treated by the poet earlier, and even common words into things of

dismantled, molten and refashioned into new objects and phenomena. It may appear extreme, but in a sense all imaginative activity is symbolic, since what is produced or brought forth stands for what has been experienced, what has shaped the sensibility of the artist and goaded him into creation. Or as Eliot put it: "The poet's mind is in fact a receptacle for seizing and storing up numberless feelings, phrases, images which remain there until the particles which unite to form a new compound are present together". Imagination, brings 'all the particles' 'together' and forms the required 'new compound'. Even the most realistic piece is as a literary composition, much different from the reality outside the written pages. It is not so much to insist on the formal limitations of a literary production as to bring forth the essential, symbolically transforming nature of imagination in the poet that this fact should be noted. In Sanskrit poetics, the acceptance of *Śabdārōkṣa Alankāra* as an integral figure of speech is an affirmation of this symbolic activity of imagination. Similarly, in a most life-like statue the connoisseur or the sensitive critic will discern not the details but conception of integrity of the artist, projected in a transformed, suggestive manner.¹ It was to this creative, symbolically imaginative faculty of the poet that Ānandavardhana referred to and paid a glowing tribute when he called the poet the master of his world, doing with it anything that pleased him.² Abhinavagupta, going still further, maintained that in poetry even the operation of the causal phenomenon was not called for.³ Mammaṭa, who was more eloquent over this aspect of the poetic genius, called the poet even greater than God. The poet was not bound by the sense of destiny; he created a world of ecstasy and rapture which was self-sufficient, totally independent of any extraneous factor.⁴

And finally a word about the word, or the behaviour of language. Some schools take all words as symbols, and

1 *Essays in Sanskrit Criticism*, p. 194

2 *Ibid* pp. 183-84

3 *Ibid* p. 184

4 *Ibid* p. 184

PRINCIPLES OF LITERARY CRITICISM OF THE DHVANI SCHOOL A REVIEW

Dr. Bhanurath Bhatnagar

The study of Poetry as a distinct discipline owes its origin to Bhāmaha and Dandin, belonging to north and south respectively and almost to the same period, from the middle of the seventh century to the first quarter of the eighth. Since then the study continued unabated, and many scholars came forward with their views, and gave rise to a grand body of literature which they christened as the *Alamkāra Śāstra* or the Science of Poetic Embellishments. Undoubtedly, the term *alamkāra*, in its technical sense, was first used by Bharata in the context of embellishments of the drama. Discussing the diction of a play in the 17th Chapter, devoted to Verbal Representation in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Bharata recommends the use of four figures of speech suited to the drama. As far as our knowledge goes, this reference to figures of speech as a means to embellish dramatic diction is the first.

In the absence of definite material, relating to the intervening period, we can safely surmise that by the time we reach to Bhāmaha, and with him to the historic period, so to say; of the *Alamkāra* literature, discussions must have been going on in the circle of scholars. In all probability, these discussions were directed, following the clue supplied by Bharata to the question of finding out what constituted the charm of poetic creation. That is why, it appears, Bhāmaha named his treatise—*Kāvyaśāstra*, the poetic figure, attempted to define the figures of speech relating to poetry, as was done by Bharata in relation to the drama.

Though Bhāmaha was acquainted with the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and the Bharatan school, as is evident from his classification of poetry as well, he omitted to treat of *Rasa*, the evoking of which was the chief end of the drama. This proved to be a lamentable loss as it deprived the poetry of its purpose. Bhāmaha had to define *Kāvya* and supply a purpose of it, and spoke

that would ensure flawless composition. The importance of poetic imagination also was not fully comprehended, although 'pratibhā' (genius) was considered valuable for the poet. To Bhāmaha, ultimately, it was the Alamkāra, both of sound and sense, that was essential for poetry.

Alongwith this, it should also be noted that the study of poetry assumed, from the very beginning, the nature of more or less a mechanical discipline—all theorists calling it a Śāstra—that too not of poetry but of the *alamkāras*. Hence the entire treatises took the shape of authoritative prescriptions concerning 'dos' and 'don's'. The critics were more interested in discussing in great detail the individual figures of both sound and sense, and based their views mostly on individual verses. The whole Kāvya was seldom subjected to a critical assessment. That is why, in spite of the fact that such great poets as Kālidāsa, Bhāravi etc. antedate all the Alamkāras, they do not find full treatment at their hands. At times, instead of referring to the poems of celebrated poets, many theorists supply even their own examples.

This mechanical and prescriptive attitude continued right up to the time of the Dhvanikāra and more correctly to that of Ānandavardhana towards the middle of the 9th Century. From Bhāmaha to Ānandavardhana, the intervening period is roughly that of 200 years. This period was marked by great intellectual activity and Dr. S.K. De is right to call it the creative stage in the development of Sanskrit poetics, marked as it was by the formulation of all important theories regarding poetry.

The approach to Kāvya, during the interval, may be said to have been from the crude to the subtle. Starting with the external factors, the study of poetry developed slowly into a serious and deeper enquiry into all the essential elements. The progress may be pointed out thus :— From the Alamkāra to the Riti; from the Riti to the Rasa; and from the Rasa to the Dhvani. These are the well-known schools of Sanskrit poetics, which hold the Alamkāra, the Riti, the Rasa and the Dhvani to be the soul of poetry, and the evolution of these schools followed more or less a chronological order. It is remarkable that a regular attempt for a synthesis of earlier concepts is traceable in all the follo-

to the follower of this school, the style, the Gunas and the Alamkāras are to be judged in a Kāvya. In addition, Dosas are however to be shunned by the poet, grammatical correctness maintained and poetic conventions honoured.

The Rasa school, of which our knowledge is rather scanty, based its observations on the famous aphorism of Bharata 'the combination of the Determinants, (vibhāva) Consequents (anubhāva) and the Transitory states (vyabhicārī-bhāva) evolves the Rasa'. On the basis of the fragmentary references extant of the views of the three main exponents—Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, it appears that they thought Rasa to be the end of poetry and so in the Kāvya, one should carefully judge the right use of the proper *Vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and the *Vyabhicārī-bhāvas*. All the three exponents are unanimous about the end of poetry, i.e. evolving the Rasa, but they differ with regard to the relation between the *Vibhāva* etc. and the Rasa, and the process of its evolution.

Thus it can be said that upto the advent of the Dhvani theory, the study of poetry, starting more or less like a mere study of rhetoric or persuasive manner of expression, gradually assumed the grandeur of poetics: All the factors—right from the word and meaning, the figures of sound and sense, the blemishes of composition to the soul and essence of poetry—were discussed elaborately and threadbare. All the different theories, however, remained as theses and anti-theses until the genius of the Dhvanikāra brought about a synthesis of all by putting forward his theory of Dhvani.

(3)

It is well known that all the schools of Sanskrit poetics can broadly be divided into two groups—the pre-Dhvani and the post-Dhvani schools. The concept of Dhvani serves as the central point which marks the change of the whole outlook regarding poetry, and everyone will agree with Rājasekhara in paying homage to the great savant, Ānandavardhana who, following the Dhvanikāra, established with

of speech, the *Dosas* Gunas and the like, which had so long been invariably associated with all the treatises on Poetics. This dissociation of rhetorical matter from the treatment of *Kāvya* is very important, as it removes the imbalance from the treatises on *Alamkāra*, which devoted the largest space to these items. One should not however think that the *Dhvani-kāra* was ignorant of their importance. On the other hand, it is he who for the first time saw these in the proper perspective. It is *Kāvya* that he is dealing with and not merely the embellishments or blemishes of poetic composition.

The *Dhvanyāloka* also gives an answer to the old question—'What is the special feature of the poetic expression?' As we have seen, different schools answered the question differently. To one this speciality is the *Alamkāra*, to others it is the *Guna*, to some others it is *Rasa*. But the *Dhvani* theorists say that the special and characteristic feature of poetic expression is Suggestion (*dharma*). The words used by the poet do not convey merely the conventional expressed Sense (*Pratyārtha*), nor the Indicated (*Lakṣya*) one, but the Suggested sense (*vyangjārtha*). The standpoint of the *Dhvani-vādin* is that the self-same Expressive words (*vācaka*) when used by a poet become Suggestive (*vyangjaka*) and convey the Suggested sense. Since neither the suggestive word, nor the suggested sense nor even suggestion as a function of words (*vyangjana-vyāpāra*) is accepted by any of the philosophical schools, the theory of suggestion truly belongs to the literary field. The *Dhvani-vādin* holds that the function of suggestion is typical to poetic expression and hence, is its unique feature.

The *Dhvani* School puts forward the view that *Dhvani*, i.e. the suggested sense is the soul of poetry. *Ānandavardhana*, through his cogent and convincing arguments, proves the existence and validity of *Dhvani*. He accepts the challenge of the earlier schools of Poetics on the one hand and the philosophical schools on the other, and successfully establishes the distinct and separate entity of the Suggested sense in addition to the Expressed and Indicated senses accepted by all. Likewise, the function of Suggestion also as a distinct function of words and sense is convincingly established.

(5)

Let us now enumerate the principles of judgement of Kāvya according to the Dhvani School. These may be said to be as follows —

(1) In the Kāvya, the Suggested sense is of the foremost importance. The critic must see what is being suggested—Rasa, Vastu or Alamkāra, and whether it is all important. On this will depend its classification as the best or the second-rate or as the lowest.

(2) Careful assessment is to be made of the Alamkāra, Guna and the style. The criterion of judging these is whether they enhance the charm of the suggested sense. The Dosas are also to be viewed from this point of view. In relation to certain Sentiments, some Dosas may not appear as blemishes.

(3) Suggestion of Sentiment is the highest type of suggestion, and so the use of *alamkāras* should be carefully taken account of. It should be noted that employment of complex figures of both the sound and sense does not only add charm to poetry, but actually impedes the relish of the Sentiment suggested.

(4) There is thus no fixed rule regarding the use of Alamkāras, Gunas and the Ritis in the Kāvya. Their aptness should always depend on the sense suggested by it.

(5) Last but not the least, is the importance of Poetic imagination. Ānandavardhana declares the poet to be a creator, in the world of poetry, capable of doing whatever he likes. Suggestion of sentiments, proper use of the figures, the style and the Gunas, in other words both Content and Form are all determined by Poetic imagination. The *pratibhā* of the poet can mould even the age-old theme into something rich and strange. It bestows a new significance, a novel charm, *chāṣā* upon the Kāvya and renders it a source of joy for ever. In the judgement of Kāvya, therefore, an evaluation of the imagination of the poet is also called for.

(6) The Dhvani school does not say that the Kāvya should be didactic. The suggestion of Sentiment is the highest purpose of poetry and, when suggested, sentiment is

etc are suggestive of it. The Determinants, the consequents and the Transitory States are themselves Expressed (*vācya*) but become suggestive (*vyañjaka*), and by the power of suggestion (*vyāñjanā*) suggest the Permanent Mood (*Sthāyin*) in the heart of the listener or spectator. He then tastes this suggested mood This tasting of one's mood ■ Rasa

Abhinavagupta goes on to clarify that the Kāvya, by its power of suggestion, arouses the Permanent Mood in man and then he tastes it objectively although it is inseparable from his own self From this it follows that for the Rasa-realisation one must have the respective Permanent Moods in him in a latent form or as, what ■ called, *vāsana* Those who do not have this *vāsana* are incapable of relishing the Rasa In relation to Rasa-realisation, the theory of universalisation (*Sādhāranīkaraṇa*) of both the object (*vibhāva* etc) and the subject (*rasika* or *sahṛdaya*) establishes the super-normal character of aesthetic pleasure Forgetting, even if temporarily, one's narrow individuality ■ the highest bliss that rasa-realisation brings about By this very process the self-same 'thing of beauty' ■ enjoyed equally by both the oppressor and the oppressed, the old and the young, men and women. Man, by nature, sympathises with his fellowmen, but the Kāvya urges him to sympathise with the sympathies of others When we read, for example, of the pathetic laments of Rāma, we are not merely sorry at his loss but sympathise with his feelings. This remarkable feature of the Kāvya makes the pleasure derived from it *a-laukika*, super-normal It liberates our self-centred mental process and makes it all-embracing.

To conclude, we may say that the principles of the Dhvani School, in so far as these have touched the fundamentals of the poet's art hold good even to-day. The form and content of literature do change with the passage of time and judgement in literature is, to a great extent, individualistic and so never final. But whatever be the form and content, the appeal of the Kāvya will ever consist in what it suggests This is true even in case of the most modern poets who are unwilling even to accept the control of grammar

JAGANNĀTHA'S RAMAṆIYATĀ

Dr (Kumar) Surran Pandit

Jagannātha is the last luminary in the galaxy of literary critics. Bharata is the first known exponent of the system of literary criticism who expressly designates the contents of his Nāṭyaśāstra as Kāvya-guṇa, Kāvya-Doṣa or—Alankāras pertaining to Kāvya. The period from Bharata to Jagannātha covering nearly two thousand years of time is marked by an intense ideological investigation into the essence of poetry. During this long period of scholastic speculation various currents of thoughts dominated the field adhering vehemently to one principle or another. Six such schools are known as—

1. Rasa School—which Stresses—emotion
2. Alankāra " " " —figures of speech
3. Rīti " " " —style
4. Dhvani " " " —suggestiveness
5. Vakrokti " " " —fascinating uncommonness of idea and expression.
6. Aucitya " " " —propriety of idea and expression

These six schools should not be considered as thoroughly exclusive of each other or antagonistic to each other, rather they represent the gradual stages through which the study of literary criticism was marching towards the inner core of poetry. It is a continuous search and hence a *gradual growth of the doctrine, which can thus be classified in four stages also :—*

1. Formative stage—from unknown beginning to Bhāmaha
2. Creative stage—from Bhāmaha to Ānandavardhana
3. Definitive stage—from Ānandavardhana to Mammaṭa
4. Scholastic stage—from Mammaṭa to Jagannātha.

In the third the process starts with चमत्कार and ends in चमत्कार.

The three elements शब्द, भावना and चमत्कार thus loom out clearly. It is the भावना that interconnects शब्द and चमत्कार. Kāvya is thus the result of these three—शब्द, भावना & चमत्कार. The word चमत्कार stands for लोकोत्तराह्लाद “लोकोत्तरत्वं चाह्लाद-गणश्चमत्कारत्वापरपर्यायोऽनुभवनास्तिको जातिविशेषः” It is a supermundane pleasure of which personal experience is the proof. It cannot be derived from ordinary words like a son is born to you. This चमत्कार is related to word through भावना which is described by Jagannātha as “पुनः पुनरनुमानतना” It consists in continued contemplation.

Of the three elements, शब्द, भावना and चमत्कार the last one is supreme. To this Jagannātha refers as—“वाच्यधीविर चमत्कारित्वं चावशिष्टमेव”¹ On this चमत्कार only he has based the classification of poetry. Upto Jagannātha the position of प्रतीयमानार्थ was the fundamentum Divisions of poetry, which was not very just. Some very beautiful instances of poetry were thus thrown in the third class. In the post-dhvani period Viśvanātha had gone to the extent of recognising only two varieties—ध्वनि & गुणीनूतव्यग्न only. He did not recognise the third variety even as a kāvya. At this time Jagannātha on the basis of चमत्कार so re-arranged the poetry that instances which Viśvanātha refused to recognise as Kāvya, could assume the status of उत्तमकाव्य. Jagannātha is not the first one to recognise चमत्कार. In the sixteenth century प्रनाकर in his ‘रसप्रदीप’ had defined poetry as “चमत्कारविशेषकारित्वम् मुन-विशेषकारित्वम् वा”. Before him in the 18th century विश्वेश्वर too had written his चमत्कारचन्द्रिका. According to Narāyaṇa, the great grand-father of विश्वनाथ, चमत्कार is the soul of poetry. All these must have influenced Jagannātha. To Jagannātha not only the चमत्कार but all the three elements शब्द, भावना and चमत्कार are important. His शब्द is रसनीयता-साधक. While dealing with Rasa he says—

Jagannātha. It is thus a synthesis and a symbol of all the principles of poetics

R G. Duttvedi : The idea of *Camatkāra* which, according to some scholars, owes its origin to the sound *Camal* produced at eating a good dish was later on philosophically propounded under the influence of Śaivism. It would be interesting and instructive to learn Jagannātha's original source of *ramanīyatā* concept, the author and the book in which it is hinted at for the first time and to trace its development through the centuries till it is finally raised to such an exalted position and declared the soul of poetry by Pandita-Rāja Jagannātha. The idea of *ramanīyatā* was accepted by all the poeticists who preceded or followed Jagannātha. It would indeed be interesting to explore its precise correlation with kindred concepts and various terms used by ācāryas through the ages to express their pre-eminent concern with *ramanīyatā* and how it is effected by a poet. I am afraid Jagannātha, by making *ramanīya* (beautiful) an adjective of meaning, *artha*, in his definition of poetry, laid more stress on content rather than form. Indian tradition of literary criticism has by and large laid equal emphasis on both the word and meaning, which Jagannātha and some other poeticists seem to contradict.

In the beginning, the tradition in poetics seems to have made no mention of *Bhakti* at all. Vedic and Paurāṇic treatises were considered, as if, super-literary works that could not be dealt on par with other compositions of poetry expressive of the human feelings. Bharata, therefore, in line with the tradition prevalent in his times recognises only eight sentiments,¹ where the Erotic (*Śṛṅgāra*) is expressive of an attachment between a male and a female on the human plane. It is only in Abhinavagupta (C 1100 AD) that we find a great stress on *Śānta*, though Bharata has also made a mention of it.² *Bhakti* finds a mention at this stage as one of the ingredients as a *Saṁcāri* emotion centred in gods as distinct from the attachment for a human heroine.³ This attachment need not necessarily be centred in gods etc. but may be expressed as Devotion and Faith with concentration on God. These were regarded as ingredients of the *Śānta rasa*.⁴ Mammata⁵ and Hemacandra⁶ also endorse this view in placing *Bhakti* in the category of a *Bhāva*.

A departure from the tradition is manifest with Panditarāja Jagannātha who seems to have been influenced by the *Bhakti* stalwarts like Sri Rūpa and Jīva Gosvāmins. He maintains, "Therefore why these the only *rasas*? Propped on the supreme God-head, manifested through the enthralling horripilation and flow of tears etc., well nourished by the emotions of joy at the time of listening to the narrations of the Purāṇas like the Bhāgavata and others, the intimate and immediate experience of the *Bhakti* sentiment in devotion to the Lord is utmost difficult to conceive. The devotion here in the form of love for the Lord, is the stable emotion. This cannot be included under the *Śānta rasa*, there being a contradiction between attachment and detachment."⁷ It is really a pity that in spite of strong advocacy for the *rasahood* of *Bhakti*, Panditarāja declares his slavery to the tradition and

1. Nāṭyaśāstra, Garkwad Series, Baroda 1934, Vol I, IV. 16

2. Ibid, Vol I, IV. 125

3. Dhvanyāloka locana, Ed. Chowdhamba Series, p. 175

4. Abhinavabhāratī, Delhi 1960, p. 656

5. Kāvyaaprakāśa, Ed. Jhalakara, Poona 1938, p. 118

6. Kāvyaanusthāna, Ed. Mahavira Jain Vidyalaya, Bombay 1938, p. 106

7. Rasagangādharā, Nirnaynagar Press, Bombay 1916, p. 45

no intrinsic defect or shortcoming in *Bhāṣā* being potentially capable of culminating in the status of a fullfledged *rasa*. Its inclusion, therefore, under one or the other emotions or sentiments serves practically no purpose and cannot, therefore, be justified, if *rasa* in its pure intrinsic nature is the very essence of the Highest Bliss "Rasa, verily is He". "One enjoys Supreme Bliss on attainment of this Rasa."¹ This authority of the highest philosophic value goaded the protagonists of the *Bhaṭṭi* school not to recognise it as a mere *rasa* but to proclaim it as *rasa-rāṭ* or the king of *rasas*, the only sentiment capable of transformation into the eight, nine, or twelve traditionally recognised *rasas*.

The motive force behind a *rasa* is not merely a recognition by a group of literary critics but the very underlying vitality, the real joy, that forms the fundamental numenon of love, pathos, fear etc. capable of taste by the men of taste.

The stable emotion of all-engulfing, sweet attachment develops through the eight successive stages of *Bhāṣā*, *Prema*, *Sneha*, *Aśā*, *Pranaya*, *Rīga* and *Aśwāga* to mount into the *rūḍha bhāṣā* that is the rarest wealth by itself.² The joy and ecstasy are inexpressibly tasted both in union and separation, the poison, honey and nectar being fused into one in both the aspects. It is an irony of anguish and enjoyment to be suffering severe pangs of separation even amongst the most intimate embraces of the lover or the beloved. And it is the highest boon to dive deep into the loving embrace where a glance would be a well nigh impossibility in the case of love with *parakīyā*.³ The poor wretch knocking about for a handful of gram strikes against the inconceivable fortune of the rain of golden treasure overhead.⁴

mony within the just man's psyche, and from the fact that when a man is attracted to excellence in men and actions everywhere he is only being drawn by an anxiety for the most valuable part of himself. There can never be a real conflict between a man's concern for himself and his concern for what is valuable in the world around him.

1. *Rasa rasī sah. Rasas hyāṁśaṁ lobhānand āstasī* Tattvīya-
nigad, Gita Pras, Gorakhpura, V E 2:19 p 173

2. *Ujjvalanilamanī*, p 416

(1) *Bahu vārvate yatah ābahu yatra prachyāna kīrṇakṛtsam ca.*
(ii) *Yā ca muho durābhātā nī paramā mannatāṁsa rasī ḥ*

3. *Ibid* p 34

4. *Ibid* p 360-81

This is the supreme Copernican change wrought by the Vaisnavite rhetoricians in the nucleus of the Sanskrit poetics in so far as the traditional literature used to revolve round the mundane objects of senses and now the whole structure moved on the pivot of the Absolute Lord, the dearest of the dear, the loveliest of the lovely and the final goal of all poetry, poets and poetics

- (b) Bhagavadbhakti Rasāśna-
 Kāntādi visayā vā ve rasādvāstatra nedham,
 Rasatvam puṣṭate pūrnasukhāparatvalāraṇāt,
 Paripūrṇarasā Kṣudrarasabhyaḥ bhavaivedratib,
 Abhāvairbhava nāditiprabhava bahavattarā

to us than what they would mean to any schoolboy or linguist or lexicographer or scientist, I am afraid we are no literary critics and we cannot claim to interpret rightly the principles of criticism.

Much earlier than Bhāmaha, in Kālidāsa himself, we have the invocation to *śabdā* and *artha* as happily wedded to each other in a harmony which is the privilege of poetry. No Indian theorist could take this aesthetic harmony (*sāhitya*) for granted, that would be begging the question. His business was to explain it in detail, in terms of literary categories. In all poems, whether taken in parts or as a whole, there is beauty and the business of the theorist is to demonstrate the hidden art of the poet in the use of *śabdā* and *artha* to result in the reader's aesthetic delight.

This brings us to the second basic premiss of all the Sanskrit theorists that all poetry must end in the reader's delight, whether it is called *prīti* (joy), or *ānanda* (bliss) or *rasa* (aesthetic experience). I would like to know if there is a single writer in the whole range of Sanskrit *Alaṅkāraśāstra* who denies this essential fact, viz., the reader's delight while enjoying a poem. In this broad sense, and this is the only sense which is justified, all concepts propounded in the *śāstra* are aesthetic concepts, i.e. concepts concerned with the elucidation of beauty as attained by the unique *sāhitya* of *śabdā* and *artha*.

III

Now let us see how each of the concepts throws light on 'beauty' in poetry and how each provides a sufficient explanation in itself without opposition to, but in relation to, the other concepts.

First comes *Alaṅkāra*, perhaps the most misunderstood of all concepts. Its differentia itself is *prabokti* or the principle of *anvitā* to use Bhāmaha's expression. Without imaginative handling by the poet there is no *alaṅkāra* of any type—of *śabdā* or of *artha*. One is regarded as a poet at all because his perception involves the activity of his imagination or *pratibhā*. It is the imagination which perceives things in multi-coloured relations, similarity, contrast, identity, etc.

never *ornamental*. It is the poetaster or imitator that we have the mechanical adding up (*astha*) where art is reduced to artifice, and this abuse only proves the rarity of *mahākars* or master-poets. This consideration of propriety or *aucitya* is the first requirement in the making of a literary critic and without it, one would be no more than a pretender in the critic's dress.

What then is the nature of the total impression of beauty with reference to which something may be accepted as appropriate (*ucita*) or rejected as inappropriate (*acucita*)? This question turns on the criterion which is at the basis of all literary judgement, of all statements of *gunas* or excellences and *doṣas* or flaws in literature. *Gunas* and *doṣas* are related concepts and their dichotomy is disastrous. The Indian tendency towards normative classification usually makes one lose the binding thread of underlying principle behind all accepted *gunas* and *doṣas*. Again, we fall back on the literary taste as the guiding factor and on the aesthetic delight of the critic in deciding this issue.

At this stage we have to face another question. Is all poetry uniformly good? Are there no gradations of goodness or different manifestations of goodness? By goodness is here meant aesthetic and not ethical valuation, of course. Again from the earliest writer on poetics proper, viz., Bhāmaha, up to the latest, we have converging evidence to the fact that at least two types of beauty are clearly distinguishable, their mixture constituting a third. One is the sweet and spontaneous path of genius which can be contrasted with cultivated artistry revelling in gaudy glitter of thought and language. If the first is natural art, the second is cultivated and sophisticated art. Criticism has to recognise both. This is at the back of the concept of two styles or *mārgas* or *rītas*, viz., *Vaidarbhī* and *Gaudī*, later including *Pāñcālī*, the mixed one. Kālidāsa represents the first, as Subandhu the second by common consent; while Bāṇa illustrates the third. One may be interested in further subdivision of *Rīti* or one may not be. But the fundamental recognition of *Rīti* cannot be avoided by any *sahṛdaya* or literary critic.

What then is the basis for all *Rītis*? The answer is to be sought in the total impression of beauty conditioning all

Perhaps it could be the stuff of drama. But what about poetry, accepted as poetry by one and all? Is there no beauty in language valued for its own sake, no beauty in thought commonly held as valuable? If we agree that we have something more in poetry than mere represented emotion, we must at once realise that any definition making *rasa* in the narrow sense the *sine qua non* of poetry like *rāhyarī rasātmakam kāvyaṃ* by Viśvanātha, should fall wide of the mark. For as Jagannātha himself admitted ungrudgingly, the word *rasa* is a much abused term in Sanskrit poetics. Its precise significance must be caught by the critic before bandying it about recklessly.

I avoid all the textbooks on *Ala-kāraśāstra* and take what the dictionary writer has to say on *Rasa*. Kṣīrasvāmin, the brilliant commentator on Amaraśaṣṭa, has this to say on *rasa* —

ratyādayo bhāvā anukriyamānāḥ
sāmāyikāḥ rasyanta iu rasāḥ;

yadāhuh —

“vibhāvairanubhāvaivāśca vukto'tha vyabhicāribhīḥ
āsvādyatvāt pradhānatvāt sthāyīeva tu rasībhavet.
[Kṣīrasvāmin on *Amaraśaṣṭa*, Nāṭya-varga, H D.

Sharma's edn., Poona, 1941, p. 51.]

Avoiding all controversy, this must be accepted as the crucial meaning of *rasa*. It is a *sthāyibhāva* (i.e. one of the eight recognised by Bharata) which gets heightened into *rasa* by the blending of *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*. All these are mental states, moods, feelings or emotions except *vibhāvas* which are the stimuli, physical or personal, occasioning mental states. Their imitation or representation by actors make them relishable to spectators in drama. This is the very essence of Bharata's concept of *Rasa* and should not be lost sight of in abstract theorisings about aesthetic experience indulged in by several writers in the name of *rasa*.

Let us ask ourselves whether in our *Mahākāvya*s, such *rasa* can be felt or explained. Take the first canto of the *Kumārāsambhāva*. We have Kālidāsa's fine description of Mount Himālaya. Now it is a simple *parvata-parvataḥ*. Can we assert that there is *rasa* in Bharata's sense? If any one were to assert so, we should ask him these questions :—What

all concepts in *Alankāraśāstra*, ancient as well as modern. It admits intellectual ideas (*rasu*) and figurative modes (*alankāra*) on a par with mental states and emotions (*rasādi*) into the realm of poetry provided they undergo the minimum transformation through the imagination (*pratibhā*). The poetic process itself is searchingly re-defined as *suggestion* or *dhvani* to clear the common misunderstandings of it by scholars as identical with primary or secondary denotation (*abhidhā* or *lakṣanā*). *Dhvanī*, then, is not a new concept as such, it is the understanding philosophy of all concepts, viz, *rīti*, *alankāra*, *guṇa-dōṣa*, *aucitya*, *rasa*, etc. Even the worst critics of Ānandavardhana, viz, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Mahimabhaṭṭa accepted the searching analysis of Ānandavardhana, while quarrelling with him on the issue of the name to be given to the underlying poetic function, which is unique. Though I have not used the word *Dhvanī* so long in this paper, all my re-valuation of the different concepts has been from the attitude of *dhvani* only, and I claim no originality for it.

The implications of such a re-valuation on practical criticism are obvious. Practical criticism will have to analyse poetic beauty inhering in form as well content, now taken as one unit, and now taken in part, under all the different heads of *Alankāra*, *Guṇa*, *Rasa* etc, and no one analysis would be complete by itself. To talk of a poem's *rasa* as existing without its *alankāra* or *guṇa* is anathema. The earlier the analogy of detachable ornaments (*hārādīvadāṅkārāḥ*) is shed, the better it would be for practical criticism. We may talk of a poet's failure when *alankāra* miscarries; but not of poet's success without a shred of *alankāra* or *guṇa*. If the truth of this is realised, we could write independent studies of every Sanskrit poet in as many chapters as we have concepts, to bring out the success or failure of the poet. Such studies might put a stop to our cheap imitation of Western critical jargon and raise the prestige of Indian literary criticism itself.

may or may not be a *Rasika*. The audience enjoys the feelings of pleasure and pain in a detached, impersonal manner and thus the enjoyment of *Rasa* becomes a sort of universal experience. *Bharata*, therefore, seems to be quite right in not using the word *Sthāyibhāva* as equivalent to *Rasa*. The aesthetic pleasure which has been called *carvanā*, is essential for *Rasa*-experience. The masterpieces of Sanskrit literature provide us abundant food for the enjoyment of the intellectual palate. They provide not only sweet products for immediate enjoyment but are also tasteful to ruminate on for the whole of our life. Sanskrit poetry is a fountain of pleasure for one's solitary moments. I am never tired of impressing on our youngmen the pleasures of Sanskrit literature, as apart from value of this language as a vehicle for literary writings and modern scientific terminology.

Every writer of Sanskrit poetics has expanded on the importance of *Śabda* or *Artha*, and some have emphasised their inter-relation. The simple truth is that we cannot separate the *Śabda* from the meaning anymore than the *Ardhanārīvara Śiva* from *Pārvatī*. *Kālidāsa* has involved them both together, वागोदिव मन्दरौ दामयप्रतिपत्तये. The most comprehensive and acceptable definition of poetry therefore appears to be *Panditarāja's* : स्वयोरप्यर्थव्यतिपादक इव वाक्य and not a host of other definitions which are well known, but which leave out one aspect or the other of good poetry. The use of language with a view exclusively to beauty—and not for bombast or meaningless jargon—is the only true explanation of all *Alankāras*. Hence it is but *Dharm*, used in its wide sense. The *Dhvani* school has rightly dominated the field of literary criticism ever since it was propounded by *Ānanda-Vardhana* and explained in all its implications by *Abhinavagupta*. *Kuntala* could not convert the later critics to *Vakroktu* being the soul of poetry as it was identified with one of the *Alankāras* however much he tried to make its definition very pervasive.

I may say a few words about the great emphasis laid on *Pratibhā* by various writers. No doubt a poet's *Pratibhā* is of great importance in any composition. But modern psycho-

अलङ्कारस्वरूपविवेचनम्

डा० ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा

अलमुपपदपूर्वके कृधातो घञप्रत्यययोगादलङ्कारशब्दस्य व्युत्पत्तिः । घञ्-
प्रत्ययस्य भावकरणयो रित्यलङ्कारमलङ्कृतिर्वेतस्य प्रथमोऽर्थः, "अलङ्कृतं-
जेनेत्यलङ्कारः" इति करणप्रत्ययनिबन्धाच्च अलङ्कारमाधनमित्यस्य द्वितीयो-
ऽर्थः । अलङ्करणमिति प्रथमोऽर्थः शोभाधानापरपर्याय एव । स च मूलतः कर्मरूप
(अत्र कर्मणा वैशेषिकगत कर्मानभिप्रेत न तु व्याकरणगत कर्मकारकः) गमन-
पठनश्रवणादिवदभ्यापि कर्मरूपत्वात् । कर्म चेद मुख्यतः कविमन्त्रद्वयम्, तस्यैव
एतदवलम्बनेन काव्यप्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् । सहृदयस्य तु काव्यगतस्यास्य शोभाधानस्य
प्रतीतिर्न हि कर्मरूपत्वेन अपि तु गुणात्मकधर्मरूपत्वेन पूर्वविद्यमानरूपेण शोभा-
धानश्रेष्ठाधानस्य सम्पन्नत्वेन प्रतीतिः । सा चैषा प्रतीतिः शोभारूपैव ।

अलङ्करणमाधनमित्यलङ्कारशब्दस्य द्वितीयोऽर्थः साधनरूपोऽस्ति ।
साधनञ्चेद न हि बाह्ययोगेन काव्यशोभाभाषकः किमपि तद्विहतिं सत्त्वमपि तु
दान्तरिकयोगेन तच्छोभाषायकं तदन्तर्बन्ति सत्त्वम् । तदन्तर्बन्तित्वाच्च तस्य
काव्यधर्मत्वमेव । एवमप्राप्यलङ्कारस्य काव्यशोभाभाषकत्वरूपधर्मात्मकत्व
मिदम् । तच्चालङ्कारस्य शोभात्मकत्वेनैव श्रद्धानुपपन्नमित्युक्त्याप्यलङ्कार-
सहृदयदृष्ट्या शोभारूपः मौन्दर्यरूपो वेति पर्यवसितम् ।

इदं मौन्दर्यं शब्दार्थगतत्वेन द्विविधं सत् शब्दालङ्कारोऽर्थालङ्कारश्चेत्य-
लङ्कारद्विविध्यं प्रयोजकमित्यालङ्कारविभागा मनम् । तच्च शब्दार्थयोर्मैदृश-
भावेऽसम्भवमित्यत्र वदन्त भेदेऽनुसृतम् । स च शब्दस्य सामान्यार्थग्रहणेन
न सम्भवति, उच्चारणामेव सह अर्थसत्त्वस्यापि तत्रान्तर्भावात् । अतः शब्द
उच्चारणस्य इत्यस्मान्नि स्वीकार्यम् । तथात्वे कर्णविषयभूतस्य उच्चारणरूपस्य
शब्दस्य बुद्धिविषयभूतादर्थाव्याख्यानोपपत्तेः । अतः शब्दालङ्कार उच्चारण-
सौन्दर्यमर्थालङ्कारश्चायं मौन्दर्यमित्याधानम् । परं केवलस्योच्चारणसौन्दर्यस्य
समीपविषयत्वेन बाह्यागतत्वाभावात् बाह्ये च शब्देन सह अर्थस्य निपतसम्बन्ध-
दर्शनात् शब्दालङ्कारे उच्चारण-सौन्दर्यस्य अर्थसम्बन्धित्वमनायकत्वाऽपत्तिर-
मित्यर्थसम्बन्धमेवोच्चारणसौन्दर्यं शब्दालङ्कारस्य स्वरूपमिति पर्यवसितम् ।

१. घञि च भावकरणयो—अष्टाध्यायी ६-४-२७

२ अत्र शोभाया विवेचनं विषयगतं रूपमाशयं कृतं न तु आत्मगतं
रूपमाशयं ।

विकल्प बाह्यार्थान्कारकत्वेन प्रतीतेर्हृदयावनंबन्धमत्र रम्यवाच्यार्थेनवापर-
पर्यायमिति तत्रैवाग्रहलङ्कारतात्पर्यमन्वेष्टेयम् ।

अथ वृत्तकोत्सा ध्वन्यालोनामलङ्काररूपवक्रोक्त्यनुनादिकं वक्रान्ते-
र्यम्यचमत्काररूपध्वन्याभावादम्यवाच्यार्थस्यैवालङ्कारत्वं युक्तम् ।

अलङ्कारस्यैतत्त्वरूप ध्वनिवादिना सम्मतं न वेति आनन्दादिदृष्टे-
लङ्कारलक्षणोऽष्टाद्विधेने—

‘जगादिनाम्बलङ्कारा मन्त्रा कटप्रादिवन् ।

—ध्वन्यालोकः

‘उपकुर्वन्ति न मन्त्र येऽङ्गद्वारेण जानुचिन् ।

हारादिवलङ्कारान्तेऽनुप्राणोपनादयः ॥

—काव्यप्रकाशः

अलङ्कारस्यागाधिनवादनस्य च बाह्यवाच्यरूपत्वाद्बाह्यवाच्य-
चारत्वस्यैव त्रयेण शब्दार्थगतालङ्कारत्वम् । तथात्वेऽपि बाह्यवाच्यकर्मणि-
ऽनागमशब्दस्य द्युपाशान्तरं रम्यध्वन्यनुसृष्टिभावेनैव शब्दतत्त्वविकारो हेतुः ।
रम्यध्वनी बाह्यादीनामगन्तान् तदात्मकवाभिधानं तेषां युक्तम् । परममन्त्रे
रम्यध्वन्यभावेऽपि अलङ्कारमद्भावेन विज्ज्व शब्दविषय बाह्यवित्तमन्यमन्त्र-
स्मृतम्’ इति ध्वनिवादिना सम्मतेनापि तथात्वस्वीकारेण स्वतन्त्रतया अलङ्-
काराणां प्रतिपादनोपपत्तेर्नहि नवत्रातवाभिधानं तेषां युक्तम् ।

अभिनवगुणपादाद्यान्तु ‘तथा हि अचेतनं शवशरीरं कुण्डलाद्युपेतमपि
न भाति अलङ्कारसंज्ञाभावाद्’ इति रम्यध्वन्यभावे न हि अलङ्काररूपं विनापि
मौन्दर्यं मन्त्र इत्येतेषां मतं विचारणीयम् । अत्र तथा हि अचेतनं शवशरीरं
कुण्डलाद्युपेतमपि न भातीत्यत्र प्रथमं विचार्यते । अत्र रम्यस्य प्राणानुसृत्येन
रसरहितयोः शब्दार्थयोः शवशरीरतुल्यत्वमभिव्यक्तमन्त्रम्, परं पूर्वदिष्टमान-
प्राणविगमे इव शरीरस्य पूर्वविद्यमानरमापहारे एव शब्दार्थयोः शवशरीरत्व-
मग्नवान् प्रवृत्ते च रमामेगमात्रदर्शनेन तयात्वाभावात् न हि रमरहितयोः
शब्दार्थयोः शवशरीरतुल्यत्वं युक्तम् । एवं नहि ‘रमः प्राण एव’ इति यदि श्रु-
तामाग्रहन्ति नौरसशब्दार्थयोर्मूर्त्त्यादिवदेव निष्प्राणशरीरत्वं स्यात् । मूर्त्या-
दपस्वालङ्कारयोगेन विमपि चारम्य भजन्त इत्यनुभवसम्मतम् । अतो नौरस-
शब्दार्थयोरप्यलङ्कारयोगेन मौन्दर्ययोग इति ज्ञेयम् ।

वस्तुतः शवशरीरेऽलङ्काराभावात् नत्रापि तदाभावेन वा तत्र चारम्यभावे
प्राणविगमनप्रतीतिरन्या तद्वर्धनैव हेतुः । अन्यादिव प्रतीतेः नवशरीरेदिव
प्रकृतेऽपि नष्टप्राणयोगान् सम्प्रति च तत्र तददर्शनान् अनुमानत्र मिद्धि । न
तथा नीरसशब्दार्थयोः शब्दार्थयोः रमस्य निपत्ययोगभावेन तत्र तद्विगमन-
प्रतीत्यनुपपत्तेः ।

ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा उपनेत्र तु भिन्नमेव । किन्तु मुखे यत्सौन्दर्यं कुरूपता वा विद्यते
तस्य तस्या वा किं स्वरूपम् ।

रे प्र द्विवेदो मुखमेव तत्सौन्दर्यम् ?

ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा मुखमेव तत् ।

वैकटाचलम् योऽयं काव्यशास्त्रे प्रत्यं पन्था विद्यते तस्मिन् किं नामानोचितं
भवद्भिन्नलोचितं येन नूतनस्य कस्यापि पथ प्रवर्तनं भवतामभि-
रूचितम् ?

ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा पूर्ववर्तिनामभिनवमुत्तपादाचार्यादीना मते या वापि सगति-
विद्यते सा तु मया कथितं यदगत्वाभिधानमेवोचितम् । अस्माकं
मते तु वाच्यार्यरूप एवाङ्कारः स्यान् । ते तु पुनरगत्वेन तस्य
निर्देशं कुर्वन्ति ।

वैकटाचलम् अगत्वे का हानि ?

रे प्र द्विवेदो काव्यशास्त्रे तूच्यते यद् 'ब्राह्मणश्रमणन्यायेनालङ्काराणा-
मलङ्कार्यता' । ये इदानीं बाह्यावस्थायामलङ्कारा सन्ति ते एव
यदा अन्तर्भूता भवन्ति, ध्वनिभूता भवन्ति, तदा 'अलङ्कार्या'
उच्यन्ते । एवम् अलङ्कारालङ्कार्ययोर्भेदो ध्वनिवादिनामपि सम्मतः ।
"प्रतीयमान पुनरन्यदेव वस्त्वस्ति वाणीषु महावचीनाम् । यत्तत्
प्रसिद्धावयवातिरिक्तं विभाति लावण्यमिवागनाम्" अत्र यत्
प्रसिद्धपदं वर्तते तस्य व्याख्यानम् आनन्दवर्द्धनेन कृतं यत्
प्रसिद्धेभ्य अलङ्कारेभ्य प्रतीतेभ्यश्च अग्रेभ्य । एवमानन्दवर्द्धने-
नापि अलङ्कारालङ्कार्ययोर्भेदं स्वीक्रियते । भवद्भिन्नस्वभावेन
प्रतिपाद्यते भूतमेव सौन्दर्यमिति वत् । अनेन किं नूतनत्वं सिद्धं
काव्यशास्त्रे इत्यस्माकं जिज्ञासा ।

रामचन्द्र द्विवेदो . अलङ्कारविषये प्राचा मते व्यवस्थाद्वयी विद्यते, एका अन्वय-
व्यतिरेकगर्भा अपरा आश्रयाश्रयिभावगर्भा । प्रथमा प्राधान्येन
सम्मतं द्वितीया च स्वपितुरनुवर्तिनी रस्यकेण प्रतिपादिता ।
सम्मतस्य मतेऽत्र एवभूतशब्दस्य अन्वयात् एवभूतशब्दस्य च
व्यतिरेकादत्र शब्दालङ्कार अर्थालङ्कारो वा । अयं शब्द अत्र
चाह विद्यते अयमयं अत्र चार विद्यते इति निश्चित्य रस्यकेण
स्याप्यते अयं शब्दालङ्कार अर्थालङ्कारो वा । यदि शब्दार्थयो
शब्दार्थालङ्कारयोश्चाभेदं स्वीक्रियते तर्हि शब्दस्वाभाव-
ालङ्कार अर्थस्वाभाव-अर्थालङ्कार । तर्हि किमाश्रित्य, किं स्वमे-
वान्वयीकृत्य एवमप्य तस्यैवालङ्कारस्य शब्दालङ्कारता अर्थ-
ालङ्कारता वा स्यात् ? अभेदे च आश्रयस्य पूर्ववर्तित्वम् आश्रितस्य

व्यवहारः न भवति । चारुशब्दार्थता तु पूर्वभाविनी स्वीकार्या ।
 रमयदर्थे पूर्वत्र चारुशब्दार्थसंदर्भो न भविष्यतीति तु क्वचिन्त-
 नीयम् । आत्मनः सर्वत्र विद्यमानतायामपि यथा 'जीवात्मा' इति
 शब्दस्य मनुष्ये एव व्यवहारो भवति तथैव इयं रत्नदेवता तत्रैव
 निष्ठति यत्र मन्दिरं सुन्दरं भवति । तत्र कोऽपि अलङ्कारविशेष-
 स्यात् वा एतत्सम्बन्धः । किन्तु चारुशब्दार्थता तु भविष्यत्येव ।
 मा वनोन्मिह्यातिशयाख्यादिरूपा वा स्यात् । अलङ्कारविशेष-
 स्तु प्रयोजनम् । • भवता भवेन तु रम्यार्थस्य काले सर्वत्र
 सद्भावादर्थोऽङ्कारत्वं निरनवसाऽऽपत्तिः । प्राचा भवे तु बहुत्र
 दोषाभावरूपत्वं स्यात् ।

बोध, भाव-बोध, मृत्यु-बोध आदि स्पष्टतया पाश्चात्य प्रभाव के सूचक हैं।

हिंदी-आलोचना के इतिहास का आयाम लगभग सवा चार सौ वर्षों का है। उसके दो स्पष्ट अवस्थान हैं। पहला अवस्थान लगभग सवा तीन सौ वर्षों का है जो हिंदी-साहित्य का मध्यकाल कहलाता है, और दूसरा पिछली एक सताब्दी का है जिसे हम आधुनिक काल कहते हैं।

मध्ययुगीन समीक्षा प्रायेण सैद्धांतिक है। उसका क्षेत्र काव्य तक सीमित है। उसके प्रणेता आचार्य-कवि हैं। उन्हें कवि-आचार्य कहना भी समीचीन नहीं प्रतीत होना, क्योंकि वे प्रकृतिवाचक हैं, उनके साहित्य में आचार्यत्व की अपेक्षा कवित्व का स्वर ही मुखर है। कुछेक अपवादों को छोड़कर प्रायः सारी-सारी समीक्षा पद्यबद्ध है। इस काल की समीक्षा पर मस्कृत-समीक्षानास्त्र का एकाधिपत्य पाया जाता है।

आधुनिक काल में सैद्धांतिक समीक्षा की अपेक्षा व्यावहारिक समीक्षा कहीं अधिक लिखी गयी है। आधुनिक आलोचना का क्षेत्र बहुत व्यापक है। उसकी परिधि में कवित्वेतर साहित्य-रूप (उपन्यास, कहानी, निबंध, रेखाचित्र, रिपोर्टाज आदि) भी समाहित हैं। ये गद्य-रूप पश्चिम की देन हैं। अतएव इनकी आलोचना भी पाश्चात्य समीक्षानास्त्र के मानदंडों द्वारा निर्धारित है। परन्तु, काव्यशास्त्र और काव्य-समीक्षा के क्षेत्र में मस्कृत का प्रभाव अप्पाहत रहा है।

आलोचना-पद्धतियाँ

मस्कृत-आलोचना-पद्धति के प्रभाव का आकलन करने के पूर्व एक स्पष्टीकरण अवशित है। कुछ लोग रसवादी आलोचना-पद्धति, भास्करवादी आलोचना-पद्धति आदि का व्यवहार कर दिया करते हैं। यह व्यवहार भ्रान्ति-जनित है। रसवाद या भास्करवाद आलोचना के मानदंड हैं उन्हें आलोचना-पद्धति कहना गलत है। उन मानदंडों के प्रयोग की सीली ही आलोचना-पद्धति है। यदि कोई आलोचक रस की धार की नमौटी मानकर रस का शास्त्रीय विवेचन करते हुए उदाहरण-रूप में किसी रचना का उन्लेख करता है तो हम कहेंगे कि वह आलोचना की आचार्य-पद्धति का अनुसरण करता है। यदि वह आलोच्य रचना की व्याख्या करता हुआ उसमें निहित रस-सौन्दर्य का उद्घाटन करता है तो कहना चाहिए कि वह आलोचना की व्याख्यात्मक पद्धति है। इसी प्रकार केवल प्रसंसात्मक कथन या विवेचना आलोचना की भक्ति-पद्धति या प्रशस्ति-पद्धति या 'सन्तुषाम्भवहारी' पद्धति है। दूसरी ओर, केवल दोष-दर्शन आलोचना की आरोपकी-पद्धति या सडन-पद्धति है। नाभय यह है कि रसवाद की दृष्टि से ही आलोचना की विभिन्न पद्धतियों का अवलोकन किया जा सकता है और किया गया है।

“रामचरितमानस” “गोवातली” और “वरवैरामायण” में ही उदाहरण दिये गये हैं ।^१

धार्मिक काल में आचार-पद्धति पर कई प्रकार के दृश्य लिखे गये हैं (१) जिनमें गद्य में नक्षत्र-निरूपण करके उदाहरण-रूप में समुद्र-जायादीं द्वारा उद्भूत पदों के हिंदी-अनुवाद अथवा हिंदी-मध्य दिये गये हैं, जैसे—‘भारती-भूषण’ (अर्जुनदाम केडिया), ‘काव्य-कल्पद्रुम’ (कन्हैयालाल पोद्दार) आदि, (२) जिनमें हिंदी-शैली-परंपरा का पालन किया गया है, जैसे—‘रस-कल्प’ (हरिजोष), (३) जिनमें गद्यबद्ध विस्तृत सैद्धांतिक विवेचन-विवर्तन किया गया है और आदर्शप्रवचनानुसार पुगने या नये उदाहरण भी दे दिये गये हैं, जैसे—‘रस-सिद्धान्त स्वल्प-विवर्तन’ (आनंदप्रकाश दीक्षित), “ध्वनि-संप्रदाय और उसके सिद्धान्त’ (भोलाशंकर व्यास) आदि ।

सिद्धान्त-प्रतिपादन की दृष्टि में एक अन्य प्रभाव भी दृष्टव्य है । जिन प्रकार समुद्र के महाकवियों ने यत्र-तत्र अपने काव्यमंतों की संक्षिप्त निबधना की है उसी प्रकार हिंदी के कवियों ने भी ।^२

समुद्र में टीका-पद्धति या व्यावहारिक समीक्षा का निदर्शन काव्य-कृतियों पर लिखित टीकाओं में उपलब्ध होता है, जैसे सजीवनी (मल्लिनाथ), अयं-द्योतिका (राघवभट्ट) आदि टीकाकारों की आलोचना-शैली आचार्य-पद्धति में भिन्न है । उनकी दृष्टि लक्ष्य रचना पर केंद्रित है, निष्ठात-मस गौण है । अपनी भाष्यता के समर्थन अथवा स्पष्टीकरण के लिए उन्होंने आवश्यकता-नुसार सैद्धांतिक विचार-वर्चा भी की है । इन प्रसंग में मल्लिनाथ की प्रतिज्ञा ध्यान देने योग्य है “नामूलं लिख्यते विचिन्तानपेक्षितमुच्यते ।” ‘अमूल’ का आपाततः ग्राह्य अर्थ है—अप्रामाणिक । इसमें एक दूसरा अर्थ भी छोछि होता है—टीकाकार या काव्यालोचक के लिए काव्य ही मूल वस्तु है, उन्हें छोड़कर इधर-उधर की गण्य हांकना अवांछनीय है । “अपेक्षित” की व्यंजना यह है कि सहृदय-प्रबुद्ध पाठक की काव्य का मर्म समझाने के लिए विस्तृत

१. जीवन के लच्छन लिए रामायण के लच्छ ।

तुलसीभूषण ग्रंथ की या विधि कियो प्रतच्छ ॥

—तुलसीभूषण (अग्रसंग्रहित), पृ० १

२. वाग्याविच सपुनरी वाग्यप्रतिपत्तये ।

—कालिदास

गिरा वरय जल चौवि गम कहिअउ भिन्न न भिन्न । —तुलसीदास
मुभापित हारि विगत्ययो गदाल दुर्जनम्यावर्गिणोत्तिवामृतम् ।

तदेव घने हृदयेन नञ्जनो हरिमहाग्निमिवानिनिर्मलम् ॥ —बाण
कवि विधान रस क आधूरी । दृग्दिनिबर निजरना दूरी ॥ —जायसी

मिलता है।^१ सृक्ति-पद्धति का अनुनाशन विगमित रूप हिंदी-विद्वानों द्वारा लिख्यवादी गद्यो मूक्तिकाओं, जाकागवाणी की दासियों, अपनी कृति पर लिखवाने या छद्म नाम से स्वयं लिखे गये लेखों और अश्विदित साहित्यकारों पर प्रणीत मोक्ष-प्रबंधों में भी देखने को मिलता है।

इनके विनरोध, ऐसी समीक्षाएँ भी पायी जाती हैं जिनका प्रयोजन आलोच्य विषय का खंडनमात्र है। 'व्यक्तिविवेक' और 'चित्रनीमामावटन' इसी पद्धति की आलोचनाएँ हैं। यह बात ध्यान देने योग्य है कि सम्वृत में मूक्तियों कवियों को लक्ष्य करके कला और नवीन-मूल्य शब्दावली में निर्माणवात्मक समीक्षा का निबोध-ना प्रस्तुत किया गया, खंडनात्मक समीक्षा सैद्धांतिक और पूर्वनिश्चय-युक्त नहीं। हिंदी में भी वाच्यनिक युग में दोषदर्शनपरक आलोचनाएँ लिखी गयीं, किंतु वे सैद्धांतिक न होकर व्यावहारिक हैं। 'कालिदास की निरवगुणता' में महावीरप्रसाद द्विवेदी ने, और 'प्रसाद जी के दो नाटक' में कृपानंद गुप्त ने आलोच्य साहित्यकारों के केवल दोषों का उद्घाटन किया है। पहिली कृति को तत्त्वानिनिवेशी और दूसरी को मन्त्रोरी आलोचना का उदाहरण माना जा सकता है।

राजगोवर ने भाषण के जो चार प्रकार (१. आरोचनी, २. मत्सरी, ३. मनुष्यात्मवहारी, ४. तत्त्वानिनिवेशी) बतलाये हैं^२ उनमें से प्रथम दो खंडन-पद्धति के आलोचक हैं, और तीसरा सृक्ति-पद्धति का। चौथे को औचित्यानुसार व्याचारे-पद्धति अपना टीका-पद्धति के समीक्षक-वर्ग में रखा जा सकता है।

सम्वृत-समीक्षाशास्त्र में काव्यालोचन के छह भागदंड प्रसिद्ध हैं। गन, अन्वय, ध्वनि, रीति, वक्रोक्ति और औचित्य। हिंदी के प्राचीन एवं वर्तमान आलोचनाशास्त्री प्रायः अलंकारवादी या रसवादी हैं। किसी-किसी ने आनंद-

१. उपमा कालिदासस्य भावेत्यर्थगौरवम् ।

दण्डिः पदालिख्यं भावे सन्ति त्रयो गुणः ॥

मुद्रच्छांशमृद्व कविराज इति त्रयः ।

वक्रोक्तिर्भाषानिपुणाश्चतुर्षो विदिते न वा ॥ —राघवदासशेखर

कविता करवा तीन हैं तुलसी केनब मूर ।

कविता खेती इन तुली बाबर बिनत मजूर ॥

मूर मूर तुलसी कवी उदुगल केनबदाम ।

२. काव्यमीमांसा (भाष्यकवाड संस्करण), पृ० १४

कि रस-सिद्धांत व्यापकतम है और उसकी सर्वाधिक चर्चा हुई है। वे रस को व्यवस्थित मानते हुए भी यह भूल जाते हैं कि वस्तुरूप, अलंकाररूप और रस-त्रिविध ध्वनि की केवल एक विधा रस है। ध्वनि व्यापक है, रस व्याप्य है। रस-निरूपक ग्रंथों की तुलना में अलंकार-निरूपक ग्रंथों की संख्या वही अधिक है। रस-सिद्धांत-प्रोपक "काव्यप्रकाश", "साहित्यदर्पण", "रसगंगाधर" आदि में भी अलंकार को रस की अपेक्षा कई गुना अधिक स्थान दिया गया है। व्यावहारिक समीक्षा में तो टीकाकारों ने प्रायशः अलंकारों का ही निर्देश किया है, यदा-वदा ही रस की चर्चा की है। नाट्यशास्त्रीय रचनाओं के रस-प्रकरण को सम्मिलित करने पर भी संस्कृत-समीक्षा में रस की चर्चा अलंकार की अपेक्षा ग्यून है।

हिंदी में भी अलंकार पर भवने अधिक लिखा गया है। मात्रा की दृष्टि से रस का स्थान उसके बाद आता है। पचास से अधिक केवल अलंकार-ग्रंथ लिखे गये हैं।^१ रसनिरूपक ग्रंथों के दो वर्ग हैं। सामान्य^२, और शृंगारपरक^३। शृंगार के सदर्भ में नायक-नायिका-भेद-वर्णन रीति-परंपरा के आचार्यों का प्रिय विषय रहा है। किन्तु ही ग्रंथ केवल नायिका-भेद पर लिखे गये हैं।^४ शृंगार-वर्णन में उनका मन विशेष रमा है, अन्य रसों की चर्चा केवल काम-चलाऊ है। उनकी प्रतिभा का चमत्कार नायिका-भेद-निरूपण में अवलोकनीय है। आधुनिक काल में रस-सिद्धांत पर कई महत्वपूर्ण स्वतंत्र ग्रंथ और शोधप्रबंध लिखे गये हैं।

हिंदी में समीक्षाशास्त्र का आरम्भ तत्र हुआ जब संस्कृत में समीक्षाशास्त्रीय मौलिक चिन्तन का युग अवसिन्त हो चुका था। भरत, भामह, वामन, आनन्दवर्धन, कुतक आदि मौलिक विचारक थे। टीकाकार होते हुए भी अभिनवगुप्त की मौलिकता अमरिघ्न है। १२ वीं शती ई० से ही संस्कृत-समीक्षाशास्त्र में

१. ललितललाम (मतिराम, १७वीं शती ई० का उत्तरार्ध), भाषाभरण (बंदीमाल, १७४८ ई०), पद्मभरण (पद्माकर, लगभग १८१० ई०), अलंकार-भूषण (भगवानदीन, १९१८ ई०), अलंकार-मीमांसा ("रत्नाल", १९३९ ई०), भारती-भूषण (अर्जुनदास केडिया, १९३० ई०), अलंकार-भजरी (कन्हैयालाल पोद्दार, १९३६ ई०) आदि।

२. रसिकप्रिया (केशवदास, १५९१ ई०), रससारांग (भिलारीदास, १७४ ई०), नवरसतरंग (वेणीप्रवीन, १८२१ ई०), रसकलस (हरिऔध, १९३१ ई०), रसमञ्जरी (कन्हैयालाल पोद्दार, १९३४ ई०) आदि।

३. हितउत्तरिणी (कृपाराम, १५४१ ई०), रसराज (मतिराम, लगभग १६४३ ई०), शृंगारनिर्णय (भिलारीदास, १७५० ई०) आदि।

४. रामनाथ मुलकी (१६५० ई०), कुदन (१६९५ ई०), केशवदास (१६९७ ई०), पद्मराम (१७०८ ई०) आदि के द्वारा लिखित 'नायिकाभेद'।

की पूति आधुनिक युग में हो रही है।^१ इस पीढ़ी के अनेक आलोचकों ने मरुत के मूल-ग्रन्थों का गंभीर अनुशीलन करके काव्यशास्त्र के विभिन्न पक्षों की प्रौढ़ समीक्षा की है। यह सस्कृत-काव्यशास्त्र की महिमा का चमत्कार है कि हिंदी के अनेक आलोचक मूल-ग्रन्थों से संबंध बनामिन्न होने पर भी आचार्यप्रवर के उच्चासन पर विराजमान हैं।

विचारणीय प्रश्न

क्या मरुत के समीक्षाशास्त्र में प्रतिष्ठित काव्य के मानदंड आज पुराने पड़ गये हैं? क्या मरुत का कोई काव्य-सिद्धान्त ऐसा है जिसके निष्पत्ति पर हम पुरानी और नयी कविता को समान रूप में परख सकते हैं? नयी पीढ़ी के अनेक आलोचकों का उत्तर है—नहीं। उनकी दृष्टि में काव्य के पुराने प्रतिमान काल-कवलित हो गये हैं। नये प्रतिमानों के निर्धारण में वे ईमानदारी, वर्तमान की सही पहचान, प्रामाणिक अनुभूति, अनुभूति की जटिलता, तनाव, विपटन, विमर्श, बिडबना आदि शब्दों के नूतन अर्थबोध आदि की बात करते हैं।

उनकी आलोचनाओं में निष्पत्ति यह तात्पर्य अवश्यमेव मान्य है कि पुराने सिद्धान्तों को आँख मूँद कर नहीं स्वीकारना चाहिए, उनमें युगधर्मानुसार संशोधन अपेक्षित है। लेकिन, जो कुछ भी पुराना है उसे कंबल की तरह छोड़ देना चाहिए—यह अतिवाद है।

नया कवि कोई सिद्धान्त निर्दिष्ट करके चलने के लिए बाध्य नहीं है। परंतु, आलोचक को इनका स्वच्छंद होने का अधिकार नहीं है। उसे यह निर्दिष्ट करने चलना पड़ेगा कि कविता और कवितेतर वाटमय में क्या तात्त्विक भेद है, कविता के वे कौन-से अग्रवर्तक धर्म हैं जिनके आधार पर उसकी समीक्षा करनी है। बहुत-से नये समीक्षकों के सवध में कठिनाई यह है कि वे सामान्य रूप में समीक्षा-सिद्धान्त के उपस्थापन को, और विशेष रूप में नयी कविता के मूल्यांकन में समर्थन के काव्यशास्त्र के निर्माण को भी हटिवादिता या दबिमानुमी समझते हैं।

दूसरी ओर, सस्कृत-काव्यशास्त्र के समर्थक आलोचक हैं। कुछ आलोचकों का आप्रह है कि हम ही काव्य की एकमात्र बमौटी हैं और नयी कविता भी उसी बमौटी पर परकी जानी चाहिए। वे हम ही व्यापकता की बात तो करते हैं किन्तु उसे सिद्ध करके दिना नहीं सकते। उनका हम-सिद्धान्त अभिनवगुप्त

१. हम-सिद्धान्त : स्वरूप-विवरण (आनंदप्रकाश दीक्षित), हम-विमर्श (राममूर्ति त्रिपाठी), ध्वनि-प्रदाय और उनके सिद्धान्त (भोलाशंकर व्यास), रीतिरालीन अलंकार-माहिर्य का शास्त्रीय विवेचन (ओमप्रकाश शर्मा), लक्षणा और उक्त हिंदी-काव्य में प्रसार (राममूर्ति त्रिपाठी) आदि।

गीत बेचता हूँ,
मैं सभी किसिम के गीत
बेचता हूँ ।

जी माल देखिये दाम बढाऊंगा,
बेकाम नहीं है, काम बढाऊंगा,
कुछ गीत लिखे हैं मस्ती में मंने,
कुछ गीत लिखे हैं पस्ती में मंने,
यह गीत सख्त सरदर भुलायेगा,
यह गीत पिया को णस बुलायेगा ।
जी, पहले कुछ दिन नर्म लगी मुझको
पर पीछे-पीछे अबल जगी मुझको,
जी, लोगों ने तो बेच दिये ईमान ।
जी आप न हों मुन कर ज्यादा हैरान ।
मैं सोच-भमस कर जासिर
अपने गीत बेचता हूँ,
जी हाँ, हठदूर मैं गीत बेचना हूँ ।

इस रचना से क्या रस की प्रतीति होती है ? यदि कोई हाम्य रस की अनुभूति करता है तो उसे हृदयहीन समझना चाहिए । यदि करुण रस माना जाए तो फिर 'करुण' की भजो परिभाषा बनानी पड़ेगी । एक प्रयोगवादी कवि-समालोचक का कथन है कि इसकी सबसे बड़ी विशेषता यह है कि इसमें गंभीर बात हल्के पुरके ढग में कही गयी है । लेकिन हल्के-फुल्के ढग को कविता का लक्षण नहीं माना जा सकता । बान्धविकता यह है कि इस कविता में ध्वनि का ही चमत्कार है । आज के पाठक और समालोचक की रूचि और मूल्यावधारणा विवृत हो गयी है । कवि ने यह बात बड़ी शक्तिमत्ता और चित्रात्मकता में कही है । उसमें प्रत्येक वाक्य से ध्वनित प्रत्यक्ष चमत्कार को उत्कर्ष प्रदान करने हैं ।

समिरा उदाहरण धर्मवीर भारती की 'कविता की मौत' से लीजिए ।

मूख ने उसकी जवानी तोड़ दी
धो वही ही नेक थी कविता
मगर धनहीन थी, कमजोर थी,
और बेचारी गरीबन मर गयी ।

इसमें शोक या करुणा नहीं है, क्योंकि कविता का उपमहार है :
लो तुम्हें मैं फिर नया विश्वास देती हूँ
नया इतिहास देती हूँ,
कौन कहता है कि कविता मर गयी ?

जाने वाली प्रत्येक वस्तु पर लागू हो सके। नायक के साथ तादात्म्य वाला चिदान्त व्यापक नहीं है। वस्तुतः भावक का समस्त भाव-वस्तु के साथ तादात्म्य होता है।

वेंकटाचलम् यह ठीक है कि प्रेक्षक अथवा सहृदय का सभी नाटकीय पात्रों से तादात्म्य होने में कुछ वैयक्तिक कठिनाइयाँ हैं। किन्तु कवि का—जिसका मैंने अपने निबन्ध में सहृदय से अभेद स्थापित करने का यत्न किया था—काव्यमर्जन के समय अपने पात्रों से तादात्म्य स्वीकार करना ही पड़ेगा। यदि कवि अपने पात्रों से तादात्म्य स्थापित नहीं कर सकता तो वह उनका स्वाभाविक चित्रण, उनके मानसिक भावों का यथार्थ विवेचन और उनके अनुरूप भाषा का प्रयोग करने में सफल नहीं हो सकता। यह मानना ही पड़ेगा कि कवि अपने पात्रों के साथ तन्मयीभाव करता है।

उ. भा. सिंह यह ठीक है कि कवि तन्मयता के बिना नहीं लिख सकता, अभिनेता भी तन्मयता के बिना अभिनय नहीं कर सकता। प्रेक्षक को भी अपनी एक तन्मयता होनी है। पर प्रश्न यह है कि ये तीनों स्वरूप एक ही हैं या इनमें कुछ साम्य-वैषम्य है। मनुमोहन सरस्वती के मत को स्वीकार करते हुए मैं यह मानता हूँ कि इनमें 'तादात्म्य' है अर्थात् साधारणीकरण में मात्रा का भेद है, गुण या स्वरूप का नहीं। जिस प्रकार आप कवि और सहृदय को मूलतः एक मानते हुए उनकी अनुभूतियों में मात्रा का भेद करते हैं उन्हीं प्रकार मैं भी प्रेक्षक और कवि के तादात्म्य में मात्रा-भेद को स्वीकार करता हूँ।

वेंकटाचलम् : अनुभूति या भावना में तो मात्राभेद हो सकता है पर तादात्म्य के साथ ऐसा संभव नहीं है। या तो पूरा तादात्म्य होगा या विलुप्त नहीं होगा—आधा तादात्म्य हो, आधा न हो ऐसा नहीं हो सकता।

उ. भा. सिंह : काव्य तीन प्रकार के हो सकते हैं—एक तो कवि किसी प्रस्थान वधावस्तु पर लिखे, दूसरे अपने जीवन में जाये और निकट में अनुभव किये गये किसी व्यक्ति के विषय में लिखे और तीसरे स्वयं अपनी अनुभूतियों पर लिखे। इन तीनों में प्रथम तो मुनी-मुनायो या कल्पित वस्तु है, दूसरी कवि द्वारा देखी गयी और परिचित, तीसरी में कवि स्वयं उसका अनुभव करने वाला है। तीनों ही प्रकार के काव्य में साधारणीकरण होता है पर उसमें अन्तर स्वीकार करना होगा। हम जो प्रेक्षक के

रा गो शर्मा 'दिनेश' : आपने बनी जो यह कहा कि जिसने जवाहरलाल नेहरू को देखा है वह उनके विषय में अच्छी कविता लिख सकता है। मेरे समझता हूँ कि प्रत्यक्ष अनुभूति से अच्छी कविता नहीं लिखी जाती है, परोक्ष अनुभूति से लिखी जाती है। यदि किसी को माँ भर गई है तो वह बैठ कर रोवेगा, कविता नहीं लिखेगा। सुन्दर दृश्य को देख कर व्यक्ति प्रसन्न होगा उस पर कविता नहीं करेगा। कविता करने की प्रक्रिया पूर्णतः परोक्षानुभूति की प्रक्रिया है। जवाहरलाल नेहरू को देखें या न देखें, यदि कवि को परोक्षानुभूति प्रदल है तो वह अच्छी कविता कर सकता है।

बसन्त जेठली : परोक्षानुभूति से आपका क्या तात्पर्य है? क्या 'अनुभूति' जैसी वस्तु भी परोक्ष हो सकती है? मेरे समझता हूँ 'परोक्ष' और 'अनुभूति' ये शब्द अपने में विरोधी हैं।

रा गो शर्मा 'दिनेश' : यह बेहोरां कह सकते हैं जिन्होंने कविता नहीं लिखी।

लेखकों और कवियों ने भी पाश्चात्य काव्य-पद्धतियों से प्रभावित होकर स्वतंत्र लेखों के रूप में 'विम्ब' या 'विम्बवाद' की चर्चा और स्थापना का प्रयत्न किया है। इन नए चर्चाकारों में कुछ व्यक्ति तो ऐसे हैं जिनका दृष्टिकोण यह रहा है कि पाश्चात्य सिद्धान्तों को भारतीय सिद्धान्तों के साथ रख कर समझा जाए; किन्तु अधिकांश नए लेखक परिचय के लारेन्स, इटिपट, एडरस पाउण्ट आदि साहित्यकारों एवं विभिन्न मनोविज्ञानवेत्ताओं के चिन्तन से आश्रित होकर भारतीय काव्यशास्त्र को अंगुली मानने की अपनी कुटिल या धोखा करने गत हैं। अद्यावधि आधुनिक भारतीय आचार्यों में केवल डा० नरेन्द्र ही ऐसे विन्ध्य हैं, जिन्होंने प्राच्य और पाश्चात्य काव्य-सिद्धान्तों का गंभीर मध्यन करके अपनी स्थापना निष्पक्षता से देने हुए स्वतंत्र पुस्तक के रूप में इसी पाश्चात्य सिद्धान्त 'काव्य-विम्ब' का निष्पक्ष दृष्टि से विमर्श विस्तरेपण किया है। हम विभिन्न परिभाषाओं पर विचार करने हुए यहाँ हिन्दी के इन मनोयोग आचार्यों द्वारा प्रस्तुत विम्ब की व्याख्या का आभ्यास प्रस्तुत करेंगे।

'विम्ब' शब्द अंग्रेजी 'इमेज' शब्द का पर्याय है। इस ('इमेज') शब्द की व्याख्या को स्पष्ट करने के लिए गार्टर आक्सफोर्ड डिक्शनरी, 'चेम्बर्स ट्वेंटीएथ सेन्चुरी डिक्शनरी', 'थर्ड न्यू इण्टरनेशनल डिक्शनरी', 'एन्साइक्लोपीडिया ब्रिटैनिका' आदि में लेखक कई महत्त्वपूर्ण कवियों और लेखकों की कृति में तक की सम्मिलित बिना आ सकती है। यथा—गार्टर आक्सफोर्ड डिक्शनरी की परिभाषा इस प्रकार है। विम्ब : 'किन्हीं पदार्थ का मनचित्र या मानस प्रतिरूप'।

इन परिभाषा से यह निश्च होता है कि विम्ब पदार्थ का एक ऐसा चित्र है, जो मानस पर या मानस के द्वारा निर्मित होता है।

चेम्बर्स ट्वेंटीएथ सेन्चुरी डिक्शनरी में निम्नांकित परिभाषा मिलती है।

"बल्बना यथवा स्मृति में उपस्थित चित्र अथवा प्रतिरूप, जिसका अतिशायन नहीं है।"

दस परिभाषा में बल्बना और 'स्मृति' के नाथ-नाथ चतुर्दश का भी उल्लेख किया गया है। यहाँ विम्ब को माना तो चित्र ही बना है, किन्तु उसे मन से हटा कर मन के धर्मों तक विस्तृत कर दिया गया है। चतुर्दश की अनिवार्यता अन्वीक्षारक के समझी व्यापकता तथा दी गई है। 'न्यू इण्टरनेशनल डिक्शनरी' में प्राप्त परिभाषाएँ इस प्रकार हैं—

विम्ब पदार्थों के आन्तरिक नादृश्य की अभिव्यक्ति है।^१

स्वयं डा० नगेन्द्र ने भी अपनी परिभाषा देते हुए यही तथ्य सिद्ध किया है। वे लिखते हैं कि 'काव्य-विम्ब शब्दार्थ के माध्यम से कल्पना द्वारा निर्मित एक ऐसी मानस-छवि है, जिसके मूल में भाव की प्रेरणा रहती है।' इस परिभाषा में पूर्वोक्त सभी परिभाषाओं में अधिक व्यापकता है। डा० नगेन्द्र ने काव्य-विम्ब को मानस-छवि माना है, उनके लिए शब्दार्थ का माध्यम बतलाया है, कल्पना को उनकी निर्मात्री शक्ति घोषित किया है तथा भाव को प्रेरक कहा है। स्पष्ट है कि काव्य के मदन में विम्ब एक ऐसी अभिव्यक्ति है, जो भाव की प्रेरणा से, कल्पना की रचना से एवं शब्दार्थ के माध्यम में मानस में बनकर बाहर आती है। यदि ध्यान से देखा जाए तो डा० नगेन्द्र ने इस तथ्य को बहुत अच्छी तरह से स्पष्ट कर दिया है कि विम्ब काव्य का रूप है, काव्य की आत्मा नहीं, एक माधन है, मिडि नहीं। वे मानते हैं कि 'कला की सर्जना बन्तुव' विम्ब-रचना का ही नाम है।' यहाँ विम्ब-रचना को कला की सर्जना बताने में उनका यही उद्देश्य प्रतीत होता है कि विम्ब कला का सञ्चित स्वरूप है। यदि कला सर्जना को ही, जो कि किसी अन्य नाध्य या नाधन है, नाध्य मान लिया जाए, कला-कला के लिए वा नारा मध्य स्वीकार कर लिया जाए, तो बात दूसरी है, अतथा इन परिभाषाओं ने अनुभार विम्ब काव्य के नाधन पक्ष का ही सिद्धान्त ठहरा है, माध्य पक्ष का सिद्धान्त नहीं। और इस दृष्टि ने यह सिद्धान्त भारतीय काव्यशास्त्र के अलंकार, रीति, बहोक्ति आदि सिद्धान्तों के समान काव्य के अभिव्यक्ति-मय तक ही सीमित रह जाता है उनकी आत्मा का मूल्य नहीं देन पाता। मध्य बात यह है कि विम्ब मूलतः अनुभूति के सम्प्रेषण में महायत्न होता है। काव्य में यह सम्प्रेषण-प्रक्रिया शब्द के द्वारा ही पूर्ण हो सकती है। यही वाक्य है कि हर शब्द विन्नी न विन्नी अनुभूति के विम्ब को प्रेषित करता है। शब्द की स्वतंत्र रूप में एक सीमा है, इसीलिए हमारा विम्ब एक जड़ है। बकि इस जड़ता को तोड़ कर जब शब्द को अपनी अनुभूति की अभिव्यक्ति का माध्यम बनाता है, तब प्रतीक जन्म लेते हैं और प्रतीकों के माध्यम में ही इन शब्दों में वह शक्ति आ जाती है, जिससे केवल बन्तुओं के ही नहीं, गुणों के भी विम्ब पुनरुत्पादित हो उठते हैं। इस प्रकार विम्ब शब्द की वह शक्ति बन जाती है, जिससे माध्यम से बन्तु-जगत्, जो भाव-भाव में परिवर्तित हो चुका होता है या गुणधर्म जो मूल में दृष्टकर मान्य

१. काव्य-विम्ब, पृष्ठ ५

२. वही पृष्ठ १

भाग को उस सीमा तक बढ़ा दिया है, जिस सीमा में पत्रकारिता, इतिहास आदि की पहुँच होनी चाहिए।

वस्तुतः विम्ब-मिथ्या के मूल में यह भाव छिपा है कि काव्य जो प्रस्तुत करता है, वह सब उस वस्तु या गुणजगत् का मूल रूप नहीं होता है, जिसकी प्रत्यक्ष या परोक्ष अनुभूति कवि को होती है, अपितु उस वस्तु या गुणजगत् का प्रतिरूप होता है। इस तथ्य को हम महज में समझ सकते हैं कि विम्ब-मिथ्या के अनुसार काव्य-सर्जना में यथार्थ का नहीं, यथार्थ की प्रतिवृत्ति का जन्म होता है। और प्रतिवृत्ति जहाँ है, वहाँ बहुत-कुछ प्रतिभा, रचि एवं कल्पना है—वह यथार्थ में भिन्न एक नई सृष्टि है। जिस प्रकार दर्पण में हमारी जो छवि बनती है, वह हमारा शरीर नहीं होती और प्रायः ठीक बँसी भी नहीं होती जैसा हमारा रूप है। निश्चय ही दर्पण का उस छवि के निर्माण में अद्भुत योग रहता है। एक दर्पण में हम अपनी छवि देख कर आगे ही मौन्द्य पर मुग्ध हो जाते हैं, तो दूसरे दर्पण में अपने उसी रूप को बदला हुआ देखकर उस दर्पण को ही फोड़ देना चाहते हैं। फिर भी हम यह नहीं कह सकते कि हमारा कौन-सा रूप यथार्थ है। कान्ध में विम्ब-निर्माण की प्रक्रिया तो जड़ दर्पण में भिन्न चेतन मानस द्वारा पूर्ण होती है और उस पर बुद्धि तथा आत्मा का भी अनुशासन रहता है। इसीलिए वह लोकोत्तर भूमि पर ले जाती है। यह वह लोक नहीं होता जिनकी छवियाँ जड़ता पर आधारित होती हैं, और जिनमें हमारी इन्द्रियाँ प्रत्यक्षन प्रभावित रहती हैं, अपितु वह ऐसा जगत् होता है, जहाँ हमें लौकिक अभाव की पूर्ति का असर मिलता है। अब विम्ब केवल 'जो है' की ही प्रतिविम्बा नहीं होता या 'जो था' के अंगों में ही नहीं बनना अपितु 'जो नहीं है' या जो 'नहीं था' उसमें भी वह समान की मापदण्ड के आधार पर अवतरित होता है। पारश्चात्य विचारक 'कोचे' ने अपने मौन्द्य-दर्शन के मूलाधार में जिस महजानुभूति को स्वीकार किया है, वह कवि की प्रतिभा, रचि और कल्पना के संयोग से अनेक रूपों में परिवर्तित होती हुई विम्ब बनती है। और तभी उसमें मौन्द्य-भावना जाग्रत होती है।

विम्ब और सम्यक् काव्यशास्त्र

जैसा कि हम आरम्भ में संकेत कर चुके हैं, भारतीय काव्यशास्त्र में 'विम्ब' की एक मिथ्या के रूप में तो स्वीकृति नहीं है, किन्तु सम्यक् के आचार्य 'विम्ब' शब्द और काव्य में उसकी स्थिति में परिचित अवश्य थे। विम्ब हमारे विभिन्न काव्य-मिथ्याओं में महजारी मात्र है, रचना का नेतृत्व नहीं करता। इस तथ्य को कुछ अधिक विस्तार में समझने के लिए अब मैं पहले रम-मिथ्या को लिया

लक्षणा और व्यञ्जना के प्रायः समस्त व्यापार विम्बात्मक ही होते हैं। अन्तर है तो इतना ही कि विम्ब जिस रूप या गुण का मूर्तन करता है, उसको सीमा रहती है, जब कि लक्षणा और व्यञ्जना उस सीमा को लांघ कर अपनी शक्ति का आगे भी प्रसार करती हैं। 'निरालय' की कविता 'जूही की बली' को नए समीक्षक विम्ब-रचना का अच्छा उदाहरण मानते हैं। इस कविता में, पवन और बाली दोनों प्रतीक भी हैं। किन्तु, विम्ब और प्रतीक का समस्त अस्तित्व उसमें लक्षणा एवं व्यञ्जना पर ही निर्भर है। जहाँ प्रतीक और विम्ब-विधान का कार्य समाप्त हुआ है, वहाँ व्यञ्जना का महत्वपूर्ण कार्य शेष भी रह गया है। और, जब उस व्यापार का विस्तरेषण किया जाता है, तब वे विम्ब उभरते हैं, जो शब्दार्थ में नहीं, व्यङ्ग्यार्थ में निहित थे। ये निहित विम्ब अचाक्षुष तो हैं, पर अगोचर नहीं।

अलंकार-विधान तो समग्रतः विम्बात्मक ही होता है। सादृश्यमूलक सभी अलंकारों में विम्ब का चमत्कार निहित रहता है। आचार्य डॉ० नगेंद्र ने इन सम्बन्ध में दृष्टान्त और निदर्शना अलंकारों के साहित्य-दर्पण और वाक्य-दर्पण ग्रन्थों में दिए गए लक्षण उद्धृत किए हैं, जिनमें 'प्रतिविम्ब' एवं 'विम्बानु-विम्ब' शब्दों का प्रयोग भी हुआ है। ये दोनों अलंकार ही नहीं, अपना, उत्प्रेक्षा, रूपक, सदेह, आदि अनेक अलंकारों की स्थापना विम्ब के आधार पर ही हुई है। ससृष्ट के आचार्यों ने विम्ब को गौण मानकर उससे उत्पन्न होने वाले शब्दार्थ-चमत्कार ही को प्रधानता दी है। अलंकार-सिद्धान्त का समस्त प्रस्तुत और अप्रस्तुत विधान विम्ब-रचना करता हुआ ही आगे बढ़ता है। वास्तविकता यह है कि अलंकार-विधान में विम्ब का ही नहीं विम्ब के भी विम्ब का ग्रहण होता है। यही कारण है कि अलंकार-ग्रन्थ चमत्कार केवल विम्ब के प्रस्तुत पक्ष तक ही सीमित नहीं रहता, न वस्तु या गुण की व्यपार्यता उस काव्य का सौन्दर्य बँध पाता है। हरिजीव जब लिखते हैं—

दिवस का अवमान समीप या
मगन या कुछ लोहित हो चला,
तरु-शिखा पर थी अब राजती
कमलिनी-बुल-बल्लभ की प्रना ।

तब वस्तु-जगत् का 'फोटो' ही सामने आता है, मानस-साक्षात्कृत विम्ब का विस्तार उससे भी विम्ब-प्रतिविम्ब तक नहीं होता। अतः विम्ब-सिद्धान्त के लिए जहाँ यह छद्म विरोध कवित्व-पूर्ण है, वहाँ अलंकार-सिद्धान्त के लिए इस का स्थान वाक्य की सामान्य श्रेणी में ही है। विशेष श्रेणी का कवित्व

ही नहीं, उनके द्वारा होने वाली अभिव्यक्ति और अभिव्यक्त्य के औचित्य को भी सम्मिलित किया गया है। अलंकार, रस, आदि सबके लिए औचित्य की भर्पादा स्थापित की गई है। उस भर्पादा में विम्ब-योजना भी आजाती है। विम्ब सिद्धान्त का अगर कोई जरा उपेक्षित रह जाता है, तो मात्र वह अंग जो खण्डित बिम्बों में जुड़ा हुआ है, क्योंकि उसमें औचित्य का पूर्ण निर्वाह नहीं हो पाता।

वक्रोक्ति में वर्ण में प्रवृत्त नज़रों की जो वक्रता स्वीकृत है, वह स्वतः बिम्बों का निर्माण ही नहीं करती बिम्बों के माध्यम से ही काव्य की निद्रि तक पहुँचती है। जब प्रसाद की निम्नांकित पक्तियों में काव्य-वक्रता स्थापित करते हैं, तब उनसे महज रूप में विम्ब-विधान साबने आजाता है—

पिर रहे ये घुँघराले बाल
अत अवलजित मुख के पास ।
नील घन शायक में मुकुमार
मुषा भरने को बिघु के पास ॥

अब स्पष्ट है कि वक्रोक्ति-सिद्धान्त भी विम्ब-प्रक्रिया की उपेक्षा नहीं करता, किन्तु वह विम्ब को अपना लक्ष्य भी नहीं बनाता है।

विम्ब-सिद्धान्त की अपूर्णता

सम्पूर्ण काव्यशास्त्र के प्रमुख-सिद्धान्तों में विम्ब की स्थिति को समझ लेने पर यह स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि यह सिद्धान्त काव्य की समीक्षा का पूर्ण सिद्धान्त नहीं कहा जा सकता। रचना-प्रक्रिया के मानसिक आयामों तक तो इस सिद्धान्त की अच्छी पहुँच है। काव्य की व्याख्या भी इस सिद्धान्त के द्वारा सरलता-पूर्वक की जा सकती है, किन्तु काव्य की निद्रि का मूल्यांकन इस सिद्धान्त के द्वारा सम्भव नहीं है। विम्ब-विधान के द्वारा हम काव्य में विभिन्न मानवी छवियों को तो देख सकते हैं, किन्तु उन छवियों की योजना का लक्ष्य खोजने नहीं जा सकते। अब विम्ब-सिद्धान्त रूप-गुण-मण्डन द्वारा मौन्दस्य-भावना की स्थिति एवं खण्डित-सिद्धि विम्बों के माध्यम से जिज्ञासा-चिन्ता की बौद्धिक स्थितियों तक ही हमें सीमित रखता है। वह काव्य को एक मासित्राय मर्जना नहीं करने देता। इन सिद्धान्त में स्मृति और वक्त्रता का जिक्र महत्व है, उनका भाव की परिणति का नहीं है। इसीलिए आजकल हिन्दी की विचार-प्रधान नई कविता में यह सिद्धान्त पश्चिमी साहित्य से भी अधिक सम्मानित हो रहा है। विम्ब सिद्धान्त की अपूर्णता का मुख्य कारण यह है कि विम्ब काव्य-भाषा की धामा है, काव्य की नहीं, काव्य का तो वह उपकरण

है, उसने प्रभावित होता है या अनुभूति प्राप्त करता है तो वह अनुभूति उनके अन्दर भावात्मक होनी है। भाव से मेरा तात्पर्य काव्यशास्त्रीय भाव नहीं अपितु सूक्ष्मता है। किसी भी वस्तु या दृश्य की अपने मानन पर बनी हुई भावात्मक सत्ता को हम जब प्रेषित करना चाहते हैं तो यथावत् प्रेषित न करके उन सबने हमारे मानन पर बने हुए रूप या छवि को हम प्रेषित करते हैं। जो प्रेषित किया जाता है वह हमारी दृष्टि में बिम्ब है। यह बिम्ब वस्तु का यथार्थ रूप नहीं होता क्योंकि उसके पीछे व्यक्तिगत अनुभूति भी होती है। बिम्ब के माध्यम से हम किसी अनुभूति को जगाना चाहते हैं। इस प्रकार बिम्ब माध्यम है—माध्यम न होने के कारण वह काव्य की आत्मा नहीं हो सकता, जैसा आपने द्वितीय प्रश्न में कहा है। जहाँ तक एक प्रतीक का संबंध है, यह किसी भाव को व्यक्त करने के लिए प्रयुक्त होता है जैसे मैंने उल्लू वाला उदाहरण दिया है। मत्स्य के लिए 'नीली झील' भी एक प्रतीक है। इन प्रतीकों को कवि ने किसी अनुभूति में गड़ा है—अनुभूति की भाषात्मक सत्ता तो यहाँ भी है किन्तु नीली झील प्रतीक बिम्ब नहीं हो सकता, बिम्ब वस्तुतः प्रतीक में भावों की वस्तु है।

डा. कल्याणलाल शर्मा सम्भवतः आपको यह रोचक प्रतीत होगा कि हिन्दी तथा अन्य भारतीय भाषाओं में जो बिम्बमिथ्यान्त अंग्रेजी के प्रभाव से आया है वह वस्तुतः अंग्रेजी को चीन और जापान की देन है। भारतीय तथा रोमन आदि लिपियाँ बनें या अक्षर सूचित करती हैं किन्तु चीनी लिपि वस्तुतः एक चित्र लिपि है जहाँ प्रत्येक चित्र एक वस्तु या विचार का चोतक है (idiogram)। पचास वर्ष पूर्व जब इबरा पाउण्ट ने सर्व प्रथम इस मिथ्यान्त की जन्म दिया तो उसके मन में यही धारणा थी कि एक पूरे विचार के लिये एक शब्द-चित्र ही क्यों न प्रस्तुत किया जाए। अपने १५-२० वर्षों के जीवन काल में यह इंग्रैण्ट ने अधिक प्रसिद्ध नहीं हो सका। हिन्दी में यह सम्भवतः इस शताब्दी के तीसरे दशक में आया किन्तु चौथे दशक के प्रारम्भ होने तक यह बहुत अधिक प्रसिद्ध नहीं रहा। कारण यह है कि इस प्रकार की कविता लिखना बहुत कठिन है। (अनु.)

रतेरुत्पत्ते, कटाशादिभिरनुभावं तस्या प्रतीते, लज्जादिभिः सञ्चारि-
भिरच तस्या परिपोषस्य स्वीकारात् । तथापि उत्पत्तिमन्तरा प्रतीते परि-
पोषस्य च अभावात् उत्पत्ते प्राधान्यमादाय उत्पाद्योत्पादकभावसम्बन्ध एव
प्राधान्यात्तदभिमत । अत एव तन्मतम् उत्पत्तिवादनाम्ना व्यपदिश्यते । विभा-
वादिभिः उत्पत्त्यादित्रयेण परिपोषमुपयात रत्यादिग्धाद्यिभाव एव रसः ।
एष च रस मुख्यतया रामादावनुकार्ये एव वर्तते, किन्तु सार्वव्याचिवा-
ङ्गिकाहार्यत्वेनैरभिनयै रामाद्यनुकर्तारि नटेऽपि रामत्वाद्यनुसन्धानबलात् स
वर्तते । रामत्वाद्यनुसन्धानयत्नात् नटे गौण्या वृत्त्या, आरोपेण वा विद्यमानस्य
रसस्य साक्षात्कारात्मकं ज्ञान सामाजिकं विधीयते । तज्ज्ञानाच्च सामाजिका-
नामानन्दानुभूतिर्जायते, रते स्वभावमुन्दरत्वेन तज्ज्ञानस्य आनन्दप्रदत्वात् ।
तदुक्तं पण्डितराजेन—“मुख्यतया दुष्यन्तादिगत एव रसो रत्यादि कमनीय-
विभावोद्यमिनयप्रदसामोविदे दुष्यन्ताद्यनुकर्तारि नटे समारोप्य साक्षात्प्रियते ।
मतेऽस्मिन् साक्षात्कार धर्म्यं लौकिक आरोप्यासौ त्यलौकिकः” । इति ।

श्रीशङ्करस्तु—चित्रतुरगादिन्यायेन रामत्वेन ज्ञाते नटे नटेनोच्चारित-
वाक्यबलानुसन्धेयं विभावार्यं वारणं शिक्षाभ्यामसमधिगतपाठवप्रदर्शितं
अनुभावाख्यं कार्यं, कृत्रिमनिजानुभवाज्जनयलान् प्रकाशितं सञ्चार्याख्यं
सहकारिभिरच रामविपरिण्या रतेरनुमिति विधीयते सामाजिकं । यद्यपि नटे-
नाभिनीता विभावानुभावव्याभिचारिण वृत्रिमा, न पारमाधिका, तथापि
नटेन शिक्षाभ्यासगमधिगतापूर्वकौशलेन ते विभावादयस्तथाभिनीयन्ते यथा
सामाजिकाना तत्र कृत्रिमताज्ञानं न भवति । अतो भवति तेभ्यो रतेरनुमिति
सामाजिकानाम् । सा च अनुमितिसिद्धाति रति स्वभावमुन्दरत्वात् आनन्द-
प्रदा इति सामाजिकाना वागनया चर्च्यमाणा सामाजिकेभ्य आनन्दं ददाति,
आनन्दरूपरमजनयत्वाच्च रसनाम्ना व्यपदिश्यते । अत्र मते रसमूत्रस्यसयोग-
पदस्य गम्यगमकभावात् साम्यन्ध, निष्पत्तिपदस्य चानुमितिरर्थः । रतेरनुमानादेवं-
तन्मतं नैयायिकमतानुसारि व्यपदिश्यते ।

अश्रोभयत्रापि मते अनुवृत्तिनिष्ठा रत्याविभावार्या रतिरेव रतियाना
रसजनिका । एकत्र सा अनुकर्तारि रामरूपनानुसन्धानात् ज्ञानलक्षणा लौकिक-
मद्विवर्णे साक्षात्प्रियते । अपरत्र च अनुमित्या ज्ञायते रमिके इति वैकल्यभेदः ।
परन्तु अस्मिन्मतेऽपि रति सामाजिके नैव वर्तते । अपि च या रति रस-
तामेति सा लौकिकी एव न तु ततो विरुद्धा । तस्या ज्ञानाच्च य आनन्द उप-
जायते न सामाजिकेण तिष्ठतीति रसानन्दयोर्वैयधिवरण्यं न तु सामानाधि-
करण्यम् ।

भट्टनायकस्तु अन्येभ्यो लौकिकेभ्य सास्त्रीयेभ्यश्च शब्देभ्य वाच्यशब्दानां
वैलक्षण्यात् तेषु अभिधाव्यापाराद् भिन्न व्यापारद्वयं स्वीकरोति—भाववत्त्व

केवलानां भावकत्वम् अर्थापरिज्ञाने तदभावात्, न च केवलानामर्थानां, शब्दान्तरेणार्थमापत्वे तदभावात्, इत्येवम् भावकत्वमस्माद्विरेकोक्तम्" इत्यादि-
भिलोचनवचने स्पष्टमेव काव्यस्य अर्थान् शब्दार्थयोर्भावकत्वमुक्तं न तु
विभावादीनाम् । अतो विभावादिभि सह रतेन भाव्यभावकत्वमन्वयः ।
तुल्यदुर्जनन्यायेन यदि विभावादेर्भावकत्वमङ्गीर्येत, तदापि भावकत्व नाम
साधारणत्वापादनम् । न च रत्यादे स्थायिभावस्य साधारणत्वापादनेनैव
रतिरिष्यति मन्त्रेति वाक्यं सामाजिकानां तस्य भोगो न स्यात् । अतो
हेतोरपि नात्र विभावादीनां स्थायित्वा सह भाव्यभावकत्वमन्वयः सघटते । अत्र
एव पण्डितराजं रक्तम्—^१"एव साधारणीकृतेषु दुष्पन्तश्चान्तलादेशकालवयो-
वस्थादिषु पद्मौ पूर्वव्यापारमहिमनि तृतीयस्य भोगकृत्वव्यापारस्य महिम्ना
निगीर्णयो रज्ज्ममयोरद्विक्तसत्त्वजनितेन निश्चितस्वभावनिवृत्तिविश्रान्ति-
लक्षणेन साक्षात्कारेण विषयीकृतो भावनोपनीत साधारणात्मा रत्यादि स्थायी
रम । तत्र भुज्यमानो रत्यादि, रत्यादिभोगो वेद्यभ्रममेव रसः" इति ।

अत्र मते रामादिरति भावकत्वव्यापारेण रामादिव्यक्तिविशेषमन्वयः
परिहृत्य साधारणीकृतेन सामाजिकानां तस्या भोगे न काचिदपि बाधा,
तथापि ना रति न सामाजिकानाम् अपि तु रामादेरेवेति वस्तुगत्या सामाजि-
कानां साक्षात्कारात्मको भोगो नोपपद्यते । स्वस्या एव रते स्वेन मनसा
मह मयोगेन साक्षात्कारमन्वयान् पररत्या मह साधारणीकरणेऽपि मनसः
मनिकर्षाभावात्, मनसः मन्त्रिषमन्तरा च रत्यादीनां साक्षात्कारानुपपत्तेः ।
तस्मादभिनवगुण एतामनुपपत्तिं पण्डितुं रसमूत्रमन्यथा व्याचक्ष्यौ ।

तथा हि य स्थायिभाव साधारण्यमापाद्य सामाजिकैः चर्यमाणं स
रमत्वमधिगच्छति, न न परकीय — अनुकाम्यगताः श्रुतं गतो वा, अपि तु सामा-
जिकनिष्ठ एव । न सामाजिकानां हृदये वामनारूपेण पूर्वमेव वर्तते । किन्तु
तदानीं भोजनिरूपकतद्भावात् वर्तते । यदा तु गद्ये दोषाभावागुणालंकारसंस्कृतं,
गद्यं नाट्ये च आगिकादिभिश्चतुर्विधैरभिनयैः तस्य स्थायिभावस्य
कारणकार्यमहकारीणि समुपस्थाप्यन्ते, तदा सौमित्रव्यक्तिमुपधाति । यदपि
रत्यादे स्थायिनो भावस्य नीतादीनि कारणानि, वटाश्वविशेषादीनि वार्याणि,
लज्जोन्मुखरनिर्वादादीनि महकारिकारणानि च व्यक्तिविशेषसम्बद्धानि इति
तैर्न सामाजिकजनस्य स्थायिनो रत्यादे समुद्बोधनमभिव्यक्तिर्वा सम्भवति,
तथापि वाक्ये तेषां कारणकार्यमहकारिणां दोषाभावागुणालंकारसंस्कृतं सुन्दरैः
शब्दैः नाट्ये च चतुर्विधैरभिनयैः समुपस्थापितत्वात् तानि सहृदयहृदये
स्थानं लभन्ते । चित्तगताश्च ते विभावाश्च चमत्कारित्वात् सहृदयेन भाव्यन्ते

भिनवभारत्यामभिनवगुप्तेन—“तत्र लोकव्यवहारे वार्थकारणमहकारात्मव-
लिङ्गदर्शने स्थाव्यात्मपरिचितवृत्त्यनुमानाभ्यासपाटवादयुना तरेवोद्यानकटाक्ष-
वीक्षादिभिलो किको कारणत्वादिभुवमतिशान्तिविभावानानुभावानामभुपरञ्ज-
कत्वमात्रप्राणं, अन एवालौकिकविभावादिव्यपदेशभाग्यि प्राच्यवार्णादिस्प-
सम्कारोपजीवनरव्यापनाय विभावादिनामधेयव्यपदेश्ये” रित्यादिना सन्दर्भे ।

पूर्व काव्ये नाट्ये च विभावादीना देशकालसम्बन्धपूर्वक विशेषधर्मदुश्चारेण
व्यक्तिविशेषमन्वन्वित्वेनैवोपस्थिति, पश्चात् मानससाक्षात्कारापर्यवस्य
भावनाया तेषा देशकालमन्वन्वपरिहारपूर्वक व्यक्तिविशेषमन्वन्वराहित्येनो-
पस्थितिर्भवतीति प्रतिपादित स्वयमभिनवगुप्तेनाभिनवभारत्याम्—“ग्रीवा-
भङ्गाभिरामम्” इत्यादिवाक्यात् “वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तेरनन्तर मानसो साक्षात्कारा-
त्मिकाऽऽहमित्यतश्चाक्योपात्तकालादिविभागा तावन्प्रतीतिरपजायते”
इत्यादिना ।

व्यक्तिविशेष-देशकालादिमन्वन्वर्तित्वेनैव एव साधारणीकृतविभावादिभि
सामाजिकचेतसि वासनारूपेण विद्यमाना साम्प्रतमभिव्यज्यमाना रतिरपि
व्यक्तिविशेषमन्वन्वराहिता मती साधारण्येनैवाभिव्यज्यते । अर्थात् सामाजिके
साधारणीकृतविभावादिभिर्भिव्यज्यमाना सा रति न सामाजिकनिष्ठत्वेनाभि-
व्यज्यते, अपि तु रतित्वेन रूपेणाभिव्यज्यते । अभिव्यञ्जकाना विभावानुभाव-
व्यभिचारिणा साधारण्यात् । अन एव तत्र सकलहृदयानाम् एकघननयैव प्रतीति
संशयो वा जायते । अर्थात् सकलहृदयाना समानैवानुभूतिस्तस्या । अन्यथा
व्यक्तिविशेषमन्वन्वित्वेन तदभिव्यज्यती तु व्यक्तिविशेषसम्बन्धस्यापि तत्र
सत्त्वात् व्यक्तीना च परस्परमत्यन्त वैपम्यात् रतेरनुभूतिर्न सकलहृदयेषु ऐक-
हस्य भजेत, न च तेषा मृदयाना परस्पर मवादोऽपि उपपद्येत । अत
एवाभिनवभारत्याम्—“यद्यमेव पर देशकालाद्यनालिङ्गितम् । तथाविधे
हि नात्माऽत्यन्त निरम्बुना न वा विशेषत उल्लिखितः । एव परोऽपि ।” इति ।
तथा साधारण्याभाभव्यक्ता रतिश्च सामाजिकेन लौकिकप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेभ्यः,
तादन्त्यावबोधमालियोगिज्ञानान् अस्मिन्मात्रविश्रान्त्युक्तयोगिज्ञानात् च
मिन्नेन अनुभूत्यपरमययिण अलौकिकेन मानसेन ज्ञानेन साक्षात्प्रपद्यते तदा रमो
भवति । न चात्र लौकिकप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणव्यापारः । किन्तुलौकिकविभावादि-
मयोगादशेषनर्तयेय चरणा । सा च प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमोपमानादिलौकिकप्रमाण
अतिवृत्त्याद्यवधारण तथा योगिप्रत्यक्षजनिततदुत्पत्त्यपरमवित्तिज्ञानान्मवल-

१. अभिनवभारत्या पृ २८४ ।

२. अभिनवभारत्या पृ २७९ ।

३. तत्रैव ।

विज्ञा, यथा च तेषां विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिमज्ञा अलौकिक, यथा वा तस्या रसनप्रकारः प्रत्यक्षादिमविविधलौकिकप्रमाणाविवयत्वात् अलौकिक, तथा अस्या साधारणेनोपस्थिताया तात्कालिक्या रते कारणानां विभावादीनां हेतुत्वमपि अलौकिकम् । तथा हि लोके द्विविधो निमित्तहेतुर्भवति—कारकं ज्ञापकश्च । विभावादयश्च रसस्य न कारकहेतवः । यतो हि दण्डादीनां कारकहेतूनामभावेऽपि घटादे स्तिनिर्द्ध्यते । न च विभावादिविषयाभावे रस-
म्यिति केनाप्यनुभूयते, अपि तु विभावादिविषयमस्त्वे एव । अत एव रसस्य विभावादिविषयतावधित्वं प्रोक्तम् । न वापि विभावादय रसस्य ज्ञापका हेतवः । दीपादिभ्यः प्राक् घटादेरिव, ज्ञापकहेतुभ्यः प्रागपि ज्ञाप्यस्य सत्त्वदर्शनात् । न च विभावादिस्य प्राक् रसः केनाप्यनुभूयते, साधारणीकृताया रतेरेव रसमानत्वे रसत्वात्, तस्याश्च विभावादिवर्चनात् प्रागनत्वात् । अतो न लौकिक्या रते रसत्वम् अपि तु तद्विलक्षणाया अलौकिक्या एव । अत एव आचार्येण भगनेन रससूत्रे विभावादीनामुपादानेऽपि स्यादित्यदं नोपातम् । तथा मतिं परकीयां चित्तवृत्तिं रस इत्यन्युपगम्येत न चेदमभीष्टम् । यथोक्तमभिनवगुप्तेनाभिनवभारत्याम्—“अत एव सूत्रे स्याद्विग्रहणं न कृतम् । तन् प्रत्युत शल्यभूतं स्यात् । केवलमौचित्यादेवमुच्यते स्यायी रस इति । औचित्यन्तु तत्स्याद्विग्रहणत्वेन कारणान्निरासः प्रमिद्वानाम् अथवा चर्वणोपयोगितया विभावादित्वावलम्बनात्” इति ।

लोचनेऽप्येतदेव तेन उक्तम् । यथा—“अत एव न परकीया चित्तवृत्तिर्गम्यते इत्यभिप्रायेण ‘विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिमयोगात् रसनपत्तिः’ इति सूत्रे स्याद्विग्रहणं न कृतम् । तन् प्रत्युत शल्यभूतं स्यात् । स्यादित्यन्तु रसीभाव औचित्यादुच्यते । तद् विभावानुभावोचितचित्तवृत्तिमस्कारमुत्तरचर्वणोदयात्, हृदय-
मवादोपयोगिलौकचित्तवृत्तिपरिज्ञानावस्थायाम् उद्यानपुलकादिभिः स्यादित्यन्त-
रत्पाद्यवगमाच्च ।”

न चोभयविधप्रकारमिदं । कोऽपि हेतु लोके उपलभ्यते इति वर्यं विभावा-
दीनां हेतुत्वम् इति शक्यम् । उभयप्रकारभिनस्य हेतो लोके अदर्शनेन तद-
भिज्ञानां विभावादित्तेनानालौकिकत्वनिन्दे । विभावादीनामलौकिकत्व-
मिद्विदं रसस्य अलौकिकत्वमाधिकेति भूषणमेव न दूषणम् । तदुक्तमभिनव-
भारत्याम्—“अत एव विभावादयो न निष्पत्तिहेतवो रसस्य तद् बोधायमे-
ऽपि रसमभवप्रमणान् । नापि जप्तिहेतवः येन प्रमाणमध्ये पतेयुः । तद्विषय-
कम्यचित् प्रमथेयभूतस्य रसस्याभावात् । किन्तु एतद्वि विभावादय इति ।

१. अभिनवभारत्या पृ. २८४

२. लोचने पृ. १५६

यथा—

‘उध्वोचंमारुह्य यदधेनत्त्व,
 धौ पदमनि ध्रान्तिमवेदयन्ती ।
 फल तुदाये परिकल्पिताना,
 विवेकनोदानपरम्परया ॥
 नत्मात्मनामत्र न दूषितानि,
 मतानि नान्येव न शोधितानि ।
 ध्वं प्रतिष्ठापितयोजनाम्,
 मूलप्रतिष्ठाफलमामनन्ति ॥

परमत्र एतद्वदस्य ध्येयं यद् रमास्वादम निविधिरा चमत्कारनिवेशरमना-
 स्वादनयोगममापन्निलयविश्रान्तादिभिरङ्गैर्नभिधीयमानया सकलविधनिर्मुक्तया
 स्वानुभूत्यपरपर्यायया सवित्त्यैव भवति । तस्मात् रमास्वादनार्थं सविद्धि रस
 प्रतीतिप्रतिबन्धकाना सकलविघ्नानामभाव आवश्यक । ते च दिघ्ना—
 प्रतिपन्नावयोर्यना, सभावनाविरह, स्वगतत्वपरगतत्वनियमेन देशकालविशेषा-
 वेश, निजमुखादिविवशीभाव, प्रतीत्युपायवैकल्यम्, स्फुटत्वाभाव, अप्रधानता,
 मगमयोगश्च ।

तत्र प्रथमस्य विघ्नस्य परिहारार्थं लोकसामान्यवस्तुविषयो हृदयमवाद,
 अलोकसामान्येषु तु चेष्टितेषु शब्दाद्वयमादिनामधेयपरिग्रहं त्रियते । स्व-
 गतत्वपरगतत्वनियमेन देशकालविशेषावेष्टारूपविघ्नापन्नारणार्थं च ‘नटी
 विदूषको वार्धपि’ इत्यादि-प्रस्तावनालोकेन नटस्वनाधिगमं तथुरन्मर,
 अलौकिकभाषादिभेदस्याङ्गरङ्गपोटमण्डपगनकक्षादिपरिग्रहनाट्यधर्मिनहितं,
 प्रतिगौरवादिना तत्प्रच्छादनस्योन्मुपायश्च समायीयते ।

निजमुखादिविवशीनावस्य नृतीरविज्जस्य व्यपोहवार्थं तु प्रतिपदार्थनिष्ठं
 मानारण्यमहिम्ना सङ्गमोगत्त्वमहिम्नुनि शब्दादिविषयस्यैवातोद्यगान-
 विविधमण्डपवदविदग्गगतिगादिभिरपगन्जनं समायीयते । प्रतीत्युपायवैकल्य-
 रसस्य चतुर्थस्य दिघ्नस्य स्फुटत्वाभावरूपस्य पञ्चमस्य विघ्नस्य क्षान्तारणार्थं
 लोकसमिगृतिप्रवृत्तुपमृता शब्दसिद्ध्यापारविमदृशा प्रत्यक्षव्यापारकस्या
 अभिनया समायीयते ।

अप्रधानतास्य पष्ठस्य प्रत्यूहस्य व्यपोहनाय अप्रधानविभावानुभाव-
 व्यभिचारित्वनिरिक्ता स्यादेव चवगातोक्तत्वेनाधीयते । अत्र एव ‘स्वादि-
 नावान् रसवमानास्याम’ इत्यादिना तुल्यवगाया एव रसवस्तुतन्, न तु
 विनावादिचर्वाया ।

परिचर्चा

- रे. प्र द्विवेदी - भट्टनायकनतस्यापने भवद्भिरुक्तं यत् स अनुकार्यनिष्ठा रतिर्मेव भवति । अस्त्यत्र किञ्चिदप्रमाणम् ? दत्तुत विभावस्य साधारणीकरणमेव उक्तम् । तत्स्वीकारेणैवान्तेषां मानादिकादीनां तत्र प्रवृत्तिर्घटते । काव्यप्रमाणानां वृत्तापि रतिः साधारणीकृता भवतीत्यत्र श्रमाय नास्ति । अस्ति चेद्दीपकम् ।
- सु. दा. स्वामी - काव्यप्रमाणे रसगङ्गावरे चैतत्सिद्धं त्रिविधं वर्तते 'साधारणीकृता रतिः' । अन्ये रते साधारणीकरणं न जातम् ?
- रे. प्र द्विवेदी - परनिष्ठाया रते साधारणीकरणं भवतीति वृत्तापि काव्यप्रमाणे भट्टनायकनते नास्ति यद्धि नत दा. रानवन्द-द्विवेदिमहोदयेनाश्रया अनुपस्थापितम् ।
- सु. दा. स्वामी - एतत्पूर्वमेव प्रतिपादितं यद्विभावादयः पूर्वं विशेषरूपेण अनुपस्थाप्यन्ते । रतिरपि विशेषरूपेण उन्मेषयिता भवति वा न वा ?
- रे. प्र द्विवेदी - कामनेन परनिष्ठाया रतेरान्वाद्यन्व प्रतिपादितं अन्येऽपि किन्तु भट्टनायकमतेऽपि तदेव वर्तते इत्यत्र हि प्रमाणम् ?
- सु. दा. स्वामी - वर्तते । रतौ को नाम साधारणीकरणान्पूर्वं विशेषो वर्तते । यदुन्मेषयितात्वमेव विशेषः । किन्तु ना रतिः यदुन्मेषयिता एव वर्तते सा साधारणीकृता, न तु मानादिकानाम् ।
- रे. प्र द्विवेदी - सर्वेऽपि भावा विभावस्य एव वर्तन्ते । विभावस्यैव च साधारणीकरणम् । 'साधारणात्मा रत्यादि रित्यत्र मानादिकनिष्ठा एव रतिर्न पुनरनुकार्यनिष्ठा रतिरतिप्रेता ।
- रा. प्र द्विवेदी - 'भावनाभाव एषोऽपि शृङ्गारादिकानां नत' अन्वयविभागे-न्युद्धृतस्य भट्टनायकमतस्यास्य बोधनिप्रदानं ?
- सु. दा. स्वामी - अनिवार्यमात्रमेव पदानामर्थो वर्तते—भावनाद्वारा माना-रणीकरणेन रसस्य भोगो भवति ।

दर्पणदृष्टिर्विवक्षायां माहित्यदर्पणेऽनुमेव क्रममनुसरति । रुटिप्रयोजनाभ्या द्वैविध्यं चोपप्रेक्ष्यमानेव भेदान् षोडशमन्त्रावकता नयति ।

२ काव्यप्रदीपकारादयः क्रममिम—

“रुटिप्रयोजनाभ्या भेदे संभवत्यपि न ते विभाजकत्वेनोच्ये, किन्तु हेतुत्वेनेति न तत्कृतो भेदो गणितः । अत्र एव च पश्चाद् “ध्यम्येन रक्षिता रुटा”-वित्यादिना तन्वृत्त भेद दर्शयिष्यति, अन्यथा पुनरस्मिन्प्रमगान् । एवं च यथोक्तमप्याख्यानेन षड्विधत्वे निष्पृष्टे यन् “षड्विधेति रुटिप्रयोजनोपादान-लक्षणारोपाध्यवमानत्वं षड्विधरूपाधिनि-कल्पिता विधा प्रकाशयन्त्या-मिति षड्विधेति षडोदासप्याख्यायान् तन् “शुद्धं वा सा द्विधा, सारोपान्या तु” इति “एव, ल” शब्दयोरनालोचनविजृम्भितत्वाद्भावेऽयम्” इत्येवम् “अनह्मना शूद्राभेदचतुष्टयस्य स्वीकृत्यम् अमवा आगेपाध्यवमानभूतयो भेदशोपा-दानलक्षणभेदभेदपटकतामुद्भाव्य—

“लक्षणा तावद् द्विविधा—(१) शुद्धा, (२) गौणी च । तत्राद्या द्विविधा (१) उपादानलक्षणा (२) लक्षणलक्षणा च । ते अपि प्रत्येकं (१) सारोपा (२) साध्यवमाना चेति द्विविधे इति शुद्धाभेदश्चत्वारः । गौणी तु द्वेधा (१) सारोपा (२) साध्यवमाना चेति षड्विधत्वं लक्षणाया”-^१ इत्येव षड्विधत्वमन्या आधादयन्ति । मुद्राभाष्यरवारी श्रीमच्छेनदीक्षित^२, म०म० दुर्गाप्रसादद्विवेदी^३, व्यासभट्ट श्रीनन्दविद्यारण्यम्भा^४, डा० नन्दब्रजमिह^५, श्रीनिवासनाम्बो^६ चैतमेव क्रममनुधावन्ति ।

३. म० म० गौकुलनाथोपाध्यायप्रभृतयः^७ पुन प्रागुक्तयोर्भेदजनयो-अन्विमदभेदमन्तोर्गणि निम्नैर्नवाध्वना प्रवर्तन्ते । ते हि ‘आरोपाध्यवमानभूतयोः शुद्धाभेदयो ‘उपादानलक्षण’भूतान्या तान्या विविक्ततामेव गणयन्ति ।

१ “स्वनिर्देश—”इति वा० प्र० आश्विनाराः प्रदीपेऽद्वयगिरिवा ।

२. मुद्राभाष्ये काव्यप्रदीपस्यैवोपार्द्धना “लक्षणा-तावद् षड्विधत्वं लक्षणाया” इमा एव पक्षयो लभ्यन्ते । प्रक्षिप्ता अर्थाभा मनवन्ति ।

३. माहित्यदर्पणस्य निधेयनागरीये सम्करणे पृ० ५६ ।

४ चन्द्राशेखरगोपालानी मद्र० ९ वा० १३ ।

५ श्रीवभाविद्यानवतत् प्रकाशित काव्यप्रकाशस्य हिन्दीनापानुवादः ।

६ मेरुत्त प्रकाशित काव्यप्रकाशहिन्दीभाषानुवाद । अत्रानुवादको मम्मटस्य लक्षणभेदानवैजायिकानपि वयनति ।

७ दाराणसेनमन्त्रद्विविधविद्यायन प्रकाशिते म०म०गो०ना०द्विते काव्यप्रकाशविवरणे ।

प्रवरणमिदं न मापयितुं कामं अनयो लक्ष्यलक्षकयोः भेदाभेदाभायामपि “अनयो-
लक्ष्यस्य लक्षकस्य च गगानटे लक्षणायाः को भेदः” इत्यनेन वृत्तिप्रत्येतोप-
स्थापयति । तदेव प्रकरणमिदं “शुद्धे”ति कारिकाालम्बेन “एव”कार-
साचिध्येन व्यवच्छेद्य प्रकरणान्तरात् “मारोपान्या तु” इत्येव कारिकापलम्बे
व्यवच्छेदमात्रपरे ‘अन्य-तु’-भेदे अवधानो वृत्तिकृत् स्वातन्त्र्यमेव प्रथमते ।
ज्ञातुर्विध्य प्रतिपाद्य च पूर्वोक्तयोः उपादानलक्षणयोः वाच्यप्रकाश इव शब्द-
व्यापारविचारेऽपि भवतनाय “लक्षणा तेन पृथ्वि”तिवाक्योत्तरम् “आद्य-
भेदाभ्यां सहे”ति कृते । इत्य यथा “एव-तु”-शब्दसाचिध्येन प्रदीप-
कार चण्डीदामन्त प्रत्यादेष्टि तथैव “अन्य”शब्दार्थविधान्या ताम्ना प्रदीप-
कारमतमपि प्रत्यादेष्टुं शक्यते ।

२. काव्यप्रकाश-शब्दव्यापारविचारयोर्मम्मटेन लक्षणाया यान्मुदाहरणा-
न्युपस्थापितानि, ये च तेषु तस्या भेदा भवन्ति तदुभयमप्यबोद्धव्यं तादृक्का
स्पष्टम्—

उदाहरणानि	लक्षणाभेदाः
१ वृत्ता प्रविशन्ति	उपादानलक्षणा
२ गगाया घोष	लक्षणलक्षणा
३ गीर्वाहीक	मारोपा गौणी
४ गौरयम्	साध्यवसाना गौणी
४ आयुर्धृतम्	सारोपा शुद्धा
६ आयुरिदम्	साध्यवसाना शुद्धा

प्रकाराल्लक्षणमुपजिगमिषाया पुन “वृत्ता पुरपा प्रविशन्ती”ति “गगायाः
तटे क्षीप” इति, अत्रानि चैवविधानि साहित्यदर्पणवृत्त्यभूतिभिः प्रतिपादितानि
स्वतन्त्रमौ समग्रोप्यत् । न चानी सगृह्णाति । एतच्चात्र विन्मयावह यत्
प्रदीपेऽपि स्थलानीमानि न लम्बन्ते, काव्यप्रकाशवृद्धाहृतानामभेदाभ्यामुक्तानामेव
स्थलानां तत्रोपलम्भान् ।

३. येषु वाच्येषु लक्षणाया उपयोगो दृश्यते तेषामप्यनुसौलनेन तथ्यमिदं
द्रष्टिमानमनुते यदुपभूक्ता एव पृथ्वि भेदा व्यवहारोपयोगिनो भवन्ति नान्ये ।
एतदपि च निम्नप्रदत्तया तादृकया स्पष्टभूयिष्ठम् :—

लक्षणाभेद	काव्यभेद	उदाहरणम्
१. उपादानलक्षणा	अर्थान्तरनमित्रितवाच्यध्वनि	“त्वामस्मि०”, “बदली बदली०” ।

यद्यप्यत्रान्तिमयो काव्यभेदोनामनी नोल्लिख्येते तथापि येषां तत्पूर्ववर्तिना तानि लिख्यन्ते तत इदं स्पष्टं यद् गोडुलनापादिभिः प्रतिपादित एव लक्षणाभेदत्रयं वाक्योपयोगी मम्मटाभिमतश्च सिद्धयति, नान्य, उक्तेषु काव्यस्थेषु प्रकारान्तरोपजनितस्य लक्षणाभेदस्यानुपलम्भान् । लक्षणाया ध्वनीतिप्रकारात्मभिमन्यमान माहित्यरूपेणकारोपि कल्पितैवाक्यत्रयैरेव “गगाया तटे घोष” इत्यादिभिन्नान् उदाहरति, न तु वाक्यस्थैः । यत्र चामी काव्यभेदान् गणयितुं वाक्यस्थान्युपस्थापयति तत्रानावपीमानेव काव्यप्रकाशदृढमिन्नान् पदेव भेदानुपयोजयति नान्यान् । न हि लक्षणापादानोपजीविनः अदिविश्रित-वाक्यवत्स्य ध्वने पदगताय अर्थान्तिग्नमनाय ‘नयने तस्यैव नयने चे’ति, वाक्यगताय च तस्मै काव्यप्रकाशदृढुदाहनम् ‘त्वामस्मि वच्मि विदुषामि’-त्यादि वाक्यमेव निश्चयतया प्रमत्तवीनि, प्रमत्तवीनि चैवमेव पदगताय जलन्त-तिग्नस्वारान् ध्वनितदृढुदाहनं निश्चयमानान् इवादेश’ इति पक्षम्, वाक्यगताय चाम्मं काव्यप्रकाशनिर्दिष्टमर्थेव उपहृतं बहु नत्रे त्यादि विपरीतलक्षणो-दाहरणमेव । न चैतेषु स्थलेषु लभ्यमानानां लक्षणानां उपादान-लक्षणयो आरोपादिमवलम्बित्वं दृश्यते । रूपपरिणामादीनामपि विदुषानेव यानि निर्दिष्ट-स्यलान्युपस्थापितानि तेष्वपि आरोपाध्यवनावागम्यमितरं कश्चनापि लक्षणा-प्रकारं नानुभूयते । एतेन स्पष्टं यल्लक्षणाया भेदान्तराणि काव्यानुपयोगीत्येव । न केवलं काव्ये, वाक्यात्मके वेदेषु यावत् तानि नोपयुज्यन्ते । गुणवाश-त्मकमयवाद प्रयुज्याना वैदिका ऋषयोपि “यजमान प्रमत्तः”, “आदित्यो मूष” इत्यादिषु स्थलेषु व्यावहारिकीभेव लक्षणांमुपजीवन्ति, न वाक्यनिकीम् ।

माहित्यकौमुदीकारो विद्यानुपणोऽपि “उद्घोषादानलक्षणाविषु भेदेषु अथा-न्त्यामपान्तरमप्रमितवाच्यात्यन्ततिरस्मृतवाच्या, मध्यमाभ्या रूपवप्रथमाति-शयोक्ती, निरूपयिष्येते”—इत्येव “लक्षणा तेन पदविधे”ति वाक्यविवरणे लक्षणोपयोगस्य दिग्गमिमामुक्तेरैव यथा द्योतयति ।

माहित्यसारकारं अच्युतगोपि च तामेव दिग्गमनुमरति—“जहती लक्षणा-पेणमजिका, गगाया घोष इत्यत्रात्यन्त वाच्यान्तिरस्मृतं अत्रह्यप्युपादाननाम्नी ध्वनोभिभावति, अनयाथान्तरे अकमिनवाच्यात्र मूच्यते, गोपी प्रयोजनवती सारोपा चन्द्र आननम्, गौर्वाहीक इति जेया रूपकाल्पितो हिता, मय माध्यव-माना तु गौर्वायमिति स्मृता चन्द्र एवेदमित्यादी रूपरात्रिशयोक्तिवृत्त” इति । (माहित्यसारे २।७१-७८) ।

१. ३० मीमानादर्शनस्य १।४।१२—मूत्रे गावर आप्य तन्त्रवानिकं च । मीमानादर्शनस्य ३।१।६—मूत्राभ्यपि ३० ।

कल्प्य च दोषो दशम उल्लान एव परिकरान् पूर्वं काव्यलिङ्गानुपनिबध्नतोऽपि हेत्व-
लकार विस्मरत । एतेन “पण्डितान् परमपि मम्मटमृदु एव निरनाम्यचेद्
वैचित्र्यस्यान्तानादप्रतिगोतिमत्र मोद्भाविष्यते” त्वपि श्रद्धा लूनमूला ।
यद्युच्यते—‘आयुधं नमि त्यादौ वैचित्र्यम्, तथापि नैतद्व्यङ्ग्यं नृणांति,
वैचित्र्यदेगनात्रम्यात्कारत्वं जनवतानाम्युपानाद्, तथा नति “गतोऽन्तमव”
इत्यादावपि बलकारस्वमन्मपेयेत, वैचित्र्यदेगन्त्यावापि मत्त्वान् ।’ बाध्यो-
पयोगित्वं चैषा व्यग्यार्थप्रत्याख्यानमात्र एव चरितार्थमि’ ति, तर्हि “गौर्वो-
होक् गौरेवे” त्यादावप्युपनिषत्तामलकारत्वाभाव, न्यायमास्यात् । न च
“विच्छित्तेरतिभूमिश्चानुभूयते इति नास्त्यत्र न्यायमान्यमि” ति बाध्यन्,
पक्षान्तरेपि विच्छित्तिविशेषस्य स्वीकृतुं शक्यत्वात् । स्वीकृत्ये चापि “आयु-
धं नमि त्यादौ गुडारापयन्तो यो हेतुहेतुनतोरनंदोऽनुभूयते तमेवैवमाश्रित्य
निमित्तेषु—“अविरलकमलविज्ञानं” उल्लानं धृत्वापरेरुपलभ्यतमल-
पुष्पयपानाम्”, “नारदस्य विज्ञानं” इत्यादिषु स्थलेषु रद्वद्वगन्नाय-
विश्वनाथैर्विच्छिन्ति । विद्याभूषणाच्युतरायाप्यप्यदीक्षितैरपि च मन्यन्ते
एवात्र विच्छित्ते मत्त्वम् । न केवलमेभिरेव, काव्यप्रकाशादीविमृषु मुष्पा-
द्वद् नीमनेन, विवरणद्वद् गोशुलनायद्वद् स्मरत्वेप्यु विच्छित्तिविशेषम-
नुमोदते साधयेते च नूनं गुडारापयवतानयो नाप्यवताम् । अन्ति च

१ नामहोऽत्र काव्यत्वानावमेव मनुते—“गतोऽन्तमवो भार्तान्दुर्गान्ति
वाताप पक्षिण । इत्येवमादि किं बाध्य वानामिना प्रचक्षते ॥२॥८॥

२ अत एव स्वयं काव्यप्रकाशमृतेव बाध्यार्थं यो बाध्यमत्याभेदा-
वतेतैव वाक्येन प्रतिपाद्यते । द्रष्टव्यम उल्लान । अत एव च पण्डितराशेपि
रत्नागाधरकाव्यलक्षणनिर्धारणप्रस्तावेऽत्र बाध्यत्वं शपययति ।

३. रद्वद्वगन्नाय० ॥८३, काव्यप्रकाशकारणनालावृत्तिः ।

४ रत्नगाधरे अवलम्बनिरूपणान्ते ।

५ नाहित्यदर्पणे हेत्वलकारनिरूपणप्रस्तावे ।

६ तनाहि मुनानारदक्षणाप्रकरण—“गुडान्ता ताम्या हेत्वकारं
निरूपयिष्यते” ति नीमनेन, विवरणं च—“हेतुस्वादिमदन्त्य हेत्वकार-
स्वरूपेन तन्मूला लक्षणा “आयुधं निमहोन्मवस्य... कलिदेवर” इत्यादौ
स्वरूपं प्रकाशयन्तम् अपवा “हेतुमता नह हेतोरनिमानमनेद्वो हेतुं रिति
मतेन हेत्वकारमुपास्यति” इति म० म० गोशुलनायः ।

वीकोपि^१ मम्मटः पतित एव प्रेक्षाजुषाभुषालम्भगोचरे । तच्च ज्वरपन्था-
लवारविमर्गिण्या काव्यलिङ्गालवारप्रवरणतः स्यात्तत्रमेव, यत्रासौ महता
सरम्भेणोक्तिप्रवारस्यालवारनाव प्रत्यादेष्टि^२ । एतत्प्रत्यादेशपञ्चम्या रम-
नगाधरवन् पण्डितराजस्यापि प्रतिना—

“काव्यलिङ्ग मालङ्कारः, चञ्चित्र्यात्मनो विच्छित्तिविशेषस्याभावाद्, हेतुहेतु-
मद्भावस्य वस्तुसिद्धत्वेन कविप्रतिभानिवृत्त्यंत्वायोगात्”

इत्येवमनुवदत्येव काव्यलिङ्गापेक्षयास्य हेतोः भामहोपज्ञमिमं तिलीकारम्,
उद्भावस्यैव च तत्र निहेतुत्वरूपशेषाभावान्तर्भूतताम् ।^३ अत्रति चेतु
तत्त्वताप्रत्यामन्तिम् । तथा हि—हेतुहेतुमद्भावस्य आद्यन्वमेवात्र चमत्कृति प्रसूते ।
अत एव ‘भयानवत्वात् परिवर्जनीया दद्याधितत्वादसि देव मैव्य’^४ इत्यत्र
काव्यलिङ्गतत्वं प्रत्याचक्षाण पण्डितराजो रत्नाकरवार इवैव ‘गम्यमान हेतु-
त्वकर्म्ये’ हेतोः सुन्दरत्वेन काव्यलिङ्गने^५ ति हेतुमुपन्यस्यति । अन्ति चतत्
काव्यप्रकाशोदाहृतेषु ‘वपु प्रादुर्भावाद्’ इत्यादिषु काव्यलिङ्गमपलेषु ।
तत्रापराधद्वयाऽनमनादीना हेतुहेतुमद्भावस्य गद्यतोऽप्युच्यतात् । न
चार्यत्वमात्रेण कुत्रचिदलवारत्वमापद्यते, कविप्रतिभाप्रभूतत्वस्यैव तन्निष्पादक-
त्वात् । यदि चापद्यते, तर्हि हेतुहेतुमद्भावोक्त्यापि तदापद्यताम्तराम्, तत्र
कविप्रतिभाया जागरूकत्वस्यानुभविक्त्वात् । किं च यो हि ‘महौजमो मान-
घना घनाचिता’ इत्यत्र भागविपक्षे घनुर्भृद् रूपव्यक्तिगतत्वेन बहूना विशेषणा-

१ परवर्तिष्वलवारमवस्थ—साहित्यदर्पण—कृत्स्नानन्द—कृतप्रभृतयः
काव्यलिङ्ग मन्वते । नूनमसौ मम्मटस्यैव प्रभावः । यद्यपि काव्यलिङ्गपदम्
इदप्रथमतया उद्भट एव प्रयुक्ते, विल्लु न हेत्वर्थम्, अपि त्वनुमानार्थम् ।
मम्मटोऽप्यनुमानार्थं काव्यलिङ्गमेव पदं प्रयुज्यते, प्रयुज्यते च काव्यलिङ्गार्थं काव्य-
हेतुपदमेव दशम उल्लसतिऽपि चतुर्थं उल्लास इव चेदुच्यते तत्र स्यात् ।

२. अलवारमवस्थे अथरथकृतालवारविमर्शिनी पृ० १८१-८२, निमंय-
सागरम्—२ ।

३-४ रमनगाधरे काव्यलिङ्गालवारप्रवरणान्ते ।

५ रमनगाधरे काव्यलिङ्गप्रवरणारम्भे । अतश्च भामहस्य ‘हेतुलिष्ट’
नाम्नोऽलवारम्योदाहृतेऽपि नातिव्याप्तिः ।

६ रमनगाधरकाव्यलिङ्गप्रवरणारम्भे । रत्नाकरे शोभाकरमित्रोर्मि
पदार्थहेतुवे काव्यलिङ्गे हेतुत्वस्यार्थत्वमेव चमत्कृतिवारणं मन्यते ।

भेद । अभेदे ह्यभेद एवाभियन्ताननर्माविच्छिन्नप्रतियोगितानिरूपितानुयोगिता
प्रति शरण्यो भवति, आरोपे च विषयः । ततश्च तन्प्रतियोगितापि विपनिता-
वच्छेदकेनैवाच्छेद्यते । अत्र एव चारोपे विषय-विषयिणोर्मध्य उद्देश्यविषय-
भावोऽनुभूयते, अनेदे न । अन्ति च “धृतमानु, महसंधात विनिर्द्वन्द्वनलनिपाति-
ग्नमरोत्पन्न” इत्यादिषु विधीयमानानां हेतुनतामायुरादीनामुद्देश्यभूतेषु
हेतुध्वारोप । अत्र एव च शुद्धनारोपलक्षणापि प्रेक्षावद्भिरनुपेयते । अतएव
विप्रतिरुद्धा विचलित आचार्यो “हेतु”रिति नाम्ने मयि न दधे । आरोपे च
निर्दिष्टमतिरूप्यसौ निर्वाहद्विज न लेभे, बाध्यालो तस्याभावात्, रूपके च मज्जोपि
तस्य सादृश्यं वनिगडितवान् । “वाग्विकल्पानामानन्त्यम्” पदिष्टवृत्तौ
वर्मानुवर्तमानेन, अत्र एव च मध्यमपि बाध्यलक्षणे “अनलवृत्तौ पुन क्वापि”
त्यलवारानां स्फुटताया वैकल्पिकत्वमाधाय तान् प्रति दक्षितौदासीन्येन
तत्रनदना नहृदयगिरौमणिना निर्वाहाय प्रयत्नोपि न कृतः ।

वस्तुनां हेतुहेतुमनोरभेदविच्छिन्नेरारोपमूले रूपके, अतिरूपमूलेऽतिरूपो-
क्तिप्रपन्नभेदे वा सग्रहं कर्तुमुचित । त्रियते च परवान्तिभिः अलंकाररत्नाकर-
विज्ञानप्रमुखैरालङ्कारिकैः । अलंकाररत्नाकरकारो हि सादृश्यलक्ष्यमूलकम्
आरोपमिव मय्यनान्तरमूलकमप्यारोप रूपवविच्छिन्तौ हेतुं प्रतिनद्यते ।
वक्ति हि न—

(सूत्रम्—) “आरोपो रूपकम् ॥२६॥

(वृत्ति—) तदर्थमन्त्यादिप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं सामानाधिकरण्यानिर्देशा आरोप ।

इत्येवमारोपमात्रस्य रूपकत्वम्, उदाहरति च सादृश्यमूलकाय तन्म “तुम

१. मानह—“उपमानेन यत् तत्तन्नुपमेयस्य रूप्यते ।

गुणानां सनता दृष्ट्वा रूपकं नान तद् विदुः ॥” बाध्या० २।२१

दण्डो—“उपमेव तिरोभूतभेदा रूपकनिष्यते ॥” बाध्यादशंस्य २।१६

उद्भट—“श्रुत्या मदन्यविरहाद् यत् पदेन पदान्तरम् ।

गुणवृत्तिप्रधानेन युज्यते रूपकं तु तत् ॥”—बाध्या०

१।११

अत्र यद्यपि सादृश्यं नाम्नि तथापि उदाहरणेऽप्य तदत्येव

“ज्योत्स्नाम्बुने”त्यत्र ।

रुद्र—“यत्र गुणानां नाम्ने मत्तुपमानोऽनेययोरभिदा ।

अविवाञ्छितनामान्वा कल्प्यत इति रूपकं प्रपन्नम् ॥”

बाध्या० ८।२८।२९ ॥

२. ध्वन्यालोचनप्रपनोद्योतात्मने ।

मनमिजवृत्ती शृंगारश्चीविमानमहो नु नो

निरवधिमुलश्रद्धादृष्टे- कृतो मृगदेतनः ॥” अत्र इन्द्ररूपे कारणे कार्य-
रूपाया श्रद्धाया आरोपः । अन्यकृता (अलंकारमर्बस्वकृता) अप्यलंकारानुमा-
रिण्यामत्र “श्रद्धाहेतुत्वात् श्रद्धे”त्यनिदधता जयमेव पक्षः कटाक्षितः^१ ॥”

मन्त्रि चालवारनवम्ब-तद्विमर्गिनीकाररदयो मन्मटभट्टस्य प्रविणानुगार
एव । अद्यापि यदिम एववादिनो दूरयन्ते तत्रापि हेतु स्वय मन्मट एव । वाच्य-
प्रकाश एव सोपि मादृश्यमिव मदनचान्तरमपि “अभिन्न-चनचार”जनकतया-
ऽऽद्वियते । अत एवानौ “हृदयमधिष्ठितमाश” विन्यादिषु, “राजन् राज-
मुना न पाठयति मानि त्यादिषु चातिगयोक्त्यप्रस्तुतप्रशान्ताम्पु
कार्यकारणभावमपि “वनलमनम्भनी”त्यादिषु, “येनाम्यम्युदिते”-
त्यादिषु वा मादृश्यमिववाभिज्ञाया एवातिगयाप्रस्तुतौक्तिरूपाया विच्छि-
तेनिष्पादकमूरोकुरते । अन्यत्रापि च “उद्भूत वस्तुन सपन्नहता चोपलक्षणम्”
-इति, “एक जमेगानेवस्मिन् पर्यायोऽप्यस्तनोऽप्यर्थे”ति निदर्शना,
“अभवन् दन्तुमवस्थ उपमापिक्वत्पक्, स्वम्बहेन्दवम्योक्वि त्रिदशैव
च माररे”ति च निरमिश्रा अपि विच्छित्तोरमादेकैकालकारे नगृह्णानो
दृश्यते । अतो हि मदनचान्तरमूलकमप्यारोप मादृश्यमूलकेन तेनैव सह
रूपविच्छिन्नो नगृह्णीयान्चेत् बोधव्यमुना विगृह्णीयान् । अत एव च
तद्विवाकारो गोकुलनायगमोपाय्यायो रूपवन्त्वमेव “आयुर्दाननहोमदम्ये”
त्यादिति प्रागुपस्थापिते पक्षगते पूर्व रूपवत्प” प्रकाशान्तरमेवोद्भावयति,

१ काश्मीरक-महाकवि-ब्रह्मण-प्रणीत-मोमपाल-विलास-वाच्यस्य
तन्नाम्या उत्कृताया टीकायाम् ।

२ अलंकारनवम्बविमर्गनीरूपकप्रवरणम् । निर्णयना० न०—२ पृ० ४४ ।

३ वाच्यप्रकाशे कार्यकारणयोर्वाच्यविपर्ययविपर्ययानुदाहरणम् ।

४ कारणे प्रस्तुते कार्योक्तिर्यो निर्णयनाया अप्रस्तुतप्रशान्ताया वाच्य-
प्रकाश उदाहरणम् ।

५ वाच्यप्रकाशे निर्गोप्यवसानानुतिशयोक्तिरनुदाहरणम् ।

६ वाच्यप्रकाशे मादृश्यमूलकाया अप्रस्तुतप्रशान्ताया उदाहरणम् ।

७-९ वाच्यप्रकाशस्य दशम उल्लेखः ।

१० ३० २६६ पृष्ठे ६ सख्यात्रमन्त्रव्यमेव पादटिप्पणम् ।

ध्यातम्बेयाः सुरनितनयात्मनजा मानयिष्यन्^१

सोनोमूर्त्या भुवि परिणतां रन्तिदेवस्य कीर्तिम् ॥

अत्र हि कीर्तिहेतुभूतायाश्चर्मण्यत्वा कीर्तिशब्दादेवोन्मेवान् कीर्तित्वेनैव प्रतीय-
मानत्वादस्म्येव कार्यद्वारा कारणस्याध्यवसानम् । एवमेव “स्वागतमविलम्बिनो
मनोरथस्येति”^२ शाकुन्तलवाक्येऽपि कार्यभूतेन मनोरथेन कारणभूतस्य
दुष्यन्तस्याध्यवसानान् सैव म्यनि, विपयिण प्रति विपयस्य तादात्म्येन
कारणताया प्रसिद्धचरत्वात् अस्ति च स्वविपयभूताय दुष्यन्ताय मनोरथो
विपयो । नास्ति च कीर्ति-चर्मण्यस्यो मनोरथदुष्यन्तयोश्चात्र किंचिदपि साम्य
येनाप्राध्यवसानस्य गौणता कल्पयितुं शक्यते ।

ननु—“कार्यकारणभावस्य निद्वेऽपि विच्छित्तिमूलतयालङ्घितप्रयोजकत्वे,
सादृश्येतरेषा मवग्यान्तराणा तु वेनालम्पत्रैवावलम्बिन, काव्यम्यलेषु तदुदा-
हरणानामनुपदर्शित्वान्^३ तेष्वलङ्कारप्रयोजकताया माषयितुं दुष्करत्वादि”^४ति
चेत् तत्रापि स्यादेव कार्यकारणभाव इवैव तादृशी प्रयोजकता, यत्रैषा दृढ-
प्रायता न स्यात् । अस्ति हि हृदप्रायता तात्कर्म्यादिभि जायमानयोरारोपाध्य-
वसानयो “बाह्यणमज्ञा” “तज्ञा” इत्यादिषु । तत्रापि दृश्यते चेच्चमत्कार,
स्वीकृतानामालङ्घितप्रयोजकत्वम्, शब्देष्वन्तान्ता च तदुदाहरणान्यपि महति
मारस्वते प्रगति ।

एव म्यितमेतद् यद् शोकुलनायादिभिरपगत एव स्रज्जगामेक्षणायाप्रमो
मम्मटस्यभिमत, म्यित चैतद् यन् तत्र शुद्धयोरारोपाध्यवसानयोरपयोगाय
स्वीकृतं व्यमेव तदपठितेषु वाक्येषु वाच्यत्वम्, तदर्थं चमत्कृतित्वम्, तदर्थं
तज्जनकेष्वलङ्कारत्वम्, तदर्थं च हेतु-रूपशक्तिसाधोक्त्यन्यतमत्वम् ।

१. मेघदूते ४५—नम पद्यम् ।

२. शाकुन्तलस्य तृतीयेऽद्वे “तपति तनुगात्रि कामत्त्वाम्” इतिपद्या-
न्तरस्य मनीवाक्यम् ।

३. शोकुलनायादिभि यैरपि टीकाहृदमिहैवत्वकार उदाहृत, जगन्नाया-
दिभिरप्येव महात्मभिश्चाचार्यैस्ते शुद्धारोपस्यैवोदाहरणानि दत्तानि, न शुद्धा-
ध्यवसानस्यापि । तदुदाहरणद्वयमस्माभिरेवात्रोन्प्रेष्यते पूर्वोक्तम् । कार्यकारण-
भावानिरक्तमवन्मूलक-शुद्धारोपाध्यवसानयोर्मूलादाहरणानि प्रायेण सर्वैरेव
संज्ञतानीति इत्युक्तिः ।

साहित्यिक अभिव्यक्ति

डा० देवराज उपाध्याय

निबन्ध का विषय है साहित्यिक अभिव्यक्ति। अब सर्वप्रथम अभिव्यक्ति और साहित्य इन दो शब्दों के अर्थ के बारे में निश्चय कर लेना है। प्रायः अभिव्यक्ति शब्द का प्रयोग किसी वस्तु की अभिव्यक्ति के अर्थ में किया जाता है। शुद्ध, मात्र अभिव्यक्ति के अर्थ में नहीं। पर किसी वस्तु की अभिव्यक्ति अलग बात है, शुद्ध अभिव्यक्ति अलग बात है। कवि का सम्बन्ध शुद्ध अभिव्यक्ति से ही होता है, किसी वस्तु से नहीं, यह बात कवि को मुक्त हृदय से स्वीकार कर लेनी चाहिए। एक युग था कि कवि का प्रभुत्व था, सब बातों में कवि की पूछ होनी थी, कोई सक्कट आया लोग कवि के पास नमस्कारन के लिये आते थे। पर विज्ञान ने कवि को सब क्षेत्रों से अपदम्य कर दिया। १६वीं शताब्दी में खगोल, भूगोल तथा शरीरशास्त्र ने कुछ भाग को कवि से छीना, १७वीं शताब्दी में रामायणिकी तथा भौतिकी ने कुछ और भूमि ले ली, १८ वीं में अर्थशास्त्र तथा राजनीति की नूतनी बोलनी, १९वीं में प्राणिशास्त्र तथा नमोज्ञाशास्त्र की दुहाई फिरी और २० वीं शताब्दी मनोविज्ञान की पतला फहरा रही है। अब कवि को मान लेना चाहिये हम किसी वस्तु के बारे में कोई भरोसे की बात नहीं कह सकते। हमारा क्षेत्र अभिव्यक्ति है, शुद्ध अभिव्यक्ति। अब मैं अभिव्यक्ति को किसी वस्तु से सम्बन्ध तोड़ कर उसे उन्मुक्त करना चाहूंगा। दूसरी ओर साहित्य को थोड़ा मरुचित करूंगा। साहित्य के दो वर्गों—ज्ञान का साहित्य (Literature of Knowledge) तथा शक्ति का साहित्य (Literature of Power) में मैं केवल दूसरे को ही साहित्य कहूंगा। अब शुद्ध अभिव्यक्ति और शक्ति का साहित्य दोनों को मानकर आगे बढ़ूंगा।

अब हमने दो बातें तय कीं। प्रथमतः साहित्य का अर्थ तय किया। द्वितीयतः अभिव्यक्ति को प्रधानता दी और निश्चित किया कि साहित्य का ध्येय अभिव्यक्ति है किसी वस्तु की अभिव्यक्ति नहीं। हम कोमल से कोमल, मर्म-स्पर्शी से मर्म-स्पर्शी भावों को ले सकते हैं पर उनकी अभिव्यक्ति असाहित्यिक, हिमानव हो सकती है, ऐसी हो सकती है कि पाठक के हृदय में दान उत्पन्न हो, और वह अन्दर से प्रभुत्व हो उठे। इतना ही नहीं। यह भी संभव है कि त्रिम तर्ह के भाव को पाठक पर उत्पन्न करने की चेष्टा की जा रही है उनके ठीक विपरीत भाव उत्पन्न हो। मैंने ऐसी रचनाएँ भी पढ़ी हैं, ऐसे भाषा भी सुने हैं जिनका उद्देश्य है पाठक तथा श्रोता में उच्च भाव उत्पन्न करना, उदाहरणार्थ

की, पाठक में भक्ति के भाव जगे, मूर के विरह-वाक्य को पढ़ कर विरह के भाव जगे, भूषण ने वीरत्व के गीत गाये, पाठक में वीरत्व के भाव जगे।

पर क्या यह सही है ? मानव इतना मीठा मादा प्राणी है ? वह इतने ही मीठे तथा मस्ते दम से प्रतिक्रिया करता है ? व्यावहारिक जगत तथा उत्ती की परिधि में विचरण करने वाले साधारण मनुष्य के लिये यह मन्त्र मान भी लिया जाय तो क्या साहित्य के क्षेत्र तथा उसकी सीमा में प्रवेश करने वाले पाठक के लिये भी इसी मापदण्ड से काम लेना होगा ? यदि यह बात सही मान ली जाय तो ग्रामदी की समस्या कैसे हल हो, लोंग दुष्मान्त नाटकों से आनन्द कैसे ग्रहण कर सकेंगे ? वह करणा जो "भवभूति" में अधिच मूल्य नहीं रखती उसकी उत्तर विरह की विभूति कैसे बन जाना ? वास्तव में यदि यही सब इतने मस्ते दम से होता तो अग्रस्त की विरेचन-निदान की तथा भट्टनायक की साधारणीकरण की स्थापना ही क्यों करनी पड़ती। प्लेटो तो अपने आदर्श गण-राज में कवियों को निष्क्रामित कर ही चुके थे।

अतः हो न हो वाक्य का समार एक अलग ही समार है, वहाँ की दुनिया ही निराली, वहाँ के विधान तथा नियम ही भिन्न हैं। शायद इसी को देखकर हमारे वाक्यशास्त्री ने कहा होगा

वक्रोक्तयो यत्र विभूषणानि

वाक्यायवाच परम प्रवर्ण ।

अथैषु बोध्येष्वभिधैव दोष

मा वाचिदन्या मरणि कवीनाम् ।

प्रकृत समाग में भी असाहित्यिकता नहीं चल सकती पर वहाँ बहुत कुछ अवधि तक चल भी जाय पर वाक्य जगत में तो एक क्षण भी वह चलने में नहीं। प्रकृति ने राम को वंदा किया पर वही उसे वा भी गई। नहीं, या कहा गई, गाने जा रही थी कि कवि ने उसके फीशरी तथा रक्तान्त पत्रों तथा दाढ़ (Red in tooth and Claws) से छीन कर अपने गालि-प्रद, कल्याण प्रद, अहिमा तथा प्रीति की गोद में लिया कि आज राम स्वयं तो अमर हैं ही गये दूमरों को भी अमरत्व प्रदान कर रहे हैं। यही कारण था कि साहित्यशास्त्रियों के सामने जब वाक्य के स्वरूप पर विचार करने का प्रश्न आया तो उन्होंने देखा कि वाक्य-जगत तथा प्राकृतिक जगत में तो एक बात सामान्य रूप में मिलती है, दोनों कुछ-न-कुछ अन्तर्गत देते हैं, कोई बात कहते हैं, कोई उपदेश देते हैं पर दोनों में एक अन्तर भी स्पष्ट है। वास्तविक जगत में उपदेश प्रभुमग्निव हो, मुदतुमग्निव होता है, पर वाक्य में "वाक्या-मग्निव" की ही प्रधानता है। जोर में पूछना है कि यह जो वाक्या-मग्निव है वह विनिष्ट अभिव्यक्ति के सिवा और क्या है ?

rapid Retreat और इस को पढ़कर लोगों के हृदय में निराशा के बादल छा जाते थे। इसी बात को यदि कहा जाता था—“The retirement of the French forces of the previously prepared position in the rear was accomplished briskly and efficiently” तब सारा वातावरण ही बदल जाता था।

इस उदाहरण को सामने रख कर विचार करने में कितने ही लक्ष्य उपलब्ध होते हैं। (१) यदि उक्ति का उद्देश्य प्रभविष्णुता है, पाठकों की भावमत्ता पर अधिकार करना है तो साधारण व्यवहारगत भाषा के प्रयोग में काम नहीं चलेगा, साथ ही शास्त्र इत्यादि में प्रयुक्त इतिवृत्तात्मक शब्दार्थोपनिबन्ध भी पर्याप्त नहीं होगा। मूल वस्तु से अधिक महत्त्व अभिव्यक्ति को देना होगा। इसी को कुल्लुक ने कहा “वक्तोक्ति काव्यस्य जीवितम्” और वक्तोक्ति को स्पष्ट करते हुए कहा “शाम्नादिप्रसिद्धशब्दार्थोपनिबन्धव्यतिरेकि, प्रसिद्धप्रस्थानव्यतिरेकि, अतिशान्तप्रसिद्धव्यवहारमरणि।” मतलब काव्य (साहित्य) का उद्देश्य सामान्य सूचना मात्र देना ही होता तो शब्दों के सामान्य प्रयोग से काम निकल जाता है। पर साहित्य का उद्देश्य अलौकिक आह्लाद का उन्मीलन करना है। अतः उसकी अभिव्यक्ति में विचित्रता—सम्पन्नता होगी ही।

अब अब प्रश्न यह उपस्थित होता है कि यह प्रभविष्णुता, लोकोत्तर प्रदायकता का समावेश उक्ति में किस तरह किया जाय कि वह साहित्य की श्रेणी में प्रतिष्ठित हो जाय। दूसरे शब्दों में अभिव्यक्ति साहित्यिक किस तरह हो सके। अर्थात् ऐसी हो जिसे वा अभीष्ट प्रभाव पड़ सके, न कम न अधिक। यदि कम प्रभाव पड़ा तो वह साहित्य है ही नहीं, और आवश्यकता में अधिक प्रभाव पड़ा तो वह साहित्य नहीं। जो साहित्य पाठक को भाव में आये बटकर त्रियातत्परत्व में प्रवृत्त कर देता है वह साहित्य नहीं। साहित्य का काम ‘वर्णनीयतन्मयीमवन-योग्यता’ उत्पन्न करना ही है, उसे प्रतित्रियातत्पर करना नहीं। साहित्य का काम है पाठक के हृदय के वाठान्य को गला देना। लोहा को लाल बनाकर नमनीयता ला देना है। लोहा लाल है, प्रभाव ग्रहण करने की स्थिति में है। अब शिथी आकर उसे घेरेष्ट मोड़ दे सकते हैं। काव्यशास्त्रियों में भी रस-विवेचन के प्रसंग में बहुत-सी बातें कही हैं वे भी हमारे लिये प्रागमिक महत्त्व रखती हैं। अभिनव के मतानुसार “मर्वया रमनात्मकवीनविघ्नप्रतीतिग्राह्यो भाव एव रस। तत्र विघ्नापमारता विभावप्रभूतयः।” यों तो विघ्न अनेक हैं। पर उन्होंने मात्र विघ्नों का उल्लेख किया है। ‘प्रतिपत्तावयोग्यता, सभावनाविरहो नाम’ इत्यादि। यह तो हमारे काव्यशास्त्रियों की बातें हुईं। हम सभी अपने दैनिक जीवन में भी इस बात का ध्यान रखते हैं।

संस्कृत अलंकार शास्त्र में काव्य का सर्जना-पक्ष

मूलचन्द्र पाठक

काव्य के दो पक्ष हैं—सर्जना और आम्बाद। प्रथम का मन्व्य कवि ने है और दूसरे का महदय ने। कवि की अनुभूति ही वह बीज है जो काव्य-वृक्ष के रूप में अकुरित, पल्लवित और पुष्पित होकर महदय के रमाम्बाद में फलित होता है।^१ इस प्रकार काव्य-कर्म का प्रसार अनुभूति में अभिव्यक्ति की ओर होता है। अतः काव्य-प्रक्रिया के एक छोर पर कवि की सत्ता है और दूसरे पर महदय की तथा काव्य है इन दोनों सत्ताओं का योगमूल। यद्यपि अनुभूति के घरातल पर कवि और महदय का अद्वैत अमर्श है तथापि काव्य-विषयक, कविगत व महदयगत प्रक्रियाएँ परस्पर भिन्न ही हैं। कविगत प्रक्रिया स्वरूपतः सर्जनात्मक होती है तथा उसका अनुभूति में अभिव्यक्ति की दिशा में विवात होता है जबकि महदयगत प्रक्रियाएँ ग्रहणात्मक होने के कारण काव्यरूप अभिव्यक्ति के माध्यम में उसकी मूलवर्तिनी अनुभूति की ओर अप्रसर होती है। अभिनवगुप्त ने अनुभूति और अभिव्यक्ति को ही त्रयश प्रस्था व उपाध्या शब्दों में अनिहित करने हुए लोचन के मंगल श्लोक में काव्य की अन्वष्ट प्रक्रिया के अगमून उक्त दोनों पक्षों के अविभाज्य सम्बन्ध की ओर इस प्रकार संकेत किया है—

अपूर्वं यद्वस्तु प्रथयति विना कारणकला
जगद् भावप्रस्थ निजरसनरेण मारयति च ।
कमारप्रभ्योपाध्याप्रसरन्मुनय भानयति तत्
मरन्वन्ध्याम्नस्त्व कविमहदयास्व विव्रयते ॥

सम्भूत अलंकारशास्त्र में काव्य पर कवि और महदय दोनों ही दृष्टियों में विचार किया गया है, यद्यपि कतिपय विद्वानों को यह शिष्टाक्षर रही है कि सम्भूत काव्य-चिन्तकों ने काव्य की विवेचना एवात्मन अथवा प्रधानतः महदय की दृष्टि में ही की है। यह तो सच है कि सम्भूत अलंकारशास्त्र में काव्य की सर्जन-प्रक्रिया का उतना विस्तृत, व्यवस्थित एवं प्रौढ विवेचन नहीं किया गया

१. अभिनवभारती (गायकवाड ओरियन्टल मिरीर, बड़ोदा) भाग १, अध्याय ६, पृ. २९४ (द्वितीय सम्स्करण १९५६)
२. मुनीन्द्रकुमार दे. संस्कृत पोएटिक्स एज ए स्टडी आफ एस्पेक्टिव, पृ. २

प्रतिफलित होता है।^१ हेमचन्द्र के साक्ष्य^२ के अनुसार भट्ट तोन कवि के लिए ऋषि होना आवश्यक मानते हैं। किन्तु ऋषि में केवल द्रष्टृत्व का गुण होता है जबकि कवि में दर्शन के अनिरिक्त वर्णना शक्ति भी होती है। शास्त्रों में प्रयुक्त कवि शब्द केवल तत्त्वद्रष्टा अर्थ का वाचक है जब कि लोक में दर्शन और वर्णना इन दोनों को लेकर कवि शब्द प्रचलित है। इस विषय में वाल्मीकि का दृष्टान्त देते हुए भट्ट तोन ने कहा है कि आदि कवि में स्वच्छ दर्शन की सामर्थ्य तो पहले से ही विद्यमान थी किन्तु वे जब वर्णना में भी प्रवृत्त हुए तभी लोक में कविता का जन्म हुआ। इसी प्रकार अभिनवगुप्त ने भी वर्णना के योग में ही कवि-भङ्गा स्वीकार की है। 'अतएव ते वचनो वर्णनायोगात् तेषाम्'। मम्मट ने काव्य को 'लोकोत्तरवर्णनानिपुण कविकर्म' कहते हुए कवि की वर्णन-धर्मिता का ही निर्देश किया है।^३ महिम भट्ट ने कवि प्रतिभा को शिव का तृतीय नेत्र मानते हुए कहा है कि उसके द्वारा कवि अलोक्यवर्ती भावों का साक्षात्कार करता है।^४ इस प्रकार यह स्पष्ट है कि मञ्जुनमाहित्य और विशेषतः अङ्कार-शास्त्र में कवि की दर्शन और वर्णना की शक्तियों से सम्पन्न एक अलोक्यमान्य व्यक्ति माना गया है। वह वस्तुओं के वाह्य रूप का ही अवलोकन नहीं करना, उनकी सारभूत आत्मा का भी साक्षात्कार करता है। यह साक्षात्कार वस्तु-उमका प्रतिभ-ज्ञान ही है।

सञ्चुत अलङ्कारशास्त्र में कवि की उपमा प्रायः प्रजापति (ब्रह्मा) में दी गई है। आनन्दवर्धन के अनुसार कवि ही इस अनादि-अनन्त काव्य-समर का एकमात्र प्रजापति है।^५ काव्य-मृष्टि उसकी इच्छानुसार रूप-रंग बदलती रहती है। प्रजापति के समान वह भी अपूर्व निर्माण की क्षमता से सम्पन्न है। उमका काव्य-जगत् सर्वत्र उमका इच्छानुवर्ती रहता है।^६ अभिनव और मम्मट ने कवि की ब्रह्मा में भी उच्चतर पद पर प्रतिष्ठित किया है। अभिनव के मतानुसार कवि की वाणी ब्रह्मा में भी उत्कृष्ट है क्योंकि जहाँ ब्रह्मा की शक्ति परिच्छिन्न है

१ वही, अध्याय १२

२ काव्यानुशासन, अध्याय ८, सूत्र १ की वृत्ति

३ ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३ पृ. ५०८ का लोचन (वालप्रिया सम्भरण, चौलम्बा १९४० ई.)

४ काव्यप्रकाश, उल्लेख १, वारिका २

५ व्यक्ति-विवेक २, ११८

६ ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३, वारिका ४३ की वृत्ति पृ. ४९८

७ अभिनवभागवती, भाग १ पृ. ४

करण के लिए कवि-स्वभाव को आधार स्वीकार कर उन्होंने काव्य के मूलवर्तों तथा उसके मममन् अग-प्रत्यगो को प्रभावित करने वाली कवि-भत्ता को रेखांकित किया है।^१ अलंकारगत चारुत्व में 'कवि-प्रतिभा-निर्वाहितत्व' का निर्देश कर कुल्लुक, मम्मट, मय्यक व जयरथ आदि ने कवि-व्यक्तित्व के महत्त्व को अङ्गीकार किया है। इस प्रकार रम-ध्वनिवादी तथा वशोक्तिवादी आचार्यों व उनके अनुयायियों के अनुसार काव्यात्मक अभिव्यक्ति का मोन्दर्य कवि की विशिष्ट अनुभूति या उसके व्यक्तित्व की ही देन है। किन्तु यहाँ यह निर्देश करना आवश्यक है कि मम्मट व आलंकारिकों ने काव्य के मूल में जिस कवि-व्यक्तित्व को प्रतिष्ठा दी है वह कवि का लौकिक व्यक्तित्व नहीं है, अपितु काव्य-व्यक्तित्व है। कवि लौकिक भाव-भूमि पर अवस्थित होकर काव्य-भूजन में प्रवृत्त नहीं होता, अपितु उसका एक अलौकिक और विशिष्ट काव्य-व्यक्तित्व ही उसकी कृति में प्रकाशित होता है। जिस प्रकार सहृदय की रमानुभूति एक अलौकिक अनुभव है, उसी प्रकार कवि की मर्जनात्मक अनुभूति भी वस्तुतः अलौकिक ही है। अभिनव के मत में काव्य या नाट्य का मूल कविगत साधारणीभूत सविन् (अनुभूति) है।^२ यही सविन् परमार्थतः रम है। काव्य इसी रमात्मक सविन् की शब्दार्थमयी अभिव्यजना है जिसके माध्यम में सहृदय भी कविगत रम-सविन् का साक्षात्कार करने में समर्थ हो जाता है। इस दृष्टि में कवि भी सामाजिक के तुल्य ही है—'कविहि सामाजिकतुल्य एव'। भट्ट तोड के अनुसार नायक, कवि और श्रोता तीनों का अनुभव समान होता है।^३ भरत मुनि ने 'कवेरत्नगंत भाव भावयन्भाव उच्यते' भाव की इस परिभाषा द्वारा इसी सत्य की ओर इंगित किया है।^४

अभिनव के अनुसार कविगत रम ही काव्य का बीज है, काव्य वृक्ष है तथा नाट्यगत अभिनवादि पुष्पम्यानीय हैं एव सामाजिक का रसाम्बाद फल है।^५ इस प्रकार ममस्त काव्य-प्रक्रिया एक जीवन, अवण्ड व विकासशील प्रक्रिया है जिसका प्रारम्भ कवि में और पर्यवसान सहृदय में होता है। इस प्रकार यह काव्य-विदग्ध अर्थ से इति तक रममय ही है। अतः कवि काव्य में अपनी जिन अनुभूति को बागवत् करता है वह उसके लौकिक व्यक्तित्व से सम्बन्ध नहीं रखती, प्रत्युत उसके अलौकिक काव्यात्मक व्यक्तित्व की अमूल्य निधि है। 'शृंगारो

१ वही १, २४

२ अभिनवभारती, भाग १, पृ. २९४

३ ध्वन्यालोच, उद्योत १, बारिदा ६ का लोचन

४ नाट्यशास्त्र, अध्याय ७, श्लोक २

५ अभिनवभारती, भाग १, पृ. २९४

पार्यन्तिक प्रयोजन घोषित किया है।^१ उन्हें अनुसार कवि को प्रीति से प्रीति की ही प्राप्ति होती है। यद्यपि काव्यानुशीलकों को काव्य से प्रीति के अतिरिक्त व्युत्पत्ति का भी लान होता है परन्तु इन दोनों में प्रीति ही प्रधान है, अन्यथा काव्य में वान्ता-सम्मितत्व की क्या विशेषता रह जायेगी ? अतः आनन्द ही काव्य का, कवि व सहृदय दोनों की दृष्टि में, प्रमुख प्रयोजन है। धनं, अर्थ, काम व मोक्ष की व्युत्पत्ति से भी अन्ततः आनन्द की ही उपलब्धि होती है।^२ इसी प्रकार मम्मट ने भी 'सद्यः परनिवृत्ति' को ही काव्य का मौलिक प्रयोजन स्वीकार किया है।^३

उक्त विवेचन के निष्कर्ष के रूप में कहा जा सकता है कि रस व ध्वनिवादी आचार्यों के मत में कवि अपनी काव्य-सर्जना में किसी लौकिक या व्यावहारिक प्रयोजनवान् प्रवृत्त नहीं होता, उसका पारमार्थिक प्रयोजन आनन्द-ज्ञान ही है, यद्यपि व्यावहारिक स्तर पर अर्थ-प्राप्ति, यश व अमंगल-नाश आदि भी प्रयोजन कहे गये हैं। यदि रसवाद की दृष्टि में भी विचार करें तो भी प्रीति या आनन्द को काव्य का प्रयोजन मानना समीचीन प्रतीत नहीं होता, क्योंकि आनन्द या रस की अनुभूति तो काव्य-प्रक्रियागत सर्जना और आस्वादन का आवश्यक लक्षण है अतः उसे प्रयोजन कैसे कहा जा सकता है ? वह तो वस्तुतः काव्य की प्रकृति है, प्रयोजन नहीं। आनन्द या प्रीति को काव्य का चरम प्रयोजन स्वीकार करते हुए रसवादी आचार्यों ने एक प्रकार से काव्य-विषयक निःप्रयोजनवाद की ही स्थापना की है। काव्य-विषयक इस आनन्दवाद को हम पश्चिम के 'बला बला के लिए' मिडान्त का भारतीय मस्वरूप कह सकते हैं।

अभिनवगुप्त ने ध्वन्यालोक के प्रथम उद्योत की पञ्चन कारिका की व्याख्या करते हुए आदि कवि वान्मीकि के शोक की दशोद-परिणति के सदन में काव्य-सर्जन की मूल प्रेरणा व प्रक्रिया का बड़ा गंभीर विवेचन किया है। उन्हें अनुसार निपाद द्वारा गरविद्ध श्रौञ्च को देख कर शोवाकुल श्रौञ्ची आनन्द कर उठी। वान्मीकि का संवेदनशील हृदय महानुभूतिवशान् श्रौञ्ची के माय प्रमश हृदय-सवाद व तन्मयीनवन का अनुभव करता हुआ लौकिक शोक से भिन्न अतः करण रस में परिणत अपनी ही शोकानुभूति में निमग्न हो गया। वान्मीकि द्वारा अनुभूत यह शोक न लौकिक था और न व्यक्तिगत ही। यद्यपि उसका मूल आधार श्रौञ्ची या लौकिक शोक ही था, परन्तु श्रौञ्ची के आनन्द आदि अनुभावों की चरणा में वान्मीकि के हृदय में उद्बुद्ध शोक एक अलौकिक व आधारणीय अनुभव बन गया था। जिस प्रकार जल में परिपूर्ण कुं न छलकने लग जाता है या तीव्र

१. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत १, कारिका १ का लोचन पृ. ४०-४१

२. वही

३. काव्यप्रबन्ध, उत्पत्ति १, २ की वृत्ति

सवाद एव सन्मयीभवन के द्वारा साधारणीकृत सविन् (अनुभूति) का अनुभव करता है। यही सवित् काव्य का उत्पन्न है। अतः अभिनव के अनुसार काव्य में अभिव्यक्त अनुभूति निर्वैयक्तिक और अलौकिक होती है। यही कारण है कि उसमें महदय के चित्त में भी रमानुभूति प्राप्त की करने की सामर्थ्य रहती है। कवि का अनुभव ही अन्ततः महदय का अनुभव बनता है। अतः यह अनिवार्य है कि कवि को भी साधारणीकृत भावों के माध्यम में रमानुभूति हो।

अभिनव ने अन्यत्र भी कवि-हृदय की महज भाव-स्फूर्ति के रूप में काव्य का निरूपण किया है। ध्वन्यालोक की एक कारिका में प्रयुक्त 'निष्पन्दमात्रा' शब्द की व्याख्या करते हुए उन्होंने कहा है—'दिव्यमानन्दस्य स्वयमेव प्रस्तुताना, इत्यर्थः' अर्थात् कवि की मरम्बनी स्वयं ही वरिगत स्वरूप दिव्य आनन्द को प्रवाहित करती है। इस सम्बन्ध में उन्होंने भट्टनायक का एक श्लोक उद्धृत किया है जिसके अनुसार काव्य-सर्जना की प्रक्रिया वस्तु के स्नेह से द्रवित धेनु के दूध-निष्पन्दन के समान सहज-स्फुरित होती है। ध्वन्यालोक की अन्तिम कारिका में ध्वनिकार ने काव्य-सर्जन को इसी अप्रयत्नप्रभृत प्रक्रिया का निर्देश करते हुए कहा है कि स्वयं भगवती मरम्बनी ही मुक्ति की काव्य-वस्तु का निर्माण कर देती है, उसके लिए कवि के अपने व्यापार की आवश्यकता नहीं होती। इस प्रकार ध्वनिकार जानन्दवर्धन तथा अभिनव तीनों के अनुसार काव्य कवि के हृदयस्थ रस की ही स्वतः स्फूर्त अभिव्यक्ति है।

संस्कृत काव्य-चिन्तकों में काव्य-प्रयोजनों के समान काव्य-हेतुओं का भी विस्तृत निरूपण किया है। मुख्यतः शक्ति या प्रतिभा, व्युत्पत्ति या निपुणता एवं अभ्यास को काव्य का कारण माना गया है। आचार्यों में दो बातों को लेकर मतभेद रहा है—(१) उक्त तीन हेतु सम्मिलित रूप में काव्य के कारण हैं या पृथक् पृथक् (२) काव्य-निर्माण में इनका परस्पर क्या सम्बन्ध व अनुपात है? प्रायः सभी आचार्यों ने शक्ति या प्रतिभा को काव्य-सर्जना का मुख्य हेतु स्वीकार किया है यद्यपि व्युत्पत्ति और अभ्यास के आपेक्षिक मूल्य व योगदान के विषय में उनका मतभेद नहीं है।

प्रतिभा तत्त्व की व्याख्या संस्कृत काव्यशास्त्र की एक महती उपलब्धि है। आचार्यों ने प्रतिभा को काव्य की मूल सर्जना-शक्ति माना है। इसमें अभाव में काव्य का प्रवर्तन ही नहीं होना और यदि हुआ तो क्या भी जाना है तो वह उपहाम का ही पात्र होना है। वैसे तो अन्तर्कार-स्रोतिवादी आचार्यों ने भी प्रतिभा या शक्ति के काव्य-जीवन को जगीकार किया है किन्तु काव्य के बहिरंग में अग्रिम रसि रसने के कारण वे काव्य की इस मूल शक्ति का उल्लेख मात्र करते रह गये, इसके स्वरूप एवं काव्य-मृष्टि में इसके योगदान के विषय में वे प्रायः मौन हो गये। ध्वनिवादी आचार्यों ने ही सर्वप्रथम प्रतिभा के स्वरूप व काव्य-निर्माण

जो जगत् की विरगचित्त वस्तुओं और व्यापारों की नित्य नूतन वैचित्र्य से गुम्फित कर देती है। यह दृष्टि वस्तुओं का बोध मात्र नहीं है, अपितु उस बोध का अतिक्रमण करने पर ही इसका उन्मीलन होता है। यह जम्हर है कि इन्द्रिय-ज्ञान के अभ्यास या आवृत्ति से यह प्रतिभा अधिक चम्क उठती है।^१ अनिवार के अनुसार प्रतिभा कवि-हृदय में स्थित एवं अनादि प्राक्तन मन्थार है।^२

हेमचन्द्र ने प्रतिभा के विषय में मट्ट तोत का यह मन उद्धृत किया है—

प्रज्ञा नवनवोन्मेषार्णवो प्रतिभा मया ।

सदनप्राणनाजीवद्वर्णनानिपुण कवि ॥

अर्थात् नित्य नवीन स्फुरणाओं से शोभित प्रज्ञा को ही प्रतिभा कहते हैं। उनमें अनुप्राणित जीवन्त वर्णना में निपुण व्यक्ति का ही नाम कवि है।

राजनेवर के प्रतिभाविषयक विचार भी अतीव महत्त्व रखते हैं।^३ उन्होंने समाधि (चित्त की एकाग्रता) और अभ्यास द्वारा उद्भासित शक्ति के कमरूप में प्रतिभा का प्रतिपादन किया है। मनवन के प्रतिभा की शक्ति का विपारम्भक रूप मानते हैं। उनके मन में प्रतिभा कवि के हृदय में काव्य-सर्जना के निमित्त शब्दार्थमूह अस्कार-नत्र उक्ति-प्रणाली आदि सामग्री को प्रतिमानित करती है। इस प्रकार राजनेवर ने प्रतिभा को काव्यात्मक अभिव्यजना के उपकरणों का मानसिक साध्यात्मक बनाने वाली अन्तर्दृष्टि माना है। उनके अनुसार प्रतिभा-रहित व्यक्ति के लिए पदार्थमूह प्रत्यक्ष होकर भी अप्रत्यक्ष रहता है। इसी कारण मेघाविरट तथा कुमारदाम जन्मान्ध होने पर भी सफल कवि हो सके। राजनेवर ने प्रतिभा के दो रूप माने हैं—(१) कारयित्री (२) भावयित्री। काव्य-निर्माण में कवि को साहाय्य देने वाली प्रतिभा कारयित्री और भावक को काव्यान्वादन में समर्थ बनाने वाली प्रतिभा भावयित्री होती है। कारयित्री प्रतिभा के तीन रूप हैं—(१) महजा, (२) आहार्या, (३) बोधा-यित्री। इन प्रतिभाओं के धनी कवि प्रमग भारन्वत, आभ्यासिक और भीमाधिक रहे जाते हैं।

राजनेवर ने प्रतिभा व व्युत्पत्ति दोनों की काव्य-निर्माण के लिए श्रेयस्कर कहा है। इन दोनों के आधार पर उन्होंने कवियों के तीन भेद माने हैं—काव्य-नवि, मान्त्र-नवि और उभय-नवि। वे इन तीनों में किसी प्रकार का तात्तम्य नहीं मानते क्योंकि अपने अपने क्षेत्र में वे नहीं श्रेष्ठ हैं।^४ इस प्रकार राजनेवर

१ ध्वन्यालोक उच्छेद ३, वारिका ४३ का लोचन

२ अनिवारनाम्ना, भाग १, अ ७, पृ ३४५

३ काव्य-मीमांसा, अध्याय ४

४ वही अध्याय ५

यह स्पष्ट है कि सस्मृत आलंकारिकों का एक वर्ग यह मानता है कि कवि जन्मजान ही नहीं होते, उनका निर्माण भी किया जा सकता है। भामह, दण्डी, रुद्रट आदि के ग्रन्थ कवियों को काव्य-निर्माणार्थ प्रशिक्षित करने के लिए रचे गये हो, ऐसा लगता है। राजशेखर ने काव्य-मीमांसा में कवि के प्रशिक्षण-क्रम व चर्चा आदि का जो विवरण दिया है उससे प्रतीत होता है सस्मृत कवि मात्र प्रतिभा का सम्बल लेकर काव्य-निर्माण में प्रवृत्त नहीं होना था, उसे एक लंबे समय तक निश्चित शिक्षा-दीक्षा में होकर गुजरना पड़ता था। दूसरी ओर रम-ध्वनिवादों आचार्यों की मान्यता के अनुसार प्रतिभा ही काव्य-निर्माण में कवि को प्रमुख सहायिका है तथा व्युत्पत्ति व अभ्यास प्रतिभा के उपकारक मात्र हैं। काव्य कोरा शिल्प या रचनावैशाल नहीं है, वह एक अव्यङ्ग्य, सजीव व विकास-शील प्रक्रिया है जिसका आरम्भ कवि की मर्जनात्मक प्रतिभा में निहित है तथा जो शब्दायुग्मयी अभिव्यञ्जना में सविग्रह होकर सहृदयों के प्रति, रसास्वादन के लिए, निवेदित होता है।

अभिनवगुप्त ने काव्य-मर्जन की प्रक्रिया का अभिन्नव भारतीय में इस प्रकार वर्णन किया है—'तदेव मूल बीजम्यानीयो कविगतो रसः । कविर्हि सामाजिकतुल्य एव । ततो वृक्षम्यानीय काव्यम् । तत्र पुष्पादिम्यानीयोज्ज्वलित-दिव्यापारः । तत्र फलम्यानीय सामाजिकरसास्वादः । तेन रसमयमेव विद्वम्'" (अ भा भाग १, अ ६ पृ २९४)।

बीज से लेकर फलोत्पत्ति पर्यन्त वृक्ष के विकास की जो सहज प्रक्रिया है वही कविगत अनुभूति भी, काव्य के माध्यम से, सहृदय के रसास्वादन में परिणति की भी प्रक्रिया है। राजशेखर ने भी भावस्थिती प्रतिभा के मदभ में कवि-वर्म को वृक्ष की ही उपमा दी है—तथा तत् फलित कवेर्व्यापारतः, अन्यथा सोऽप्रकेतोऽस्यात् (वा भी अ ४)। वात्मीकि के शोक की श्लोक परिणति की रसाध्या में लौचनकार ने बताया है कि आदिकवि का शोक उन्नी प्रकार श्लोक बन कर फूट पड़ा जिस प्रकार कि रसपरिपूर्ण बल्लभ छल्लक उठता है। काव्य-निर्माण कविगत रस का ही उच्छलन है। पर यहाँ यह प्रश्न मन में उठता है कि क्या रम-दशा में कवि के लिए काव्य-मर्जन संभव है? अभिनवगुप्त ने रमानुभूति का जो स्वरूप प्रतिपादित किया है उसके अनुसार तो रसावस्था में काव्य-निर्माण में कवि की प्रवृत्ति संभव प्रतीत नहीं होती। समवन- इस दशा के तुरन्त पश्चात् ही जब कि कवि की चेतना रमानुभव के तीव्र मस्कार या स्मृति में धुक्न रहती है, काव्य या निर्माण होता है। इस प्रकार काव्य-मर्जन के क्षणों में वास्तविक रम-दशा में न होकर भी कवि 'रसममाहितचेता' तो रहता ही है। आनन्दवर्धन व अभिनव दोनों ने अलंकार, गुण, रीति आदि काव्यान्वय अभिव्यञ्जना के विभिन्न तहों को रस के माध्यम से ग्रहण मान कर यह निरूपित किया है काव्य-

पृथक् प्रयत्न करना पड़ता है।^१ यह पृथक् प्रयत्नस्वरूप अतिक्रम निश्चय ही रस-भोग का हेतु बन जाता है। कवि को महान् आत्मलाभ तभी होता है जब वह ध्वनि की आत्मा रसरूप अमलक्ष्यकम व्यङ्ग्य का समाहितचित्त ने उपनिबन्धन करता है।^२

आनन्दवर्धन ने मघटना या रीति को रसानिबन्धजक तथा माधुर्यादि गुणों पर आभित माना है। इस प्रकार मघटना गुणों के माध्यम से रस प्रीति उन्मीलित करती है। वक्ष्या तथा वाच्य के औचित्य को मघटना का निदमहेतु मान कर उन्होंने प्रकारान्तर से काव्य में रस को जगिता का ही प्रतिपादन किया है। आनन्दवर्धन के अनुसार वाच्य का निबन्धन करने हुए कवि को मदव रस-भरतत्र ही रहना चाहिए। प्रबन्ध वाच्य में इतिहास-निष्ठ इतिवृत्त मात्र का निर्वाह कवि का प्रयोजन नहीं है, अपितु रस-निर्माण ही उसका एक मात्र उद्देश्य होना चाहिए।^३ आनन्दवर्धन ने महाकवि के मर्जन-कर्म के नार का निम्नलिखित वारिका में निर्देश किया है—

वाच्याना वाचनाना च यदौचित्येन योजनम् ।

रमादिविपयेनैतत् कर्म मुख्य महाकवे ॥ (ध्वन्या ३, ३२)

अर्थात् रसाभिध्यक्षिण विषयक औचित्य के साथ वाच्य (अर्थ) तथा वाचक (शब्द) की योजना ही महाकवि का प्रधान कर्म है। रमादि की विवक्षा के विना ही कवि द्वारा निबद्ध अलङ्कार चित्र या अरम काव्य कहा जाता है। गुणीभूतस्वरूप या मध्यम वाच्य में रमादि की अभिव्यक्ति तो रहनी है परन्तु कवि उसे समुचित महत्त्व नहीं दे पाता। उसमें वाच्य-वाचक व्यापार्य के अभिव्यजक होकर भी स्वयं प्राधान्य प्राप्त कर लेते हैं, रस के प्रति गुणीभूत नहीं हो पाते।

नाट्यशास्त्र के १६वें अध्याय में लक्षणों के स्वरूप की विवेचना करते हुए अभिनवगुप्त ने किसी अज्ञाननामा विद्वान् का लक्षणविषयक मत उद्धृत किया है जिसमें काव्य-निर्माण की प्रक्रिया के तीन क्रमिक सोपानों का वर्णन किया गया है।^४ इस मत के अनुसार काव्य-मर्जना में कवि का प्रथम व्यापार स्वयं उसकी प्रतिभा है। प्रतिभा-व्यापार में ही वाच्य में गुणों का विन्यास होता है क्योंकि प्रतिभावाली कवि में ही रमादि की अभिव्यजता व माधुर्यादि गुणों के उप-निबन्धन की सामर्थ्य रहनी है, सामान्य कवि में नहीं। 'इम' शब्द में इस वस्तु

१ वही

२ ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत २, वारिका १९ की वृत्ति, पृ. २३३-४

३ ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३, पृ. ३३६

४ अभिनवभास्त्री, भाग २, अध्याय १६, पृ. २९६ (बड़ोदा, प्रथम संस्करण)

यद्यपि काव्य-नर्जना की प्रक्रिया एक ज़ीव जटिल, अनिश्चित व बहुत-कुछ रहस्यमय प्रक्रिया है तथापि रत्नवादियों की उक्त व्याख्या किसी सीमा तक, मोटे रूप में ठीक मानी जा सकती है। जलकार-ध्वनि व वस्तुध्वनि का भी अन्तः-रत्न-ध्वनि में पर्यवसान मान कर अभिनवगुप्त ने ध्वनि निदान्त को भी रत्न निदान्त की परिधि में ममेट लिया है।

अब एक प्रश्न काव्य और वस्तु जगत् के सम्बन्ध का रह जाता है अर्थात् कवि करने काव्य में जिसे जगत् की मृष्टि करता है उसका बाह्य जगत् में क्या सम्बन्ध है? क्या कवि जगत् के वस्तु-व्यापारों का ज्यों का त्यों अनुकरण करता है या उन्हें किसी अन्य रूप में प्रस्तुत करता है। इस विषय में सम्प्रुत आलोचकों की मान्यता नितान्त स्पष्ट है।

सम्प्रुत आलोचकानाम् के अनुसार मोटे रूप में यह सक्ते हैं कि काव्य बाह्य जगत् एव लोक जीवन पर ही आधारित है। काव्यगत अनुभूतियों का मूल उद्गम जीवन की अनन्त एव विचित्र अनुभूतियाँ ही हैं। जगत् के नाना वस्तु-व्यापार ही काव्य में प्रतिकलित होते हैं। राजशेखर के मत में कवियों के मति-दर्पण में ममस्त विश्व प्रतिकलित होता है—“मतिदर्पणे कवीनां विश्वं प्रतिकलितम्।” भरत के ‘अवस्थानुवृत्तिर्नाट्यम्’ ‘लोकवृत्तानुकरणं नाट्यम्’, आनन्द के ‘मन्त्र-लोचस्वभावेन’ ‘तत्र लोकाश्च काव्यम्’ आदि कथन लोक और काव्य के घनिष्ठ सम्बन्ध के सूचक हैं। परन्तु सम्प्रुत काव्य-चिन्तकों ने काव्य और लोक के सम्बन्ध को स्वीकार करते हुए भी दोनों में प्रभूत अन्तर माना है। उनके अनुसार कवि बाह्य जगत् का अनुवर्ता मात्र नहीं है, वह एक स्वतन्त्र स्रष्टा और विघाता है। उसकी सृष्टि लोक पर आधारित होकर भी एक अपूर्व सृष्टि है। इसी अपूर्वता को आचार्यों ने कही वक्रांकिता, कही अतिशयोक्ति, कही नवनवोन्मेष अथवा नवनवोन्मेष के रूप में प्रस्तुत किया है जो कि वस्तुतः कवि-प्रतिभा की देन है। कवि की प्रतिभा उसकी नितनवीन दृष्टि का ही एक रूप है जो इस जगत् को नित्य नूतन वैचित्र्य में मृत्रित कर देती है। यह लोकवार्ता में पतित बोधमात्र नहीं है, अपितु इसे हम कवि की दिव्य दृष्टि कह सकते हैं।^१ कवि-प्रतिभा केवल वस्तु-जगत् में ही अपूर्वता और वैचित्र्य की मृष्टि नहीं करती वह उसकी वाणी में भी नित्य नवीन उन्मेषों को जन्म देती है। आनन्दवर्षेण के अनुसार प्रिया के हाव भावों के समान मुकवियों की वाणी की नता कोई अवधि है और न उनमें कभी पुनर्गति ही होती है।^२ कवि-वाणी, जिसके विषयों की कोई दयता नहीं है, वस्तुओं को हमारे हृदय में एक सर्वथा नूतन रूप में निर्वाणित करती है।^३

१. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३, कारिका ४३ पृ. ५०८

२. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ४, कारिका ७ की वृत्ति में उद्धृत श्लोक पृ. ५३९

३. वही, उद्योत ४, कारिका ३ की वृत्ति में उद्धृत श्लोक पृ. ५२७

स तत्त्वदर्शनादेव शान्त्रेषु पठितः कविः ।
 दर्शनाद् वर्णनाच्चाप्य रुडा लोके कविश्रुतिः ॥
 तथा हि दर्शने स्वच्छे निषेज्यादिवर्मेन ।
 मोदिता कविता लोके दावग्जाता न वर्पना ॥

(वाल्मीक्यानुशासन, अध्याय ८ की वृत्ति में उद्धृत)

परिचर्चा

पु ला भागवत व्यक्तिगत शोक नहीं रहा जोर साधारणीकृत हो गया, उस दशा में तो वाल्मीकि को ही आनन्द की प्राप्ति होनी चाहिए थी। मैं मनसूना हूँ, 'मा निपाद' आदि श्लोक को पढ़कर पाठक को वरपन्न की प्रतीति होती है। इस प्रकार उसे आनन्द प्राप्त होता है। वाल्मीकि के विषय में यह कहना वहाँ तक उचित है?

मू च पाठक मैंने जो कुछ कहा है अग्निव्याप्त के साक्ष्य के आधार पर कहा है। वस्तुतः जिस शोक को वाल्मीकि ने इस श्लोक में उद्धृत किया है वह मुनि का अपना शोक नहीं है अपितु साधारणीकृत शोक है। इनके अनिरिक्त यदि कवि को स्वयं रसानुभूति नहीं होगी तो वह महदय पाठक को कैसे रसानुभूति करा सकता है। यद्यपि यह ठीक है कि कवि रसानुभूति की दशा में काव्यसर्जन नहीं करता। बाद में उसके सत्कार या स्मृति जो शेष रह जाती है उसी से कवि काव्यसर्जन करता है।

पु ला भागवत मैं केवल यह जानना चाहता था कि क्या इसका समर्पण कैसे कर सकते हैं?

मू च पाठक: कवि में एक विशेष प्रतिभा होती है जिसके द्वारा वह लोक के भावों को आत्ममान् कर अपने भावों के रूप में अनुभव कर सकता है या अपने भावों को साधारणीकृत करके देव सकता है।

मु दा स्वामी वाल्मीकि का व्यक्तिगत शोक काव्य में वरपन्न नहीं हुआ अतः साधारणीकृत शोक ही कारण बना। वस्तुतः कवि के साधारणीकृत भाव ही काव्य के रूप में प्रतिरक्षित होते हैं—न कि व्यक्तिगत रूप में अपने से सबद भाव।

पु ला भागवत: वाल्मीकि को हुआ तो व्यक्तिगत शोक ही था ..

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**PRINCIPLES OF LITERARY
CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT**

Principles of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit

P. G. SECTION

Papers of a Seminar (sponsored by the University Grants Commission, New Delhi) held in December, 1968 under the auspices of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Udaipur.

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डा. देवराज उपाध्याय, एम ए (हिन्दी, संस्कृत), पीएच डी
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- 30 संस्कृत अलंकारशास्त्र में काव्य का सर्जना-पक्ष
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PREFACE

Principles of literary criticism is a fascinating subject and a help to understand, evaluate and appreciate a work of imagination. Critics of Sanskrit set on to explore these from the 5th century A.D. onward and their search, now more through modern languages of India including English, knows no end. Present work, which offers original formulations of new ideas and fresh insight into topics of literary criticism and aesthetics, is a co-operative venture of nearly thirty scholars. Ideas and principles explained and enunciated here may not be found absolute and commanding universal validity. Yet we hope, these refreshing reflections will help better understanding of the subject. World is coming closer day by day and one may fondly hope that the 'twins shall meet' and give birth to better informed Comparative Criticism which will be significant addition to departments of comparative learning like comparative religion and philosophy.

It was on the recommendation of our distinguished Vice-chancellor, Dr. G S Mahajan, who later very kindly inaugurated the Seminar, that the University Grants Commission, New Delhi, accepted my proposal to sponsor a seminar on "Principles of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit". I am deeply and thankfully indebted to him and the Commission. The seminar was held from 26th to 28th December, 1968 under the auspices of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Udaipur. This publication, which bears the same title, is an outcome of deliberations at the above seminar and constitutes substantially its proceedings.

The papers presented to the seminar have been edited with a view to achieve some kind of uniformity (where none seemed possible due to variety of styles). Absolute uniformity has never been my aim here (perhaps that could not be realised either, due to lack of time and resources at my disposal). Discussion on the papers¹, which has been considerably

1 Some of the papers could not be taken up for discussion primarily because the authors were not present and secondarily for lack of time at our disposal

his staff for printing the work in good time. However, some mistakes have crept in for which I am apologetic to the readers

The seminar has been a wholly exciting experience for us, the participants. May I now invite *Sahridayas* to share our experience and request the learned critics to evaluate our co-operative performance ?

Department of Sanskrit
University of Udaipur
7th June, 1969

R. C. Dwivedi

EXCERPTA

नियतिकृन्नियमरहितां ह्यदिकमयीमनन्यपरतन्त्राम् ।

नवरसरविरां निर्मितमादधनो भारतो कवेर्ब्रूयति ॥

(Benedictory verse in the Kāvya prakāśa of
Mammata)

Supreme is the poet's speech which projects a creation, free from the laws of *ṃyati* (destiny), constituted by pure delight, independent of anything else and charming on account of nine (or novel) sentiments.

समष्टिः सर्वशास्त्राणां साहित्यमिति गीयते ।

Criticism is the sum of all Sciences.

पञ्चमो साहित्यविद्या

[Rājasekhara in the Kāvya mīmāṃsā]

Literary Criticism in the fifth *Veda*.

द्वे वर्त्मनो गिरां देव्याः शास्त्रं च कविकर्म च ।

प्रतोपतं तपोराजं प्रनिमीद्वन्मन्त्रिमम् ॥

[Bhaṭṭa Tauta quoted by Bhaṭṭa Gopāla
in his commentary on the Kāvya prakāśa]

Two are the paths of Goddess of Learning, one, Science, the result of intellect; and two, Poetry, the product of imagination.

अपूर्वं यदस्तु प्रचयनि विना कारयकतां

जगद्भावप्रत्ययं निजसमरान् सारयति च ।

ऋमात्यव्योपाख्याप्रसरमुनयं नास्तपनि त-

त्सरस्वत्वास्तत्त्वं कविसहृदयाख्यं विजयते ॥

[Abhinavagupta in the Locana]

SEARCH FOR UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES OF LITERARY CRITICISM

(Inaugural Address)

Dr G S Mahajan

1 I cordially welcome you to this historic City and also to the University which has yet to make history. The City is blessed by nature and hallowed by history.

But the University has yet to develop its physical facilities. It is therefore not in the usually formal sense but quite sincerely I request you to overlook our shortcomings in making your stay as comfortable as we should have liked.

2 Sanskrit literature is so vast, rich and ancient that it was wise to limit the scope of your discussion—as apparently you intend to do. It is trite to state that as language only precedes its grammar, literature must first exist before the principles of criticism are formulated. All languages are expressions to thought and we see two broad streams—Science and Literature. There was a time when even scientific subjects like mathematics and medicine were treated through verse. We have now reached a stage when while prose has free access to both, poetry is largely confined to humanities—literature. Can you formulate a rule that the subject-matter of poetry must be non-scientific?

The more fundamental question to my mind is to investigate which of the now recognised principles of literary criticism are absolute, all pervading and common to all languages and which of these are only relative? Human mind is cast in the same mould, but since nurture affects nature and environment influences heredity, it is an interesting exercise to discern what is absolutely native and immutable.

Again we observe that humour is peculiar to certain languages, not so to others. The scope of humour and wit is, to my knowledge, limited in Sanskrit. But English language is particularly suitable for subtle humour. Why?

3 Times affect the very nature of literary output. You

world in which the *law of cause and effect* ruled with only the minimum of delay even with major opposition. Today literature aims at keeping close to the contemporary society and takes upon itself to depict its problems and deals with them. But life in its short-term duration is full of injustices, triumphant vice and unrequited virtue. And therefore literature turns to tragedies. *One of the dramaturgic prescriptions of Bharata is thus thrown overboard*

6 Take again the doctrine of the *three Unities*. Here at any rate, one thought, there is something which is absolute. But experience reveals that the success of a play is quite independent of this doctrine. In fact, it will be found that all dramatists of note have discarded the unities-doctrine. Shakespeare, for example, is no slave to Unity of Time which he violates conspicuously in the *Winter's Tale* by introducing an interval of 16 years between the 3rd and the 4th Act. Kālidāsa, too, in his *Śakuntalā*, introduces an interval of at least 5 years between the 7th Act and the earlier ones. Of course, other things being equal a dramatist should prefer a short to a long duration for the action, so as to make the spectacle for the play as close an imitation of real life as possible. A well-constructed drama makes us feel for the time as if the events represented were really taking place. The effect of a play upon the audience largely depends upon the success with which this illusion is kept up, and long intervals of time tend to destroy this illusion, because they remind the spectators that they are looking not at real events, but at a scenic representation. Then again if the times of action are shortened the retribution for vice and reward for virtue are rendered more impressive. If they are delayed, the effect is lost.

7 Next, what about the subject-matter or, if you like, the plot? Does Bharata have any dramaturgic principle for this? Should a plot be original or can it be borrowed? Detective stories and thrillers mostly depend on the originality of the plot. Agatha Christie has written over fifty books but each has a new plot, never used before or by any one. Shakespeare and Kālidāsa on the other hand often freely borrowed material from history and mythology. This fact, however, does not detract from the piece of art, because merit lies in their handling of the material.

SANSKRIT CRITICISM AND CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE

(An extract from the Welcome Speech)

Dr R C Dutt

The renowned scholars of Sanskrit Criticism have shown great favour to this young University Department of Sanskrit by accepting all hardships of journey in winter to attend the Seminar in this city of lakes, not so well connected by trains. Your affection and generosity shall be sole refuge of our inability in making befitting arrangements for the scholars of your age and fame. My awareness of organisational limitations does not belittle my sense of pride and joy at your distinguished visit. It rather waxes to find that not only pre-eminently the scholars of Sanskrit but also of Hindi and English have found it interesting to actively associate themselves with the Seminar. This reminds me of the famous line काव्यशास्त्रविनोदेन कालो गच्छति धीमताम्. Your participation, I am sure, will inaugurate comparative studies of the Principles of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit in depth. In the past ages Sanskrit was the national and composite vehicle of literary and cultural consciousness of the country. It systematised, conserved and transmitted the intellectual movements of the country. The literary tradition, which originated with the languages of the masses—Pāli, Prākṛta or Apabhraṃśa—was critically evaluated by the Sanskrit ālankārikas. It is not surprising therefore that many original works on poetics are full of illustrations from the Prakrit. The movement of Bhakti was similarly popular in its origin. But its philosophy was constructed in Sanskrit by Rāmānuja and Caitany, his followers Rūpagosvāmin, Jivagosvāmin, and by Madhusūdana who expounded the principle and philosophy of Bhakti Rasa. Jainism and Buddhism originated as popular movements expressing their faith in local languages. But it was not very long after their origin that the religion, philosophy

past the Sanskrit Acharyas never failed in appreciating and judging the literary mood of the people who expressed themselves in the idiom of the day. The scholars of Sanskrit criticism will no doubt revive the old tradition of understanding and evaluating the modern Prakrits—Hindi and others, and if need be evolve new canons of literary criticism. Dandin, Maṇmāṭha, and many other ācāryas did not ignore the literature in the people's languages, nor will the distinguished critics participating in the seminar. This may open up new horizons and lay the foundations of new canons of literary criticism. I have ventured to make some observations, it was but irresistible in the enlightened presence of so distinguished ācāryas here.

letter as a unit of such sound is the smallest constituent that the objective analysis of a poetical work reveals. It shows (i) that the letters are distinguishable from one another because of the distinctive sounds and different effects, pleasant or otherwise, which they produce on the sense of hearing, (ii) that they enhance the excellence of poetry because of their harmony with the suggested emotion, (iii) that recurrence of the same or similar sounds in a composition, constitutes various figures of speech, such as alliteration, and, therefore, has ornamental value in beautifying the piece where they occur, (iv) that their distinct sounds have exciting, softening, or neutral value (Dipta, Māsrna, Madhyama) to the mind or heart of the hearer, (v) that the use of words containing letters of a particular sound-quality helps in the arousal of a particular aesthetic emotion; (vi) that even a letter can suggest an emotion, (vii) that often a skilful choice and arrangement of words, made up of letters which have a particular visual form in writing, makes a written verse look like a sword, a drum, a lotus, and so on, because of the visual shape of letters and thus gives rise to pictorial poetry (*Chitrakāvya*)

THE DISTINGUISHING MARKS OF POETRY

Poetry is a set of well-connected meaningful words which constitute, as it were, its body. But such a set is also used for the ordinary communication of ideas in daily transactions, as well as in scientific and philosophical works. Metrical form cannot be looked upon as the distinguishing mark of poetry, for in India even the works on technical subjects are written in that form. A question, therefore, arises—what is it that distinguishes poetry from common speech? If it is said to be the beauty or attractiveness of words a further question arises—what is it that makes them attractive? It cannot be said that attractiveness is due to the presentation of an attractive set of events or of a complete aesthetic configuration, technically called *Rasa*, for a detached stanza, presenting a single idea, is also called poetry. The reply is that it is the presence of six essentials, which are called principles from the point of view of the critic, and the absence of defects, counted under the fourth, that distinguishes poetry from common speech.

refers to the view about the externality of embellishments as that of "others" (Pare) and discusses forty-three embellishments, maintaining them to be characteristic marks of poetry and including in his list most of those, mentioned by Bharata. He did so because he took the word *Alankāra*, not in the sense, signified by the English expression 'figure of speech', as it is usually translated, but in its literal derivative sense, meaning "that which gives sufficiency" (*Alam karoti*). In the context of poetry, therefore, according to him, it means "that which gives sufficiency to a composition to be classed as poetry." Taking the word in this sense, he identified characteristics (*Laksana*) with embellishments (*Alankāra*) and asserted the general characteristic of all types of poetry to be a turn or twist (*Vakratva*) that a poetic genus gives to words and meanings. He held this turn to be the characteristic of all embellishments.

Bacon seems to echo this very idea when he says that the poet distorts nature. As an empiricist he means by nature the material world, the sum total of all that is perceptible. He, therefore, finds that works of poetic art present the objects of nature, not in the form in which they are directly perceptible through the senses, but in such a form as is different from what exists in nature, though similar to it, so that it cannot be thought to be simply a copy of what is already there in nature. Accordingly he does not agree with the naturalistic view that poetry is characterized by close adherence to nature, by faithful presentation of nature as it is. On the contrary, he holds that poetry is distorted nature.

THE WIDER MEANING OF ALANKĀRA

Subsequently, however, the particular derivative meaning of the word *Alankāra* was ignored, and it was used in the popular conventional sense of ornament or figure of speech. Consequently the number of *Alankāras* continued to increase from the forty-three recognized by *Bhāmaha*, who amalgamated the characteristics, embellishments, and some of the qualities, to one hundred twenty-four, in the hands of *Appayya Dikṣita* (sixteenth century, A.D.), and gave rise to excessively ornamented poetry.

position, the former belong to the whole, like the beauty of a girl, whereas the latter pertain to a part only, like a bracelet to an arm, and accepted only the three qualities which Bhāmaha had recognized

IV DEFECT Defect (Dosa) is that which diminishes the excellence, attractiveness, or value of a work of art According to Bharata, poetic defects are ten circumlocution, superfluous expression, irrelevancy, want of significance, unrefined expression, tautology, want of synthesis, illogicality, hiatus, slang Mammata (11th century, A D) in his Kāvya-Prakāśa, Ch VII, deals with poetic defects in very great detail

In regard to defects it may be pointed out that defects are not necessarily always defects This view was elaborately propounded by Abhinavagupta in his important work, the Purūṣaravicāra, which is now known from references only, but which is referred to and quoted in the Ghatakarpara Kulaka Vivṛti, written by him

There are very few poems which present so many problems as does the Ghatakarpara Kulaka Its authorship is one of the most disputed points Some regard it as a work of poet Ghatakarpara But Abhinavagupta holds on the basis of a persistent tradition, current among his teachers in Kashmir, that it is a work of Kālidāsa and that it is an excellent poem, without the least blemish, that the use of Yamaka in it does not diminish but enhances its poetic value.

किंच अत्र कर्ता महाकवि कालिदास इति अनुभूतमस्माभिः । न चास्य काव्ये
तृणमात्रमपि कलकषात्रनुप्रेक्षितवन्तो मनोरयेऽपि सुखेऽपि सहृदयाः । इति ।

अथ च

न वै दोषः दोषः न च खलु गुणः एव च गुणः ।

निबद्धः स्वातन्त्र्य सपदि गुणदोषान् विभजते ।

एव सा वैदग्ध्यं प्रहृतिमवधूरा तस्य मुकुटे

रोलादादप्यतिमुग्धमाव परिणतः ॥ इति

V. Style (Rīti). Style is the mode of arranging words, according to their sound and meaning values, so as to present the poet's ideas effectively in harmony with the central theme—something like arranging different parts of the human organism in a picture. There are four recognized styles, based on the study of poetry of different regions Berar, Bengal, Uttar

VI. SUGGESTION (DHVANI) Suggestion, i.e., the suggested meaning, is called Dhvanī because it is connected with the symbolic or conventional meaning just as the echo is with the original sound of a bell, tolled in a temple. Just as the rise of the echo depends on acoustic conditions, which are due to the construction of the temple, so the rise of the suggested does on the subjective elements which constitute the personality of the aesthetic individual. Dhvanī is also used for conventional symbol and conventional meaning from which the suggested meaning arises, for the power of word that is responsible for the arousal, and for the composition that contains such a meaning.

Discussion on the various problems connected with suggestion, such as distinction of Dhvanī as a power of word from other powers, primary, secondary and implicative, and of Dhvanī as a meaning, different from other types of meaning, recognised in the learned circle, presentation of the psychological conditions, necessary for the rise of the suggested meaning and refutation of the arguments against the acceptance of Dhvanī, such as those advanced by Mahumma Bhaṭṭa and other opponents, need more space than can be given in the course of this address. Suffice it to say that it is one of the most essential elements of poetry and a literary critic has to satisfy himself that the literary work under criticism, has got this element before he judges it to be of the highest type.

VII RASA : The word signifies aesthetic configuration. It is used for the aesthetic object as well as for the aesthetic experience, got from it, because the constituents of both are the same. As found in a drama, they may be classified as follows :

(i) The situation with a focal point which the central figure, the hero of the piece, faces, (ii) the basic emotion that it arouses in the hero and that which the personality of the hero arouses in the human focus of the situation, (iii) transient emotions which arise from the basic emotion, like waves from the sea, and merge back into it, (iv) physical changes, which are consequent on the rise of an emotion, both involuntary, such as horripilation, the blush, and voluntary, like the movements of hands and feet.

The aesthetic object is not a mere juxtaposition of these

and is free from all defects, with the soul, which is their enlivening principle and in the absence of which the body of poetry with all its ornaments etc. is like a dead body. But Dhvani, in the sense of that which can be only suggested and can never be presented in conventional terms, is identical with Rasa. For Rasa is admitted to be suggestible only. Thus, there is complete agreement between the two statements which seem to contradict each other: *Kāvyaśātmā dhvaniḥ* and *Vākyaṃ rasātmakam Kāvyaṃ*.

(iv) Conclusion

Looking at aesthetics as philosophy of independent arts, I have referred to the aforesaid seven principles as *aesthetic categories*, in some of my writings. Here, however, I call them principles, because I am dealing with them, not from the point of view of a philosopher, but from that of a critic, who looks at a work of poetic art from the objective point of view, to find out if it has got the recognised essentials in order to pass a judgement on it, on the basis of the experience that they jointly arouse in him. Those principles compare well with those, discussed by I.A. Richards, the title of one of whose books is the same as of the subject of the present Seminar, i.e. *Principles of literary Criticism*; as well as with those propounded by F. P. Scott, who talks of five approaches to literature (1) *historical* (2) *sociological* (3) *moralistic (theological)* (4) *anthropological or archetypal* (5) *formal or structural*; T. S. Eliot, Mathew Arnold etc. They are being discussed in my *Comparative Aesthetics* Vol. III, *Aesthetics Indian and Western*. A detailed treatment of these seven principles in a different manner is to be found in *Comparative Aesthetics* Vol. I, *Indian Aesthetics* and in the *Svatantra Kālā Śāstra* Part I, *Bhāratiya*. Learned friends, desirous of knowing more of them may refer to them.

actions (krtānukaranam) The Daśarūpaka (I, 7) defines this imitation in a slightly different way by calling drama an imitation of a state or condition (avasthā) which led Dr Keith to make the inaccurate remark that "in the sāstra it is a state or condition, in Aristotle it is action, a distinction absolutely in accord with the different genuses of the two peoples"¹ The fact is that in the sāstra action is as much the object of imitation as in Aristotle Again the statement of Aristotle that tragedy is essentially an imitation not of persons but of action and life, of happiness and misery², agrees in substance with the statement of Bharata (N S Ch I) that when human nature with its joys and sorrows is depicted by means of representation through gestures and the like it is called drama

A very important rule observed by the Greek tragedian consists of the three unities The most important of these unities is the unity of action According to Aristotle the unity of plot i.e. action does not consist, as some suppose, in its having one man as its subject An infinity of things befall that one man, some of which it is impossible to reduce to unity; and in like manner there are many actions of one man which cannot be made to form one action The truth is that just as in the other imitative arts one imitation is always of one thing so in poetry the story as an imitation of action must represent *one action, a complete whole, with its several incidents so closely connected that the transposal or withdrawal of any one of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole* Now a whole is that which has beginning, middle and end A well-constructed plot therefore cannot either begin or end at any point one likes³ The unity of action is of no less importance in the Indian drama Whereas Aristotle divides the action into three stages, Bharata divides it into five stages, viz ārambha or beginning, prayatna or effort, prāpti or possibility of attainment of the object, niyatāpti or certainty of attainment and finally the phalāgama or fruition There are besides five elements of the plot viz the bija or germ, the bindu or drop, the patākā or episode, the prakāri or incident and the kārya or denouement Based on these parallel sets is a third division

1 The Sanskrit Drama, p 335

2 Aristotle, p 37.

3 Aristotle, pp 40-42

element is spectacle which according to Aristotle is the least artistic of all the parts because the tragic effect is quite possible [without a public performance and actors and besides the getting up of the spectacle is more a matter for the costumer than the poet¹

These elements are mentioned by Bharata also. According to Bharata, the plot or *itivṛtta* is the *body of the drama* and is of two kinds—the principal or *ādhikārika* and the subsidiary or *prāsaṅgha* (N S Chapter, XXI) These two are, however, not exclusive. The principal plot is essential in every drama, while the subsidiary plot may or may not be present in a drama. The characters are divided by Bharata, like Aristotle, into three categories according to their *nature or śīla* i.e. *Duttama* or high, *madhyama* or middle and *adhama* or low. Bharata unlike Aristotle also postulates *heroes of four types*. They must all be *dhīra* or self-controlled but they can be distinguished as *udāta* or exalted, *śānta* or calm, *lalita*, or light-hearted and *uddhata* or haughty (N S Chapter XXXIV). The element of thought by which Aristotle no doubt means dialogue is called *pāṭhya* by Bharata and is traced to the holy Rgveda itself (N. S. I, 17). Corresponding to the element of diction mentioned by Aristotle we have in the twenty-second chapter of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* mention of the four styles which a poet may adopt in a dramatic composition. They are the *Kausiki* or graceful, *śāntvati* or grand, *śārabhaṭi* or violent and *bhāratī* or verbal. Like Aristotle Bharata also regards song as the greatest of the pleasurable accessories of drama derived from the holy *Sāmaveda* itself (N. S. I, 17). Bharata adds dance and instrumental music to song as pleasurable accessories of a drama (N. S Chapter XXVIII). The fundamental difference between Aristotle and Bharata, however, is with regard to the element of spectacle. While Aristotle regards it as the least artistic of all the parts and strangely enough connects it with the costumer alone, Bharata regards it a most important dramatic element which he traces to the holy *Yajurveda* (N S. I, 17). In fact the very designation of drama in Sanskrit as *drśyakāvya* or a poem to be seen shows the importance of spectacle. Moreover, spectacle is not connected with

in separately in the parts of the work, in a dramatic not in a narrative form, with incidents arousing pity and fear wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions.¹ This catharsis is no doubt very much the same as rasa. Aristotle clearly says : "Though the objects themselves may be painful to see, we delight to view the most realistic representation of them in art."² According to Indian writers also a poem or a drama gives a spiritual joy to the reader and even when a person is shedding tears on reading or witnessing a pathetic scene he is nevertheless enjoying a spiritual pleasure. To quote Bharata : Just as well-disposed persons while eating food cooked with many kinds of spice enjoy its taste and attain pleasure and satisfaction so the cultured people taste the durable psychological states while they see them represented with words, gestures and involuntary states and derive pleasure and satisfaction" (N. S. Ch VI).

The question arises whether pity is the only sentiment according to Aristotle which a drama arouses. The answer is that so far as tragedy is concerned pity is certainly the predominant sentiment. Unfortunately the second part of Aristotle's Poetics in which the nature of comedy seems to have been discussed is missing. But we can presume as Ross has rightly observed that comedy was probably described as effecting a purgation of the tendency to laughter as tragedy does of pity and fear.³ The bhayānaka and raudra rasas of Indian writers on poetics are also hinted at by Aristotle when he mentions fear and anger along with pity as being aroused by the element of thought in a drama.⁴ What is, however, surprising is that Aristotle does not make any mention of what Bharata and his followers regard and what really are two of the most important of sentiments viz the erotic and the heroic. Surely if a tragedy causes pity and a comedy causes laughter, an erotic play causes the blooming or vilāsa and a heroic play the exaltation or vistāra of the heart as the Indian writers on poetics say.⁵

We would now take up for discussion two elements of

1 Aristotle, p 35

2 Aristotle, p 29

3 W D Ross—Aristotle p 290

4 Aristotle p 66

5 Dāśarūpa, IV p 43-44

back) " Judging from what Aristotle says, are not the most famous Sanskrit Nātakas, prakaranas, vyāyogas, and Ankas the best examples of Tragedy ? Let us take the greatest of Sanskrit Prakaranas, the Mircchakatika. The machinations of Samsthānaka, against whom Cārudatta cherishes no animosity have succeeded in the sentence of death being passed on the innocent Cārudatta for the murder of Vasantasenā. This misfortune is partly due to Cārudatta's inability to defend himself. However, the discovery of the fact that Vasantasenā is alive is made in time to save Cārudatta from execution. One of the most famous of the Sanskrit Nātakas is the Mudrārāksasa. We meet with a similar situation in this drama. The noble Candanadāsa is being taken to the place of execution because he has incurred the wrath of Cānakya for giving shelter to the family of his friend Rāksasa. Just then Rāksasa arrives and accepts all the terms of Cānakya so that his friend's life may be saved. Another famous Sanskrit Nātika is the Venīsamhāra. Here we find the actual situation of a brother intending to kill his brother but withdrawing in time. In the sixth and the last act of this drama Bhīmasena after killing Duryodhana goes to meet his brother Yudhisṭhira. As he is besmeared with blood from head to foot he is not recognized by Yudhisṭhira who mistaking him for Duryodhana wishes to crush him to death. Just then Bhīma speaks and is recognized and everything ends happily. Among the Vyāyoga type of dramas the most famous is the Madhyamavyāyoga of Bhāsa. Here we have the situation of a son trying to kill his father unknowingly and prevented from doing so by his mother who arrives in time to tell her son that the man whom he wanted to kill was his own father. Another of Bhāsa's drama the Urubhanga belongs to the type called utrsjikānka. Here we find the actual depiction of the death of the hero Duryodhana.

Aristotle unfortunately has said very little about the comedy. But from what he has said it is clear that the Sanskrit Nātakas and Prakaranas cannot be called comedies. The characters of the comedy are thus described by Aristotle: "As for comedy it is an imitation of men worse than the average;

it is discovered only in the last moment that he is innocent.

Pandey : You have put forward in your paper that 'Catharsis' is no doubt very much the same as 'Rasa'. Now the word catharsis simply means 'purification'—i.e. purification of sentiments which implies that they should be brought to the mean—not too much, not too little, whereas Rasa is a harmonious union of Vibhāva, Anubhāva etc like a nicely blended syrup (*pānakarasa*). There seems to be, therefore, almost no similarity between the two.

Bhargava : Yes, they are not exactly the same. But I see the similarity in the fact that both of these elements, the purification of the sentiments (catharsis) as well as Rasa lead to spiritual joy.

Pandey : But Aristotle nowhere talks of spiritual joy. 'Catharsis is simply a physical process of purification.

Duxedi : According to Aristotle Pathos is the main sentiment of the drama whereas you said we admit nine chief sentiments reducible to four. But Bhavabhūti, just, too like Aristotle, admits the Pathos to be the only sentiment. (tr.)

Bhargava : This statement of Bhavabhūti is true of Uttara-rāmacarita only. Even his other dramas do not follow this maxim. This may not be valid in respect of all literary creation.

S. Mahajani : According to our definition, Comedy is a drama which ends well. And as such when a person contemplates a deed of violence but draws back in time and the untoward incident is averted it is Comedy and not tragedy.

L. Bhargava : From Aristotelian point of view this is not a Comedy but a tragedy pure and simple.

S. Mahajani : Well, that is a question of definition, that way many of our Comedies will be tragedies.

ant Jaitly : If only that is tragedy where the assailant "draws back in time" then no Shakespearean Tragedy could be a real tragedy.

AN ETYMOLOGICAL NOTE ON THE WORD ALĀNKĀRA

Dr G C Tripathi

According to the famous lexicographer Amarasimha, the word *alam* has three different shades of meaning. It can denote (a) *bhūṣana* i.e. to adorn—in this sense it is always associated as a nominal suffix with the verb *kr*—(b) *vāraṇa* i.e. to forbid—used as an adverb with instrumental case and (c) *paryāpta* i.e. to be sufficient—Pier also used as an adverb in which case the use of dative is prescribed by the grammarians.

As is well known, the word *alankāra* in Sanskrit means ornament and in poetry it is used as a terminus technicus for those factors which enhance the beauty of the poetry namely the figures of speech. But if we go back to the beginnings of Sanskrit Poetics we find that the word *alankāra-śāstra* is used to denote the science of the Poetics itself of which the figures of speech form but a small part. The word *ālankārika* is used for a person who is well versed in Poetics, besides, of course, the comparatively recent meaning of a person, who attaches foremost importance to the figures of speech in Poetry.

It is a common belief that the original meaning of the word *alankāra* is ornament and also in such expressions as *alankāra-Śāstra* or *kāvyaalankāra* the same meaning is reflected with a slightly different shade, meaning "the science of that particular element which *adorns* the poetry in some way or the other" and as such the word *alankāra* in its broader sense comprises everything which forms part of the poetry.

But in my humble opinion the word *alankāra* in the older expressions like *kāvyaalankāra* or *alankāra-Śāstra* has a considerably different shade of meaning and it should not be confused with the word *alankāra* meaning ornament or the figure of speech.

To understand it let us look at the etymology of the word. Coming to *Rgveda*, the very first thing that we observe is that the sound *l* in *alam* is a later variation of the original *r*. Hence we have the word *aram* instead of *alam* and though we

appropriate, proper, apt (e.g. in the sentences like—it does not fit you, it is not fit for a gentleman etc.) exactly in the same way the adjective 'āra' in Rgveda comes to mean fit, sufficient, appropriate, proper, apt, suitable etc. The word arāmatī simply means 'proper thinking', arāmanas=proper or becoming of thought i.e. according to thoughts.

The nominal prefix aram which is added in Rgveda not only to the root kr as is the case in classical Sanskrit but also to gam, and bhū in fact an adverb which has developed itself from the accusative singular of the adjective 'āra'. It is no more declinable since it has got suffixed like so many other adjectives as e.g. Varam (Varameko guṇi putrah) which are used in their accusative singular form as adverbs.

The combination of aram with root kr occurs at five places in Rgveda and almost everywhere it means 'to do the fit or the right thing', to treat in an appropriate manner, i.e. to worship or even to serve. I am giving here all the passages with Geldner's translation.

- 1 yah svayam vahate so aram karat. RV 5/44/8
"He who carries (her) by himself does the right thing .."
- 2 yathā vidvāṁ aram karat viśvebhyo yajatebhyah 2/5/8
"So that the wise one (Agni) may do the right thing to all worthy of sacrifice"
- 3 aram kṛvantu vedam samaganam indhatām purah 1/170/4
"They should prepare the veda rightly"
- 4 ehi manur devayur yajñakāmo aram kṛtyā
"Come O Agni, Manu wants to sacrifice to gods, having set everything right"
5. aram dāso na mīlhuse karānt
aham devāya bhūmaye anāgāh 7/86/7
"I as sinless would serve (or worship) the angry god as a slave serves his master"

Besides these verbal forms the word aramkṛt—a root noun with aram—appears four times in Rgveda (1.14.5, 8.1.10, 8.5.10, 8.67.3) in the sense of the "one who makes proper, appropriate, sets right" etc.

The word aramkṛt is used but once in Rgveda i.e. in 7/29/3. Vasistha says to Indra: "kā te asti aramkṛt"

In view of the above discussion the development of the meaning Bhūšana or ornament hardly needs an explanation. The word kāra is to be taken in an instrumental sense—"through which is done". The objects through which the appropriateness (of form or appearance) is achieved is alankāra. And as Beauty is only another name for *Perfection* born of appropriateness, an alankāra is a means to perfection or in other words to beauty.

DISCUSSION

V Venkatachalam I just want to point out that our Rhetoricians have not missed the meaning suggested by Dr. Tripathi in his paper. The suffix *ghaṇi* can be used in *bhāva* as well as in *karana* घञ् च भावकरणयोः

In *bhāva-ryutpatti* the meaning of the word *alankāra* would be 'beauty' and not "instrument of beauty". The first Sūtra of *Vāmana* is कान्व श्राह्यम् अलकारात् and just after that he says : मोन्दयमलकारः

It shows clearly that *Vāmana* had all the principles which beautify a poetic work in view when he gave his book the title of the *Kāvyaalankāra* (-sūtravṛtti) and he has given due treatment to all of them.

R C Divedi : Besides the shade of meaning suggested by Dr. Tripathi in the paper the word is found to be used in other senses also. For example in the *Kausitaki Upaniṣad* the word *Alankāra* has been used in the sense of competent or elaborate language. It seems that in Buddhist circles the word came to be established in this very sense as is evident from a reference by *Subandhu* in his *Vāsavadattā* : बौद्धमगीतिमिवानकारमुपिज्ञाम्, where *Alankāra* occurs in the sense of 'graceful approach', or 'Art of persuasion'. This compares well with the concept of the Greek rhetorics. May I suggest it to Dr. Tripathi to probe further this use of the word *Alankāra* to find out its connection with the Rgvedic *aram* etc.

THE INTER-RELATION OF THE KAVI AND THE SAHRDAYA IN SANSKRIT LITERARY CRITICISM

V Venkatachalam

The question of what makes a poet has been discussed by Sanskrit critics from Dandin onwards. The three factors that together go to make a poet as enumerated by Dandin have been repeated in more or less the same form by subsequent writers, though some of them have singled out *Pratibhā* as the factor, *par excellence*. But when we look up to these very sources for their views about what makes a *sahrdaya*, we are disappointed. We find that no writer has ever attempted a scientific treatment of the equipment of a *sahrdaya*. Beyond random references to the *sahrdaya* and his pre-eminent place as a determinant factor of the various facets of good poetry, no clear statement of the nature of the *sahrdaya* is to be found in the earlier writings, let alone any discussion of *सुहृदवस्त्वरीव* on the lines of *कवित्ववीथ*.

As against this, Sanskrit literary criticism has dealt *in extenso* with the question of the aesthetic experience of the *sahrdaya*, in a manner that has almost no parallel in any other language. Whereas on the plane of experience, the *sahrdaya* has received such preferential treatment from the critics, the poet appears to have been relatively ignored. The creative mental process of the poet, which expresses itself in the form of poetry has not been similarly analysed.

These deficiencies apart, no integrated or comprehensive study of the inter-relation of these two concepts of *kavita* and *sahrdaya* has been made by writers of Sanskrit criticism or by modern exponents of their theories. The present paper is an attempt to bring together at least the more important ones of the scattered statements of the critics on the nature of the *kavi* and the *sahrdaya* with a view to review this question of the inter-relation of the artist and the art-critic from the standpoint of Sanskrit literary criticism.

I first take up the famous *śoka-śloka* equation which throws a flood of light on the psychological state of the poet when he is in the creative mood. This equation hinted at by Vālmiki

noisseur's appreciative mood. It is *hrdayasamrāḍa*—parity or community of hearts leading to its total merger (*tanmayibhāva*) with the object before him—that is the real governing principle of *sahridayatva* and Abhinava expressly affirms that the poet shares this *hrdayasamrāḍa* during his creative moments. This leads us to the logical conclusion that the kavi is a *sahridaya* first, before he becomes a kavi.

Two questions arise here. First, whether the poet's *rasānubhava* and his *kāvyaśrī* are co-eval or the latter follows the former. It is difficult both ways. If we were to say that he creates when he is actually in his emotional ecstasy it will strike at the root of *rasānubhava* itself, which consists in an experience of sheer delight, which banishes all else from the province of his experience. If we say that the *ślokaśrī* clearly follows the *śokānubhūti*, this will amount to saying that the poet does not create when he is in the creative mood, but *after* it. This again will be self-contradictory.

The correct position is : the poetic creation comes after his *rasānubhava*. As for the apparent contradiction involved in this it may be resolved by an explanation analogous to that usually given to explain the sequence between वाच्यार्थज्ञेय and रसानुभव. The sequence though present is not felt and the creation and the creative mood, therefore, appear to be simultaneous (वाच्येन तु वक्ष्य सदैव प्रतीतिः । and विद्यमानोऽपि जनो न मलङ्घने).

The second objection is of greater consequence. If the mental state of the kavi in his creative mood and of the *sahridaya* in his appreciative mood are both identical ; both being the same *rasānubhava*, there can be no rational explanation for the fact that the poet creates whereas the *sahridaya* does not. In other words, if the transmutation of *śoka* into *Karunarasa* in the heart of Vālmiki burst forth in the form of poetry, why should not the identical transmutation of *śoka* into *Karunarasa* in the hearts of the numerous *sahridayas* not find similar expression? It is, therefore, essential to differentiate between the aesthetic attitudes of the kavi and the *sahridaya*. There are, in fact, Sanskrit critics, who have drawn such distinction. Rājasekhara, for instance, speaks of two different kinds of *pratiśhēḥ*, the creative, with which the poet is endowed and the ecstatic which is the gift to the *sahridaya*. Though he refers

definitely cannot subscribe to this view, which divests the poet of the essentially-emotional stuff of which he is made.

Apparently, Abhinavagupta seems to hold that though there is no qualitative difference between the creative and appreciative *rasānubhava* of the poet and the sahrdaya, there is a quantitative difference. When in the creative mood, the poet's "fine frenzy" is considerably more intense than what usually characterises the aesthetic experience of the sahrdaya. The metaphorical image of a jar filled with a fluid incapable of holding any more and resulting in an overflow, which he has employed in the context to describe the poet's heart, suggests precisely this fundamental difference between the *rasānubhava* of the creative mood and that of the normal appreciative moods. The words of *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* quoted by him in this context that unless and until the heart is full with rasa it does not let it out, make Abhinava's mind still more clear. That Abhinava subscribed to grades in the *rasānubhava* is evident from his statements in other contexts too. Thus, the ultimate position according to this view is that the kavi and sahrdaya share the identical *rasānubhava* in their creative and ecstatic moments and are quite at par in this respect, except that the poet's experience is a whit superior, quantitatively, to that of the sahrdaya. When this subtle distinction is made, the conclusion previously reached that the kavi is at bottom a sahrdaya and that there is no basic distinction in their mental attitude becomes quite secure. Putting the same conclusion in terms of mathematical terminology, we may say that the kavi-sahrdaya equation follows from the *śloka-śloka* equation of Ānandavardhana as its inevitable corollary. Thus the *śloka-śloka* equation, properly analysed and interpreted, provides a very interesting peep-hole to study the views of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta about the inter-relation between the kavi and the sahrdaya.

So far, I have tried to show that the kavi is a sahrdaya. Now looking at it from the opposite angle, can we likewise say that every sahrdaya is basically a kavi and that *sahrdayaatva* implies fundamentally *kavitva*? My answer to this question is—though it may appear somewhat unusual, and even a bit revolutionary—that we can equate the sahrdaya too with the

Let us take the example of another fine art, Music. In this case, a vocal singer who weaves the fabric of melodies of a particular *rāga* is the creator, corresponding to the poet, who weaves his fabric of words. The *sahrdaya* in the case of Music is the connoisseur who has a trained ear for music and who with his *hrdaya*, *amrāda*, shares the ecstasy of the melodious music along with the vocalist. The *sahrdaya*, in this case, has a thorough knowledge of the nuances of the *rāga*, its notes and cadences and can, in fact, survey the whole scheme of the *rāga* within his mind and recognise the most minute lapses in its reproduction by the singer. While hearing the *rāga* being rendered, he anticipates the musician and creates the whole fabric of the *rāga* within his own mind. That the connoisseur of music mentally creates or recreates the entire scheme of the *rāga* more or less simultaneously with the singer is too patent to need any argument. But if he is asked to render vocally the *rāga* by himself, he would plead inability. It would not be inappropriate if we say that he sings in his own mind, which amounts to saying—absurd or self-contradictory as it might seem—that he is a “mute” singer! This mental creation of musical melodies will become more evident if we take the case of an Instrumentalist, who is not a vocalist. The Instrumentalist reproduces the *rāga* through the cords of his instrument, what his vocal cords dare not attempt. In this case, it is crystal clear that he creates the entire scheme of the *rāga* in his mind before transferring them to the instrument. These instances from Music should suffice to show that the *sahrdaya* in the case of poetry too creates the poet’s world in his own mind and it is this re-creation that is the real source of his delight. If the *sahrdaya* in Music is a “mute” singer, the *sahrdaya* in *sāhitya* is a “mute” poet—a मूक कवि.

It is interesting to note that the well known poetess Vijñā of Karmāṭaka, while paying a tribute to the *sahrdaya* refers to his silent expression of the poet’s ideas, which practically amounts to saying just what I have said, namely, that the *sahrdaya* is a “mute” poet. Vijñā says that the vision of the poet is beyond the pale of words and the *sahrdaya* does not make the futile effort of trying to express it by words, but instead expresses the thrill through the horripilation of his limbs, being all the while dumb. This beautiful verse of

mation for the *kavi-sahridaya* equation, envisaged by Sanskrit literary critics

Here, I may add a word of caution about the use of mathematical terminology in this discussion. If I have done so, it is only because the *śloka-śloka* relationship propounded by Ānandavardhana has often been spoken of as an equation. It is quite obvious that this is not intended to imply absolute identity of the *śloka* and *śloka* for, after all, the *sthāyibhāva* itself is not the poem. Likewise, when I speak of *kavi-sahridaya* equation or *sahridaya-kavi* equation, on the same lines, I do not in the least, propose any identity of the *kavi* and the *sahridaya*. What I mean to convey by the equation is that the one is a necessary concomitant of the other, in other words, that *kavitva* and *sahridayatva* are नित्यसंपृक्त. It is indeed interesting to note that even as *vāk* and *artha* are नित्यसंपृक्त the *kavi* who deals with *vāk* and the *sahridaya* who deals with *artha* are also नित्यसंपृक्त

The total upshot of all that I have said about the inter-relation of the *kavi* and the *sahridaya* may be conveniently put down as follows. The *kavi* is a *sahridaya* with a difference and likewise the *sahridaya* too is a *kavi* with a difference. Each performs the distinctive function of the other in a slightly attenuated form. Employing the language of verse extracted in the *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, we may say that the *kavi* is also a मावक only, the *kavi* is वाग्मावक whereas the *sahridaya* is हृदयमावक; on the same analogy I wish to add that the *sahridaya* too is a स्रष्टा; only the *kavi* is वाक्स्रष्टा, whereas the *sahridaya* is हृदयस्रष्टा.

This conclusion of नित्यसंपृक्तत्व of the *kavi* and the *sahridaya*, which I have sought to establish here is not my independent idea of the inter-relation of the *kavi* and the *sahridaya*. On the other hand, I have deduced this only from the description of the process of aesthetic relish given by the Sanskrit critics. Though the basic idea behind the *kavi-sahridaya* equation may not have been stated explicitly in so many words by any of our writers, I still feel that there are subtle indications of the same in the writings of our critics. Adopting the language of Ānandavardhana, used in a similar context, I may say that the idea of the underlying identity of the *kavi* and the *sahridaya* is चन्वानोक्तमोचनप्रभृतिनि लक्ष्ये सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धव्यवहार

या व्यापारवती रसान् रमयितुं काचित्कवोना नवा
दृष्टिर्या परिनिष्ठितार्थविषयो मेपा च वैपश्चित् ।
ते द्वे अप्यवउभय विश्वमनिश निर्वर्णयन्तो वय
श्रान्ता नैव च लब्धमन्विशयत त्वद्भक्तिनुन्य सुखम् ॥

Though Abhinava has taken the second line as referring to शास्त्रदृष्टि, the line can be interpreted with equal felicity as pointing to सहृदयदृष्टि. The verse would then mean that the combined vision of the kavi and the sahrdaya comprehends the entire universe

Likewise the expression कवि-भावक in Dhanañjaya's verse in the concluding part of the Daśarūpa should also be explained, in my opinion, on the same lines as Karmadhāraya in preference to the Dvandva

Though I am unable to find any other writer directly supporting my interpretation of कविसहृदयास्य the late M M Kuppuswami Shastri's cryptic and tantalising statement in the opening of his commentary appears to lend some support to me. He writes :—अथ 'परस्परमास्वाद कविसहृदयास्य' इति लोचने. अत्र ध्वन्यमाना अर्थविशेषा आम्वाद्यन्ताम् "परस्परममास्वाद" इत्यादिपदे उपलोचनस्योपक्रमे ।

The verse referred to here is his own benedictory verse which runs as follows —

परस्परमास्वादप्रथमानमनत्त्वयो ।
कवितावद्युपयोगं नमामि शिष्योऽयं ॥

I leave it now for the readers to judge

Before concluding, I seek your indulgence for striking a purely personal note to say a word about the genesis of this paper. The paper owes its origin to a strange dream I had in the small hours of the morning of the 4th December. I had been cogitating for well over a week about themes for the paper to be presented by me in this seminar.

I had been vacillating and vacillating for quite some time, when this dream furnished the nucleus for the present theme and decided the issue. In the dream-vision, I saw myself engaged in a rather animated discussion with a highly respected scholar-critic of Madras well known in the intellectual

exactly the world of the poet : Just as an elephant created in an individual dream is in its nature exactly the same as the real one with the only difference that the latter is created by God and can be perceived by all of us but we create our own 'elephants' in our dreams so also the poet is the author of a world whereas the *sahṛdaya* creates a world of his own on the basis of the world of the poet. The only difference is, that whereas the poet's world can be enjoyed by every body, (just as the real elephant), the world of a *sahṛdaya* is a personal experience, although the world is the same, just as the *gaja tattva* is the same.

R. C. Dwivedi : Can it be called *gajatatva* ?

Venkatachalam : Yes, Yes, why not ? Say it *gajatva* if you please. This *gajatva* is the *pāramārthika sat*; *gaja* of the world is the *vyāvahārika* and that of the dream is the *prātibhāsika* one.

R. C. Dwivedi : *Gajatva* is never a *pāramārthika* reality. I am afraid, you have missed my point. That there is a difference between the world of practical reality (*vyāvahārika*) and the world of dreams or illusion (*prātibhāsika*) is well understood by all of us and is very well explained by Abhinava in his commentary on the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti*. My point is whether the world re-created by the *sahṛdaya* is exactly the same as the world of the poet or is it different from it ? If they are exactly the same both of these can either be *vyāvahārika* (practically real) or *prātibhāsika* (apparently real).

P. L. Bhargava : He says that they are the same with a difference.

Venkatachalam : Yes, they are the same so far as the *tattva* is concerned. But the experience is comprehensive in one and limited in the other.

K. C. Pandey : You have got to make a difference between the medium i.e. a set of words and the idea aroused by it. Poet's work is to provide a medium which is capable of giving rise to identical ideas in a *Sahṛdaya* provided certain subjective condi-

for the comparative importance of the poet and the *Sahrdaya*

B Bhatnagar—You have compared the frenzy of the poet in the mood of creation with that of the *sahrdaya*. How would you compare poet's frenzy with that of the *sahrdaya* when the poet is not creating and simply experiencing?

The distinction between the poet and the *Sahrdaya* (critic) is admitted in Sanskrit poetics, the former experiences and communicates whereas the latter is only capable of experiencing. The poet creates a work of art without any end in view. It is purely an aesthetic or poetic delight in creation whereas the critic has definitely some end in view—be it simply elucidation or analysis. Would you accept that there is an end in view with the poet also?

Venkatachalam According to *Ānanda-vardhana* and his followers both the poet and the *Sahrdaya* experience *rasa*. Yet it is the intensity of the experience which makes a person poet. Whereas the attenuated form of the experience makes it difficult for a critic to communicate. This is of course, a deduction which, I feel, can be made on the basis of what our own critics have stated. *Abhinavagupta* compares a poet with a jar full of *rasa* which, unless it is full, can't overflow. To differentiate between the mental state of the two would not be advisable. The quality of the experience is the same but the quantity is different.

Surjan Das Suami : You have placed the poet and the critic on the same level and do not accept any qualitative difference between the two. But I think that even a qualitative difference can be drawn between the two. A poet has both kinds of *pratibhā*—the *kārayitṛī* as well as the *bhāgayitṛī*. But the critic has only the second kind of *Pratibhā* in himself and hence it is not proper to hold them both as identical.

Secondly, the state of apparent reality which

BLUSHING A MISSING LINK IN SANSKRIT LITERATURE AND POETICS

Dr R S Jaisly

Emotions influence profoundly, and in countless ways, the lives of men. Students of human behaviour are familiar with the major physiological changes which accompany emotions. These changes include blushing or pallor of the face, excessive sweating, cardiovascular changes, disturbances in respiration, muscular changes, which determine facial expression, vocalization, involuntary movements, postures and gestures, and many vague visceral sensations. Who has not noted the ready flow of tears, inhibition of salivary flow, erection of hair, dilation of pupils, wide opening and protrusion of the eyes, acceleration of the heart-beats and such changes in the activity of glands under the stress of emotions? These changes which are fully expressive of internal states of men can be observed at the surface of the body. An understanding, therefore, of the various emotions and their manifestations—voluntary or involuntary—is a matter of practical importance for the students of literature. This paper endeavours to study blushing and its various causes with particular reference to Sanskrit literature and Poetics.

Blushing is the most peculiar and the most human of all expressions. It is an involuntary reddening, specially of the face associated with the feeling of embarrassment and confusion due to shyness, shame or modesty.

Shyness is one of the chief causes which induces blushing. In this state the face is reddened, eyes are either averted or cast down and awkward nervous movements of the body are also witnessed. It depends on the sensitiveness of the person concerned. Conceited persons are never shy, because they value themselves so high that they do not expect depreciation and so are not at all afraid of it. Shy persons are very sensitive to the opinion—whether good or bad—of others. Their disapprobation or ridicule and, sometimes, approbation also make them blush.

cause and effect link is nowhere noticed. The movements and gestures which accompany blushing are profusely mentioned, but not blushing. It seems really surprizing that no term was ever evolved in Sanskrit literature for blushing.

The matter does not end here. According to the technical terminology of Poetics blushing should come under the category of involuntary expressions called '*Sātvikabhāvas*'. Their peculiar characteristic is that these expressions can never be caused by any external action on the body. This is the reason that these are involuntary. Laughing can be caused by tickling the skin, weeping or frowning by a blow, but *Sātvikas* cannot be caused by any physical means. It is the mind which must be affected first. They emerge only when the mind is stirred. That is why in the words of Bharata they are '*Manahprabhava*' (arising directly from the movement of mind) and '*Na Sakyate anya-manasā Kārtum*' (cannot be induced by the action of another mind on oneself). According to the above characteristic blushing is one of the best *Sātvikabhāvas*, but the crux of the point is that it has not been enumerated by any Acharya in the list of *Sātvikas*.

There is no point in holding a novel view, unless that is substantiated by apt examples and valid proofs. Here is an attempt to demonstrate from the poetic pieces of renowned Sanskrit poets that the context and the contents of the poems discussed below are best suited for the expression of blushing. The standard translators in rendering those poems in English consciously use the word blushing in order to complete the desired poetic effect, though in original no term that gives the sense of blushing, is found. This is one of the problems that has no solution.

The other problem, namely not enumerating blushing in the list of *Sātvikabhāvas*, will be dealt with later on.

Here are some of the examples from Kālidāsa's "*Kumāra-sambhavam*" to illustrate the point. At Śiva's command the Seven bright Saints approach Himālaya to seek Umā—the mountain-maiden as his bride. At the time of proposal the presence of Umā makes her position quite embarrassing and her modesty and shyness become apparent on her cheeks. It would be in the fitness of things if the original and its translation are critically examined. The verse runs thus—

the accompanying acts and motions of blushing are given by the poet, but he does not say that Umā blushed' The translator from the description of acts and motions, concludes that she blushed and introduces the word in his rendering.

When the rite of marriage had ended and the wedded pair was left alone, Śiva took Umā's hand within his own to lead his darling to the bridal bower—*Kautukāgāra* Her maidens there looked with arch smiles and glances at the pair. Such an occasion and situation would normally make a maiden blush. But our Sanskrit poet says '*Navaparinyaya-lajjābhūṣanām*' (feeling bashful on account of being a new bride), '*Tatkrīṭākṣepam Vadanamapaharamlīm*'—(turning the face away when Śiva tried to attract her eyes towards him), '*Kathañcit sayanasakhībhyo dattavācam*'—(attending the queries of her bed-fellows with modest reluctance) (1) Only these accessories of blushing are there and it is for readers to infer blushing on these accounts.

Another example from the same source may be taken. When the first love-sport of Śiva and Umā was over, Umā taking a mirror in her hand was viewing with pride the traces of past enjoyment on her body in solitude. She was not aware of Śiva's presence there. The moment she saw the reflection of Śiva in the mirror, she reacted by doing so many things to hide her feelings. By implication this is a situation where blushing is normal and natural. But all this has been conveyed in these words :

*'Kānī kāmī na cakāra lajjayā'*¹

The next example is from *Amaruśatakam*. The *Nāyikā* depicted in it is *Mugdā*—(a young girl attractive by her youthful simplicity). She is portrayed in a situation which indicates the originating source—cause of blushing.

The verse runs thus —

*'Śūnyam vāsagrham vilokya sayanādutthāya kuñcicchanaīr
Nīdrāvyājamupāgatasya sucīram nīrvarṇya patyurmukham
Vīrabdhām paricumbya Jātapulakāmālokyā gandasthalīm*

1 *Kumārasambhavam*, 7/95

2 *Ibid*, 8/11

text suits and some of the accompanying movements and gestures are seen, it becomes clear-cut case for the expression of blushing. That is the reason why translators generally use the term blushing in rendering such passages into English.

I have stated before that blushing has the real characteristic of '*Sātrika bhāras*' i.e. the involuntary evidences of strong emotions brought about by hormonal or endocrinal action, glandular discharges created by actions of the autonomic nervous system, and even then it has not been enumerated by our Āchāryas in the list of '*Sātrikas*'. They are eight in number viz *Stambha* (Stupification—prevention of motion by fear, joy or pain), *Śveda* (sweating), *Romāñca* (Horripilation), *Scarabhanga* (disturbance of speech), *Veṭathu* (trembling) *Vaivarnya* (changes of colour), *Aśru* (tears) and *Pralaya* (fainting, loss of consciousness). But one of the kinds enumerated above has the characteristic of blushing *Vaivarnya* might create a doubt in the minds of readers and they might like to include blushing into its fold as the liberal sense of the term is alteration of colour and that is associated with blushing. But it is very clear from the various definitions of *Vaivarnya* that this alteration of colour has not been mentioned in the context of blushing. Bharata says in his *Nāṭyaśāstra* that *Vaivarnya* occurs due to cold, anger, fear, sickness, fatigue and heat and this should be represented by alteration of colour of the face by putting pressure on the artery and thus is dependant on the limbs.¹ Viṣvanātha Kavirāja also explains *Vaivarnya* as an alteration of colour caused by sorrow or intoxication or anger.² The same conception of *Vaivarnya* has generally been maintained by all the Āchāryas. No doubt they mention the change of colour (*Varṇanyathābhāva*), as Bharata does, but definitely in a different context. Rūpa Gosvāmin (Sixteenth Century) is the only exception as far as the various types of *Vaivarnya* with its different colour-effects are concerned. He says that in sorrow the change of colour is white, grey or black, in anger red and in fear black or white. The state of excessive happiness also causes red colour.³ This descrip-

1. Nāṭyaśāstra 7/58 and 105

2. Sāhityadarpana 3/138

3. Haribhakturasimptasandhu Daksanabhāga, Lakṣaṇa 3/20, 21.

ed in a woman when a man directs attention to her personal appearance and gazes intently at her. It is also caused due to non-fulfilment of vows and defeat. It is to be represented by consequents such as change of colour, down cast face and the like.¹ Here in Jagannātha's definition of *Vridā* it seems certain, as if the writer had a fair idea of blushing, but both the verses cited as examples by him, tell a different story. The first verse runs thus :²

“Kucakalasayugāntarmāmakinam nakhānkam
Sapulakatanu mandam mandamāloka mānā
Vinūhutavadanam mām vikṣya bālā gavākse
Cakitanatanatāngī sadma sadyo viveśa ”

Dr. Har Dutt Sharma translates it thus —

“The young lady, with her body all horripilated looking at the marks of my nails between her two jar-like breasts, at once entered the house, with limbs expressing fear and bent down, when she saw me with my face placed in a window (looking at her).”³

Explaining the verse Panditarāja himself says that here *Vridā* is mixed with *Trāsa* (fear) and that is why the lady at once entered the house, with limbs expressing fear and bent down. Except for the implication of fear the situation described above can make any sensitive lady normally blush. The lady in question would have blushed here, but neither the term expressive of blushing is found in the verse (which was necessary), as being *anubhāva* (consequents) all the involuntary actions must be given specific expression, nor *trāsa* mixed with *Vridā* creates proper atmosphere for blushing, as it must have induced a disturbing influence over the lady and she must have found her mind much confused. Such a frame of mind is certainly favourable for the suggestion of *Vridābhāra*, but not for the expression of blushing.

The other example suggestive of *Vridā* is an excellent one. The state indicated therein is most appropriate for blushing :—

1. Rasugāḍgādhara P. 97 (Nirmaya Sagar Press, Bombay)

2. Bhāmanavilāsa, Śṛṅgāra-vilāsa, 30, (Pub. oriental Book Agency, Poona)

3. Ibid.

(Trans. Porten)

DISCUSSION

L. L. Joshi : I can give you a very plausible reason for the absence of the description of blushing in our literature. It is simply that our complexion is normally too dark to make the crimsoning of the cheeks clearly visible ! There are, however, some excellent descriptions of the situation of blushing in Sanskrit literature, such as the following two ślokas from the Kumārasambhava

हरस्तु किञ्चित्परिलुप्तवर्णश्चन्द्रोदयारम्भ इवाम्बुराशि ।
 उमामुखे विम्बफलाघरोष्ठे व्यापारयामाम विलोचनानि ॥
 विवृण्वती शैलसुतापि मावमगै स्फुरद्बालकदम्बकल्पै ।
 साचीकृता चास्तरेण तस्यौ मुग्धेन पर्यन्तविलोचनेन ॥

This is fine description of blushing. But the actual word of blushing does not occur on account of the reason, I have already explained.

Venkatachalam : Dr. Janly has placed sufficient evidence before us to show that both in literature as well as in poetics there really exist situations which call for a mention of blushing and the absence of any such word is rather striking. But he himself points out that the picture is not so bleak as he painted it in the initial stages and that at least in poetics blushing is comprehended indirectly under *Vairamya* coming under *Vridā* (Shyness). In fact the word *vairamya* should be taken not in the sense of *Vaṇābhāra* but in the sense of *Varnatīkāra*. There are really some situations of shyness where blushing has been indicated through the word *Vairamya*. I remember of a Śloka where the speech of a person trying to speak in an assembly of the learned scholars has been compared with a newly wedded bride :

नाहतापि पुर पद रचयति श्राप्तोपकथं हठान्
 श्रुता न प्रतिवक्ति वयममले स्तम्भं ममाविगति ।

P. L. Bhargava : The impression that I gathered from the paper of Dr Jaitly is that not only blushing has been totally ignored by our ācāryas but by our poets also and that there is no mention of the crimsoning of the cheeks due to shyness in Sanskrit literature. As far as Dr Dwivedi's contention is concerned, that blushing is more internal than external. I can say that not only blushing but every feeling is essentially internal but it has its external manifestation too. And when the external manifestations of other feelings have actually been described by the poets, it is surprising that the external manifestation of shyness is totally ignored. Shri Joshi humorously remarked in the beginning that blushing finds no mention in Sanskrit Literature because due to our dark complexion crimsoning of cheek is not visible. But it is not true, if we consider it seriously, because redness of the face in anger has actually been mentioned.

R. P. Dwivedi : You have associated blushing with shyness. But, I think it is not necessarily so. Crimsoning of the cheeks is caused by the increased blood circulation which may be due to any kind of excitement. Blushing should, therefore, be connected with excitement in general and not particularly with shyness.

To the suggestion of Mr. Venkatachalam, that blushing be included in *Vaivarnya*. I wish to point out that it is normally used derogatively in the sense of 'fainting of the natural brightness of the face', for the shadow of depression. Look at the following famous śloka of Kālidāsa :

सञ्चारिणी दीपसिखेव रात्रौ यय व्यतीयाय पतिम्बरा सा ।
नरेन्द्रमार्मट्ट इव प्रपेदे विवर्णमाव स स भूमिपालः ॥

Therefore, I think, blushing can hardly be included in *Vaivarnya*. (tr)

R. S. Jaitly : I agree with Shri Joshi and Mr. Venkatachalam that blushing was not unknown to Sanskrit

ties we would have been able to say that perhaps they included blushing in it. But obviously that is not the case. I, as such, do not object to the suggestion of blushing being included in *vairamya* but only wish that it should have some clear division to provide for crimsoning of the cheeks caused by the shyness.

That the Sanskrit *ācāryas* really overlooked blushing and it was not included in *Vairamya* is evident from the colour scheme given by Rūpa-gosvamin. He describes the colour effects of various emotions on face, such as whiteness in sorrow and redness in anger on face etc. etc. but he nowhere mentions the pink colour caused by shyness. (tr)

Brahmananda Sharma In fact the word blushing in English comprises both, the shyness as well as crimsoning of the cheeks. It includes, in other words, the cause as well as its effect, whereas in Sanskrit the cause (shyness) and the effect (crimsoning) are denoted by two different terms. Synonyms from two different languages seldom have the same extent of meaning. It is, therefore, not justified to search for an exact synonym in Sanskrit for the English word, "blushing" and to declare that the absence of blushing in Sanskrit is striking and thus constitutes a missing link. (tr)

R. S. Jolly : As far as English is concerned the word blushing denotes only the effect i. e. crimsoning of the cheeks which is the external manifestation of a particular emotion. There are some *ācāryas* in Sanskrit who comprise in *sāttvika bhāva* both *bhāva* as well as *anubhāva*. Some take it to mean only the external effects, the *ensuants*. Following the view of the first category of *ācāryas*, we should not interpret the word, "blushing" as meaning shyness as well as crimsoning, since blushing is only crimsoning, the effect, pure and simple. (tr)

R. C. Daxid Dr. Sharma has pointed out that there is no

A SYNTHESIS OF THE DHVANYBHĀVA-VĀDINS AND THE DHVANI-VĀDINS

Dr D.N. Shukla

My studies of reputed poets and aestheticians of Kashmir have given me a new approach to both poetics and aesthetics. In the contemporary studies and researches, the scholars have not been able to reconcile the different schools of poetry especially the Alankāra school and the Dhvani school. It is my first approach to reconcile this seeming opposition between Dhvanyabhāvavādins and Dhvani-vādins.

We are all aware that there are as many as five schools of poetics, namely,

Alankāra-school	of	Bhāmaha, Dandin etc.
Rīti-school	of	Vāmana etc.
Vakrokti-school	of	Kuntala etc.
Anumiti-school	of	Mahimabhaṭṭa etc.
Dhvani-school	of	Ānanda, Vardhana, Abhinava-gupta and Mammata etc.

Similarly, there is also a very narrow approach to aesthetics that it is only related to Rasāśvāda. The landmark amalgamation of Alankāra, Rasa and Dhvani by Ānanda-Vardhana, the great Kashmirian literary luminary, who has shed lustre, is unfortunately not fully grasped by contemporary scholars. Let me, therefore, concentrate on this theme.

The Vedas themselves are repository of Poetry and Music. The Hymns of Rgveda are earliest compositions or most appropriately revelations. Thus these suggest that the poetry is not a mere verbal jingling and jugglery. It aims at some revelations. This background was responsible for poetic insight, genius and genesis which culminated in the sphota-Theory of the Vaiyākaranas, the Nāda-Theory of the Saṅgita-Panditas, the Vāsta-Theory of the Sthapatis and the Sthāpakas and lastly—the most prominent doctrine of Dhvani of the Sāhitya Panditas. This fundamental background is enough to convince us that the poetry is the

Origin of the Drama to Bharata means the first performance of the first drama.

The aestheticity of the dramatic art has captivated the minds of a number of reputed authors, like Bhattachārya, Śrī-Śaṅkṛ, Lollata and Abhinavagupta for whom the Nāṭya-śāstra's aphorism—

“विभावानुभावमभिचारिणयोगादभिनयप्रतिः”

was the starting point for the Rasa-Theory. I do not think I should take this side of the dramatic development here. I am more concerned with the art of the Art rather than the philosophy of the Art. This later aspect, I hope to take while saying some thing on the art of poetry.

My own original contribution is the amalgamation of Alaṅkāra and Dhvani both. Poetry and Drama, i.e. Śravya and Drīya Kāvyas, are the two manifestations of poetry. We all know that the main theme of the dramatic performance is Rasāhvāda. This leads us to Aesthetic Ideal of our Fine Arts.

Aesthetic Ideal of our Fine Arts

Art in India is Iconography. The Viśnudharmottara has remarkable contribution on this score and Rājā Bhoja in his celebrated treatise, the Samarāṅganasūtradhāra, has simply canonised this aspect of Indian Art which distinguishes it from the Greek Art and provides a Philosophy for Art which is its genesis and genius.

Iconography is both a science and art. For an artistic perfection of an image, it has to be accomplished in such a way as to arouse in us the aesthetic experience akin to one as we get from poetry and music. According to the Indian aestheticians, the main purpose of a poetical composition is to arouse pleasure, the Āhvāda (what is called 'Rasāhvāda') in the reader. And this Rasāhvāda is extolled as Brahmānanda-Sahodāra. It is from this fundamental point of Indian aestheticians that we do not have tragedies in our dramatic literature. The Indian view or more appropriately the Hindu view of life is one of unbounden faith in eternity, a profound sense of optimism and sublime outlook of life, coloured by the noumenal existence and heavenly bliss, both

rational approach. We have to bring the two extremes of the Dhvanyabhāravādins, i.e. the Ālankārikas and Dhvani-Vādins into one integrated plane to judge the art of poetry in both its aspects, the Vāc्यārtha and the Vyangyārtha. Ānandavardhana, the founder of the Dhvani school and the greatest exponent of this doctrine himself opines this very view. After defining the Dhvani, he is not neglecting the foundation of Dhvani and let me quote both his Kārikās :

योऽयं सहृदयलाघ्य काव्यात्मेति व्यवस्थितः ।
वाच्यप्रतीयमानास्यो तस्य भेदादुभौ स्मृतौ ॥
तत्र वाच्यः प्रसिद्धो यः प्रकारैश्चमादिभिः ।
बहुधा व्याकृतः सोऽयं ततो नेह प्रत्यये ॥

Thus it is clear that Alankāras are a bedrock or the foundation of the Dhvani-doctrine. The above-quoted two Kārikās themselves speak of the evolution and development of the Dhvani doctrine from the Vāc्यārtha to the Vyangyārtha. The Vāc्यārtha is the foundation and the Dhvani is the sublimest imposing edifice of poetry. This aesthetic ideal is really one of the major contributions of Indian canons of Art as propounded in the texts like Viṣṇudharmottara and the Samarāṅganasūtradhāra, which give a distinct and unique character to Fine Arts in India. The oft-quoted aphorism रजो वै स is not without significance and high meaning, it aims at ennobling life. Even birds and beasts, the so-called brutes, when characterized with these different sentiments in accordance with the different situations, can go higher up; men and women, imbued with them, simply become divine. Further more this aesthetic element in Indian Art pre-supposes the ideal of beautiful not only in its real perspective but also in the inner manifestation, the sole criterion of the beautiful the 'Sundara' from the Hindu view of life. Internally beautiful, in its turn, pre-supposes the truthful, the 'Satya' both internally and externally and the art which is both Satya and Sundara, that alone becomes the Beneficent, the Śiva the supreme ideal of life. The Indian seers, especially the Kashmirian philosophers, teachers and monks, have

Thus a perusal of the sections on painting in the *Viśnudharmottara* and Bhoja's *Samarāṅgaṇa-Sūtradhāra* will show how *Citra* is based on the canons of *Nāṭya*. For them *Citra* is only one scene of *Nāṭya* and the latter is a succession of *Citra*. The *Viśnudharmottara* says that *Citra* is as much the art of imitation (*Anukarana*) as *Nāṭya*. The poses of the hand in dance called *Nrtyahastas* and *Rasadr̥ṣṭis* are equally essential in painting. These are studied elaborately in the *Nāṭya* and this study is absolutely necessary and is fully utilised in painting.

What the hand poses implicitly express, the *rasas* and the *rasa-dr̥ṣṭis* make that explicit. Thus the images are bestowed with life movements through this symbolism of gesticulation the very essence of dramatics both put together (*Sarvābhinayadarśanāt*). Therefore, this delineation of the *rasas* and *rasa-dr̥ṣṭis* and their representation constitute the fundamental background both in the *Āṅikā* (Drama) and the *Citra* (painting) arts. The science of Aesthetics included dramatics.

The symbolism in Art is again a second landmark to illustrate the impact of philosophy on Fine Arts in India. *Mudrās*, *Lāñchanas* and *Laksanas* of the Indian images themselves speak of this fundamental impact and it is not necessary to treat this massive subject here. There is a great misconception among the contemporary writers that Hindu images have no *mudrās*.

The renowned adherents of *Rasa* theory like Bharata, the founder of the *Rasa* school in Sanskrit Aesthetics and others like Śrīṣaṅku, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa and Abhinavagupta, all stand for *Rasāśvāda*. Anandavardhana has epoch-making distinction to have enunciated this theory of *Rasa* on the amalgamated plane of *Rasa* and *Dhvani* thus bringing both poetry and drama as an integrated Fine Art. Abhinavagupta has a scholarly exposition to his credit to focus the attention of the later writers to adopt this everlasting and everfresh doctrine of *Dhvani*. *Dhvani*, the *Mahāvīṣaya*, and *Rasa*, *Alankāra* and *Vastu* as its main constituents.

We have been hearing that literature is the mirror of

“परिनिर्व्विननिरपञ्चतदशब्दब्रह्मणा विपरिचिता मनमाश्रित्य एव प्रवृत्तः एव ध्वनिव्यवहारः ।”

“प्रथमे हि विद्वान्. वैयाकरणा । ते च वर्गेषु ध्वनिरिति व्यवहरन्ति । तथैव अन्यैस्तन्मतानुसारिभि मूरिभि काव्यतत्त्वार्थदर्शिभि वाच्य-वाचकमस्मिन् शब्दान्मा काव्यमिति व्यपदेश्य व्यञ्जकत्वसाध्याद् ध्वनिरिति उक्तम्.”

Similarly the further exposition also helps us to enunciate this background

अजत्ववृत्तिर्यं शब्द मूढमत्वाच्चोपलभ्यते ।
व्यञ्जनाद्वायुरिव स स्वनिमित्तात् प्रतीयते ।

Punyarāja, a reputed commentator on the Vākyapadiya elucidates it still higher to help us in establishing this stand (vide his commentary on the above Kārikā)

The grammarians employed the word Dhvani that manifested the sphota, similarly in the poem, words manifest suggested sense. The very first verse of Vākyapadiya enunciates this principle .

अनादिनिघन ब्रह्म शब्दनेह यदक्षरम् ।
विवर्ततेऽर्पमावेन प्रक्रिया जगती यथा ॥

Similarly the following quotation of the Vākyapadiya also help us to enunciate this background .

अरणिम्या यथा ज्योतिः प्रकाशान्तरकारणम् ।
तद्वच्छब्दोऽपि बुद्धिस्थ श्रुतीना कारण परम् ॥

Punyarāja elucidates it still higher to help us in establishing this stand

मूढमो वायुरिव सर्वभूतानामन्तर्बहिस्त्व ध्वनिरवस्थितः, स एव कश्चिद् आकाश इति पठ्यते,
तत्र यथा मूढमस्य वायोर्षज्जनाद् अनिव्यञ्जनाद् अभिव्यक्ति-
तया मूढमो ध्वनिः स्वनिमित्तेरभिव्यक्त प्रचितविक्रियात्प श्रोत्रदेहं
प्राप्त उपलभ्यते इत्यर्थः ।

The term like *Vyañjana*, 'Vyañjanā' 'Vyañjaka', 'Pratyāyana', 'Pratyāyaka', 'Prakāśana', 'Prakāśaka' used by Ānandavardhana in connection with his theory of *Dhvani* frequently occur in the *Vākya-pādiya*

Ānandavardhan's views that the relation between a significant word and its meaning is eternal are based on the similar view expressed in the *Vākya-pādiya* .

नित्यं शब्दार्थसम्बन्धं समाम्नातो महर्षिभिः ।

सूत्राणां सानुवन्त्राणां भाष्याणां च प्रणेनृभिः ॥

The hint for Ānandavardhana's recognising even a single letter as expressive of 'Rasa' is supplied by the statement of Bhartṛhari in which he declares even a single word to be capable of denoting the sense of the whole sentence -

सोऽयमन्यमिसम्बन्धो बुद्ध्या प्रक्रम्यते यदा ।

वाक्ये सघटमाया च स प्रवन्देऽपि दीप्यते ।

In order to meet an objection of the *Mīmāṃsakas*, Ānandavardhana divides the *Vyangya* sense into 'Nāntariyaka' i.e. inseparably connected and 'Vivakṣita' i.e. desired or intended; the former being not different from the 'Vācya' or the denoted sense, the latter deserves the designation of *Dhvani*. This idea of 'Nāntariyaka' to my mind has been borrowed from the *Vākya-pādiya*

The kind of *Dhvani*, called 'Asamlakṣyakrama-Vyangya' in which no order or succession of the manifestor and the manifested is perceived during the manifestation (*Rasa*), is based on a view expressed in the *Vākya-pādiya*, regarding the manifestation of *sphoṭa*. In reply to the question 'Is the order of the manifestor and manifested at the time of the manifestation of *sphoṭa* felt or not ?' Bhartṛhari gives two views - According to one, sound *sphoṭa* is perceived as indistinct just as the *sphaṭika* stone, in which the colour of the *Japā* flower is reflected, looks coloured and not distinct from flowers (vide *Puṇyarāja's* commentary on the *Vākya-pādiya*) while according to the second, the sound, though having its own existence independent of *sphoṭa*, is

aspect. This elucidation has been very scholarly and ably detailed by Dr K.C. Pandey

In the end I must refer to Kashmir Śaivism which had very profound impact on the writers belonging to this school. Abhinavagupta was a great Śarva and the moorings of Kashmir Śaivism before Vasugupta were providing the germs of this all powerful movement of Kashmir Śaivism which to my mind permeated every thought of Fine Arts—Architecture, Sculpture and Painting. It is, therefore, imperative to touch this branch rather the main branch of fine Arts to bring this topic home. In my work on Śilpaśāstra I have given a new lead about how to co-ordinate Music, Dance, Drama, Poetry, Painting, Sculpture, Iconography and architecture and have formulated the following maxim —

पद्मेदः । पद्मसंनानि । तदेव पद्मला ।

Aspects of Poetry in terms of Pictures :

Vāmana, among other Ālankārikas, was a keen student of pictures. With much insight, Vāmana says that the essence of poetry is style (Riti) and compares this Riti to the linear beauty :

एतन्नु विष्णु रेखाच्चिव चित्रं काव्य प्रतिष्ठितम्.

As style is the soul of poetry so are lines that of a picture. On seeing this remark of Vāmana we are reminded of the Visnudharmottara which says that the masters praise the lines :

रेखां प्रशंसन्ति आचार्याः ।

Vāmana again returns to the same metaphor of which he seems to be very fond of and says in his Kāyalankārasūtra-vṛtti :

यदा विच्छिद्यते रेखा चतुर विप्रपण्डितैः ।

तदेव वागवि प्राज्ञैः समस्तपुण्यमुष्मिता ॥

Another reference to the painting in Vāmana speaks of colour. The Visnudharmottara, after saying that the masters praise the lines, remarks that some others praise 'colour' :

वर्णोद्दिष्टिरे जनाः

Vāmana briefly compares Rītu, the essence of poetry, to lines (rekhā) which are the essence of pictures. This Sūtra is quoted and further explained by Ratneśvara in his commentary on Bhoja's *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharana*

यथा चित्रस्य लेखा अग्रप्रत्यगलावस्थोन्मीलनक्षमा, तथा रीतिरिति
द्वितीये विस्तरः ।

Rājānaka Kuntaka, another great Ālankārika, in chapter III of his *Vakroktu-jīvita*, says thus regarding the poet's beautiful speech

मनोजककोलेखवर्णञ्जायाधिय पृथक् ।
चित्रस्येव मनोहारि कर्तुं किमपि कौशलम् ॥

The stamp of beauty on a poet's utterance is totally different from the materials of poetry, viz, the words and thoughts. It is the result purely of the great powers of the poet, constituting his genius. This is like the beauty of a picture which is born of the genius of the artist and is separate from the plank or wall on which the picture is painted or the colours employed. Kuntaka here refers to two surfaces, wall and plank, to the rules for lines, anatomy etc. given in the *Citra-sūtras*, to the colours and to the *Cāyā* or *kānu* or *aujvalya* of which Vāmana spoke. The following is Kuntaka's *Vṛtu* on the *Kārikā* given above

फलकमालेख्यावारभूता भित्ति, उल्लेख चित्रसूत्रप्रमाणोपपन्न रेखाविन्यास-
मात्र, वर्णा रञ्जकद्रव्यविशेषा, छाया कान्ति । तदिदमत्र तात्पर्यं — यथा
चित्रस्य किमपि फलकाधुपकरणकलापव्यतिरेकि सबलश्रुतपदार्थजीवितादमान
चित्रकारकीलक धूमकन्वेन मुख्यतयोद्भवाते ..

Ibid. P 154

The application of the Rasa Theory to Citra

It follows from the above mentioned facts that Citra is based on Nāṭya, that the critics of old applied the Rasa theory of Nāṭya, and Kāvya to Citra as well. As a matter of fact the Rasa theory applies to all arts. So it is that while speaking of the kinds of pictures in the section on painting in

those Rasas, this would rather constitute a flaw of poetry, called the स्वराब्धवाच्यत्व. Thus the title of a picture forms a very little part of it. If one does not avoid this flaw, his poem comes to the state of that picture which can be known only by its title or that frame which has the title of the picture within.

According to Kuntaka alankāras are not separate from alankārya. Alankāras essentially exist in poetic Śabda and artha and are not added externally to the poetic composition. They are distinguished and discussed to reveal and explain their nature. Kuntaka is not a blind follower of his predecessors. He takes bold steps against them time to time to prove and justify his own theory. He criticises the earlier rhetoricians who gave a minor position to alankāras as the external means of decoration to poetry like Kaṭaka etc. to a human body. Kuntaka stresses that there can be no beautiful poetry without striking alankāras. Alankāras are meant to enhance the beauty of alankārya. He includes all the alankāras in his Vākyavakratā. Alankāras are dependent on Kavipratibhā and without the power of imagination there is no striking Alankāra. There is novelty and beauty in poetic expression, though the theme may be the old one, due to the infinite ways of figurative expressions.

At the same time, while giving such a high position to Alankāras, Kuntaka is also aware of the fact that the excess of the alankāras, sometimes, mars the delicacy and beauty of alankārya. There should be propriety in using the alankāras so as not to harm the beauty of the delicate Vastu-Varnana and the development of Rasa. For example in the following stanza,

“घौत्ताञ्जने च नयने स्फटिकाञ्छकान्ति-
गण्डस्थली विगतकृत्रिमरागमोष्ठम् ।
भगानि दन्तिशिबुदन्तविनिर्मलानि
किं यन् सुन्दरममूत् तद्विनीतस्य ॥”

There is Upamā Alankāra when the fair complexion of the bathing ladies is compared with the tender teeth of young elephants. The beauty of the delicate theme, i.e. the description of the natural beauty of the bathing ladies, is doubled by this Upamā Alankāra. Thus the use of Alankāra should be proper according to the Kāvya-Vastu. The Vastu which is to be decorated also should be equally striking as the Alankāras, otherwise the composition will be like a ghost without having soul though decorated with alankāras, and such a poetry will not please the critics.

composition by its striking beauty. Such a rasavat alankāra enhances the beauty of alankārya, for example,

“वपोदराग्रेण विलोलतारक
तया गृहीत दशिना निशामुखम् ।
यया समस्त तिमिराश्रुक तया
पुरोऽपि रागाद् गलित न लक्षितम् ॥”

The nāyaka-nāyikā-bhāva is attributed to the Moon and the Night. So it is a beautiful Rūpaka with a touch of Śleṣa enhancing the beauty of the Śṛṅgāra rasa depicted in the stanza. Though it is a Nature-description it is *sarasa* and pleasing due to this striking rūpaka alankāra which can be called rasavat.

Similarly, like rasa, bhāva, rasābbhāsa, bhāvābbhāsa, bhāvaśānti etc. also are alankārya according to Kuntaka. So he does not accept preyas, ūrjasvin, udātta and Samāhita as the alankāras.

Kuntaka, like Ānandavardhana, is aware of the great importance of rasa in poetry, but like all other poetic concepts he includes rasa also in the varieties of Vakratā, mainly in Vākyavakratā, Pralāṇavakratā and prabandhavakratā. He criticises Udbhaṭa's Svāśabdavācya theory of rasa. As in alankāra, Kuntaka admits the importance of aucitya also in rasa. Kuntaka admits the view of Ānandavardhana that if rasavat is not admitted in inanimate objects, the vast portion of good poetry will be included in nirasakāvya:

He divides rasa into three categories:-

1. Mukhyacetanaviśaya, like gods, human beings etc.
2. Amukhyacetanaviśaya, like animals, birds etc.
- and 3. Acetanaviśaya or relating to inanimate objects.

The uddīpana vibhāvas, by their minute description, become subordinate to rasas according to Kuntaka. Thus he admits the importance of rasa in poetry but treats it objectively as a Vastu, unlike Ānandavardhana who treats it subjectively as the soul of poetry.

Kuntaka criticises the Rīti concept of the earlier rhetoricians who name them after particular countries like Vaidarbhī, Gauḍī etc., and accept one of them as the

mārgas, but their nature is different in each mārḡa. In Sukumāra mārḡa Mādhurya guṇa stands for the use of the pleasant words having no compounds. Prasāda is clarity of meaning. Lāvanya is the beauty of arranging the poetic composition and ābhijātya is the use of sweet and pleasing sounds in the Sukumāra mārḡa. In vicitra mārḡa, Mādhurya stands for the lack of loose composition (Śaṁthilyābhāva) and prasāda is meant for uncompounded words with a touch of ojas. Lāvanya is skill in arranging letters strikingly and ābhijātya is meant to avoid the too harsh or the too soft letters in a composition. In madhyama mārḡa a beautiful combination of both the groups of guṇas is found.

Kuntaka justifies his two novel guṇas lāvanya and ābhijātya. They are the qualities residing in an extraordinarily beautiful lady but by upacāra are attributed to poetry, as Mādhurya and prasāda guṇas are attributed, though they are the qualities of sweet meats and water respectively. Kuntaka gives two more general guṇas. aucitya and saubhāgya as belonging to all the mārḡas. Aucitya is a clear description of things with propriety and Saubhāgya is a charm found in a composition as a whole. Kuntaka takes the idea of aucitya from Ānandavardhana and relates it to all the poetic concepts. Saubhāgya Guṇa is his own addition of a novel Guṇa decorating the entire composition.

Thus Kuntaka shows novelty and originality in the treatment of all the poetic concepts discussed by the earlier rhetoricians, and his treatment is very close to the modern literary criticism which can be applied to any literature. He practically points out the drawbacks of earlier rhetoricians and tries to correct them in his own way. The broad treatment of his Vakrokti theory supported by the practical illustrations with his own critical commentary shows his great genius as the best critic as well as the best poet.

Kuntaka's classification of Vakratā is based on the classification of Ānandavardhana's Dhvani. He is greatly influenced by Ānandavardhana and many times he quotes him in his work with great respect. He classifies Vakratā into six parts :—

appreciate the existing poetry Kuntaka is vastuniṣṭha and his select illustrations in the *Vakroktijīvita* show his highest taste. Thus his book is meant for both the critics and the poets. Though being most broad, systematic and modern, Kuntaka's theory of *Vakrokti* did not become as popular as the *Dhvani* theory of Ānandavardhana due to the lack of eminent followers. And hence the importance of Kuntaka's contribution to Sanskrit Poetics remained sorely neglected.

The sixth chapter, which consists of five stanzas only and which is named as *prasaṁsādhya*, serves as a small bridge leading over to the second half.

In the first verse¹ of the seventh chapter Śrīkaṇṭha argues out the case of treating rasas in his work on the ground that they enhance the beauty of drama and dance.

In the second stanza², instead of confining the scope of rasas merely to the field of drama and poetry, he rightly extends it further to that of music, and describes as to how

1. cf. कथ्यते सप्तमेऽध्याये रसमन्दोद्दलनम् ।

तेऽपि सर्वे स्वयं यस्मान्नाट्यसौभाग्यदीपका ॥ ७ २

(Here नाट्य=drama as well as dance)

2. ॥ सप्त रसस्वरूपमाह ॥

उद्याने प्रेयसीमिमंलयजपवनं कोविताद्वैविभावै-

श्रीवाग्भूषस्त्रिनेत्राम्बुजमुजलनिकाऽऽन्दोलनाद्यानुभावे ।

व्यस्तीमूनो विवृडं मुष्णिरमुषचितो भूरि निवेदनार्थ-

नाट्ये गीते च काव्ये त्रिषु वनति रसः शुद्धबुद्धत्वमात्र ॥२॥

उत्सादितो धीवनरम्यरामाऽऽरामादिभिस्तैर्वदुभिर्विभावै ।

सर्वचितो भूलतिवाविभगैर्मैरपायस्य करकियाभि ॥३॥

निवेदमुख्यैः महकारिभिस्तैः सर्ववित्त पल्लवित्त. वभेण ।

रामादिरूपे पटुननकेऽपि प्रतीयमानो रसशब्दवाच्य ॥४॥

भोगेन भुज्यत इति प्रवदन्ति केचित्

सामाजिकप्रकरसादरचर्चमाण ॥

काव्ये न कारणकलाविभावनाशे

यस्मान्न तिष्ठति रसो रसनीयरूपी ॥५॥

वेदान्तरस्पर्शविहीनचेतसा

मानाजिकानां किल वाचनाम्भव ।

एकोऽप्यनेकैरनुभूयते रसो

न स्थाततो लौकिकभोगमन्त्रिभ ॥६॥

Varial Lectures

1b रसम् (for रस), 1cd यस्मान्नाट्य, 2 a मन्थयज

2c विवृडं (for विवृड) 2d गीते (for गीते च)

5b सान्नादिक, चर्चमाण 5d रसो (for रसो)

we look up again to the lines 5b and further 5c it will be obvious that the expression *caryamāṇah* etc appears in the Kāvya-Prakāśa in context of the theory of Abhinavagupta (चर्यमाणैकप्राण etc) and not in that of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka or Śankuka. The words *kāryo na* etc in 5c have been culled from the description of the theory of Abhinavagupta. I, therefore, think that the summary of the view of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka ends with 5a, and in 5b-6d the theory of Abhinavagupta has been propounded.

R.P. Dwivedi: It is true that some of the expressions in 5b to 6d are reverberations of the view of Abhinavagupta as quoted by Mammaṭa, but an examination of the last sentence (6d) of these lines shows that Śrīkanṭha again ends with *bhukticāda* (see लौकिकभोगसन्निभ) of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. We can therefore assert that Śrīkanṭha has described only the view of Bhaṭṭanāyaka with the mixed terminology of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta (tr.)

R.C. Dwivedi: I can hardly agree with your view. In the last line वेदान्तरस्यसंविहीनचेनसा सामाजिकानां किल वासनारमक, एकाग्र्यनेकरनुभूयते रस etc the *bhukticāda* has not been expanded but rather refuted by the author. This, in my opinion, typically and exclusively elucidates the view of Abhinavagupta.

Bhaṭṭi also did not remain behind the race. Therefore, he introduced a new style in poetry.

Moreover, from the study of the Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya, it appears that Bhaṭṭi was a follower of the Alankāra and Guna school. He illustrated as many as thirty-eight Alankāras, including Śabdāṅkārā and their categories. The whole of the eleventh canto is said to be an example of Mādhurya guna. Evidently, later rhetoricians accepted Mādhurya as a guna. Also, most of the verses of this canto can be said to be good examples of Śṛṅgāra Rasa. Bhaṭṭi could name the canto Śṛṅgārakānda, but he named it deliberately as Mādhurya Kānda. It shows that Alankāras and Gunas were more agreeable to Bhaṭṭi than Rasa. It again indicates that Bhaṭṭi thinks that Alankāra and Guna are more important in a poem than Rasa which betrays his contemporary trends in the treatment of Rasa in practice.

To illustrate the above tendency it can safely be stated that like Bhāmaha, Bhaṭṭi also incorporated Rasa in an Alankāra called Rasavat. The example given by Bhaṭṭi¹ is one applicable to Śṛṅgāra (of inanimate objects). But since he has not referred to any Rasa there, it shows that he tries to incorporate this Rasa in an Alankāra. This omission of Rasa by Bhaṭṭi evidently shows that he was not a follower of the Rasa School.

Moreover, as Bhaṭṭi was writing Lakṣyagrantha, he could have illustrated various Rasas like Alankāras. But he has not done so because, perhaps, he did not think it to be an essential element of poetry.

Thus, various elements used by the Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya show that in fact, the time of Bhaṭṭi did not give any distinct importance to Rasa. That is why, it is ignored by the poet.

Though theoretical references to Rasa are completely wanting, however, in practice Bhaṭṭi has followed the conven-

¹ Bhaṭṭi Kāvya, X. 48

सहनगिरयन दिवो निरुध्व विपुमनुत्तमलवकान्तिर्योगम् ।

- न्युत्पन्नवदन मनोजमिरामं निव्वरकरमंदनादिव स्तुतन्म् ॥ -

It is supported both by Bhāmaha and Dandin. It further shows that the seed of the explanation of the procedure of Rasa which was put by Bharata in his Nāṭyaśāstra was suppressed by the poets who cared almost exclusively for Alankāra and Guna. The Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya proves the same both in theory and practice.

(a) Bhāva is the meaning born of Vibhāvas and conveyed by Anubhāvas i.e. three types of acting known as Vācika, Āngika and Sāttvika. Here Bhāva is used for the meaning of poetry.¹

(b) The second verse is nothing but the repetition of the first. Kaverantargata Bhāva cannot be anything else except the meaning of poetry. But the point worth noticing here is that Bharata has made an attempt to explain the word Bhāva from the spectator's view, as he always keeps him in mind. The question, what is Bhāva for the spectator, demands thorough consideration. Bharata ponders over the problem and talking in terms of transference says that which communicates the emotional experience of the poet to the spectator through the acting of Vak (conversation) Anga (body) Mukha-rāga (anointing of the face) and Sattva (the quality of purity) is called Bhāva.²

(c) That which brings Rasa or sentiment into being which pervades, intensely affects the spectator is known as Bhāva.³

Rudrata does not talk about the Bhāva as such, but his stand may be made clear from the twelfth chapter of his *Kāvya-lankāra*. He says that the ācāryas are of the opinion that Bhāvas are Rasas like madhura, amla etc. because they may be relished. He further argues and stresses that Nirveda etc. i.e. all the Vyabhucārins, Sthāyins and Sāttvikas are also Rasa because they too have the quality of Rasas.⁴ The question before Rudrata is how the Bhāvas are culminated into Rasa unless they possess this particular quality. This is the line of his analysis and he has rightly concluded that they are Rasa because they have the quality of Rasas. The statement of Rudrata is to be regarded of importance because he has pointed out an important quality of Bhāvas which though hinted at by Bharata but was not so forcefully put forward.

Rājasekhara has not written anything about Bhāva independently. Only a brief outline on his stand may be formed

1. The same, 7. p. 407, Ibid.

2. The same, 7. p. 407, Ibid.

3. The same, 7. p. 408, Ibid.

4. *Kāvya-lankāra*, 4. verse 12.

the Vibhāvas and Anubhāvas, probably because they are external and absolute in nature. This interpretation of Abhinava seems to provide equal footing to the Bhāvas of poetry and the Bhāvas which are worldly. But the difference is there. In the world as such Bhāvas merely remain or happen, but in poetry or drama they pervade and do cause something to be. Later Ācāryas on poetics have more or less repeated Abhinava by accepting Bhāva as Cattivṛtti or disposition.

Anyhow it should not be taken as the end. The importance of the contribution of Abhinava lies in his theory of Prāktana Samskāra. He, like many other philosophers, believes that the samskāra of our pre-birth accompany us and remain with in the present life¹. For instance, when a new born child faces an unknown or distorted figure, he feels frightened. This fear, in fact, is caused by his congenital instinct or samskāra of fear. These impressions and instincts actually emerge in the shape of Bhāva. As a matter of fact we don't need to say that the stand of Abhinava is peculiarly original and the modern psychology seems to support his view with its analysis of the congenital instincts.

Mahimabhaṭṭa has added nothing new to the conception of Bhāva. He flatly says that in the world specific situations like Rati etc. remain in a static state in Rāmādī. They are known as Bhāva in poetry or drama. Poets and actors impose them on their own selves for the description or acting of a particular type and with the help of this medium they provide Rasa, as it has been said (by Bharata) that these situations which provide Rasa due to the various types of acting are known as Bhāva.²

The question before the Sarasvatikanṭhābharana of Bhoja is, whether Bhāvas are caused by the Rasas or Rasas are the root cause of the Bhāvas? The question was first of all posed by Bharata. He came to the conclusion that Rasas are the root cause of the Bhāvas and the case is vice versa also i.e. the Bhāvas are caused by the Rasas³. Abhinava later on justified that stand of Bharata. He held, as a seed produces

1. The same, p 345. Ibid

2. Vyaktivṛkka, p 71. Chowkhamba Ed.

3. Nāṭyaśāstra, 6. verse 38, Gackwad's Ed

born of Ahankāra, therefore, all of them are Sthāyins, all are Vyabhicārins according to circumstances and all of them are Sāttvikas as they are mind-born (*manah-prabhavatvāt*), Sattva meaning nothing more than mind.¹

Mammata includes two factors in his definition. Firstly, Rati concerning gods, sages, teacher, son etc. but by no way Kāntāvisayaka as it becomes Śṛṅgāra. Secondly, the suggested stage of the Sañcārins.² The question automatically arises, in which way Kāntāvisayaka Rati is to be treated if it is not perfectly evoked by Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas etc. ? The answer to the question is, it should be treated as Bhāva. The answer puts forward one more fact that the Sthāyin not properly evoked is also Bhāva. It is here for the first time that the Apuṣṭa Sthāyin has been included in the definition together with other factors. The analysis of Mammata thus provides a broader sphere to Bhāva as such and his success lies in the fact that the word Bhāva has frequently been used, by the later followers, in the same technical sense which was indeed provided by him.

Bhānumisra defines Bhāva as Rasānukūla Vikāra.³ Rasānukūla is a new term which has been used for the first time in Rasataranginī. It implies, that agitation only is Bhāva which obviously produces Rasa. This agitation or Vikāra is of two types i.e. external and internal. Internal too is of two types viz. Sthāyin and Vyabhicārīn. Sāttvikas etc. are external because they pertain to the body.⁴ This is worth considering. All the Ācāryas are of the opinion that Sāttvikas possess dual nature. They are Bhāvas as well as Anubhāvas. If we look at the problem from a broader angle, all the Bhāvas appear to be Sāttvikas because they are born of the Sattva. Thus interpretation gives birth to a new problem that why only Stambha, Sveda etc. have been named Sāttvikas ? The solution of Rasānavasudhākara is that Sāttvikas are called so because they are born of mind which is being overwhelmed by Sattva or the quality of purity. Sattva is the quality of mind. therefore Sāttvikas

1 Śṛṅgāraprakāśa, p. 354-355, by Raghavan

2 Kāvya-prakāśa, 4-48

3 Rasataranginī, 1. Page 6, Veākatesvara Press Ed

4 The same, 1. p. 8-9, Ibid

ensuant (Anubhāva) being Kāryarūpa on one hand and expresses Rasa on the other. Because of this Ativyāpti blemish this definition also cannot be accepted ¹

After preparing grounds through the discussion, out of which two main arguments are given above, he introduces his definition. According to his *Rasagangādhara*, Bhāva is the Vyabhicārin suggested with the help of Vibhāvas as it has been said previously by Mammata.² It is beyond any doubt that the definition is liberal enough to include both suggestive of sentiment and suggested Bhāvas in its circumference. But when we look at it with a critical sight we feel that the soul of the broadness which was visible in his discussion is missing in his definition. He has completely failed in crossing the limit of the thirtyfour Vyabhicārins mentioned by him. It may be deduced that he kept the definition of Mammata in his mind and therefore failed to include Sthāyins and Sāttvikas in it. Moreover he was too much conscious about his analysis where bhāva is associated with the Bhāvadhvani only.

The date of Kṛṣṇa Kavī, the author of *Mandāramaraṇḍacampū* is not known to us. Any how Dr S K De considers him to be later than Appayya Duxit. His analysis of Bhāva is similar to that of Bhānumiśra.³ The only difference is that he has accepted two kinds of Śarīra i.e. Sattvikas and Anubhāvas. Further he accepts the emergence of Sattva in mind in connection with the Sāttvikas but surprisingly calls them Dehadharma like Bhānumiśra.⁴ It has been pointed out before that the Sāttvikas have dual nature, therefore, it will be simply worthless to discuss it again here.

Murāridāna in his *Yasavantayāśobhūṣana* 'considers the questions about the root cause of the Bhāvas etc. For him Bhāva is merely an agitation or perturbation in mind.⁵ It automatically implies here that he has accepted Bharata's first etymology of the word i.e. Bhavatīti Bhāvḥ, one that happens in Bhāvā. Proceeding further, unlike most of the aesthe-

1. The same, 1 p 282-83, Ibid

2. The same, 1 p 283, Ibid

3. *Mandāramaraṇḍacampū*, II p 91, Pardurang Javji Ed

4. The same, 9 P. 97, Ibid

5. *Yasavantayāśobhūṣana*, 2 verse 2.

and feelings etc. are not necessarily related to the impressions of previous lives. Secondly to look upon *bhāva* as *Vāsanā*, as Abhinavagupta does, is to give it a very narrow definition which will be not applicable, and to call *bhāva* as *rasānukūla rikāra* is giving it too wide a definition.

Basanta Jaitly Would you kindly explain a little more, how these definitions are characterised by (non-applicability, *avyāpti*) and *atīvyāpti* (over-applicability)?

V C Shrivastava Well, *vāsanā* is limited only to *sthāyibhāvas* and it does not include other *bhāvas*, and in the second case *rasānukūla rikāra* will comprise not only *bhāvas* but physical conditions as well.

Basanta Jaitly As far as the first question is concerned, I think that there is not much of a difference between the theory of latent impressions of Abhinava and what I have said about congenital stage.

V Venkatchalam Latent impressions are related to previous births, but not the congenital instincts.

Basanta Jaitly: Congenital instincts are also related to something which was there prior to our birth, you may call it heredity or something else. In fact, our congenital instincts are governed by long chain of the development of human race, preceding our birth.

R P. Dantedi: With regard to *Sāttvika Bhāvas* you have said that all the *ācāryas* accept two aspects of them—internal (feeling) as well as external (manifestation i.e. *kriyārūpa*). Abhinava and Dhanañjaya put forward the view that the *Sāttvika-bhāvas* are *sāttvika* only when they are reflected or manifested in the *citta* of a *Sahridaya*. Otherwise objectively speaking, they are abstract and internal. Thus one and the same thing can have two aspects or manifestations according to its different bases. Do you think that these two aspects are possible in one and the same substratum? (tr.)

Basanta Jaitly: As far as I think—and the modern psychology seems to corroborate my view—*Sāttvikas*, when they are caused and so long as they are internal,

R.S. Jaitly. I think that instead of the above classification of the Anubhāvas referred to by you, if we classify them as voluntary and involuntary, that would be more convenient and we could then include the *sāttvikas* in involuntary *anubhāvas* (tr)

Surjan Das Saami. In my opinion it is useless to classify the *anubhāvas* on the model of western psychology as voluntary and involuntary in order to incorporate the *sāttvikas*. In fact the word *anubhāva* denotes that every type of *bhāva* can have its *anubhāvas*. Why restrict it and say that only *sthāyīn* and *sañcārībhāvas* can have their *bhāvas* in their latent internal state ? (tr)

Venkatachalam. I think that the original question of Dr R.P. Dwivedi remains still unanswered. His main contention was that if you assume an internal state of the *sāttvikas* it can either exist as a *sthāyībhāva* or as *sañcārībhāva* in the heart. There is, of course, no other possibility. If I have understood Dr. R.S. Jaitly correctly, I venture to answer this question on his behalf, making his view more clear. He perhaps means that though *sthāyīns* and *sañcārīns* are ultimately the root causes of all the *anubhāvas* including *sāttvika bhāvas* it is so with the *Sāttvikabhāvas* that before they are externally visible they are internally created by *sthāyīns* or *sañcārīns*, e.g. internal *āśratā* in the case of fall of tears etc. This internal state is, in fact, a link between *sthāyīns* and *sañcārīns* on the one hand and the *sāttvikas* on the other. There is no term in our Rasa theory for this state. Therefore he prefers to call it simply the *bhāva* state of the *sāttvika bhāvas*.

P.L. Bhargava: Association of the term *Bhāva* with the *Sāttvika* has been in a way responsible for the confusion that these are internal, while, in fact, these are not different from the *anubhāvas*.

all the more difficult by the severe expectations of the Naiyāyikas, the absence of the three faults of *atyāptā*, over-extension, *atyāpti* non-extension and *asa-hāra*, impossibility. In a sense, these three appear to be very natural expectations of a good definition, but it is these that have created innumerable difficulties for the rhetoricians. A look at the works of Mammata, Viśvanātha, Jagannātha Pandita and others will show how much ingenuity is spent on these problems. Arguments and counter-arguments and refutations and improvements characterise these works. It must not be supposed that it is the severe logical expectations and tests that have made these problems so difficult, for in their very nature the problems are difficult to be solved, and admit of different explanations, since what is being discussed is essentially a subjective problem: what do I understand by poetry and why do I like it. Here is an attempt to define what is that affects me, its nature and its constituent factors and also how I have been affected by these factors. In other words, here is an attempt to study the object that excites the mind and also the excitement experienced by the mind. Accordingly, the approach in the definitions attempted is seen either to be 'objective' or 'subjective.' In the former is made an attempt to understand the nature of the object, the cause, while in the latter is made an effort to understand the experience, the effect. This often confuses the issues and this confusion is again made worse by the fact that the cause has many constituents and the importance of these is differently understood while the effect is also conditioned by the receptivity and culture of the mind involved and so admitting a variety of responses. The word *śāhitya* itself would need clarification and one would be not satisfied with mere '*śrī-māyī-bhāṣana-yogyā*.' If all these points and difficulties related to them are properly appreciated, it will be clear why the Sanskrit rhetoricians are often seen to indulge in a battle royal on this issue.

These definitions appear unsatisfactory on account of another additional reason, namely the expectations in a definition. What should it define and include—only the best specimen or even that which deserves the name only by courtesy? The word *kāvya* would be seen to include all this, the best as well as the most trash, and so must the definition

the medium. Poetry is word no doubt but also has something more. The lullabies and the nursery rhymes that attract us in our infancy and at times linger in our memory and seem to harass us occasionally are not poetry. One therefore agrees with Mammata when he points out that compositions, where attention is paid to *śabda-camatkṛti*, do not deserve to be regarded as poetry and if so regarded should be put down in the lowest class, *adhama* variety. The illustration that he has given,

Svaccandocchaladacchakacchakuharacchātetarāmbucchatā-
mūrchanmohamaharsiharsavihutasnānānhilāhvāya vah
bhundyādudyadudāradarduradaridīrghādaridradruma-
drohodrekamahormimeduramadā mandākini mandatām

at once carries his point and one is likely to observe that this verse may express devotion but is certainly not poetry. Sound has to play an important part here no doubt but poetry is not all sounds and nothing more. As soon as it is said that here *Śabda* has importance as medium, one might think of music, *sargīta*, but a little thought would indicate that music seeks to appeal through pure and simple sound alone while poetry that appeals through the charming meaning ought to be regarded as different from it. The *śara* in music is *śabda* but not a *śabda* in the sense in which it is to be understood in poetry, *kāvya*. It would be proper to say that *śabds*, the medium, separates music and poetry from the other arts while it is the meaning that separates, distinguishes poetry from music. Poetry may be enriched and heightened by its internal music but it is not all music, and here music is always subordinate to its meaning. It is because of this great importance of meaning in *kāvya* that almost all the definitions as a rule, one might say, observe that *kāvya* is *śabdārtha*.

The words *śabdārtha* bring us to language but poetry is not merely the language that we use in our daily life. In our life too *śabdārthas* are used and sentence is the unit. This unit satisfies the three expectations of *ākāṅkṣā*, *jogyatā* and *samīdhi*, but in a sentence, *nāṭya*, that seeks claim to poetry, something more is very necessary. Capacity to convey something, grammatical correctness and a logical consistency characterise a sentence used in day to day life

A point to be noted here is that in these discussions Vāmana when he discusses the concept of Rītu appears to take the objective point of view, discusses the Kāvya as and how created by the poet, in other words he has the poet in his mind while Ānandavardhana and Viśvanātha appear to have the *śaṅka*, the reader, before them and therefore appear to discuss the matter from the subjective point of view Vāmana is seen discussing the constituents of the 'cause' while Viśvanātha and Ānandavardhana appear to discuss the 'effect.'

As a matter of fact, one feels that a good definition of poetry should make a reference to all these aspects of its capacity to give highest delight, appeal to emotion and conveying of a charming meaning and yet instead of attempting any co-ordination and harmonization of these various aspects, critics are seen to lay special emphasis on this or that aspect according to the tradition to which they belong. What we call 'beautiful' has so many diverse constituents and these again have appeals in varying degrees to different minds so much so that unanimity in these matters seems very difficult. Can we really accept Jagannātha's contention that there is no *rasa* in the descriptions of children and animals, '*kapibālavināśita*'. How do we respond to the description of the child's pranks as described by Tārāpīda in the *Kādambarī* of Bānabhaṭṭa? What is our response to the Lucy Poems of Wordsworth? One may accept Jagannātha's view that there is no poetry in '*mrgāḥ dhāvanti*' but can this mean that there is no poetry in a running deer? What is then our reaction to the Kālidāśian poem :

"Grivābhagābhīrāmam muhuranupatati syandane
 baddhadrsṭih
 paścārdhena pravistah śarapatanabhayāt bhūyasā pūrvakāyam
 darbhaiḥ ardhāvalidhaiḥ śramavivrtamukhabhramasibhiḥ
 kīnavartmā
 paśyodagraplutatvād viyati bahutaram stokamurvyām prayāti"

Do we not regard this piece as a very fine composition? Again one may concede that *ramanijārīḥapraṭīḍakāṭa* is more extensive, *vyāpaka*, than *sarasatā* and "*sa-hṛdaya-hṛdayālīlāḍī śabdarthamangalā*" but then can these be ignored altogether

'upadeśa' has very remote similarity to what is contemplated by the term of Matthew Arnold, 'criticism of life'. In a way this is as it should be if we take into consideration the attitude towards poetry that is to be seen in these Sanskrit critics. According to them the main purpose of poetry is to give highest delight and therefore with reference to those who seek 'criticism of life' in poetry and those who do not like poetry, they observe '*tasmai namah stādu-*parānmu'hāya*' and '*arasikeṣu kavītra-nivedanam*' etc.*

What is the view of these critics so far as 'language of poetry' is concerned? Coleridge and Wordsworth had to start a movement in this respect over the issue which could be perhaps stated as whether the language of poetry must be the 'artificial and ornate' or it could be the 'simple one used in our daily life'. This movement could be understood as a reaction against the 'Ornate School.' The same is reflected in Sanskrit rhetorics in the controversies between the *Ālankārikas* on the one hand and the protagonists of *Rasa* and *Dhvani* on the other. Bhāmaha would represent the former attitude while Ānandavardhana and Viśvanātha would represent the other. These latter are conscious of the great power that simplicity of language often possesses; Mammata seems to concede this point when he adds '*anāṅkṛit puṇah kṛāpi*' in his definition of *Kāvya*.

It would be worth our while if we consider the illustrations of *Kāvya* as given by these writers, for it is these illustrations that are expected to make the definitions clear by supplying, clarifying or explaining whatever has been expressed or implied in the definition. It is therefore that in such works, the illustrations also should be given the same importance as the definitions themselves. Mammata gives the verse:

"Nīśesacyutacandanam stanatataṁ nirmuṣṭarāgo dhara
netre dūramanañjane pulakītā tanvī taveyam tanuh ।
muthyāvādīm ,dūtī bāndhavajanasy ājñātapīdāgame
vāpīm snātum ito gatāsi na puṇah tasyādhmasyāntikam"

as an illustration of '*uttara kāvya*' since it has *dhvani* in it. When one studies this concept of 'highest' type of poetry as revealed in the choice of this verse, one, might feel that as to why these critics should have rarely looked beyond

tive in itself of that eternal longing that human mind is always seen possessing for the past joys. To be in that familiar atmosphere where every thing has a story to tell, is to be fully intoxicated and to feel intensely to 're-live' the whole episode. There is something finer and deeper about this *atanki* so that it does not remain only a banal longing for the physical pleasure. The personal experience has something much more human about it, and so has risen far above the mere experience of an individual.

One can refer to another fine verse, again familiar to us:
 "Utkampinī bhayaparāḥhalitāmsukāntā
 te locane pratidīṣam vidhuram kṣipanti
 krutena dārunatayā sahasarva dagdhā
 dhūmāñcitenā dahanena na vikṣitāḥ"

It would need an Udayana to fully bring out the world of beauty and significance of the phrase '*te locane*' in this exquisite description of Vāsavadattā. How could one do justice to the celebrated words of Rāma in the Uttarakāṇḍa '*te hṛdāḥ dīpāḥ galitāḥ*' which again have not remained at the level of personal expression of Rāma but have come to symbolize the eternal cry of the whole humanity, the pang felt at the loss of the happy world which has gone for ever, never to return. It is with these thoughts and similar to these in mind one thinks that it would have been more appropriate if the '*attara*' poetry were illustrated with pieces like these or one of the type of

"nāham jānāmi keyūre nāham jānāmi kundale
 nūpure tvabhijānāmi nītvam pādābhivandanāt"

rather than the pieces of the type of '*rikṣa-tyāga-candanam*', etc. It is indeed difficult to understand as to why these rhetoricians, when there are so many fine passages in Kālidāsa, Bhavabhūti, Bhartṛhari that could be taken as brilliant poetry anywhere in the world, passages that have something valuable directly from life, ignored as if all of them and went about such '*śṛṅgārīc*' pieces. Tradition honours the Śākuntala as a very good piece and the verses in it as the best, at the least the four traditionally enumerated, but the rhetoricians even do not refer to these also. If poetry is '*suggestive*', *tyāga*, then the suggestion so conveyed should have something really deeper about it, which

come of all these efforts to define poetry one is reminded of the fact that defining poetry is like catching a butterfly, that wantonly flies from one flower to another in a garden. For a pretty long time one is not able to catch it at all. And when after a long exhausting chase one is able to catch it, one finds that all the best colours on its wings have fallen off, it has completely faded and lustreless, indeed what one finds in one's hand is the dead body of the butterfly. How true is this !!

The more and more one thinks of this problem, the more is one convinced that it is beset with really insurmountable difficulties and defies any solution. The perception and appreciation of beauty in literature is as a matter of fact a very subjective fact and an attempt to have any generalizations based on that or about that are bound to be unsatisfactory as well as extremely difficult. The intensity as well as the nature of an experience of an individual is difficult to be measured nor can the constituents and reasons of appeal can be correctly understood. The nature as well as the intensity of perception and appreciation depends on an 'inner necessity' felt by the individual as well as on the previous impressions of that individual mind. In the absence of these two things all discussion about literary beauty and its experience remains nothing but a talk meaning nothing. This is the reason why at different times by so many different persons were put forth different views rather vehemently in this field. Ānandavardhana, Kuntaka, Vāmana, Mammata, Jagannātha all these differ between themselves and it is the appreciation of these differences that is likely to lead to a proper appreciation of their views. No seminars are likely to bring about a unanimity amongst rhetoricians in this respect. For in the ultimate analysis, a discussion that is philosophical or intellectual presentation is not likely to grasp correctly an experience. If such a discussion strikes the cord of assent in us then only we are in a mood to accept or otherwise there is an urge to disagree violently. The core of an individual is something that cannot be thoroughly grasped, some of its elements come from social environment, some from heredity, but the individual being is not mere the sum-

meaning is understood only by minds that are capable of establishing 'harmony and a concord' This may be 'mood' generated in us, may be beyond the capacity of words to convey, but then there is no doubt that there is something that is felt keenly as captivating, enchanting, expanding This expansion is many times felt by the poet himself too, and the images reveal an ascending expansion of content I shall illustrate Take Kālidāsa at the end of his Raghuvamśa XIX 51 He observes about the tragic end of the illustrious dynasty of the Raghus

Vyoma paścimakalāsthitudu vā pankasamiva gharma-
apalvalam
rājñi tatkulamabhūt ksayāture vāmanārcitva dipabhāja-
nam XIX 51.

Kālidāsa thought of the great dynasty as the vast Vyoma and the dying King the fading digit of the moon and then coming to the earth, our world, he thinks of the 'dried up lake, a pathetic awful sight' and finally he comes to the 'Lamp' 'with its dying flame' The poignancy, ascending order of subtlety and purity and sublimity is something that can be felt and hence these Kālidāsan images coming one after another mean so much to us The number of the images is immaterial, for it is the natural blooming of the poet's mind into these images and the suggestive quality of these images that captivate us Poetry need not always discuss philosophy, need not discuss truth of life It fills us with a mood and we seem to overhear the poet It is well said that 'greatest poetry is that which is overheard' How finely do we overhear Kālidāsa here as well as elsewhere, in the Meghadūta too The poet writes for himself undoubtedly, to express himself but this expression invades the empires of minds of the *sahṛdayas* A living expanding mind overwhelms another mind that seeks to be so influenced This dialogue of two minds is the aim and fulfilment of all poetry and literature, the *vigalita-vedyāntara*

Through this dialogue between human minds, the quality of the mind has improved and all the classical literature is nothing but such dialogues These dialogues have enriched our philosophy, understanding of life, of human problems and human conflicts. The powerful minds

COMMON TRENDS IN INDIAN AND GRECO-ROMAN AESTHETICS*

Dr K C Pandey

Casting a glance at the history of Greco-Roman aesthetics we find the following main currents —

(1) Sophist Gorgias, speaking from the point of view of the artist, asserted that imitation is the principle of artistic production, and insisted that imitation should be so thorough as to create an illusion. Accordingly, speaking from the point of view of the spectator, he said : "Tragic representation is a deception, which turns out to the honour of both, of him who deceives and of him who is deceived, in which it is shameful not to know how to deceive oneself and not to let oneself be deceived."

'Imitation' is recognised to be the principle of artistic production in the earliest period of the history of art everywhere. And imitation, when it is most successful, produces illusion.

Such a theory of art, namely, that a work of art creates illusion, that it deceives the connoisseur to take the product of art to be the product of nature and arouses the same psycho-physical responses in him, is attributed to Bhaṭṭa Lollata. Accordingly it is said that he maintained that just as at the time of illusory knowledge of silver at the sight of brilliance of mother of pearl, there is the same experience for a moment as at the sight of the real silver ; so, on the objective perception of the stage-representation of the historic, there is for a moment an extremely pleasant experience, very much the same as at the sight of real For, the spectator is aware of the presence of an emotive state in the focus of the situation, the hero, though it is really not there.

We find a reference to imitative sculpture in the *Pratimā Nāṭaka* of Bhāsa. The scene may be presented as follows:—

* General lecture delivered by Dr Pandey during the Seminar
Remarks of Shri Bhanu Sen who presided follow

"Kamsa was killed long ago. How can the use of the present tense be grammatically justifiable in reference to the action presented on the stage?" And the reply is that "It is justifiable, because in the imaginative grasp of the stage-presentation, the actors shine as the original historical characters."

The fact that Patañjali admitted dramatic presentation to be such an imitation as made the actors shine as original characters in the imagination of the spectator is referred to by Helārāja in his commentary on the *Vākyapadīyam* (Kānda III P 177) as follows —

In witnessing a drama, in which the past deeds of historical characters / such as Kamsa and Kṛṣṇa are imitatively presented, the represented shine as original in the imagination of the spectator because of similarity.

Criticism of the Theory of Imitation

But imitation as the principle of production of works of art in any artistic medium, may it be clay, stone, paint, musical sound, language or human body, has been condemned both in East and West. It has been recognised as a principle of production of works of arts for preserving the memory of great persons, but not of such works as have independent value. Imitative art is domineered by hedonism. It is capable of giving sensuous satisfaction only. It does not lead the mind beyond the particular to the Universal. It may have educative value. It may enable us to get an idea of the imitated through imitative representation, but it has no aesthetic value.

Plato in the West was the first to condemn imitative art. And he knew of no other art than imitative. In the context of his metaphysics and ethics, he formulates the problem of aesthetics as follows :—

"Is art, mimesis, a rational or irrational fact? Does it belong to the noble region of the soul, where philosophy and virtue are found, or does it dwell in that base lower sphere, with sensuality and crude passionality?"

In summarising the solution we may say that (1) since matter and the world of phenomena, which is but matter

the awareness of what is mental, such as feeling and emotion, which are essentially mental states, though they find expression in the physical changes”

The exponent of the imitation-inference theory, therefore, maintains that the basic mental state is known from the imitative presentation, through inference of it from the situation, the cause of emotion, from the mimetic changes, the effects of emotion, and the invariable concomitants of emotion, the transient emotion.

He guards against the criticism, levelled against the imitation-illusion theory, namely, that if art creates illusion and arouses the same kind of reaction as does the real, it has no independent value and the tragic presentations should not be enlivening but depressing. He asserts that the emotion that is inferred from the imitative presentation is not the real but imitated and therefore, it does not arouse that commotion in the heart, which the awareness of a real emotion does. For, when we see an angry lion in a picture and are aware of its being only an imitation, the emotion of fear does not arise in us.

But this justification of the imitative art is illogical. The inconsistencies of the imitation-inference theory are apparent.

For, if the spectator takes the reasons, which are realistically presented on the stage, to be real, how can the basic mental state, inferred from them, be spoken of as imitation? But if he takes them to be the products of art, the inference of the basic mental state from them is out of the question.

From Imitation to Idealisation

In the history of Aesthetics, both in the East and the West, the criticism and consequent rejection of the theory of imitation in art, because of its sensuousness, deceptiveness and hedonism, has led to the substitution of “imitation”, as a principle of artistic production, by Idealisation and of hedonism by Pedagogism. In the West, for instance, we find Aristotle, a pupil of Plato, propounding idealistic and the pedagogic views of art.

Aristotle's teacher, Plato meant by imitation the produc-

poetical muse, we have to keep two points in our minds (I) his conception of soul and (II) distinction between virtue and philosophy. Tragedy is not presentation of pure abstract idea. For, such an idea is to be realised only in philosophic contemplation. Tragedy is not philosophy. It is imitation of worthy or illustrious and perfect action. It is, therefore, not concerned with the pure intellectual aspect of the human soul. Its aim is to present the appetitive aspect, to which all passions and emotions belong and which is the spring of all action. It presents human soul, not in its blind pursuit of the objects of sensuous satisfaction, but in its effort to strike the *mean* between two extremes under the guidance and control of reason; or rather a soul which, because of long and continuous obedience to the dictates of reason, has got into the habit of always following the middle course between two extremes, a soul, which is virtuous, worthy or illustrious and exhibits its worthiness in all actions.

But tragedy is not the only product of the poetical Muse. Epic and comedy are also her productions. The meaning of imitation, as has just been stated, is the particular meaning in the context of tragedy. In general, however, imitation means presentation of action of worthy and virtuous persons no less than that of the depraved and vicious. Men are of three kinds. (i) better or (ii) worse than we are and (iii) like ourselves. Epic, such as that of Homer, imitates better men than we are. Tragedy and comedy differ from each other, because of the difference in their objects of imitation. The former imitates better and the latter worse men. The former is the presentation of the beautiful and the latter is that of the ugly.

The Comedy

The full meaning of comedy, we can understand, only if we remember Aristotle's conception of the ugly. According to him, as we have already stated, there are two principles, idea and matter. And although they are always together, yet matter does not always submit to the directing force and control of idea. It resists the force of idea. Thus, when matter refuses to submit to idea and asserts itself in disobedience to the dictates of reason, we have the ugly and de-

found in the external world. It is the presentation of an advance on a given reality. It is not confined to the perceptible. It extends to the mental. Voices and figures are to be imitated no less than the passions and feelings.

Recognition and Inference Admitted by Aristotle

It is interesting to find that Aristotle, like Śrīśankuka, admits —

(1) That aesthetic experience is a cognitive experience in so far as the spectator recognises the natural or historical in the artistic representation, and

(2) that there is a kind of inference and, therefore, some exercise of the intelligence is involved in such recognition.

Thus, Aristotle in speaking of "some kind of inference" seems to have realised that the inference of the emotive state of the presented is not the ordinary inference (a) of effect from cause or (b) of cause from effect or (c) of one invariable concomitant from another. He seems to realise that empirical inference of the emotive state, presented in a work of art, is not possible. He seems to admit a different means of knowledge to account for the awareness of emotion from a work of art. The criticism, therefore, that has been levelled against Śrīśankuka's theory of inference of emotive state from a representation in a work of art, does not apply to Aristotle's theory of imitation in the context of aesthetics. Aristotle seems to present an advance on the imitation theory of Śrīśankuka.

Pedagogic view of art

Plato condemned art, refused it a place in the ideal republic, because of its sensuality and hedonism. Aristotle differs from his teacher, Plato, and asserts that the end of art is not simply to please the senses but to improve its lover morally. His theory is technically called 'pedagogism'. This theory is, however, propounded in the context of tragedy. And tragedy, he holds, brings about the moral improvement of the spectator, not through sermons, put in mouths of important characters, but through Katharsis of emotions,

the ethical value of effecting the moral improvement of lovers of art. But it is pointed out that the ethical value of works of the poetic or dramatic art, is different from that of the categorical imperatives of the sacred scriptures, and also from that of persuasive reasoning of a friend who tries to lead to the path of virtue. For, art does not command nor does it reason. And the moral improvement of the lovers of art is not the sole aim of art, because such an admission would mean denial of independent value to art.

Indian Aesthetician, therefore, holds that the ethical value of work of higher art is only a dependent, secondary or implied value. The true, primary or independent value of higher art is aesthetical only. Art primarily aims at arousing aesthetic experience only. And because aesthetic experience is possible from the presentation of the ideal, and not of the real, of things as they should be and not as they are, and because the ideal, if it is 'human', must necessarily be ethically also ideal and, must necessarily act and talk in strict accordance with the highest ethical principles, therefore, art is attractive. It draws the spectator very much as the object of love draws the lover to herself. It addresses itself to the aesthetic senses, the eye and the ear. It pleases. It suggests to the mind all that it cannot present to the senses. It builds up a world of imagination before the mind's eye of the spectator, with the presented and the suggested material. It lifts the aesthete from the empirical world to the world of imagination and makes him willingly live in it. He identifies himself with the hero of the piece, experiences ethical satisfaction in performing the onerous duty in difficult situation and realizes the goodness of the path of virtue and badness that of vice.

And the characteristic of humanity is to strive to realise in practical life all that healthy imagination presents to be good, true and beautiful. The spectator, therefore, automatically follows the path of morality after he has imaginatively grasped what is "Good". Art therefore serves ethical end without aiming at it. Art is "purposive without purpose".

Art presents morality as an essential element of beauty and immorality as a dominant aspect of ugly to offset beauty by contrast. It mixes up the moral principle, that it presents,

expounded by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is very great indeed. For, both Plotinus and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka use almost the same language to present the essential nature of aesthetic experience. The former says "It is akin to the experience of "the one", and the latter says "Brahmānanda sahodarah" (It is akin to the transcendental Bliss)

"The true difference between the historian and the poet is that one relates what has happened, the other what may happen. Poetry therefore is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history, for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular." The first distinguishing mark then of poetry is that though it deals with the individual, it shows the universal truth, it seeks to represent the permanent possibilities of human nature. It is an idealized treatment of life.

It will thus be seen that though Aristotle also uses the word imitation and considers it as the essential in a fine art, it has for him a far more comprehensive meaning than with Plato. With him it is an aesthetic term, and implies not a literal transcript of the world of reality as perhaps with Plato, but an imaginative reconstruction of life. It implies on the part of the poet a selection, elimination, organisation, and intensification with a view to represent a higher reality. There is no question of art being twice removed from reality. If the poet necessarily gives us some thing less than reality, if he cannot in his verses give us the physical warmth of flesh and blood, he gives us in compensation some thing more, evoking so much of spirit and heightened feeling as life itself can only yield to the choicest minds in their happier moments.

Again tragedy as he defines it seeks through pity and fear to effect the proper catharsis of these emotions. Whatever be the meaning or significance of the word catharsis it is plain that its appeal is to the emotions of pity and fear—There is no awareness whatsoever—as in Plato of the emotions being the worthless part of our being. There is no sense of any essential antagonism between emotions and reason.

It will thus be seen that Aristotle stated for once and all that art is an idealized imitation of life, that it aims at universal truth, that it is its essential attribute to be beautiful, that its end is pleasure and that its appeal is through the emotions.

I shall now briefly say how I understand 'tragic catharsis.' Catharsis seems to have been used as a medical metaphor. Tragedy does stir and evoke the emotions of

THE CONTRIBUTION OF RĪTI TO THE EXCELLENCE OF POETIC COMPOSITION

Dr A P Mishra

A survey of the history of Sanskrit Poetics reveals the incontrovertible fact that before the doctrine of Dhvani was discovered, Rīti and Vṛtti, like Gunas and Alankāras, were considered to be very important factors in creating an excellent poetic composition. It was only in later days that its tradition was mostly interrupted. With the establishment of the element of Dhvani, i.e. suggestion in poetry, began the process of inclusion of Rīti and Vṛtti in it (Dhvani)¹. The question to be considered here is whether this inclusion was really proper or justified, and whether there was no strong basis behind the doctrine of Rīti and Vṛtti which could justify their separate existence. In other words, is the inclusion of Rīti and Vṛtti in Dhvani possible? Before we take up this question for consideration, it could be only proper to make certain observations about Rīti and Vṛtti.

With the rise of the Doctrine of Rīti in Sanskrit Poetics, a new line or direction of the appreciation of beauty or excellence of poetic composition comes to light. Even Ānandavardhana is quite appreciative of the originality of Vāmana's doctrine of Rīti. He says that the element of Dhvani must have flashed even though indistinctly into the mind of the propounder of the doctrine of Rīti as the soul of poetry, only he could not explain it as one which brought about charm in poetic compositions, and for this reason

1. (i) Vide Locana on the Dhvanyāloka, Kāṅkī 3/46 —

रीतिर्हि गुणेषु पर्यवसिता • गुणाश्च रसपर्यवसायिन एव ।

- (ii) Vide Dhvanyāloka, Vṛtti 0. Kā 3/47 and Locana on it —

या काश्चिन् प्रमिद्धा उन्नागरिकाद्या. हृदयत्वाश्रया वृत्तयो
याश्चार्थतत्त्वमश्वद्वा केशिकादयम्ना सम्पत्तिरतिपदवीमवतरन्ति ।
रीतिपदवीमिति । तददेव (रीतिवदेव) रसपर्यवसायित्वान् ।

as *gunātma*. Thus according to *Vāmana*, the excellence or beauty of *Kāvya* is due to the inherence of *gunas* in it. The word '*padaracanā*' points towards the body and the word '*viśiṣṭa*' towards the element which can be called the soul of poetry. It is really the proper use of *gunas* which brings about beauty in poetic composition. *Abhinavagupta* also explained '*vācya*' and '*vyangya*' in poetry as '*sāmānyā*' and '*viśeṣa*'. This *viśeṣa* of *Abhinava*¹ can be foreseen in the word '*viśeṣa*' in the definition of *Rīti*. It is to be clearly understood here that the propounder of *Rīti* distinguishes one from the other². The collective state of *gunas* is different from their non-collective or the individual state. Generally speaking, each *guna* produces beauty in a poetic composition³, but the assemblage of *gunas* produces a different type of excellence. Thus the excellence brought about by *Rīti* as an assemblage or collection of *gunas* is different from the one produced by the individual *gunas*. But *Abhinavagupta*, in his impatience or haste to include the beauty produced by *Rīti* in the one produced by the individual *gunas*, could not evaluate or estimate it correctly and properly.

On the one hand, *Abhinava* draws similarity or parity between the assemblage of *gunas* in *Rīti* and the combination or the blending of *guda*, *marica* etc., in the drink called *Pīnaka*; and on the other hand, he does not consider the assemblage as different from the individual constituents⁴.

1. Vide *Locana* on *Dhvanyāloka* : 2 —

तुल्यैर्गुणैश्च किमिति वन्मविदेव सदृशः श्लाघन्ते तद् भवितव्यं
तत्र केनचिद् विशेषेण । यो विशेषः सः प्रतीयमानभागो विवेकि-
मिविशेषहेतुत्वादात्मेति व्यवस्थाप्यते ।

2. *वाचस्पतीनायाः कर्तारो यदा गुणाः । तदतिशयहेतवस्त्वलंकाराः ।*

3. Vide *Locana* —

तेषां (गुणानां) अनुवितव्यत्वेण यद्व्योम्यमेलनसमन्वेन पानक इव
गुडमरिचादिस्मान्ना मधुप्रातृरुन्तायमनं दोषतल्लित्तिमध्यम-वर्गनोद-
विषमं गोबोरन्वैरमं पाञ्चाल-हेवाकप्राचुर्यदृशा, तदेव त्रिविध
रीतिरित्युक्तम् ।

4. वाचिर्वाचिमतो नान्य, समुदाहरण समुदायिनो नान्य इति वृत्तिरीदधो
न गुणालंकारव्यतिरिक्ता ।

Vāmana accepted ten gunas each of the word and the meaning. He is the first rhetorician to have divided gunas in this way. He defined Śabda-gunas as the gunas of the composition or the construction of words¹. The two types of gunas fully explain the excellence of both, the word-construction and the meaning. The scope of Artha-gunas is so wide as to include within it almost all the means of creating or producing poetic excellence, so much so that all the charms of Rasa are included in the Artha-guna called 'Kānti', all the shades of meaning in 'Samādhī', and all the forms of striking expressions (Ukuvācitra) in the 'Mādhurya' guna of Vāmana². Thus we see that Vāmana has tried to visualise or envisage through the means of Ritis the beauty, charm or excellence of poetic composition in its wide perspective. Since the time the principle of the three gunas viz Prasāda, Ojas and Mādhurya was propounded in the Dhvani School and all the twenty gunas of Vāmana were included in them, the roots of the Ritu-School loosened and gave way, and its importance declined. Consequently, it ceased to be the soul of poetry in due course and began to be regarded or considered merely as an element or a factor of poetic excellence.³

Although Riti was soon declining in importance ever afterwards with the ever widening sphere of Dhvani, still it continued to hold ground with a change of course in its form and name. Ācārya Kuntaka re-established the three-fold Ritis of Vāmana under new names in Sukumāra, Vicitra and Madhyama. Kuntaka has put forward an altogether new and original analysis of the two Mārgas propounded by Dandin, and the three Ritis and ten gunas propounded by Vāmana. In all, he propounds six gunas i.e. Prasāda, Mādhurya, Lāvanya, Ābhijātya, Aucitya and Saubhāgya.

1 Vide Kāvya-lankārasūtravṛtti, Guna Section —

ओत्र प्रमादश्लेषमतासमाधिमाद्युयंमोदुमार्योदारतायंब्यक्तिकान्तमो
वन्द्यगुणा । वन्द्य पदरचना । . . त एवायंगुणा ।

2 Vide Kāvya-lankārasūtra III 2 10 —

दीप्तरमत्वं कान्ति । उक्तिवैचित्र्यं माद्युयम् ।

3 Vide Sībītyadarpana —

उत्कण्ठेव प्रोक्ता गुणालङ्कारौत ।

DISCUSSION

P.L. Bhargava: What is your opinion regarding the view of some later Rhetoricians that the *gūṇas* of Vāmana can actually be included in the three main *gūṇas* viz. *mādhurya*, *ojas*, and *prasāda*?

A.P. Mishra I think that these Rhetoricians have not done justice to Vāmana and his excellent principle of ten *gūṇas*. It is not possible to reduce all the *gūṇas* to only three. The devices of the ācāryas are no doubt ingenious but they are far from being satisfactory.

V Venkatachalam: Now that you have presented a paper underlining the importance of the Rīti-School, I would like to know how far it is justified and scientific to include all types of Rasas in only one *gūṇa* viz. *Kānti* and all kinds of *Ukti-Vaṅmāyā* in one particular *gūṇa*, *mādhurya*?

A.P. Mishra: Yes, perhaps not. But what I wanted to point out is that these ācāryas also who pursue an analytical approach to poetry and apparently take care of only its *Vāṅ* aspect, were not oblivious of the finer side of the poetry, i.e. *rasa* and the subtle shades of meaning (*Uktirāsa*) etc. and their contribution to Sanskrit Poetics should also be properly appreciated.

R.C. Dattatraya: Ruyyaka in his *Alankāra-Sarvasva* makes a very pointed reference. बामनेन तु कश्चिद्ध्वनिभेदो-
लङ्कारभेदोक्तः and there he sums up Vāmana's view. With the expression *alankāratā* he is reproducing the *alankāra* concept of Vāmana. काव्यं वाह-
यनञ्कारम्. Jayaratha in his commentary explains this sentence of Ruyyaka to show how the view of Vāmana is incorporated in *Dharm* and that he was also first to conceive the idea of soul of poetry. ...A question that I have in mind is whether one could correlate his principle of the three *gūṇas* with the three primordial *gūṇas* of the Sāṃkhya

PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND INDEPENDENCE OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN SANSKRIT

Dr R.C. Datta

In this paper I propose (1) to state the obvious impact of Indian philosophical thought on Sanskrit Criticism and (2) to assert that the criticism, though informed and influenced by philosophical thought, is yet by and large independent of philosophical considerations and that these are incidental to it and do not constitute the essence of critical judgment of literature

The idea of poetry and its objectives, the description of the poet and aesthete (*akhyāta*), the poetic word and its meaning and their relation, the varieties of poetic figures (*alankāras*), the role of imagination (*pratibhā*) in the conception and creation of literature, the triad of poetic excellence (*gūṇa*), the theories of *rasa* and *dharma* and Mahima-Bhaṭṭa's theory of inferential nature of poetic sense are some of the major topics that come readily to one's mind when one seeks to trace the influence of Indian philosophical thought in general and orthodox systems in particular. I propose to deal with some of these excluding *rasa* in particular which would require separate treatment. That the literary critic in India worked under the impact of philosophy and other Śāstras, which are not pertinent for our consideration here, is no wonder to us. Western Criticism has also been informed and influenced and even at times swept off its feet by the onslaught of psychology and philosophy. This is natural when both philosopher and poet are engaged in 'seeing' the word, the philosopher may 'see' it better but it is only the poet who describes better what he sees. The title of a poet is accorded not merely to one who is endowed with a vision of world but to one who possesses both vision and expression. The famous stanzas by Bhaṭṭa Tota bear quotation on this point —

नामयिः कविरित्युक्तानुपिद्व किं दर्शनात् ।

विचित्रभाववर्मा जलत्वप्रहस च दर्शनम् ॥

one deserves the title of 'poet', of one, who is skilful in expression"¹ :

प्रज्ञा नवनवोन्मेषशालिनी प्रतिभा मता ।
तदनुप्रापनाजीवद्वर्णनानिपुण कवि ॥

The doctrine of Pratibhā in Sanskrit Criticism is very comprehensive. It includes (i) creative inspiration, imagination, genius, (ii) competent poetic expression², (iii) aesthetic sensibility, and (iv) poetic beauty³.

The literary critics had conceived this doctrine independently until Abhinavagupta, in his philosophical analysis of the Pratibhā, identified it with the ultimate consciousness, the Self, and admitted that in a poet it burns with a purified light⁴.

Pratibhā in Saiva metaphysics is identified with consciousness as creative emission (Visarga)⁵. However, what one notices is that prior to Abhinavagupta the literary critics did not consider its metaphysical overtones and were happy to explore it as a concept of poetic creation, expression and appreciation. Even Ānandavardhana, who was himself a great philosopher, treated Pratibhā in its literary context only. According to him it is a unique gift which is manifested through the Muse of great poets,⁶ attains endless forms on its journey through the *dhyanā*⁷ and so long as it

1 Quoted by Hemacandra, Kāvyaśūtrasāra, p 3. Māṇikyaśāstra in Saṃketa on KP p 7

2 On this point see also Rudrata, I 15, Rājasekhara, KM pp 12-14, Jaganmūṭha, R. G (Kāvyaśāstrānukūla Śabdārthopasthit h) Vāgdevaśāstrā, 2. 4

3 प्रतिभाऽनूवंदयुनिर्मातृप्रज्ञा प्रज्ञा, तस्या विशेषो रमादेशवैद्य-
मोन्दर्यं कविशमस्त्वम् ।

4 See T.A., V. p 432. and XI, pp 60-62; M V V, VV
1031 onwards

5 T.A. V. p 432

6 शरन्वती स्वाद् तदयं वन्द्यु निष्पन्दमाना महता कवीनाम् ।
अन्योन्यामानन्दमभिव्यक्तिं परिस्फुरन् प्रतिभाविशेषम् ॥ I.6

7 ध्वनेर्गुणानुबन्धनत्वात्वा प्रदर्शितः ।

अनेनानन्दमाप्नोति कवीना प्रतिभा-श्रुतः ॥ IV. 6

dependent upon the creative instinct of the poet on the one hand and its aesthetic meaningfulness on the other, the difference of an *alankāra* from another is based on a distinct consciousness that each should arouse¹. Thus, for example, *uṣṭrekṣā* and *Aśīṣayuktī* are distinguished on the basis of *adhyavasāya*², and *bhāvika*, *rasakat*³, *śābhāroktī* on the basis of consciousness of identity, universality and so on. Ruyyaka is never tired of repeating in essence that poetic figure being a potent media of effecting consciousness, should bloom forth from the poetic *pratibhā*, and never regrets to discard cumbersome varieties of the figures which hurt the aesthetic sensibility (the second aspect of *pratibhā*). His commentator Javaratha, who was himself a great thinker of Śaivism, has further underlined these aspects, namely the figure must be effected by *pratibhā*⁴ and that it should produce a distinct consciousness. It is such a figure that becomes synonymous with poetic beauty and Śrīvidyācakravartin in his *Saṅjivinī* a commentary on the *Alankārasarvasva* often repeats that 'an *alankāra* is nothing but beauty'

अलङ्कारो हि विच्छित्ति ।

Another important entity for our consideration is the concept of poetic flaws. Among the ten types of flaws enumerated by Bharata⁵, *nyāṣādapeṭa* (defined as *pramāṇa-paricaryā*), *Viśamdhī* and *Śabdacyuta* are clearly Śāstric. *Gūdhārtha*, (*parāyāśabdābhūta*), *arthāntarā* (*acaryā-Varnana*) *arthahīna*, *bhinnārtha*, *ekārtha*, *abhihūptārtha* referring to impediments created in comprehension of the meaning, were also partly influenced by grammatical and logical considerations, the *Tisra* (metrically uneven) relates to prosody. Bharata believed that these flaws mar poetic beauty of a literary composition. Bhāmaha followed Bharata in the treatment of

1 प्रतीतिभेदबालङ्कारभेदनिमित्तमित्यविवाद ।

2 Vide Dr. R. C. Dwivedi (ed.), *Alankārasarvasva-Saṅjivinī*, pp. 82-3; Monier Banarsidass, Delhi, 1965.

3 Ibid pp. 329-335.

4 Ruyyaka and Javaratha have given a full philosophical treatment to *B & I* and other figures. For this see R. C. Dwivedi - Percept like experience in *B & I*s included in *Essays on Indian Poetics*, Delhi 1965.

5 See Javaratha, *Vimarśinī* on A. S. (N. S. ed) pp. 44, 58, 71-163.

6 N. S. XVI, 82-91.

The words and meanings both must be out of turn¹ and should emerge from one's own experience of them². It was to probe this uncommon use of word and meaning by the poet that Bhāmaha propounded the principle of Vakrokti³ which, according to him, pervades entire poetic composition, constitutes essence of all poetic expression⁴ and is media of effecting aesthetic sense in poetry *anayārtho vibhāṅyate*. Dandin further asserted the empirical nature of literature and its criticism by admitting equal importance of the *svabhāvokti* and had even questioned the grasping of *hetu* and *nyāya* (हेतुन्यायलवोच्चय) on literary judgement.

विचार कर्कशप्रायस्तेनालीङेन किं फलम् ।

Bhāmaha had observed that flaws of logic and grammar sometimes become gunas. Dandin takes this principle further by illustrating every defect and showing how each turns into a virtue. Vāmana deals with the dosas systematically in the III *adhikarana*. Contradicting the opinion of Bharata he maintains that dosas are not positive entities but merely opposite to gunas and these are treated by him under the categories of *pada*, *padārtha*, *vākya* and *vākyaārtha*. Rudraṭa, who follows Bharata in his conception of the poetic blemish as positive entity, treats dosas under the broad classes of verbal and material. Bhāmaha had recognised seven *dosas* of *upamā* which is exclusive to poetry. Dandin and Rudrata also treated these with varying numbers. Ānandavardhana by expounding the universal and ephemeral character of the blemishes makes them subservient to the aesthetic meaning of *dharma*. It is from their relation to sentiments that the blemishes derive their *raison d'être* in literary criticism. This is significant because critical judgment of literature

1. Vide KA I 36, V 66

2. नान्वन्ययसन्ना वागविमाति मूढे मताम् ।

परेण घृतमुक्तेव सरसा कुमुमावली ॥

3. KA II 84-5

4. To state the independence of poetic expression and free it a bit from the chain of grammar Bhāmaha said that even a faulty expression or a bad word does not matter so long as the pattern and object of description has some charm. Vide Kāvyaṅkāra I 54

loka, Ānandavardhana makes following observations which deserve our attention:

- (i) वृत्तं काव्यत्वविद्भि Vṛttaṁ kārikā I I
- (ii) यतो लक्षणकृतामेव स न प्रमिदः । Ibid
- (iii) तथैवान्यन्मन्मानुयारिभि मूरिभि काव्यतत्त्वाचंदसिभि वाच्य-
वाचकममित्र शब्दात्मा काव्यमिति व्यपदेश्यो व्यञ्जकत्वस्याभ्याद्
ध्वनिरित्युक्त. Ibid

Makul Bhaṭṭa and his pupil Prathārendurāja in their observations make it clear that the Sahridayas (aesthetes) were responsible for conceiving the novel doctrine of Dhvani.

- (i) रत्नमापापाङ्गाहित्व तु ध्वने सहृदयैर्नूतनतपोषवर्णितस्य
Abhūdhyvrttumātrkā, N.S. ed. p. 21
- (ii) तथा हि तत्र विवक्षितान्यपरता सहृदयैः काव्यवर्त्मनि निरूपिता
Ibid. p. 19
- (iii) कैश्चित्सहृदयैर्ध्वनिर्नाम व्यञ्जकत्वभेदात्मा काव्यधर्मोऽभिहितः ।
Laghuvṛtti, B.S.S. ed. p. 85

The continuous tradition of *dhvani* in the learned circles and Sahridayas is alluded to by Ānandavardhana who refers to them as of mature minds in the concluding verse of the Dhvanvāloka and Abhinavagupta who further states that though the principle of *dhvani* was not reduced to writing nevertheless it was continuously in vogue:

अविच्छिन्नेन प्रवाहेन तरेतदुक्तं विनापि विशिष्टपुस्तकविनिवेशनान् ।
(Locana, p. 32 (KSR 9 ed.)

In fact Ānandavardhana has given an independent foundation to the poetic meaning and the best that we can say about grammatical impact is that it served as a prelude to or preliminary stage in the evolution of *Dhvani* as a comprehensive doctrine of Literary Criticism. This is the real significance of the concluding verse of the Dhvanvāloka.

I would now like to conclude by further bringing to your notice the denunciation of the Śāstric polemics by ācāryas

In the near past when creative criticism ceased and what remained was simply re-assertion of old principles in new language of the Naiyāyikas, the ultra-logical spirit seems to have run riot. One may now fondly hope that this sin of *arastika* polemics will not be inflicted upon new ventures of evolving or re-interpreting the principles of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit and a sincere effort will be made to seek new pastures in modern context of literary consciousness.

DISCUSSION

- L. L. Joshi:** I have always thought that Indians are falsely accused of being too philosophical. Your paper shows very clearly that they are most worldly and practical people and thus confirms my view.
- S. D. Swami:** *Pratibhā* is essential not only for *Kāvyaśāstra* but for other *Śāstras* also. Mahanabhaṭṭa has referred to the importance of it in various branches of knowledge (tr.)
- R. C. D. ved:** Should I assume that you are not raising any objection against what I have said? Because I pre-suppose that *Pratibhā* is indispensable for the creation of Poetry. That it plays an important role in other sciences also, is obvious. I do not contradict it. I have endeavoured to show how the concept of *Pratibhā*, based on the long tradition of poets (cf. मरुस्वती स्वादु तदर्थं वस्तु निष्यन्दमाना महता कवीना etc.) was later on explained more and more on the basis of philosophy. Abhinavagupta is the first to explain the significance of *Pratibhā* in poetry and to establish it on sound philosophical foundations. It is a fact that prior to Abhinavagupta no poet-critic cared to explain this term in all philosophical detail. I have also tried to show how the concepts of *Pratibhā*, *alankāra*, *doṣa* etc. remained primarily, and prior to Abhinavagupta invariably, unaffected by the philosophical overtones. Even after Abhinava his followers, for example Jayaratha

ācāryas have tailored a sūtra to suit their philosophical predisposition and design.

R. S. Jaitly At the time of Bharata, I think, the layer of the paint of philosophy on the Rasa-theory was not very thick. The layer became thicker and the paint darker with the later ācāryas. In this process completely new ideas were introduced in Rasa with regard to its theoretical aspect, but as far as its practical aspect, the aspect of relishing, rasana, was concerned, no worthwhile progress could be made. I would like to know your opinion about it.

R. C. Divedi You are right in saying that the theoretical knowledge and the discussion about the actual process of rasānubhūti does not help a spectator or a reader to relish a piece of art. It is rather a hindrance than an asset. We all here have become somewhat jaḍa to enjoy rasa properly but there are many more outside this room who are fortunately not interested to know the process of relishing but would rather relish it to the brim of their heart.

S. D. Swami The elaboration of the Rasa theory has not taken place purely on the philosophical background. The various names, śṛṅgāra, karuṇa etc., the conception of different types of bhāvas, the process of sādharmaṇīkaraṇa etc., all these things are originally contributed by the poetics itself (tr.)

Venkatachalam . I do not say that in the Rasa-theory there is nothing but philosophy, what I mean to say is simple that the process of rasānubhūti has not been able to separate itself from philosophy.

R. C. Divedi : Recall to your mind the two famous lines :
 शोक इत्येकत्वमागतं and शनोक्तत्वमागतं यस्य शोकः,
 which prove that both a great poet (Kālidāsa) as well as a great critic (Ānandavardhana) agree to the effect that *śoka* becomes *śloka*. In which school of philosophy would you find this

SYMBOLIC IMAGINATION AND DHVANI

B B. Palilal

Imagination and memory, along with intelligence and reason, are essentially the characteristics of *Homo Sapiens*. If memory assists man in establishing and maintaining connection with the past, imagination carries him forward and enables him to project himself into future. Intelligence and reason, the knowing and ordering faculties of human consciousness, distinguish creation both in practical and imaginative fields. In literary, aesthetic and philosophical worlds, imagination plays a distinct, inevitable role. It functions as the cognitive, comprehending, transforming and re-creative agent. The world of imagination is infinite and eternal because it is creative and symbolic. Imagination means creation, and this creation is on many levels such as cognition, transformation and re-creation. An imaginatively created thing is essentially created for the second time, through formal means. This creative or re-creative activity of imagination is on both the lines of the scale—of space and time. The extent of space and time, which can be brought into knowability and consciousness, is the limit of imagination. This limit forces the artist to create his world within this defined scope and this forms the spatial and temporal limit of his imagination. This limit refers to its body, scope or its extent and yet, in this very form, it defines its nature also. Imaginative realisation may indulge in pointing, naming, elaborating, formulating, or in symbolising. What imagination does not or cannot grasp in its entirety or that for which it does not find adequate, analogous figures, it transmutes into symbols, often abstract but occasionally concrete also. This function of imagination, this raid on the intractable and unknowable is the symbolic imagination¹. The symbolic imagination not only brings the various meanings together at a single moment

¹ Blackmur, R P *The Lion and the Henry-sons* (London, 1956), pp 176-73

unlimited knowledge, and as clear and precise an understanding of the nature of the ultimate reality as possible. In the *Vedas* this cosmos is described as *Brahmāṇḍa*. This is a very apt instance of the symbolic imagination. Here the entire cosmos is imagined as *andā* (or egg) of *Brahmā*, the celebrated god of creation. Besides, the mode of expression is also symbolic. The whole created universe is visualised as analogous to an egg. *Hiranyagarbha* or the golden egg of the creator of this universe, *Brahmā*, gives the idea of what this creation is like. Thus the supreme egg becomes the 'objective correlative' for the spatial concept of the universe. In the west, in the *Bible* and in Milton's *Paradise Lost*, the earth is described as a ball suspended with a golden chain by God. The old testament of the *Bible* contains a detailed account of various, created things—trees, forests, animals, mountains, rivers, birds etc. These provide excellent illustrations of how, and within what limits, human imagination has tried to work for itself a structure and history of his surroundings.

The literature of nearly all languages in the world entertains some of the followings concepts which are symbolically and imaginatively formulated. The world is a stage and human beings are actors who from infancy to old age and death play the appointed roles according to their age. Shakespeare conceived of man variously, sometimes as flies in the hands of wanton boys i.e. gods who kill us for their sport. To Milton and Dante human destiny is essentially in accepting the will of God. That is why the aim of his *Paradise Lost* is 'to justify the ways of God to man'. The culmination of Dante's experience of lifetime is in the ejaculation: 'In His will lies our peace.' According to Robert Browning, a just, watchful and charitable God sat in heaven and everything was right with the world. P.B. Shelley, a poet of rare lyric beauty and a thinker, too, of equal sensitiveness and depth, considered life a stain on the radiance of eternity, and death a release and re-union of the spark with ever-lasting, divine effulgence. He said 'Life like a dome of many coloured glass Stains the white radiance of eternity Till death tramples it to fragments.' Eternal or the *One* remains and only the people, the many change and pass. To Thomas Hardy, a

mortal life. The concept of *Nirāṇa* as the emptying of desires and finally thought also from the consciousness and self,—a successful attempt at denaturing the human psyche—is a symbol of possible, achievable perfection. Life is another miracle, one more baffling phenomenon. Biologically a protein cell multiplied to millions, psychically a consciousness or the thinking principle, life remains inscrutable even when explained either as an end of a 'thing that was', or a continuum of a spirit understood according to the theory of *Karma* or the transmigration of soul. Besides, one has to die constantly in order to live. Sleep, rest, and the fixed, dead position of a foot giving fixity and energy to the other or to step forth are the opposite of life needed for life. Again, any complex and comprehensive expression of this phenomenon can be only symbolic. Equally mysterious and perplexing is the principle of death. Inscrutable, puzzling, death has lured some of the best of humanity in her pursuit. To know by experience means not to live. To know it without dying would only be knowing it only partly or falsely. Only symbolically, by focussing many points of view together, can one reach near a somewhat real (—real as it is knowable in life —) nature of death.

The symbolic phenomenon which enables man to look at things from the nearest perspective, and yet in the widest stretch, needs some elaboration with regard to its functioning. Symbolic method is not literal or connective. It is springing and projective. Even when analogies, parallels, suggestions, hints, evocations and provocations work, the symbolic imagination projects reality or experience which is independent of such concessions. The symbolic procedure is non-analytical, nondiscursive, non-elaborative, and a-rationalistic. It is more instinctive, intuitive and formula-like. The person using symbolic imagination intuitively apprehends it as if by his sixth sense. In Sanskrit poetics this symbolic, imaginative activity has been analogised to the third eye of *Śiṣya*, which can see through present past and future. The whole process is synthetic, converging and concentric. Looked at philosophically or from the standpoint of thought, the symbolic imagination presents an integrated, synthesised attitude, an inference coming from

Similarly myth-making, the creation of a tale, a narrative, and personification are also illustrating and exemplifying devices, used in an integrated form, to body forth, to present in concrete terms some abstract or obscure phenomena which have been symbolically apprehended. Needless to note here, that all of these four devices—simile, metaphor, myth and personification—either employ or imply analogy which, in its functional or operational aspect, is an inherent trait of the symbolic imagination.

The *Dhvani* system or the concept of suggestion in Sanskrit poetics provides an interesting parallel with the concept of imagination in the western aesthetics. The *Dhvani* theory starts with the following three fundamental postulates¹ : (i) *Dhvani* exists apart from the primary and secondary sense of the world, (ii) *Dhvani* is most intrinsic to poetry, (iii) *Dhvani* cannot be explained in terms of Denotation (*Abhidhā*) or Indication (*Lakṣanā*), hence the necessity of coming a new term, Suggestion (*Vyañjanā*). Ānandavardhana, the principal architect of the *Dhvani* theory in Sanskrit, was confronted with a three faceted question—what is the essence of literature? How is the poet's genius, *Pratibhā*, and skill related with it? And, finally, how can the proper response of the critic be ensured? The essence of literature, he declared, was *Rasa*. *Rasa* was the creation of an aesthetic mood by the poet with the assistance of his imagination or *Pratibhā*. Ānandavardhana did not condemn or run down *Alaṅkāra*, *Rīti*, *Vakrokti*, and other principles of explaining the spirit of literature, but he found them inadequate. Most of those approaches related to the externals, the devices used for embellishment in literature or tried to define the poetic effect based on the pattern of arrangement of words and meaning. The real spirit of literature was not captured, and not expressed by canons. The principle of *Dhvani*, on the other hand, Ānandavardhana said, estimated the significance of *Alaṅkāras*, *Gunas* and other elements of poetry, assimilated and incorporated them into poetic effect and created the marvel of aesthetic delight. *Dhvani* was the suggested, the echoed meaning. The world, in its denotative

1. Kṛṣṇamurthy K. *Dhvanīśloka and Its Critics* (Mysore, 1968)

beauty and power¹. The three kinds of *Dhvani*, *Vastu-Dhvani*, *Alankāra-Dhvani*, and *Rasa-Dhvani*, are like the three stages of the poetic imagination in ascending order, finally leading to the symbolic imagination. The object in the *Vastu-Dhvani* offers the first, concrete and tangible parallel to the poet to develop his suggested meaning. Then in the *Alankāra-Dhvani*, second stage, he passes on to the next ascending order, where the parallel offered is an *Alankāra*, an integral beautifying device, an objective correlative which yet provides some grip over *Dhvani*,—a grip of an edifying mechanism. In the *Rasa-Dhvani*, the last kind and the final stage of the suggested meaning, both the poet and the reader are left facing a phenomenon of aesthetic delight which is infectious and moving in its impression and yet so elusive. There is not single unit of language which can be attributed to possess or contain this effect when it has once been produced. As acknowledged in the Sanskrit poetics, so also in English, the symbolic or the suggested meaning is independent of the objects (including words) that led to it. It transcends the words and sentences with the help of which it was created. So many focuses of interpretation and so many levels of meaning are fused together in this multi-dimensional effect that a complex, rich and bewildering symbol is created. Here it should be noted that a continuous creation of Rasas, a co-mingling of many directional poetic effects, a centering of many visual images and rhythm patterns, may finally develop in the poet a vision,—a view, an interpretation of life and the world,—which, earlier in the present essay, has been given as the prime purpose of the symbolic imagination. Symbol as remarked earlier, may work through a word or a group of words, through a sound or a pattern of sounds, through a poetic stanza or as the structure of the entire poem, gradually leads a poet to adopt an attitude towards the whole reality—life and the world, and since this journey is made through imagination, it ends in a symbolic imagination serving as a world-view with a poet.

Imagination is a big furnace in which experiences, observations and impressions of various kinds are absorbed,

¹ Anandavardhana, *D.śeṣṭhaka*, IV, 15

language something like a symbolic graph. This seems rather an extreme view like the one which considers man living in a symbolic universe with language, myth, art and religion as a part of it.¹ Besides, such an attitude toward language does not facilitate the differentiation and criticism aimed at in literature. This view is shared by Ānandavardhana also. Answering the objections and arguments of the Mīmāṃsakas, he held that the symbolism of a word was conditioned with reference to the speaker, occasion, time, place and the context at the time of speaking.² Even when a few words serve as symbols, all do not. Word is, primarily, a sign of an object or a phenomenon which it denotes. Symbol, as differentiated from sign, represents the concept, goes to deeper levels of perceptual knowledge, and attempts at coming individually closer to experience. Sign is the commonly shared, the semantic meaning of the word, while symbol usually forces a particular, individual and deeper meaning. Thus language, this series of phonetic and visual curves, operates on both symbolic and non-symbolic planes of meaning, and the artist employing the symbolic imagination uses words that serve his purpose.

DISCUSSION

Venkatachalam: Do you really take language as a phonetic and visual curve?

B B. Paliwal: Yes, I consider both visual and phonetic contents as basic for language.

R.P. Dandeti: How do you distinguish between imagination and symbolic imagination?

B B. Paliwal: Imagination is generally and pervasively creative faculty in a poet. Symbolic imagination is a special analogical faculty, a characteristic of symptomatically, summarizingly and religiously harmonising power.

1. Cassirer, E. *An Essay On Man*, (New Haven 1944) p. 26

2. *Dīpāyāla and Its Critics*, p. 115

of proficiency in Dharma, Artha, Kāma, Mokṣa and the Arts, as well as attainment of fame and pleasure"¹ as the purpose of good poetry. He defined poetry saying "words together with a definite sense constitute poetry"². But assigning of equal importance to word and meaning alone was not sufficient to differentiate poetry from ordinary expressions. So the figures of speech were considered essential for Poetic expression, which alone gave a special charm to Kāvya. Thus to the first literary critic, figures of speech appeared to be the essential feature of poetry. Bharata had the dramatic diction which was to be embellished in order to evoke Rasa, but Bhāmaha had nothing more than the Poetic diction which could be embellished by the figures of speech. Consequently, the poetic figures became all important, and thus what was an *alankāra*, a means of embellishment to Bharata, became an end *alankārya*, in the hands of Bhāmaha.

In addition to the figures of speech, however, the treatise of Bhāmaha includes discussion of other factors of poetry as well, such as, the purpose of poetry, the qualifications of a poet, the definition and classification of it, the blemishes, the Ganas and the logical and grammatical correctness. These topics save his treatise from being a mere handbook of advice for the practical working out of poetry. Still it cannot be denied that Bhāmaha did not visualise aesthetic pleasure as the ultimate end of Poetry.

Thus, the principles by which Bhāmaha would judge poetry may be enumerated thus. — Poetry must be embellished by figures of speech; the expression should be correct both logically and grammatically and should avoid Dosas and be attended with Gunas.

(2)

We have dilated on Bhāmaha to show that at his time the charm of poetry was recognised but the search into its essentials led only to the external factors. Word, meaning and the figures of speech—these were the factors which drew the attention, and efforts were made to formulate a theory

1. Bhāmaha, Kāvya-lankāra, I 2.

Dharmārthakāma-mokṣeṣu Vasekasya Kālīsu ca |

Kṛoti Kṛim paṭm ca Sādhukīvyanyavanam ||

2. Ibid I, 16. Śabdārthau Sahitau Kāvyaṃ.

wing schools. The Rīti school, for example, does not hold that *Alamkāras* are useless in the *Kāvya*, but says that it is the Style (Rīti) that is the essential element. Similarly, the Rasa school does not deny the usefulness of either the *Alamkāra* or the Rīti but holds the Rasa to be essential. The Dhvani School, in its turn establishes the supremacy of Dhvani and declares all the other factors to be subordinate to it.

After the advent and establishment of the Dhvani theory, an assimilation of all the factors is reached at and these are assigned their relative importance. A kind of organic arrangement of all these factors is ultimately accepted and the *Kāvya* comes to be viewed as a composite whole—for example, “the Word and Meaning constitute the body, Rasa is the soul, the Gunas are like the qualities of courage etc., the Dosas are like the physical drawbacks, the Rītis are like the special combination of the limbs, and the Figures of speech are like the ornaments of hands, ears etc.”

Although it would perhaps be wrong to hold that all the earlier schools automatically accepted the synthesis made by the following schools, it is true that in spite of sporadic opposition from the orthodox adherents of individual schools, this order of priority of the factors of *Kāvya* became standardised by Ānandavardhana, and universally accepted after Mammaṭa. The Dhvanikāra is thus the first literary critic who founded a school in which proper assimilation of all earlier concepts was effected.

Let us here, once again, consider the principles of literary criticism devised till the advent of the Dhvani School. The view point of the Alamkāra school has already been referred to. The Rīti school, in its turn formulated the following principles. The Rīti or the style is the essence of poetry; the style however means the special use of words, and this speciality consists in the Gunas; the Gunas, ten in number, pertaining to both sound and sense, add charm to the poetry; the figures of speech enhance that charm. Thus

1. *Vimāna, Kāvyaalamkārasūtravṛtta*, I, 2 6-8; III 1 1-2.

Rūpāṁśu Kāvyaṁ. Viśiṣṭa padarācāṁ rītiḥ.

Viśiṣṭa guṇāṁśu. Kāvya-obbhāvāḥ Karttā dharmā
guṇāḥ Tadanuyahetavaḥ cālamkārah.

theoretical precision the profound concept of Dhvani as the soul of poetry. The treatise Dhvanyāloka is the best flower of Sanskrit Poetics, and although enough has been written after it, it will not be wrong to hold that since then the study of poetics has not made any significant advance.

With the treatise, Dhvanyāloka, the names of three extra-ordinary critics are associated. One is the anonymous writer of the Kārikās, known as the Dhvanikāra, the second is Ānandavardhana, the writer of the *Vṛtti* and the third is Abhinavagupta, the writer of the commentary, *Locana*. The writer of the Kārikās has been completely shadowed by his own work but that he was different from Ānandavardhana was admitted by Abhinavagupta himself. In Sanskrit Poetics, these three are like the *mnūtraja* of the Sanskrit Grammar. If the Dhvanikāra supplied the outline of a new approach to creative literature, Ānandavardhana developed it into a full-fledged theory by adding his *vṛtti* to it and lastly Abhinavagupta rendered it proof against all possible attacks and established the theory on the highest pedestal. I think that the name of the treatise bears reference to both the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana. Dhvani may be said to refer to the Kārikās written by the Dhvanikāra and *Āloka*, to the *Vṛtti* written by Ānandavardhana. Perhaps this is hinted at by Abhinavagupta when he says—“Can the vision please without the eye, even if there be moonlight?”¹

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It has been observed that the Dhvanyāloka marks a departure from the old approach to poetry and in it the study assumes the grandeur of an aesthetic approach. Let us see to what extent the Dhvani School achieved success in providing a new and higher standard of judgement.

The treatise itself is remarkable. It does not start with a technical definition of Kāvya and other allied topics. On the contrary, it refers to the very genesis of poetry and thereby gives a supramundane grandeur to the art of Poetry. Secondly, the treatise totally avoids detailed discussion of the figures

1. Abhinavagupta, *Locana*, colophon of chapter I (chowkhamba Edn.)

Kam locanam vināloko bhāti candrikayāpi hi

It is not necessary to dwell on the arguments advanced by the Dhvani School in support of the validity of the Suggested sense and its postulation of the function of suggestion, as these are quite well known to the students of literature. It will, however, suffice to say that theory depends not only on logical argument, which is nevertheless fully competent, but has its sanction from the employments by great poets of words having power of suggestion. The approach of Dhvanyāloka is remarkable in this respect as well. The theorists do not assume the role of an irrefutable Śāstrakāra but argue their case in the light of the practice of the poets like Valmiki, Vyāsa and Kālidāsa. The theory, thus presented came to be accepted, in course of time, by the entire literary world. Of course, one or two discordant notes were heard but the main objection against the theory was not regarding the validity of such a special sense but about the process of reaching at it.

The Dhvani School holds that this Suggested sense can be of three kinds—the Matter (*vastu*), Figure of speech (*alamkāra*) and the Sentiment (*Rasa*). Since both the matter and the figure of speech can be either Expressed or Indicated but the Sentiment can never be Expressed or Indicated so the Suggestion of Sentiments is given the pride of place in the Kāvya. The excellent Kāvya is that in which the sentiment is suggested, and so the Kāvya itself is called Dhvani-Kāvya. The Dhvani School holds that the suggested sense should always predominate in the Dhvani Kāvya. In the case of its being subordinated to the Expressed sense, the Kāvya is to be treated as a second-rate one. The third and the lowest variety of Kāvya is that in which there is no suggestion at all. Ānandavardhana takes great pains to prove his contention that all great poetry owes its greatness to their power of suggestion.

If Dhvani is thus accepted to be the soul of poetry, the other factors so long severally accepted to be essential by different schools must be rejected as non-essential. The Alamkāra, Rīti, Dosa and Gunas are not important *per se*, but may be so or otherwise only in the context of Dhvani, the soul of poetry.

a thing to be tasted by the connoisseurs (*sahridaya*) The Kāvya may and does have a particular message which may be related to any of the four ends of human efforts—Dharma, Artha, Kāma or even Mokṣa. But the judgement of literature is not based on this message. It is the sentiment, the proper suggestion of which decides the success or otherwise of the Kāvya. Ānandavardhana refers to the Mahābhārata and says that as far as the message is concerned, it conveys greatness of the path of renunciation (*mokṣa*) as the most important end of human life but as a Kāvya it suggests the Quietistic Sentiment (*Śānta rasa*). Similarly, the Rāmāyana, although upholding the ideal life of Rāma, suggests the Pathetic (*Karuṇā*) as a whole. Herein we find that unlike his predecessors, Ānandavardhana is clear about the distinction between the 'literature of power' and that of 'knowledge'. As a principle of judgement, then, it is appropriateness or propriety that has to be judged in relation to the suggestion of Sentiment. The memorable verse—"Save impropriety, there is no other cause of interruption of the Rasa, the great secret of Rasa consists in the observance of celebrated propriety"—of Ānandavardhan supplies the clue to the over-all evaluation of the Kāvya.

The Dhvani School, thus, ushered in a newer and deeper insight into the essentials of poetry. The contributions of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, in this respect, have been unique. Although not directly related to the principles of criticism, I would like to refer to the psychology of Rasa-realisation put forward by the third great exponent of the school, Ācārya Abhinavagupta. In the field of Sanskrit literature Abhinavagupta stands as the great master with unparalleled insight. Though his contribution to Poetics consists in the two comments he wrote on the Nāṭyaśāstra and the Dhvanyāloka, these two works, all scholars agree, are more original than many, and are held in the highest regard.

The theory propounded by Abhinavagupta proceeds from the premise that the Rasa is suggested, and the *Vibhāva*

Ānandavardhana, Dhvanyāloka, III, p. 330 (Chowkhamba Edn.)
 Anuśīlād ite nānvad rasabhangasya kāraṇam |
 Prauddhaucityabandhasu rasasopaniṣat parā ||

over language. It is upto the modern critic to prove that suggestion is the soul of poetry, holds true even today

I would conclude by saying that like the work of Aristotle, the *Dhvanyāloka* is the first treatise on Sanskrit Poetics, in which the approach is from Poetry to Poetics, not the other way round. Like it again, it recognises the unique importance of a poet's imagination and sense of propriety. It also distinguishes Poetry from history and maintains the comparative greatness of the former. It is neither necessary nor possible that literary theories of two different countries would follow the same lines but what affords great surprise is the universality of the fundamental principles of the poetic art. The *Dhvani* School supplies certain such principles that are valid even in different climes and times.

Jagannātha thus comes last in the last stage. After him the race of critics practically extinguished. Even at the time of Jagannātha, the scheme of poetics was ultimately standardised. The theory of Dhvani was finally established by Mammata. Then in the post-Dhvanī period what was that which inspired Jagannātha for a fresh contemplation and renewed investigation? The span of 550 years between Mammata and Jagannātha is marked by important authors like Ruyyaka, Vāṇanātha, Hemacandra, Vidyādhara Vidyānātha, Appayya, Vāgbhata, Kesava Miśra, Śāradātanaya, Rūpa-Goswamin, Rājasekhara and Ksemendra. Even important thoughts like the केषाद्भुतवाद of नागयन, the भुवदुःखवाद of रामचन्द्रभुमवद, रसप्रक्रिया of नयनभानुनाथी and चमत्कारवाद of प्रभाकर were current. In this age of prolific literary output what was that which Jagannātha originally contributed to the literary field?

It is his concept of रसगोपनी on the foundation of which he looks to the Kāvya as रसगोपायप्रतिपादकः शब्दः. What is this रसगोपनी? He explains it as :

“रसगोपनी च लोकोपराहू सादजनकज्ञानगोचरता” In this definition of poetic *ramayajñi* Jagannātha uses the word ज्ञान which he later replaces by the word भावना. The three ways in which he presents his general definition, where the word भावना is used instead of ज्ञान, become more important from the point of clarity and precision, the two points which are most dear to Jagannātha.

The three ways in which Jagannātha presents his general definition are :—

- (1) चमत्कारवत्कलावताविश्रुतार्थप्रतिपादकशब्दत्वम्,
- (2) दृश्यदिनार्थविश्रुतभावनात्वं चमत्कारवत्कलावच्छेदक तत्त्वम्,
- (3) स्वविशिष्टजनकतावच्छेदकार्थप्रतिपादकतायनार्थं चमत्कारवत्स्वमेव वा काल्यत्वम् ।

In the first the process starts with चमत्कार and ends with शब्दः.

In the second the process starts with दृश्य and ends with चमत्कार.

“समुचितकलिनसन्निवेशचारुणा काव्येन समर्पिते ”

These words clearly bring to notice the importance he attaches to the सन्निवेशचारुत्व through औचित्य and लालित्य. Though he accepts the व्यवहार of 'दुष्ट काव्यम्' and does not incorporate निर्दोषत्व in the definition of his Kāvya, he is very particular about the precision and accuracy in the use of words. For this only he deals with the शब्दबोध and elaborately discusses even small things like the use of पुर or पुरतः. Thus the सौशब्द is not lost sight of. In his view the words must be accurate, appropriate and appealing. Then only they can give the delight which he calls a transcendental delight. Even the words like 'A son is born to you' can give delight but it is not लोकोत्तर काव्याह्लाद. Thus शब्दाश्रित शब्द are thus important. He defines प्रतिभा as “काव्यघटनानुकूलशब्दाद्योपस्थितिः ।”

His particular भावना is पुनः पुनरनुसंधानात्मा and it generates the अलीकवाह्लाद. This blissful state of mind is the supreme element among the three. It is not only the Rasadhvani that causes this अलीकवाह्लाद but वस्तुध्वनि and अङ्कारध्वनि as well. State of mind is so much important to him that not only Gunas but Bhāvas are defined in the form of *Guṇarūpī* by him. It is important to note in this connection his definitions of *nīdrā* and *marana*—

- (i) “श्रमादिप्रयोग्य चेन ममीलन निद्रा”
- (ii) “शोकादिजग्या मूर्च्छाश्वा मरणप्रायवस्था मरणम्”

Thus गन्ध, भावना and अलीकवाह्लाद stand for सन्निवेश-सौन्दर्यं, आम्बाद and आनन्द respectively. These are the three elements which his concept of रमणीयता involves. Jagannātha's रमणीयता is thus not only the इष्टार्थं of दण्डिन्, not only the सौन्दर्यम् of वामन, it is the सहृदयश्लाघ्यता of ध्वनिकार, the स्वस्वन्दमन्दरता of Kuntaka, the औचित्य of क्षेमेन्द्र and रसात्मकता of Viśvanātha as well.

All these find a beautiful synthesis in the रमणीयता of

CONTRIBUTION OF THE VAISNAVA RASA-ŚĀSTRA TO SANSKRIT POETICS

Raghunath Sharma

The Vaisnava *Rasa-śāstra* has infused into the Sanskrit Poetics the most bewitching and maddening essence, that has immediately sublimated it from a mundane literary discussion to a sublime eulogy of the Supreme Bliss. Touched by the magic wand of the great master of the devotional sentiment Śrī Caitanya, the literary giants in the form of Śrī Rūpa Gosvāmin, Śrī Jīva Gosvāmin, Kavi Kṛṣṇapūra, Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja and others were transformed, as if, into the supreme apostles of the *Bhakti rasa*, where the rugged dry faggots and the hardest stones (saphires) started oozing the nectarine juice, whereby the life-less pulsated into life and the active living got benumbed, as if, into static inanimate.¹

True to the tradition of the master of poetics, Bharata these Vaisnava rhetoricians poured forth the juice of Bhakti through its veins so as to render all the primary² as well as petty³ emotions as contributory ingredients of an exquisite display of the great king of the *rasas*, *Bhakti—the Rasa-rāt*.⁴

The great traditional literary critics, right from Abhinavagupta through Bhoja, Mammata, Viśvanātha and others, have attached varied importance to *rasa* in the field of poetry. The *Āyazā* rhetoricians have also pronounced *rasa* as the very soul of poetry⁵ and have joined in line with some of the important traditional rhetoricians like Viśvanātha⁶ in attaching supreme importance to *Rasa* as a manifestation of the supreme bliss of Brahman and as translated into eight, nine or twelve currents (*Rasas*) as interpreted in poetics at a later stage.

1. Śrīmadbhāgavatam

**spṛṇīyam gamatām pulakāṣṭa ūrām* *

2. *Haribhakti-Rasimṛta sūdhā*, Kā. Bī, Vākraṇ Era 1983, p. 309

3. *Ib. d.*, p. 309

4. *Ujjvalaśiṅgārā*, Kāvīyamālī Ed., 05, p. 4

5. *Alaṅkāra-kaustubha*, Ed. Varendra Research Society, Berga
1926 p. 5

6. *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Ed. Motilal Banarsidas 1936, p. 48.

expresses his inability in classifying *Bhakti* as a *rasa*.¹ This is a clear blot on the traditional literary system. Thus Panditarāja holds : "The counting of the nine-hood of the *rasas* in adherence to the words of the Muni (Bharata) will break asunder and hence the lack of liberty in recognition of *rasa*-hood of *Bhakti*—the traditional *sāstra*, therefore, carries more weight."² Rudraṭa, Udbhata, Dhanañjaya, Hemacandra and others have practically endorsed the *Bhāsa*-hood of *Bhakti* on the lines of Mammata, mostly in obedience to the tradition.

It was the proud privilege of the Vaisnavaitic rhetoricians to have pronounced the sole seat of *rasa* in the Supreme Brahman³ alone and its expression in the sublimest bliss in the form of *Bhakti*. It is generally maintained that the literary tradition prior to the Bengal Vaisnavism conceived of *Bhakti* mostly in terms of human love as between a man and a woman and then applied it to the sphere of gods. What the followers of the Bengal Vaisnavism did was simply to reverse the order of this application. That is to say the former extended the human sentiment to the divine plane whereas the latter interpreted the divine-sentiment in human terms. But there is still a third view singular by itself, in so far as it recognizes not merely sublimation of human sentiments, but takes the sentiment of love in its highest perspective of the archetypal form of Platonic love that is ideally true and sincere between an ideal hero and the ideal heroine in its ideal fervour and fidelity.⁴ It is, therefore, clear that there was

1. Ibid., p. 48

2. Ibid., p. 46

3. *Haribhakti-rasāmṛta-saṅgṛha*, Kāśhī, Vikram Era 1923, p. 123
(The Reality of the Vedānta is Brahman but the Vaisnavas regard their Lord Kṛṣṇa as Supreme Brahman).

A devotional attachment towards gods in general may, if at all, be regarded as a mere emotion because of the presence of the individualistic aspect of Absolute consciousness in them. But the similar treatment to an attachment towards God (Paramātmā)—the absolute seat of the Supreme bliss cannot be justified. Śrī Madhusūdana Sarasvatī remarks in his *Bhakti-rasāmṛta*—

Rasavardhinasya vyabhidhī tathorjitat,
Eśvareṣu prekṛtāḥ raso netyaduktam rasakovidubh.
Devatāreṣu jivatāt parānanda-prakāśanāt,
Tadyogyam Paramānanda-rūpe na paramātmā

4. Gould Thomas, *Platonic Love*, London 1963, p. 141 :

"The just man, unlike the unjust, loves himself. This was a Greek commonplace, but it followed, Plato thought from the peace and har-

The excruciating pangs of separation carry with them the nectarine hallucinations drawing the self and the environment into the all-engulfing love, both the lover and the beloved. This is the *Mahābhāva*,¹ the most majestic trance pulsating with *Mahara* (bewitching) and *Mādana* (intoxicating) life-currents where the separation itself melts into the ecstasy of the intimate union and is the sublimest limit of the unlimited joy. The ideal taster of the rarest *rasas*, the crest-jewel of all the *rasikas* casts asunder His own ecstatic forces of himself as of others (*Parakīyās*) to over-reach them in spite of all hindrances, hardships and limitations of ethics, sociology, and religion, so as to enable them to cross them all for an intimate taste of the supreme super-sensuous enjoyment of Supreme Bliss.

Let there be no bar to a recognition of the king of the sentiments *rasarāj* on the ground of uncommon experience. Devotion as also love are common in human mind, literature as well as religion. If the unique beauty, ecstatic separation and ecstasy of union in a *Śakuntalā* or a *Yakṣiṇī* can be regarded as objects of common taste, why should the highest ecstasy in union and separation between *Śrī Kṛṣṇa* and *Śrī Rādhā* be precluded from the taste of the *rasikas*? The rareness of quality is required at both the places and the tasteful capacity is a pre-requisite for both the enjoyments.

The apostle of *Bhakti* as also a master of poetic criticism *Śrī Rūpa* and his companions scatter the pearls of the highest literary water at the lotus-feet of the absolute Master of the absolute bliss. And this contribution has crowned the literature with the supersensuous bliss capable of touch by the minute poetic sense of a true poet. All other poetry, centred in the fading objects of earthly beauty, are rejected as mere trash, playing only with a semblance of *rasa* (*raṣābhāsa*).²

1. Ibid, p. 463.

2. *Nīrīyana* Pūrba, *Bhakticandrikā* (Quoted in the *Kalyāṇa Bhakti* 222, p. 347).

“Iṣṭam ca laukikārasaṁ śrī-gārādaṁ viśayāvacchinnasaya-
cchinānāṁśasaya sphuranānāṁśasaya nūnatvam.
Bhagavadikīrokṣa cetovṛttilakṣaṇa bhaktirase tu
anāvachchinnacchinānāṁśasaya bhagavataḥ sphura-
nānāṁśasaya A'o bhagavadbhaktirasa eva
laukikarāśīnupekṣyā paramarasaḥ sevyaḥ.”

DHVANI AS THE MEETING-POINT OF ALL PRINCIPLES OF SANSKRIT LITERARY THEORY

Dr K Krishnamoorthy

I

Besides *Dhvani*, the major principles of Sanskrit criticism are *Alankāra*, *Guna-Doṣa*, *Rīti*, *Rasa*, *Aucitya* and *Vakrokti*. In historical surveys of these by scholars like S K De, P V Kane and V Raghavan we are made to feel that there is a progress in thought from theorist to theories and a kind of evolution in the concepts themselves. We are asked to believe that, by turns, each principle provided the master-key to unlock the secret of poetic essence. Theorists are classed as belonging to the *Alankāra* School or *Guna-cum-Rīti* school or *Dhvani* School or *Vakrokti* School or *Aucitya* School. I have been struggling in my recent writings (viz, (1) *Essays in Sanskrit Criticism*, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1963; (2) *Some Thoughts on Indian Aesthetics and Literary Criticism*, University of Mysore, Mysore, 1968) to show that this procedure of scholars is not conducive to any clarification of the most fundamental facts of literary theory which are shared in common by most of our Sanskrit writers. I shall try in this paper to present some of the difficulties facing an enquirer into the nature of poetry as envisaged by our ancients and to indicate a line of approach which would make confusion less.

II

The basic analysis of *Kāvya* or poetry in which every Sanskrit theorist is agreed is the distinction of *śabda* and *artha*. There is no writer on *Alankārasāstra*, from *Bhāmaha* to *Jagannātha*, who does not allude to them or who does not rear all his conceptual superstructure on the foundation of this distinction. Let us simply ask ourselves whether we understand the significance or realise the importance of this foundational fact. So long as *śabda* and *artha* mean no more

though they are factually unrelated and it is the imagination which endows personal feelings to inanimate objects too. These are the various *alankāras* like Simile and Metaphor. The poet's function consists in recording an experience which is different from the worldly or the logical or intellectual experience of facts; and the means he adopts consciously or unconsciously, as dictated by his imagination are the *alankāras*. In other words, the recognition of an *alankāra* as such demands literary sensibility and a poet-like imagination (*Bhārayitṛi pratibhā* in the words of Rājasekhara) on the part of the reader too. All good *alankāras* are lost upon the mere grammarians, just as *Rasas* or *gunas* are missed by them. The outer characteristics of an *alankāra* which everyone can grasp, whether a *sahīdaya* or not, do not explain its poetic essence. 'Gaurā gaṇayā' is no *upā-lankāra*. Much of the cant in our books on the *Alankārasāstra* can be traced to a deliberate disregard of this primary consideration. I should like to stress therefore that all *alankāras* are expressions of the imagination and are deliberate departures from the matter-of-fact or logical uses of language. Their beauty is their success; and absence of beauty in a *kāvyā-lankāra* is a contradiction in terms. A mechanical figure of speech is *a-kāvyā* (unpoetic) and hence no *alankāra*, just as a doll is no baby, but an imitation of a baby. Thus we are, willingly or unwillingly, led to a consideration of the *soul* of poetry, the *dīman*. It is always something *felt* by the man of taste and does not admit of intellectual dialectics.

The use of language, then, with a view exclusively to beauty is the only true explanation of all *alankāras* and hence it is nothing but *dhvani*. Thus the true *alankāra-ādin* has perforce to be a *dhvani-ādin*, if he has literary sensibility.

Usually, the *alankāras* are held to beautify the part and not the whole. Again, a misnomer! They would not be adornments at all if they did not indirectly beautify the whole though attaching themselves to the parts (*a-gadā-cārenta jīva-it*) as Ānandavardhana would say. Again, it is wrong to think that a poet's task lies in taking an unpoetic idea, and adding to it an *alankāra* to make it poetic. He is a poet only in so far as his imagination seizes facts and relations poetically. In a true poet, *alankāras* are *integral* and

literary judgement; and again we are facing what is technically called the *ātman* or soul of poetry. Its manifestation may take different forms and these are the *gunas* or excellences, grounded again in *śabda* and *artha*. Corresponding to the two primary *Rīti*s, we must at least admit *Mādhurya* and *Ojas* and lucidity or *prasāda* as a third to explain general poetic appeal in all instances. In the epics like the *Rāmāyana* and the *Mahābhārata* we have only *Prasāda*, but *Mādhurya* *Ojas* can be best felt in the refined poems of classical Sanskrit. *Gunas*, then, condition the poetic personality itself and are inseparable from any poet's work. Kālidāsa is mostly *Mādhura*; Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa is fired by *Ojas*. But the theme may demand change of *gunas* as when Kālidāsa describes a fight in *Mālarikāgnimitra* or Bhaṭṭa-nārāyaṇa describes the soft passion in the *Venisambhāra*.

This consideration brings us to the realisation that particularly in drama, the psychological content has a great bearing on *rasa-cum-rīti* concepts. This is the famous principle of *rasa* perfected by Bharata in his *Nāṭya-śāstra*. In classical Sanskrit *mahākāvya*, which is primarily concerned with *Varṇanā* or imaginative description, and not *abhinaya* or representation of psycho-physical events, only that broad principle of *rasa* may be generally admitted, the detailed elaboration of its varieties being held to be confined to particular portions only. This is exactly what Bhāmaha and the ancients did in their concept of *Rasavalārikāra*. The *Rasavalārikāras* refer only to such passages in classical Sanskrit literature where the different *rasas* rise to a pitch. But the general principle of *rasa* is admitted by them in their definition of *mahākāvya* itself. *Rasas* also contribute to the reader's *prīti* or *ānanda* in their own way as *alankāras*, *gunas* and *rīti*s. They can all be called *alankāras* in a broad sense or *rasa* in a broad sense, in the sense of aesthetic factors revealed in poetry.

But the general practice of writers is to narrow down the meanings of these terms to suit their own ideas and to indulge in rating one literary theorist as against another. I think this is a mistake of modern critical scholarship which deserves to be halted.

What exactly is the stuff of poetry? Is it pure emotion, sentiment, feeling, mere *citta-vṛtti-rūpeṣa* and nothing more?

is the *sthāyibhāva*? If the answer is *vismaya*, or anything else, questions regarding its *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* will remain unanswered. In fact a general *vismaya* or wonder can be affirmed in all *varnanā* since *atīśaya* is an essential element of all poetry. In other words, my simple submission is that the *rasa* theory, when pressed literally to apply to all poetry, can do more harm than good.

In the widest sense of *rasa*, as meaning the aesthetic delight of the reader, there is no poetry or fine art, whether music or painting, sculpture or architecture, without *rasa*. But this is not what is usually meant when the theorists talk of a poem's dominant or ancillary *rasa*. In the sense of aesthetic sensibility, it cannot be denied either to the poet who works under *rasāveśa* and who reveals his *rasavattā* in his *varnanā* (to borrow the words of Rājasekhara) or to the actor who is imbued with it during his activity of representation despite the demands made upon his attention by his art. I wonder whether it can be denied even in aesthetic perception of beauty in nature in one's own life, apart from poetry.

But *rasa* in the narrower sense cannot be affirmed either of the man in life or of the poet or of the actor, or of the reader of poetry at all times. It must needs be confined to the spectator of drama and to the reader of poetry at times when the mental states as patterned by the poet and presented by the actor ring as *rasa*.

IV

Throughout, I have dwelt on the common points of agreement or the consensus of Sanskrit literary theorists relating to the essentials of the basic concepts. I do not believe that some theorists realised these implications while others did not. I am led to feel that every theorist realised these facts quite well, though he decided to emphasise one or the other vital element, since every writer is seen relating all these different concepts in a sort of general philosophy. The general philosophy is implicit in some but becomes explicit for once in Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*. That is why I regard that the theory of Dhvani is the meeting-point of all theories of Sanskrit literary criticism. It clears misunderstandings about

OBSERVATIONS ON SOME ELEMENTS OF SANSKRIT CRITICISM*

I. L. Joshi

क्वचिना मानसं नीमि तरन्ति प्रतिमाम्भमि
यत्र हृस्वशानीव भुवनानि चतुर्दश ।

I admire our President, Dr K C Pandey's selection of Abhanvagupta for complete mastery. Abhinava is not only an eclectic, who takes the best and the most reasonable from all the older writers of renown, he is also a propounder of Advaita Śaivāgama which believes in the identity of the jīvātman with the Paramātman. The jīvātman or the individual soul is regarded by this school as being of the nature of Cidānanda or conscious bliss which finds expression in Rasa. The tenets of this school seem to eliminate the necessity of renunciation and the freedom from emotional disturbance (on which Advaita Vedānta insists) For worldly people, as most of us are, attainment of the supreme bliss through a complete identity of the knower and the known is clearly a difficult process. Advaita Śaivāgama has therefore a greater appeal to the Rasikas as their appreciative soul can hope to experience the Supreme Bliss without the renunciation of appreciation of beauty everywhere and in everything. This is our Rasa-experience which we may enjoy without going to the full extent of an *aghorāpāthīn* and exclaiming like one of them :

येन मुरा श्रितमानुषनीशिनन्
प्राहः स्वभावलिनी विहृतश्च वेद्य ।
येनेदमोदमन्दमन मोक्षवर्ण
दीर्घाभिरम्बु भगवाम्भु निराकमणिः ॥

I believe that in Abhinava's view Rasa-experience emerges only in the audience, and not in the actor, who

* Remarks of Shri Joshi who presided over the concluding function held on 23.12. 1966.

logy has come to believe that creativity = not confined to a few naturally gifted people. It is inherent in human nature and can be encouraged by proper education. Old ideas in new combinations can also yield new ideas. A Sahrdaya studies good poetry deeply and his memory or rumination over the old ideas may trigger new ones. This need not be motivated by extraneous factors like fame or wealth, as these might result in excess of motivation which is fatal to a work of art. Thus Dandin seems to be correct in testifying

न विद्यते यत्रनि पूर्ववासनागुणानुबन्धि प्रतिभानमद्भुतम् ।
श्रुतेन मन्त्रेण च वागुपासिता छुब करोत्येव कमप्यनुग्रहम् ॥

Many successful writers like Robert Louis Stevenson have testified efforts they had to make before they came to be recognised as great writers

ननु शब्दायांलङ्कारयोर्भेदोपपत्तये शब्दस्यार्थान्वयविरहितोच्चारणरूपत्वे पुनर्यदुच्चारणमौन्दर्यस्य अर्थयोगस्तस्मात् शब्दे उच्चारणार्थयोरेकभयोरेवान्तर्भावो ऽप्यनिति चेन्न उच्चारणमौन्दर्यस्यार्थयोगे शब्दे च शब्दार्थयोरेकभयो-
रन्तर्भावो भेदावगमान् । पूर्वेण अर्थमौन्दर्यस्य शब्दालङ्कारनियतागत्वाभावात्
तत्रापि च कुत्रचित् तदगत्वे शब्दमौन्दर्यस्य प्राधान्यात् 'प्राधान्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्ति'
इति शब्दालङ्कारत्वाभिधानं युक्तम्—यथा हेक्वत्पनुप्रासयोः व्यस्यार्थगतस्य
मौन्दर्यस्य सतोऽपि तथान्तर्भावाभावात् समकलाटानुप्रासयोश्च क्रमशः
सतोऽर्थवैयर्थ्यापेक्षाम्यात्मकस्य मौन्दर्यस्य तत्र प्राधान्याभावात् शब्दा-
लङ्कारत्वाभिधानं युक्तम् । परत्र तु अर्थमौन्दर्यस्य उच्चारणमौन्दर्यस्य च
तत्त्ववर्तनेन अलङ्काराणामौन्दर्यविशेषानुभवविशेषः शब्दार्थगतालङ्कारभेद-
विनिगमनाविरहश्च ।

शब्दालङ्कारोऽर्थानुकूलमुच्चारणमौन्दर्यमर्थानलङ्कारद्वयार्थमौन्दर्यमिति
निर्णयः किञ्चरूपमेतदुच्चारणमौन्दर्यमर्थमौन्दर्यञ्चेत्यस्माद्विचारणीयम् ।
अत्रोच्यते—एतदाद्यमनेऽर्थोच्चारण एव ध्वनेर्णेतयोः स्वरूपे, जात्यव्यति-
रिक्तस्य मौन्दर्यस्वरूपस्यानुपलभ्ये आश्रयरूपेणैव तत्प्रतीतेश्च । समीक्षक-
दृष्ट्याऽर्थं बोधयित्वा मौन्दर्यं तत्त्वञ्चेति तत्त्वद्वयं विद्यते । अत्र मौन्दर्यतत्त्वस्य
बोधयित्वविरहितप्रतीत्यभावात् अर्थरूपेणैवोपस्थानम् । एव सत्यपि मौन्दर्य-
मर्थगतं न त्वरूपमित्यस्माकं या वाचोपयुक्तिस्तत्र अर्थबोधपुरस्सरमेवार्थानु-
संग्यानं हेतुः । न हि ध्वनेन अर्थरूपमेव तन्मौन्दर्यमित्यस्माकं सिद्धान्तस्य कापि
शक्तिः । किञ्च लोकगतकमठवृत्तिमौन्दर्यस्य चाभ्युपगमनलक्षणान् 'मुह्यं कमल-
निभं सुन्दरम्' इति वाक्यगतस्य मादृशान्नकस्य मौन्दर्यस्य च वाच्यार्थ-
रूपत्वाभ्युपगमनेनाभ्यनुभवेनाभ्यं स्पृष्टत्वेनोत्तरनिर्भवति । एवमुच्चारण-
मौन्दर्यमप्युच्चारणरूपमिति ज्ञेयम् ।

एवमर्थालङ्कारो रम्यार्थरूपं शब्दालङ्कारद्वयार्थमम्बुदो रम्योच्चारणरूप
इति निश्चेत् किं रम्यार्थमाम्नाम्यार्थालङ्कारता एव रम्यार्थविशेषस्येति
विचारणीयम् । पूर्वेण वाच्यव्यपदेशीनामविरम्यार्थप्रकाराणां परत्र च
रम्यार्थविशेषाणामर्थालङ्कारत्वे निर्णयाम्बुदयमात्रं बाधानामालङ्कारिकाणां
मननत्र द्रष्टव्यम् ।—

'वक्राभिरेदम्बुदोस्तिरिष्टा वाचामलज्वाति ।

—काव्यालङ्कारः १-३६

'धावन्तो हृदनावर्जका अर्थप्रकारान्नावलोलङ्काराः ।

—वाचालङ्कारः

अत्र धावन्नाशया हृदनावर्जकार्यप्रकाराणामर्थालङ्कारत्वाभिधानेऽपि
प्रयुक्तहरणं वाच्यार्थस्य प्रागन्येन प्रतिमानान् कुत्रचित् सतोऽपि च व्यस्यार्थ-

अथ 'अलङ्कार्यस्याभावान्' इत्यनो विचार्यते । अत्र रसोज्ज्वलकार्यो-
ज्ज्वलकारादश्च तदलङ्कारणहेतव इति तदभावेऽलङ्काराधानस्य वैयर्थ्यापत्तिरित्य-
भिनवगुप्तपादाना मतम् । अत्रोच्यते शब्दार्थयो (रसस्य) नियतयोगाभावेन न
हि तस्य सर्वत्रालङ्कार्यत्वमिति तदभावेऽप्यलङ्काराधानस्योपपत्तिः । ननु तत्र
किमलङ्कार्यमिति चेत् शब्दार्थविशेषादित्यस्माकं मतम् । ननु एवमपि
शब्दार्थावलङ्कार्यो तदालम्बके च तन्मोन्दये अलङ्कारावित्यलङ्कारालङ्कार्य-
योरेकरूपत्वात्तदभेदोच्छेदापत्तिरिति चेन्न दृष्टिभेदात्तयोर्भेदसम्भवात् ।
सौन्दर्यदृष्ट्या तत्रालङ्कारव्यपदेशो बोधनत्वदृष्ट्या चालङ्कार्यव्यपदेश इति
सर्वं मुख्यम् । ननु लोकेऽलङ्कारालङ्कार्ययोरेवमभावात्कथमेतदिति चेन्न
लोकगतस्य तयो रूपम्याधानन्वयात् । लोके हि पृथगवस्थितस्यालङ्कारस्य
अलङ्कार्येण योगो हारम्येव कष्टेन । न तथा काव्ये । तत्र वाच्यवाचकचातु-
रूपस्यालङ्कारस्य वाच्यवाचकरूपादलङ्कार्यात् पृथगवस्थानाभ्युपगमात् । किञ्च
रमस्याप्यलङ्कार्यत्वे 'रमोऽत्र' 'अलङ्कारोऽत्र' इति प्रतीतिद्वयमानेऽपि उभयो
शब्दार्थाश्रितत्वात्तत्र लोकवत्पृथगवस्थानम् ।

अनो रमानावेऽप्यलङ्कारमोन्दयमङ्गीत्वेन न हि अलङ्काराधारभूतयो
शब्दार्थयोरेकत्वमिदानीं युक्तमिति रम्यवाच्यार्थोऽप्यलङ्कारो रम्योच्चारणञ्च
सम्बालङ्कार इति स्थितम् ।

परिचर्चा

रे प्र द्विवेदी शब्दार्थयोर्मैत्रेयनालङ्काराणां वर्णनमकृत्वा भवता शब्दार्थयो-
रभेदत्वेनालङ्काराणां वर्णनं कृतम् । किमेतन्मनः संस्कृतकाव्यशास्त्रा-
नुमोदितं बुनापि च प्रतिपादितम् ?

डा. ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा - अथ तावदस्माकं दृष्टिकोणभेदः ।

रे. प्र. द्विवेदी . शब्दार्थौ तु धर्मिणौ, अलङ्कारश्च धर्मः । दर्शने तु सर्वस्य
ब्रह्मात्मनत्वाद्धर्मधर्मिणो, शक्तिशक्तिभनोर्गुणगुणिनोर्वाभेदः ।
किन्तु व्यवहारे उभयोर्मध्येऽन्तरं विद्यत एव । अतः भवता
तयोर्भेदत्वेन चर्चा कर्तव्या । तर्हि अत्र भवता शब्दार्थयोरायदत्वेना-
लङ्कारस्याश्रितत्वेन व्यवस्था कर्तव्या न त्वभिन्नत्वेन ।

ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा : वाम शब्दार्थावाययो अलङ्कारश्च शब्दार्थाश्रितः किन्तु
शब्दार्थयोभिन्नः न तस्य किमपि स्वरूपं विद्यते । स तु शब्दार्थ-
रूप एव ।

रे. प्र. द्विवेदी - भवता मूले यदुपनेत्रं वर्तते तत्किं चक्षुष्यां भिन्नं तद्रूपं वा ?

च तदन्वयवर्तिन्व न समवति । असमवति चास्मिन् सवधे
महती अव्यवस्था स्यान् शब्दार्थालंकारयोश्च भेद एव न
प्रसज्येत ।

ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा मया न हि प्रोक्तं यत् सर्वथा तयोरभेदः । मया केवलमेतत्
प्रोक्तं यत् बोधनन्वदृष्ट्या, ज्ञानतत्त्वदृष्ट्या वा यौ शब्दार्थौ
तावेव सौन्दर्यदृष्ट्या अलंकारः । अत्र केवलं दृष्टिभेदः ।

वैकुण्ठचलम् सौन्दर्यदृष्टिर्बोधदृष्टिश्च इति दृष्टिद्वयं भवद्भिः स्थापयितुमिच्छते
परन्तु सौन्दर्यस्यापि बोधो भवति । अतः सौन्दर्यदृष्टिर्बोधदृष्ट्यावेव
कथं नान्तर्भावः ?

ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा सर्वस्यापि बोधो भवति किन्तु सौन्दर्यबोधो भिन्नः अर्थबोधश्च
भिन्नः । (बोधः—अर्थबोधः, न तु बोधमामान्यम्) अर्थबोधः
विचार्य यदि [भेदं त्रियते] तर्हि तत्र तु अर्थस्यैव प्राधान्यम्
सौन्दर्यदृष्ट्या [तु अलंकारस्य]

वैकुण्ठचलम् वयं तावत् प्रथमं स्पष्टं जिज्ञासामहे कीदृशी भवता मनसि
अभेदस्य धारणा विद्यते ?

ब्रह्मानन्द शर्मा एषा धारणा यत् मुक्ते यत् कुरूपता सौन्दर्यं वा विद्यते तस्य
स्वरूपमुक्त्वाद् भिन्नं न किमपि विद्यते । मुख्यमेव तत् । एवमेव
अलंकारोऽपि न ब्राह्मरूपा अपि तु शब्दार्थरूपा एव । लोके
यथा अलंकारालंकारयोर्भेदो विद्यते—यथा अलंकारो धारीरात्
अपनेतुं शक्नोति न तथा वाक्ये । तत्र तु ते न "हारादिद्वयं"
वर्तन्ते अपि तु मुक्ते सौन्दर्यादिबन्तं यतो हि तेषाम् अस्तित्वं
शब्दार्थयोर्भिन्नं न सम्भवति । यथा सौन्दर्यं मुख्यरूपमेव तथैव
शब्दालंकारः रम्योच्चारणरूपः, अर्थालंकारश्च अर्थबोध-
रूपः ।

दे प्र द्विवेदी. यदि गुणगुणिनोर्भेदो भवता न मन्यते तदा 'गुणी' एव
ब्रह्मणम् । कथं गुणस्य ग्रहणम् ? जलकारो भावरूपः शब्दार्थौ
तु द्रव्यरूपौ । मया भावद्रव्ययोर्भेदः भवद्भिः स्वीक्रियते तथैव
जलकारस्य (सौन्दर्यस्य) द्रव्यरूपाद् शब्दाद् अर्थोऽपि भेदो-
ज्वरमेव स्वीकार्यः । अयं भेदो व्यावहारिकः । यदि भवता
दर्शनमाश्रित्य किञ्चिद् विचार्यते तदा त्वन्यत् । तत्र तु सर्वमेव
ब्रह्मात्मकं भवति ।

रामचन्द्र द्विवेदीः ज्वरस्य विमर्शिन्या टिप्पण्येका वर्तते यत् यद्यपि पर-
माणं सर्वं ब्रह्मात्मकं भवति किन्तु यथा मनुष्ये एव 'जीवः'
इत्यस्य व्यवहारः क्रियते तथैव चार्जुनशब्दार्थमदभेदं एव रमस्य

संस्कृत-समीक्षाशास्त्र और हिन्दी-आलोचना

डा० उदयमानु सिंह

हिन्दी-आलोचना के दो मुख्य उत्तमर्ग हैं (१) मस्कृत का समीक्षाशास्त्र, और (२) पाश्चात्य (प्रधानतया अंगरेजी) साहित्यालोचन। हिन्दी-आलोचना पर इन दोनों स्रोतों का प्रभाव दोहरा है (१) साहित्यिक मानदंडों की स्वीकृति, और (२) साहित्य-समीक्षा में उन मानदंडों के प्रयोग की पद्धति का अनुसरण। इन दोनों के प्रतिफल-स्वरूप एक तीसरा प्रभाव भी उल्लेख्य है मस्कृत-काव्यशास्त्र और पाश्चात्य साहित्यालोचन की पारिभाषिक शब्दावली का अविकल, परिवर्तित अथवा अनूदित रूप में प्रयोग।

“समीक्षा” और “आलोचना” को ही लीजिए। आधुनिक हिन्दी-साहित्य में प्रचलित ये शब्द व्युत्पत्ति की दृष्टि में मस्कृत के ही शब्द हैं किन्तु स्वगुणार्थ की दृष्टि में वे अंगरेजी “क्रिटिसिज्म” के समशील हैं। इस पर मैं यह क्षिप्रानुमान नहीं कर लेना चाहिए कि वे मस्कृत की साहित्यशास्त्रीय विचारधारा से सर्वथा विच्छिन्न हैं। शास्त्र-भेदों का निरूपण करते हुए राजशेखर ने समीक्षा को “अन्तर्भाष्य” और “अवान्तरार्यविच्छेद” कहा था। काव्य के सदर्भ में ये लक्षण उनके तत्त्वाभिव्यक्ति विवेचन का सकेत करते हैं।

दर्शन, विचारणा, विवेचन आदि अर्थों में परंपरा-प्रयुक्त “आलोचना” का मूल अभिनवगुप्त के “लोचन” से मिलाया जा सकता है। आलोचना का मुख्य उद्देश्य है भावक को वह दृष्टि प्रदान करना जिसकी सहायता से वह आलोच्य वस्तु के मर्म को भली भाँति ग्रहण कर सके। “ध्वन्यालोकलोचन” के प्रथम उद्योत के अंत में अभिनवगुप्त ने कुछ इसी प्रकार की बात कही थी :

किं लोचनं विनालोको भाति चन्द्रिक्यापि हि ।

तेनाभिनवगुप्तोज्ज्वलं लोचनोन्मीलनं व्यधात् ॥

हिन्दी-भाषा-साहित्य मस्कृतानुगामी है। फलतः संस्कृत-समीक्षाशास्त्र में प्रयुक्त रस, अलंकार आदि से संबद्ध शब्दावली का हिन्दी-आलोचना में तथैव व्यवहार होता आया है। यह और बात है कि मूल प्रयोक्तान्तों के तात्पर्य में अनभिज्ञ होने के कारण एकाध आलोचकों ने कतिपय शब्दों का मनमाने ढंग से अर्थ-परिवर्तन कर दिया है, कभी-कभी अर्थ का अनर्थ भी हो गया है। “साधारणीकरण”, “तादात्म्य”, “आनन्दरस” आदि ऐसे ही शब्द हैं।

आधुनिक हिन्दी-समीक्षा में प्रचलित ग्रामरी, कामरी, अभिव्यक्तावाद, प्रगतिवाद, प्रयोगवाद, नयी कविता, ठोस कविता, अ-कविता, युग-श्रवण, साहित्य-

संस्कृत-समीक्षा-शैली के विविध रूप हिन्दी-आलोचना में भी प्रतिफलित हुए हैं। संस्कृत-साहित्य में आलोचना की दो प्रमुख पद्धतियाँ दिखायी देती हैं (१) आचार्य-पद्धति, और (२) टीका-पद्धति। आधुनिक साहित्य-समीक्षा के दो स्पष्ट विभाग सर्वमान्य हैं (१) सैद्धांतिक समीक्षा, और (२) व्यावहारिक समीक्षा। आचार्य-पद्धति पर लिखित “ध्वन्यालोक”, “काव्यप्रकाश” जदि ग्रंथ सैद्धांतिक समीक्षा के दृष्ट उदाहरण हैं। “काव्यमीमांसा” में निर्दिष्ट शास्त्रभेद (वृत्ति, पद्धति, नाट्य, समीक्षा, टीका, पत्रिका, कारिका और वार्तिक) समीक्षाशास्त्र के मर्म में, अपनी सैद्धांतिक विवेचना की विधिधत्ता के कारण, आचार्य-पद्धति के ही विभिन्न रूप हैं।

संस्कृत-आचार्यों ने रस, छन्द, ध्वनि आदि के शास्त्रीय निरूपण के क्रम में प्रायः अन्यरचित और कभी-कभी स्वरचित उदाहरणों द्वारा अपने सिद्धान्तों का स्पष्टीकरण किया है। सिद्धान्त-प्रतिपादन ही उनका प्रधान उद्देश्य रहा है। रस्य कृतियों का विवेचन गौण। रक्षण-उदाहरण के द्वारा शास्त्रीय समीक्षा की यह परिपाटी हिन्दी-आलोचना में १६वीं शती ई० में लेकर २०वीं शती ई० तक चलती रही है। १८वीं-१९वीं शती ई० में तो आचार्य-समीक्षा-शैली के विरोध में इनने अधिक रीति-ग्रंथों का प्रणयन किया कि उन दो शतियों की हिन्दी का रीतिज्ञान कहा जाता है। भारतीय भाषाओं के इतिहास में यह “रीतिकाल” हिन्दी की ही विशेषता है।

संस्कृत के आचार्य तत्त्वज्ञ आचार्य थे। हिन्दी के तथाकथित आचार्य मन्त्र-कवि थे। उन “ध्वन्यालोक”, “काव्यप्रकाश” आदि की कारिकाओं तथा वृत्तियों और “ध्वन्यालोकलोचन”, “अमित्रवभागी” आदि टीकाओं में जो सूक्ष्म-विवेचन-शैली मिलती है वह हिन्दी के रीतिग्रंथों में दृष्टिगोचर नहीं होती। पद्यबद्ध होने के कारण इनमें विषय-विवेचन का वैशद्य नहीं है। “रसगह्वर” (कृतवृत्ति), “व्यमार्गकौमुदी” (प्रतापसाहि) आदि कुछेक कृतियाँ ही ऐसी हैं जिनमें गद्यबद्ध बृत्ति पायी जाती है। उनमें भी तत्त्वामिनिबन्धी व्याख्यान नहीं है। संस्कृत-आचार्यों ने बहूना अन्यरचित उदाहरण दिये थे। अधिकतर हिन्दी-रीतिकविधों ने स्वरचित उदाहरण दिये हैं। हिन्दी के रीतिज्ञान में विद्यमान संस्कृत के पंडितराज जगन्नाथ में भी रस-युगान्तर-प्रवृत्ति का पाया जाता आकस्मिक नहीं है। हाँ, हिन्दी में अपवादस्वरूप “तुलसीभूषण” (रसरूप, १७५४ ई०) जैसा अल्पाक्षर-ग्रंथ भी उपलब्ध है जिसमें केवल तुलसी के

१. निम्नान्न नूतनमुदाहरणानुरूप काव्य मनात निहितं न परम्य किञ्चित्।

—रसगोदानन्द, ११६

विवेचन की आवश्यकता नहीं है। परंपरितज्ञानलाहि वृद्धयः। अतः टीकाकारों ने अर्थ के व्याख्यानपूर्वक रचनागत लालित्य (रस, अलंकार, ध्वनि आदि) का यथाम्भानमक्षिप्तनिर्देश किया है। उदाहरणार्थ “वृत्तं न कर्णापितवन्वतं मन्वे” की टीका में राघवमंजू ने वाच्य अथवा व्यंग्यरूप में प्रतीत शब्दार्थालंकारों का, लक्षणा तथा व्यञ्जना के रसगोप्य व्यापार का, आलम्बनशक्तुत्वा के रूप-चित्रण का, और आश्रयदुष्यत की मनोदग्गा का सारगर्भित निर्देश किया है।^१ टीकाकारों की दृष्टि कही-कही पर पाठालोचन की ओर भी गयी है।^२

हिंदी में “हरिप्रकाश”, “अमरचंद्रिका”, “मानस-सीमपू”, “विहारी-रत्नाकर” आदि टीकाएँ इसी प्रकार की रचनाएँ हैं। किसी ने व्यास-शैली अपनायी है, किसी ने मसाल-शैली। टीका-पद्धति को हम आधुनिक व्याख्यानमक आलोचना का पूर्वरूप कह सकते हैं। वस्तुतः पाठक के लिए व्याख्यानमक आलोचना जिनकी उद्देश्यो है उनको प्रभावप्रतिबिम्बक या निर्गुणायामक आलोचना नहीं, क्योंकि रचना के अर्थ-ग्रहण के बिना काव्यनिष्ठ मौखिकता की प्रतीति सम्भव नहीं है। हिंदी के आलोचक-गिरामणि रामचन्द्र शुक्ल ने मूर, तुलसी आदि के अनेक पद्यों की समीक्षा व्याख्यानमक शैली में ही की है।

पूर्वोक्त पद्धतिगो के अनिरिक्त दो एकानो समीक्षा-प्रणालियाँ भी सस्कृत-परंपरा में दृष्टिगोचर होती हैं जिन्हें हम सूक्ति-पद्धति और लक्षण-पद्धति कह सकते हैं। अनेक सूक्तियों में कालिदास, बाण आदि कवियों के काव्य-वैशिष्ट्य की प्रशामात्मक आलोचना उपलब्ध होती है।^३ इस प्रकार की परंपरा हिंदी में भी चली रही है।^४ कतिपय सूक्तियों में तुलनात्मक समीक्षा का आभाव भी

१. उदाहरणार्थ . अभिज्ञानशाकुन्तल, ६।१८ पर अर्थघोषनिका

२. सिंगुपालवन, १।६० पर सर्वद्वेषा—विलासिनोविभ्रमदन्तपत्रिका इति शायीयान् पाठः। अन्यथा विप्रहृष्टार्थप्रतीतिकत्वेन कष्टान्ध्यायंदोषापत्तेः।

३. निर्गतानु न वा तस्य कालिदामस्य सूक्तिपु।

श्रीनिर्भरुत्तारांशु मञ्जरीधिव जायते ॥ —बाणभट्ट

रचिरम्बरवापसा रसभाववती जगन्मनो हरति।

मा किं नरुत्तं न हि न हि वागी बाणस्य मयुरसोलम्ब ॥ —यमदाम

४ (क) मर्मसा ने दोहरे ज्यो नावर के तोर।

(ख) समुर्ज कविता धनजानंद की हिय आगिन नेह की पीर तकती।

—द्रजनाय

(ग) भाट को देन न चहै बिदाई। पूछे केनव की कविताई ॥

वरंत की मोंति ध्वनि को काव्य का प्राणतत्त्व स्वीकार किया है।^१ रीति, वक्रोक्ति या औचित्य को हिंदी-आचार्यों ने काव्य का प्रतिमान नहीं माना। कारण यह है कि उत्तरकालीन मम्भृत-ममीशागाम्त्रियों ने इन्हें काव्यात्मा न मानकर काव्योपकारक तत्त्व में ही उनकी संक्षिप्त विचार-चर्चा की थी, हिंदी के रीति-प्रकार उसी मार्ग पर चले और रीति आदि के आपेक्षिक महत्व को और भी घटा दिया। वही विचित्र बात है कि मुप्रतिष्ठित ध्वनि-मिथान को उन्होंने अनेकान गौरव नहीं दिया। केनवदाम जैसे दिग्गज पंडित ने उनकी एकदम उपेक्षा कर दी है। सम्भवतः दग्वारी बानावरण में कठिन विषय का विवेचन सम्भव नहीं था।

मम्भृत-ममीशागाम्त्र मम्भृत (और प्राकृत) की लक्ष्य रचनाओं पर आधारित था। हिंदी-ममीशागाम्त्र पौने चार सौ वर्ष तक संस्कृत-रक्षणप्रयोग पर ही अवलंबित रहा। आधुनिक गाम्त्र-मपति का अधिकार या तो मम्भृत का दाव है या परिचय में आधारित है। हिंदी का अपना आलोचनागाम्त्र नहीं है। बहुत वर्षों में इसकी चर्चा मुनी जा रही है, लेकिन अभी तक हिंदी के ललित साहित्य को लक्ष्य मानकर उसके आधार पर व्यापक आलोचना-गाम्त्र का प्रणयन नहीं हुआ। कुछ आलोचक भारतीय और पाश्चात्य ममीशा-मिथानों की मिचड़ी पका रहे हैं बीच-बीच में हिंदी के उदाहरण भी दे देते हैं, यह ठीक है कि प्राज्ञ को ग्रहण करना अनुचित नहीं है और तुलनात्मक अध्ययन की भी उपयोगिता है, परंतु अवलंबन ही है और ममीशागाम्त्र-निर्माण का यह ढंग वैज्ञानिक नहीं है। आवश्यकता इस बात की है कि आधुनिक विधि में हिंदी-साहित्य में उपलब्ध तथ्यों की परीक्षा करके मिथानों को स्थापना की जाए।

मम्भृत-ममीशागाम्त्र का प्रवर्तन नाट्यगाम्त्र में हुआ। रम की निष्पन्नता नाट्य में ही मानी गयी, ध्वन्य काव्य में उनकी प्रतिष्ठा बाद में हुई। उसका विशद विवेचन नाट्यगाम्त्रीय ग्रंथों और उनकी टीकाओं में किया गया। हिंदी-ममीशागाम्त्र का आरम्भ काव्य में हुआ, क्योंकि आधुनिक काल के पूर्व का हिंदी-साहित्य कविता का ही साहित्य है। यही कारण है कि मध्ययुग में नाट्य-गाम्त्रों पर प्रय नहीं लिखे गये।

मम्भृत-ममीशागाम्त्र में अक्षरार तथा रम का अपेक्षाकृत अधिक विवेचन हुआ है, और तदनुसार हिंदी में भी। हिंदी के एकाग्र आलोचकों को यह मोह है

१. अग जीव ताकी कहत शब्द अर्थ है देह।

गुण गुण नूना भूषां दूषा दूषा एहा।—ग्नरत्नम् (कृतपति), १।३४
अग्न प्राग अह जग मव शब्द अर्थ पहिचानि।—रसनीयूषतिवि
(मोक्षनाय), ७।६

सग्रहकारों की परंपरा चूँ पड़ी थी। मम्मट, विश्वनाथ आदि स्वतंत्र विचारक न होकर सग्रहकर्ता ही हैं।^१ हिंदी में १६ वीं शती ई० से लेकर १९ वीं शती ई० तक मसूत के काव्यालोचन-मिद्वातो की ही उद्धरणों होती रही, उसी प्रकार काव्य के प्रयोजन, हेतु, लक्षण, गुण-दोष आदि का निरूपण किया जाता रहा। मसूत के अनुकरण पर हिंदी में भी दो प्रकार के शास्त्र-ग्रंथ लिखे गये - "काव्य-प्रकाश" आदि की भाँति विविधाग-निरूपक,^२ और "कुवलयानन्द" आदि की भाँति एकाग-निरूपक।^३

हिंदी-रीतिग्रंथों के अध्ययन में विदित होता है कि केशवदाम, कुलपति, भिवारीदाम आदि कुछ को छोड़कर अधिकतर रीतिकवि पल्लवग्राही पंडित थे। उन्होंने मसूत के गिने-चूने ग्रंथों से सामग्री ग्रहण की। उनका मुख्य उद्देश्य मसूत-काव्यशास्त्र को हिंदी में प्रस्तुत करके सबके लिए बोधमय बनाना था।^४ उन्होंने न तो मम्मट उपलब्ध ग्रंथों का अभिनिवेशपूर्वक अध्ययन किया और न ही विवेच्य विषय का प्राज्ञ प्रतिपादन। किसी-किसी ने नवीन अलंकारों की खोज की,^५ अलंकारों का नये ढंग से वर्गीकरण किया,^६ नयी नायिकाओं की उद्भावना की,^७ परन्तु शास्त्रीय मिद्वातो का प्रौढ़ उपस्थापन नहीं हुआ। इस अभाव

१. उत्तर-काल में रूपगोस्वामी, मनुमदन सरस्वती, पंडितराज जगन्नाथ आदि ने निम्पदेह मौलिकता पायी जाती है। लक्ष्य बात यह है कि हिंदी-आचार्यों पर उनका कोई प्रभाव नहीं पड़ा।

२. कविप्रिया (केशवदाम, १६०१ ई०), कविकुलकल्पतरु (चिंतामणि, १६५० ई०), रमणीरूपनिधि (मोमनाथ, १७३४ ई०), काव्यनिर्णय (भिवारीदाम, १७४६ ई०), काव्य-कल्पद्रुम (कन्हैयालाल पोद्दार, १९३४-३६ ई०), काव्य-दर्पण (रामदहिन मिश्र, १९४७ ई०) आदि।

३. यथा . अन्कार, रम, नायिकाभेद आदि के पूर्वोक्त ग्रंथ।

४. काव्यप्रकाश (मम्मट), साहित्यदर्पण (विश्वनाथ), चन्द्रालोक (जयदेव), कुवलयानन्द (अमर्य दीक्षित), रमनरगिणी, रमनवरी (भानुमिश्र) आदि।

५. त्रिती देववानी प्रमट है कविता की घात।

ते भाषा में होहि तो मव समझें रम बात ॥ —रसरहस्य, १।१४

६. स्वगुण अन्कार (भिवारीदाम), धन्दात्कार (रमरूप) आदि।

७. मामान्य और विनिष्ट (केशवदाम), उन्मा आदि ग्यारह वर्ग (भिवारीदाम)

८. परिवार-प्रेमिका, देश-प्रेमिका, लोक-प्रेमिका आदि (हरिग्रोव)

आदि आचार्यों के मतों की प्रतिध्वनि-भाव है। उस परपरा-प्रथित रस के निक्षेप पर नयी कविता खरी नहीं उतरती। स्वयं समुद्र के काव्यशास्त्र में रस काव्य का अकेला मानदंड नहीं रहा। रस को धेष्ठ मानने वालों ने भी वस्तु-अलंकार-ध्वनियों को पर्याप्त महत्त्व दिया है, और, उन आचार्यों ने जिसे अधम काव्य कहा है वह भी तो काव्य ही है। उसमें रस कहाँ है ? नयी कविता कही जाने वाली कुछ ऐसी रचनाएँ मिल जाती हैं जिनमें रसाभिव्यक्ति है, परंतु कविता मानी जाने योग्य अधिकांश रचनाएँ ऐसी हैं जिनमें अभिनवगुप्त का "रस" नहीं मिलेगा।

अतएव हमारी मान्यता है कि ध्वनि-निदान आज भी प्राज्ञ है। इसका यह तात्पर्य नहीं है कि नये कवियों और जालोचकों को ध्वनि के १०४५५ भेद वदम्य करगये जाएँ। मेरा अभिप्राय मूल मिद्धात से है। तीन छोटे-छोटे उद्धरणों द्वारा अपने इस कथन की प्रष्टि करना चाहूँगा।

गजानन मुक्तिबोध का "एक आत्मवक्तव्य" उनकी धेष्ठ कविताओं में परिगणित है, उनकी आरम्भिक पंक्तियाँ हैं

.. और, अब
मेरा मिर दुखने लगना है,
धुँधले-धुँधले अकेले में, आलोचनाशील
बनने में से उठे धुँएँ की ही चक्करदार
सीटियों पर चढ़ने लगता हूँ।

इन पंक्तियों का कवित्व किस वान में है ? यदि रस में हैं तो बताना पड़ेगा कि कौन-सा रस है। क्या कण रस है ? कहा जा सकता है कि यहाँ पर चिन्ता की व्यञ्जना की गयी है, और चिन्ता संचारी भाव है, इसलिए यह वाक्य रसात्मक होने के कारण काव्य है। परंतु चिन्ता कह देने मात्र से इसकी रस-प्राप्तता की व्याख्या पूर्ण नहीं होती। अधिक महत्त्वपूर्ण है आरम के तीन बिंदुओं के बाद प्रयुक्त 'और', 'धुँधले', 'धुँएँ', 'चक्करदार सीटियों' आदि की व्यञ्जना जिनके द्वारा कृताग्रन्थ, निराग्रन्थ तथा बरनी जटिल अनुभूतियों में घुमड़ रहे व्यक्ति का चित्र हमारी कल्पना की आँखों के सामने उभर जाता है। आनंदवर्धन की 'छाया' से 'चित्र-योजना' या 'चित्रविधान' का भी अभिप्राय ग्रहण किया जा सकता है।

'गोउकगोम' भवानीप्रसाद मिश्र की प्रसिद्ध रचना है

जो हाँ दूर, मैं गीत बेचता हूँ।
मैं तरह-तरह के

इस रचना में भी ध्वनि की रमणीयता है। भूत से प्रियमाण व्यक्ति न तो कविता लिख सकता है और न कला का संरक्षण कर सकता है। विषम परिस्थितियाँ काव्य-रचना के मार्ग में बाधा न ले पहुँचा दें किंतु उसके प्रवाह को रोक नहीं सकतीं।

ध्वनि-मिथ्यान समन्वयवादी है। उसके साथ अन्य सभी सिद्धांतों की ठीक सगति बैठ जाती है। रस भी अनलक्ष्यवमध्यय ध्वनि ही है। इसलिए नवीन परिस्थितियों की दृष्टि-मय में रखते हुए युगवर्मानुसार उसका पुनर्बुद्ध्यमान होना चाहिए। सम्वृत-काव्यशास्त्र का यह मिथ्यान आज भी सर्वाधिक उपादेय है।

परिचर्चा

पु. छा. नागंब- अपना निबध पढ़ते हुए बीच-बीच में मौखिक रूप से आपने साधारणीकरण के सन्ध में जो अपने विचार व्यक्त किये हैं और यह प्रतिपादित करना चाहा है कि साधारणीकरण व्यक्ति (—प्रेक्षक) के अपने अन्तःकरण का होता है और उस समय मन, बुद्धि, चित्त तथा अहंकार पृथक् पृथक् कार्य न करते हुए केवल मत्ता-भाव रह जाते हैं तथा साधारणीकरण का सात्त्विक नाटक के नायक-नायिकादि का दर्शक से तादात्म्य नहीं है—उम सम्बन्ध में मुझे एक यह शंका है कि यदि दर्शक का नायक से तादात्म्य नहीं होना तो वह उसके सुखी या दुःखी होने पर स्वयं कैसे सुख या दुःख का अनुभव करता है और नाटक अपनी जटिल परिस्थितियों से छूटने के लिये जितना व्यग्र रहता है उतनी ही व्यग्रता प्रेक्षक को भी क्यों होती है?

उ. भा. निहू : नाटक के नायक के साथ तादात्म्य होने की बात मुझे अत्यन्त मङ्गलित लगती है। सब प्रकार के नायकों के साथ हमारा तादात्म्य कभी-कभी नहीं हो सकता। राम के साथ हो जाएगा, दुष्यन्त के साथ हो जाएगा किन्तु नाग और प्रहसन के नायकों के साथ नहीं हो सकता। महाकाव्य के नायक के साथ भले हो जाए पर भुक्तक के नायक से होना सदिग्ध है। जिस भुक्तक में नायक होता ही नहीं तो क्या वही कवि के साथ होगा अथवा उसमें अपित्त वस्तु या नाय के साथ? निदान्त ऐसा होना चाहिये जो काव्य कही

रूप में रममच पर देखते हैं, जिसको देख कर हमारा साधारणीकरण होता है वह उस व्यक्ति के साधारणीकरण में भिन्न है जिसने, उदाहरणार्थ, राम की कल्पना करके काव्य लिखा था, जवाहरलाल नेहरू को अपने जीवन में देखकर काव्य लिखा था या जिसने अपने जीवन के किन्हीं प्रेम-व्यापार को लेकर कविता लिख दी थी। यह भिन्नता किमर्थ में हो सकती है? यद्यपि मैं यह मानता हूँ कि स्वरूप में भी कुछ न कुछ अन्तर है फिर भी, क्योंकि इसमें यहाँ विवाद बहून बड़ जाएगा, इस लिए मैं केवल यही कहूँगा कि यह अन्तर मात्राजन्य अधिक है और इसका सबसे बड़ा प्रमाण यही है कि कवि को अपनी रचना पढ़ कर जो सुखानुभूति होती वह हमें नहीं होती। उसके स्वगतत्व का सर्वथा अभाव नहीं हो जाता, जब कि हमारे स्वगतत्व हो सकता है।

रा. च. द्विवेदी तब भट्टनायक के “नायकस्य कवे श्रोतु समानोजुभवस्ततः” इस कथन की आप कैसे व्याख्या करेंगे?

उ. भा. मिह इसकी पहली व्याख्या तो यह है कि मूढ परप्रत्ययनेयवृद्धि और दूसरी यह कि—जैसा तुलसीदास जी ने कहा है, निज कविन कहि लाग न नीका। मरम होउ अथवा अति फीका—कवि को अपनी रसहीन रचना भी प्रायः मरस दिखाई पड़ती है। किसी साहित्यकार की एक कविता है ‘वियेना की सड़क’। रममच पर सुनाया करने ये ‘वियेना की सड़क, वियेना की सड़क। दयामा ठहरी, पर गई भटक।’ लोग खूब तालिया पीटते थे। वह सोचते थे—न जाने किनकी रममच कविता है मेरी। अब यहाँ यह बतनाइये कि यदि अभिनवगुप्त की बात स्वीकार कर लें तो कवि को अपनी ही वस्तु की रमानुभूति कैसे होती है, इसे कैसे समझा जाएगा?

वैकटाचलम् : रमानुभूति में तो श्रेणियाँ मानी जा सकती हैं पर तादात्म्य अनुभूति में हम अपनी बुद्धि आदि के चिन् में विलयीकरण की श्रेणियाँ कैसे स्वीकार कर सकते हैं, यह मुझे अभी तक स्पष्ट नहीं हुआ।

उ. भा. मिह यदि किसी दूसरे का ही प्रमाण लेना हो तो मैं मधुसूदन सरस्वती को उद्धृत कर सकता हूँ। उन्होंने रमानुभूति में जो तादात्म्य की बात कही है वह साधारणीकरण के विषय में भी सत्य है। क्योंकि रमानुभूति और साधारणीकरण एक दूसरे से नियमतः संबद्ध हैं।

प्राच्य एवं पाश्चात्य काव्यशास्त्र में बिम्ब-सिद्धान्त

डा० रामगोपाल शर्मा 'दिनेश'

संस्कृत-काव्यशास्त्र समार का नैर्वायिक वैज्ञानिक एवं सूचिन्तित काव्य-शास्त्र है। त्रिकाल-दशों वाचायों ने काव्य-रचना के सभी पक्षों पर अनेक दृष्टि-कोणों ने विचार किया है। रस, बक्रोक्ति, रीति, ध्वनि, अलंकार, औचित्य आदि सिद्धान्तों का सूक्ष्म-सूक्ष्म सन्दर्शनों के रूप में सततवर्धितक व्याख्यान-पुनराख्यान होता रहा है और संस्कृत-साहित्य की परम्पराओं में विकसित वापुनिक भारतीय भाषाओं के साहित्यों में भी अद्यावधि इन सिद्धान्तों पर चर्चा-परिचर्चा हो रही है। गभीर विचाराणा भी चलती रहती हैं। काव्यशास्त्रीय चिन्तन, विश्लेषण और सङ्ग्रहण की इन सुदीर्घ प्राच्य-परम्परा में 'बिम्ब' एक सिद्धान्त के रूप में अब तक प्रतिष्ठित नहीं हो सका है। हिन्दी के उन विद्वानों ने, जिन्होंने प्राच्य और पाश्चात्य दोनों काव्यशास्त्रों का अध्ययन एवं विश्लेषण किया है, बिम्ब-सिद्धान्त को पूर्णतः एक पाश्चात्य काव्य-सिद्धान्त ही घोषित किया है। अतः यह प्रस्तुत विषय पर विचार करने के लिए आरम्भ में ही यह स्पष्ट समझ लेना आवश्यक है कि बिम्ब-सिद्धान्त को भारतीय काव्य-सिद्धान्त के रूप में संस्कृत-काव्यशास्त्र में खोज निकालना हमारा लक्ष्य नहीं है। हम इस सिद्धान्त पर कुछ पाश्चात्य सिद्धान्त के रूप में ही विचार करेंगे, किन्तु हमारा लक्ष्य यह होगा कि इन संस्कृत-काव्यशास्त्र की मान्यताओं के मर्म में इन बात की परीक्षा करें कि इन सिद्धान्त की भारतीय काव्य-सिद्धान्तों के मध्य क्या स्थिति है? साथ ही हम यह भी देखने की चेष्टा करेंगे कि क्या इन सिद्धान्त को एक पूर्ण काव्य-सिद्धान्त के रूप में स्वीकार करना उचित है? हमारे अध्ययन का यह लक्ष्य भी होगा कि हम पता लगाए कि आधुनिक काव्य के मूल्यांकन में उनकी क्या उपयोगिता है या हो सकती है?

'बिम्ब-सिद्धान्त' : व्याख्या

काव्य के मर्म में अनुनूति और अभिव्यक्ति के भिन्न-भिन्न पक्षों पर विचार करते समय हिन्दी के कई वाचायों ने 'बिम्ब' की चर्चा की है। ऐसे वाचायों में रामचन्द्र गुप्त, डा० इन्द्रानन्दरदास, लक्ष्मीनारायण 'पुनर्ग', डा० हजारीप्रसाद द्विवेदी और डा० नरेन्द्र मुन्श हैं। नई पीढ़ी के चिन्तकगण

- १ किसी व्यक्ति या पदार्थ की प्रतिवृत्ति ।
- २ मूर्त और दृष्ट प्रत्यक्ष ।
- ३ एक पदार्थ के लिए किसी ऐसे मूर्त-अमूर्त पदार्थ का प्रयोग जो उसके अव्यक्त समान हो अथवा उसे व्यक्त करना हो, जैसे मृत्यु के लिए निद्रा का प्रयोग ।^१

इन तीनों परिभाषाओं में प्रथम परिभाषा में कोई नया उद्घ्य नहीं, द्वितीय परिभाषा प्रतिवृत्ति के रूप में विम्ब को स्वीकार करती हुई भी उसकी मूर्तता और चाक्षुषता प्रतिपादित करती है तथा तीसरी परिभाषा विम्ब की अपेक्षा प्रतीक के अधिक निकट है ।

एम्माइक्योनोडियात्रिटैनिका में प्रस्तुत की गई परिभाषा की शब्दावली है -

“ऐसी भवेत् स्मृति ओ मूल उद्गीर्ण की अनुपस्थिति में किसी अनीत अनुभव का समग्र अथवा जग रूप में पुनरुत्पादन करती है ।”^२

इस परिभाषा में “विम्ब” शब्द ‘भवेत् स्मृति की पुनरुत्पादन क्षमता’ का पर्याय बन गया है ।

वस्तुतः ये परिभाषाएँ ‘विम्ब’ की शाब्दिक व्याख्याएँ हैं, काव्यशास्त्रीय कम । जिन विद्वानों ने विम्ब-मिथ्यान्त पर विचार किया है, उनमें एजरा पाउण्ड, सी० डे० लीविम, लेंगर ह्वेने, ह्यूम आदि के नाम उल्लेखनीय हैं । लीविम ने माना है कि ‘काव्य विम्ब एक प्रकार का भाव-गर्भित शब्द-चित्र है ।’ स्पष्ट है कि शब्द-कोषों की परिभाषाओं में जो विम्ब मानस और उसकी शक्तियों तक सीमित था, वह इस परिभाषा में शब्द तक आ गया है—भाव में उत्पन्न होकर शब्दों में बँध गया है । काव्य भी शब्दों में भाव का ही तो आनाम है । अतः यह परिभाषा हमें विम्ब के काव्यशास्त्रीय अर्थ की ओर अग्रसर करती है ।

लेंगर ह्वेने हैं कि ‘विम्ब ऐन्द्रिय मात्रात्मक द्वारा आध्यात्मिक अथवा बौद्धिक मन्त्रों तक पहुँचने का मार्ग है ।’^३

इस परिभाषा में फिर शब्द से पठारण तथा मानसिकता की ओर प्रसार है । किन्तु एक तथ्य उक्त दोनों ही परिभाषाओं से सामने आता है, वह यह है कि विम्ब को इन दोनों विद्वानों ने मान्य माना है, माध्य नहीं, जैसा कि ‘शब्द-‘चित्र’ और ‘भानं’ शब्दों से प्रकट है । टी० डे० ह्यूम ने तो स्पष्ट कहा है कि

- १ काव्य-विम्ब पृष्ठ ४
- २ वही
- ३ वही
- ४ वही

मे अविन हो चुके होने हैं, काव्य के रूप में पुन मूर्तिन हो जाते हैं। यह शक्ति कवि की प्रतिभा के रमायन से जन्म लेती है और शब्द की जड़ता को ही समाप्त नहीं करती, उसकी प्रकृति को भी बदल देती है। अब सन्नेप में कहा जा सकता है कि काव्य-विम्ब मूलतः एक प्रकार की काव्य-भाषा है, जो उसी व्यक्ति के पास हो सकती है, जिसके पास कवि-प्रतिभा होती है। इसी कवि-प्रतिभा के फलस्वरूप शब्द-कोष या जननामान्य का 'जगत्' शब्द साकेत' महा-काव्य की मूर्ति के लिए राजभवन और माघाज्य के अनेक सुखद चित्र प्रस्तुत कर देता है—“इन कुटिया में ही राज-भवन मन भाया”। हम जो कुछ देखते, सुनते, सूघते, स्वाद लेते और स्पर्श करने में अनुभव करते हैं, वह सब हमारे मानस पर अपनी भिन्न-भिन्न छवियाँ डाल कर पीछे छूटता रहता है। वे छवियाँ मानस के घोल में सम्मिलन करती रहती हैं। कवि-प्रतिभा उस सम्मिलन से नई छवियाँ गढ़ती और उन्हें शब्दों में उतार देती है। जो शब्द उन छवियों के बाह्य बन जाते हैं, वे नयी अर्थवत्ता से अनुप्राणित होकर काव्य का स्वरूप धारण कर लेते हैं। काव्य-मर्मणा की इस प्रक्रिया में जो काव्य-चेतना जन्म लेती है, वही समस्त मानस-छवियों के शब्दों में उतरने का फल होती है।

यहाँ एक बात और स्मरण रखने की है कि विम्ब मानस-यत्र के माध्यम में या शब्दयत्र की सहायता से की गई फोटोग्राफी नहीं है। इसीलिए विम्ब के निर्माण में सहज अनुभूति के माय-माय कल्पना भी सहायक होती है और कवि की रसि भी। यथा, कवि भिन्न-भिन्न प्रकार के फूल देखता है। वे फूल रंग, रूप, गंध आदि में अनेक अन्तर रखते हैं। उन सब की छवियाँ मानस पर अंकित होती रहती हैं, किन्तु वे छवियाँ न तो पूर्णतः अपने वास्तविक रूप में रह पाती हैं और न स्थायी ही हो सकती हैं। एक-एक क्षण में वे अपनी झलक दिखाकर मानस के घोल में घुलती मिलती रहती हैं। वे घुलनशील छवियाँ परस्पर सन्निवृत्त होकर कवि की रसि के अनुसार उनकी कल्पना और प्रतिभा के बल पर एक ऐसे नए फूल के रूप में शब्दों में प्रकट होती हैं, जो अनेक छवियों की एक छवि होना है, जो वस्तु-जगत् से आया होने पर भी वस्तुजगत् का न होकर समग्रतः प्रतिभा, रसि और कल्पना से प्रसूत होता है। उसमें जो रंग होता है, जो रूप वह धारण करता है और उसमें जो गन्ध अनुभव होती है, वह देने हुए किसी एक फूल की देन नहीं हो सकती। इसीलिए विम्ब की सर्जना फोटोग्राफी नहीं है। और इसी आधार पर काव्य में यथार्थ की भाग उसी रूप में नहीं की जा सकती जिस रूप में चित्रकला में की जा सकती है। विम्ब की दृष्टि में काव्य में यथार्थ का इतना ही अस्तित्व है कि कवि जो विम्ब-मर्मणा करे वह उसके प्रत्यक्ष या परोक्ष अनुभवों पर आधारित अवश्य हो। काव्य-विम्ब के सिद्धान्त को उसके सही अर्थ में न समझने के कारण ही कुछ नए रचनाकारों ने काव्य में यथार्थ की

जाय, क्योंकि मन्त्र और हिन्दी के अधिकांश आचार्य इसी मिद्धान्त को काव्य की सर्वना एव मूल्यजन का पूर्ण सिद्धान्त मानते हैं। यह मिद्धान्त दो दृष्टियों से महत्वपूर्ण है। प्रथम तो यह कि राज्य-गजना की समस्त प्रक्रिया को इसकी कमौटी पर सफलतापूर्वक बना जा सकता है। शब्द के सभी व्यापार और उनके द्वारा ग्रहीत होकर अभिव्यक्त होने वाला वस्तु-जगत् ही नहीं गुण-जगत् भी किस प्रक्रिया में काव्य बनता है—यह सब समझने में यह मिद्धान्त सहायक होता है। द्वितीय बात यह कि इस मिद्धान्त की कमौटी पर सफलतापूर्वक उस मूल्य को भी समझा जा सकता है, जिसकी मिद्धि के लिए काव्य सर्जित होता है। इसीलिए रस-मिद्धान्त को आलम्बन, आश्रय एव उद्दीपन की लौकिक भूमि से आरम्भ करके रसास्वाद की लोकोत्तर मनुमनी भूमिका तक विस्तृत किया गया है। इस मिद्धान्त के विभाजन-व्यापार में बिम्ब-मिद्धान्त अन्तर्भुक्त है। आलम्बन और आश्रय के रूप एव चेष्टा-गत समस्त आकर्षण काव्य में बिम्ब बन कर ही प्रस्तुत होते हैं। उद्दीपन के विभिन्न चित्र भी बिम्ब-रचना का ही तो विस्तार करते हैं। अनुभावों को अभिव्यक्ति बिम्बात्मक होती है। रसवादी कवि निरन्तर विभिन्न प्रकार के पूर्ण, स्रष्टित और सश्लिष्ट बिम्ब प्रस्तुत करके ही अपनी रचना को रसानुभूति की मधुमती भूमिका तक पहुँचाता है। अतः बिम्ब-मिद्धान्त के अनुसार हम जहाँ बिम्बों की रचना-पूर्ति पर रूक जाते हैं, वहाँ रस-मिद्धान्त के अनुसार हम बिम्बों को साबन मान कर उनमें आगे बढ़ जाते हैं—रचना की निष्पत्तियों की शोधा करते हैं और वह निष्पत्ति लोकोत्तर आनन्द में परिणत हो जाती है। रस-मिद्धान्त और बिम्ब-मिद्धान्त को साथ रखकर समझने में यह तथ्य छिपा नहीं रहता कि जहाँ प्रथम सिद्धान्त काव्य की रचना की व्याख्या करके उसके मूल्यजन में भी प्रवृत्त होता है, वहाँ बिम्ब-मिद्धान्त रचना की व्याख्या तक सीमित रह जाता है। बिम्ब-प्रक्रिया काव्य-रचना या उनकी व्याख्या को कोई ऐसी प्रक्रिया नहीं है, जिसे भारतीय काव्यशास्त्री न जानते हों तथा जिसे उनकी विनी मौलिकता के आधार पर रस-प्रक्रिया से भिन्न कोई पृथक् पद्धति माना जा सकता हो। रस-मिद्धान्त में जडुभूति का निर्विकर्णोक्तिग एव साधारणीकरण आवश्यक माना गया है और बिम्ब-प्रक्रिया में भी ये दोनों बातें आवश्यक मानी गई हैं। जहाँ तक शब्दायं के मान्यता का प्रश्न है, वह दोनों के लिए चाहिए, किन्तु रस बिम्ब को शब्दायं तक सीमित छोड़ कर उच्च माननी भूमिका की ओर अग्रसर हो जाता है। इस प्रकार जहाँ बिम्ब-मिद्धान्त के द्वारा हम विनी काव्य की रचना के तत्त्वों और उनमें सर्जित मोन्दर्य में परित्वित होते हैं, वहाँ रस-मिद्धान्त के द्वारा हम रचना के तत्त्वों, उनमें सर्जित मोन्दर्य और उन दोनों की सश्लिष्ट देन से लोकोत्तर आनन्द की भी उपलब्धि करते हैं।

भयिलोचरण की निम्नांकित पक्तियों में मिलेगा, जहाँ आतिमान् अलंकार लाने के लिए विम्ब-योजना हुई है—

नाक का मोनी अवर की कान्ति से
बीज दाडिम का समझ कर आन्ति से
देखकर सहसा हुआ धुक मौन है
सोचना है अन्य नुक यह कौन है ।

अब यह स्पष्ट है कि सस्कृत काव्यशास्त्र का अलंकार-सिद्धान्त भी विम्ब-सिद्धान्त में अधिक व्यापक और विस्तृत सिद्धान्त है। विम्ब-सिद्धान्त को समस्त न्यतियाँ उसके प्रस्तुत और अप्रस्तुत विधान में अन्तर्भूत हैं। नए चिन्तक भारतीय काव्यशास्त्र को दूर से और ऊपर ऊपर में देखते हैं, इसलिए उन्हें विम्ब-सिद्धान्त भारत के लिए एकदम नई उपलब्धि प्रतीत होता है।

जहाँ तक रीति, औचित्य और यत्रोक्ति सिद्धान्तों का प्रश्न है, इनका क्षेत्र शब्द और अर्थ की उन सभी सीमाओं का स्पर्श करता है, जिन सीमाओं में काव्य-मर्मणा के अनिवार्य उपकरण के रूप में विम्ब-विधान किया जाता है। रीति-सिद्धान्त में गुणों को आधार-भूत तत्त्व माना गया है। शब्द और अर्थ के अलग-अलग गुण माने जाने के कारण रीति-विधान विम्ब-योजना में समर्थ होता है। उदाहरणार्थ, 'ममता' नामक अर्थ-गुण के कारण ही निम्नांकित पक्तियों में भित्तारी के स्वरूप का विम्ब अपने पूर्ण प्रभाव के साथ प्रस्तुत हो सका है। इस विम्ब की रचना के मूल में क्रम-निर्वाह तथा सरल अर्थ-प्रतीति—दोनों ही प्रकार की समता विद्यमान है। निराला जी कहते हैं—

बह आता
दो टूट बलेब्रे के करता
पछताता
पय पर आता ।
पेट पीठ दोनों मिलकर हैं एक
चल रहा लकड़िया टेक
मुटठी भर दाने को—भूस मिटाने को
मुँह पट्टी पुरानी शोली को फँसता
दो टूट बलेब्रे के करना पछताता पय पर आता ।

औचित्य-सिद्धान्त में शब्द, अर्थ, भाव, आदि के सभी प्रकार के औचित्य

है। हिन्दी की नई कविता पश्चिम के अनुकरण पर काव्य-वस्तु की अवहेलना करके काव्य-भाषा को महत्व देती जा रही है, इसलिए इस अपूर्ण काव्य-निदान के सम्मान में अभी और अधिक वृद्धि की ही सम्भावना है। आज का हिन्दी कवि और नया बालोचक भी—यह घोषणा करने लगा है कि वस्तु-पक्ष कविता की कोई कनौटी नहीं, भाषा ही कविता की पहचान है। वह कहता है कि मनुष्य की मूल संवेदना में कनौ कन्तर नहीं जाना, केवल भाषा के सदर्थ बदलते हैं। ऐसी परकीय मान्यता वाले चिन्तकों के लिए विश्व-मिद्धान्त एक पूर्ण कनौटी बन जाए, तो कोई आन्वय की बात नहीं।

परिचर्चा

वसन्त बेतुजी जानने नेनिचन्द्र जैन और रामस्वरूप चतुर्वेदी के इस मत का उल्लेख करते हुए कि श्रुति किमी एक गन्द के द्वारा व्यापक भाव को व्यक्त करना है इमने अपनी जनहमति व्यक्त की। यदि जैन और चतुर्वेदी जी ने इन विषय में मान्य धारणा प्रस्तुत की है तो हमारा मान ही बनाएँ कि इनकी नहीं व्याख्या क्या हो सकती है।

इनके अनिश्चित आपने अपने निरन्ध में स्वीकार दिया है कि बिम्ब भाव की प्रेरणा से बाहर आता है। भाव एक आन्तरिक वस्तु है और यदि बिम्ब उनकी प्रेरणा से बाहर आता है तो निश्चित रूप में वह भाव का सम्प्रेषक होगा। ऐसा होने पर वह काव्य की आत्मा को ही सम्प्रेषित करेगा और केवल बाह्य-रूप में या गन्द रूप में उनकी स्थिति स्वीकारना भूल होंगे, बँसा कि आपने किया है।

तीसरी बात में यह कहना चाहेंगे कि आपने म्यान-म्यान पर विभिन्न विद्वानों के मतों का उल्लेख करते हुए जो यह कहा है कि इयूम ने इस विषय पर यह लिखा है, लेविन ने यह लिखा है और डा. नगेन्द्र ने—वन्कि डा. नगेन्द्र ने ही—यह कहा है उनमें यह कहीं स्पष्ट नहीं होता कि आप बिम्ब से क्या समझते हैं और इन निदानों की कैसे व्याख्या करते हैं। यदि आप इस निदान में हमें अपने विचारों से परिचित करा सकने तो हमारे लिए अधिक लाभदायक होता।

डा. रामगोपाल शर्मा : मैं आपके अमिन्न प्रश्न का उत्तर पहले दूँगा—बिम्ब से मैं क्या समझता हूँ : जब रचनाकार किसी वस्तु को देखता

अभिनवगुप्तपादप्रतिपादितं रसविवेचनम्

सुरजनदास स्वामी

रमो वै काव्यस्य जीवितभारमा वेति निर्विवादमभिमतं प्रायश्च सर्वपा-
मालकारिकाणाम् । अत एवोक्तमग्निपुराणे—‘वाग्वैदम्यप्रधानेऽपि रस एवात्र
जीवितम्’ । इति । आचार्यो भरतोऽपि—^१ ‘न हि रसादृते कश्चिदप्यर्थं प्रवर्तते’
इति ब्रूवाणो रमस्य इनरकाव्याङ्गापेक्षया प्राधान्यरूपमङ्गित्वं साधयति ।
ध्वन्यालोककारोऽपि—^२ ‘यत्र परिपाकवत्ता कवीनां रसादिनामर्थविरहे व्यापार
एव न शोभते’ । ‘सत्यं न तादृक् काव्यप्रकारोऽस्ति यत्र रमादीनामप्रतीतिः’ ।
^३ ‘अचेतना अपि हि भावा यथायथमुपचित्ररसम्बन्धादतया चेतनवृत्तान्तमोजनया
वा न सन्त्येव ते ये सान्ति न रसाङ्गता, तस्मान् नाम्त्येव तद् वस्तु यत् सर्वात्मना
रसतान्पर्यवस्यः कवेस्तु दिच्छया वा तदभिमतं रसाङ्गता न धत्ते’ । ‘प्रतीयमानस्य
चान्यभेददर्शनेऽपि रमभावमुखेनैव उपलक्षणं प्राधान्यान्’ इत्यादिभिर्वचनैः
रसस्यैव प्राधान्यं प्रतिपादयन् तस्य काव्यजीवितत्वमाचष्टे । अभिनवगुप्तस्तु
^४ ‘रम एव वस्तुन काव्यस्यात्मा वस्त्वदकारध्वनी तु सर्वथा रम प्रति पर्य-
वस्येने’ इति साष्ट रसस्यैव काव्यात्मकत्वं दूते ।

तत्र रसम्बन्धप्रतिपादकं आचार्यभरतस्यैव सूत्रम्—‘विभावानुभावव्यभि-
चारिमयोगाद् रमनिष्पत्तिः’ । अन्यैश्च सूत्रस्य व्याख्याभेदात् रमविषये नाना
मन्त्रानि विवृम्बन्ते । यद्यप्यत्र प्राधान्येन अभिनवगुप्तपदाचार्याणामेव मतं
प्रतिपादनीयम् । तथापि तन्मतस्य वैशिष्ट्यप्रतिपादनार्थं सम्यक् अवगत्यर्पञ्च
अन्यान्यपि मन्त्रानि ममासन् प्रतिपादनीयतामर्हन्ति ।

तत्र भट्टकाल्लटा भरतमुख्यमशौचरसस्य उत्पाद्योत्पादकभावसम्बन्ध
नियतिरदस्य च उत्पत्तिमर्थं मनूते । यद्यपि तस्य मतं विभावं सह रते
उत्पाद्योत्पादकभावसम्बन्धं, अनुभावं सह प्रत्याप्यप्रत्यापकभावसम्बन्धं,
अभिचारिभिरश्च पौन्ययोगकभावसम्बन्धो वर्तते—मीमांसिभिर्विभावं

१. नाट्यशास्त्रे पृ. २७२ ।

२. ध्वन्यालोके पृ. ४९७ ।

३. ध्वन्यालोके पृ. ४९७ ।

४. ध्वन्यालोके पृ. १० ।

५. लोचने पृ. ८५ ।

भोजकत्वञ्चेति । अमिवया विशेषधर्मपुरुस्सरमुपस्थापिता रामादयो विभावा
मावनापरपयिषि भावकत्वव्यापारेण रसप्रतिबन्धकान् रामत्वादिविशेषधर्मान्
परिहृत्य नावकत्वादिसामान्यधर्मपुरुस्सरमुपस्थाप्यन्ते । एव कटाक्षमुजाक्षे-
पादिप्रभृतयः अनुमादा रज्ज्वौमुक्ताप्रभृतयो व्यभिचारिणश्च रामादिव्यक्ति-
विशेषधर्मस्वल्पपरिहाणपूर्वकं कटाक्षत्वादिसामान्यधर्मपुरु सगमुपस्थाप्यन्ते । एवमेव
माधारणीकरणान्मना भावकत्वव्यापारेण गीतादिषु नामाजिकरसप्रतीति-
प्रतिबन्धका पूज्यत्वादिवर्मा अपि निगच्छन्ते । एवञ्च गीतादयो विभावा,
कटाक्षादयोऽनुभावा रज्ज्वौमुक्तादयश्च मञ्ज्वारिण माधारण्यमापाद्यन्ता
मन्तः सामाजिकरसप्रतीतौ प्रतिबन्धकता नोपयान्ति । यथा च विभावादयः
माधारण्यमापाद्यन्ते भावकत्वव्यापारेण, तथैव म्यादिभावो रतिरपि रामा-
दिव्यक्तिविशेषधर्मस्वल्परहित्येन माधारण्यमापाद्यते । भावकत्वव्यापारेण
माधारण्यमापाद्यमानाया रतेश्च सामाजिकं रजस्तमनी अभिभूय मत्त्वोद्वेकात्
प्रकाशानन्दमयमविद्विश्चान्तिमनस्त्वेन मनसो या परिणति तदात्मकेन भोज-
कत्वव्यापारेण साक्षात्कारो विधीयते । तादृशेन मनसा साक्षात्त्रियमाणा
सा माधारणीकृतान्मा रतिरेव रसः । अत्र मते भरतमूत्रस्यमयोगपदस्य भोज्य-
भोजकभावमन्बन्ध, निष्पत्तिपदस्य च भुक्तिरयं । यतो हि भावकत्वव्यापारेण
माधारणीकृता विभावादयः चर्च्यमाणा मन्तः भोजका, माधारणीकृता च
रतिर्नोऽस्याः । माधारणीकृतानामेव विभावाद्वेना चर्च्यमा रजस्तमसी अभिभूय
मत्त्वोद्वेकेन मनसः प्रकाशानन्दमयमविद्विश्चान्तिमनस्त्वहो भोगः उपजायते
नान्यथा ।

अन्य मनस्य माध्यमनानुसारित्वात् अत्र माधारणीकृताया रतेर्भोगः ।
भोगे एव माध्यमनेन अन्य रसविषयकमनस्य साद्रश्य साग्यमन्तानुयायित्व वा ।
तथा हि यथा माध्यमने बुद्धिमर्माणामेव ज्ञाननुवादीना बुद्धिप्रतिविम्बिताया
चित्ति अविवेकेन शुष्पस्य साक्षात्कारात्मको भोगः तथा अत्रापि रामादिनिष्ठाया
रतेरेव सामाजिकाना माधारणीकरणरूपाविवेकेन भोगः ।

डा तगेन्द्रमहोदयन्तु भट्टनायकमते भरतमूत्रस्यमयोगपदस्य भाव्यभावक-
मन्बन्ध, निष्पत्तिपदस्य च भाविनिर्मयं मनस्ते । परमेतत् बोधिनः प्रतिभाति ।
न हि विभावादयो रसादेर्भावका भट्टनायकमते, अपि तु वाक्यशब्दा एव भावका ।
एतच्च—“तत्त्वैतद् भावकत्वं नाम यत् काव्यस्य तद् विभावादीना माधा-
राणासादनं नाम”, “काव्यञ्च रमान् प्रति भावकम्”, “न च काव्यशब्दाना

१. लोचने पृ. १८६ ।

२. लोचने पृ. १८८ ।

३. लोचने पृ. १८९ ।

(मूहुर्मूहुरनुसन्धीयन्ते) । पुन पुनरनुसन्धानात्मनो ज्ञानस्यैव भावनात्वात् । तदुक्तं जगन्नाथपण्डिते—“भावना च पुन पुनरनुसन्धानात्मा ज्ञानविशेष” इति । भाव्यमानाश्च ते साधारणीकृतरूपेण उपस्थिता भवन्ति । प्रतिपादितञ्च एतन् पण्डितराजेन “समुचितललितमनिवेशाद्या काव्येन समर्पितं सहृदयहृदय प्रविष्टंस्तदीयसहृदयतासहृदयेन भावनाविशेषमहिम्ना विगलितदुष्यन्तरमणी-त्वादिभि” रित्यादिना सन्दर्भेण ।

भावनया सह सहृदयताया अपि विभावादीना साधारणीकरणे आवश्यकता वरोवति । यतो हि सहृदयता नाम तन्मयीभवनम् । तदुक्तमभिनवगुप्तेन—“येषा काव्यानुगोलनाभ्यान्वगता विद्यादीभूते मनोमुकुरे वर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनयोग्यता, तेज सहृदया” । न च तन्मयीभवनमन्तरा केवल भावनया कस्यापि वस्तुतः साधारणीकरणं सम्भवति ।

कारणकार्यमहकारिणा साधारणीकरणञ्चाभिनवगुप्तमते भट्टनामकवत् न नामकत्वादिसाधारणवर्गमुपस्कारेणोपस्थितिस्तेषाम्, अपि तु समैवेते, परस्परैवेति, तदस्यैवेते इत्येव व्यक्तिविशेषमम्बन्धनिषमस्य, न समैवेते, न परस्परैवेते, न तदस्यैवेते इति व्यक्तिविशेषपरिहारनियमस्य च परिहारेण देशकालव्यक्ति-विशेषादिसम्बन्धराहित्येनोपस्थितिः । कारणादीना व्यक्तिविशेषमम्बन्धपरि-हारनियमवर्जनपूर्वकमुपस्थापने सति रते कारणानि सहृदयहृदये वासनारूपेण विद्यमानस्य रत्यादेर्भावस्य आम्वादाद्भूत्योप्यनापादने सम्पूर्णं भवन्ति, अतो विभावयन्ति—वामनात्मनया अतिमूर्ध्मरूपेण अवस्थिताना रत्यादीनामा-स्वादयोग्यतामापादयन्तीति व्युत्पत्त्या विभावा, कटाक्षादीनि कार्याणि अनु-भावयन्ति—वामनारूपेणावस्थितान् मामाजिकचिन्तगतान् रत्यादीन् भावान् अनुभवविषयतामापादयन्तीति व्युत्पत्त्या अनुभवा, लज्जादिसहकारि-कारणानि च वामनारूपेण स्थितान् रत्यादीन् कामे विशेषेणाभित सञ्चार-यन्तीति व्युत्पत्त्या व्यभिचारिणो व्यपदिश्यन्ते । साधारणीभवनानन्तर रत्यादे-कारणकार्यमहकारिणि अलौकिकतामुपमान्ति । अर्थात् देशकालव्यक्तिविशेष-सम्बन्धराहित्येन उपस्थापितत्वात् तानि अलौकिकानि जायन्ते । लोके हि तानि कार्यकारणमहकारिण्यकारणजया प्रोच्यन्ते, इदानीन्तु विभावादिव्यापार-विशेषत्वान् अलौकिकविभावानुभावव्यभिचारिमज्ञा भजन्ते इति भावः । अस्या-दगाया तानि अलौकिकाभिरेव सज्ञाभिर्व्यपदेशं लभन्ते । स्पष्टीकृतं चैतद-

१. रत्नगङ्गाधरे पृ. २ ।

२. रत्नगङ्गाधरे ।

३. ध्वन्यालोकलोचने पृ. ३७८ ।

वैपश्चितोरप्यसूक्ष्मशुद्धपरप्रयोगितत्वात्मानन्दैकधनानुभवाच्च विगिष्यते ।” इति ।

अस्मिन्मते सामाजिकं रसनापरप्रयोगेण अलौकिकेन ज्ञानेन प्रतीतिविषय-
तासादादिता रति सर्वविधविशेषराहित्येन अभिव्यक्त्या सती न लौकिकी,
लौकिक्या रते व्यक्तिविशेषमम्बन्धित्वान् । नापि शत्रुव्रतवत् मिथ्या । तथा
हि शत्रुव्रते नटे अनुमीयमाना स्थायित्वेन सम्भाव्यमाना या रति सामाजिकं
आम्बादधने, सा वस्तुतः अनुवर्तति नटे न विद्यते, अपि तु अनुवर्तनिष्ठत्वेन
सामाजिकं प्रतीयते इति मिय्यैव । अभिनवराष्ट्रमते तु या रति सामाजिक-
राम्बादधने, सा वस्तुतः सामाजिकानामेव चेतसि वासनारूपेण विद्यते इति न
मिथ्या । नाप्येषाऽनिर्वाच्या रतित्वेन तस्या निर्वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् सामाजिक-
चेतसि वस्तुतो विद्यमानत्वाच्च । नापि सा लौकिकतुल्या सर्वविधविशेषराहित्येन
तस्या अभिव्यक्तत्वात् । लौकिकतुल्यापि च लौकिकवत् व्यक्तिविशेषमम्बन्धि-
त्वान् ।

न वा भट्टलोल्लटमते आरोपिता एषा रति । तथा हि भट्टलोल्लटमते
नटे वस्तुतोऽविद्यमानापि रति आङ्गिकादिभिरभिनयं तत्र रसत्वानु-
मन्त्रानवलात् आरोप्य सामाजिकं साक्षाद्विद्यते । अत्र तु मते न सा नटे
आरोप्य साक्षाद्विद्यते, अपि तु सामाजिकं स्वचेतसि वासनारूपेण विद्यमानायाः
विभावादिवर्धयता मागारभ्येन अभिव्यक्त्याऽस्मिन्मा आम्बादो विधीयते ।
अतः सा नात्र मते आरोपरूपाऽपि, अपि तु अलौकिकेव सा रति । अत्र
एवोक्तमभिनवभारत्याम्—“तत्र एव विशेषान्तरानुपहितत्वात् सा रसनीया
मयी न लौकिकी, नानिर्वाच्या, न लौकिकतुल्या, न तद्वारोपादिरूपा वा ।”

एषा रतिश्च वस्तुतः न स्यादिति, व्यक्तिविशेषमम्बन्धित्वात् लौकिक्या
एव गते स्यादित्वान् । अन्नादिव व्यक्तिविशेषादिमम्बन्धराहित्येन अभिव्यक्त्या
स्यापि विलक्षणत्वात् । अत्र एव सा न मिद्वस्तुस्वभावा, अपि तु तात्कालिकेव ।
अत्र एव रसस्य तात्कालिकत्व स्यादिविलक्षणत्वं चोक्तमभिनवगुप्तेन यथा
“अलौकिकमिविधमनन्देनानन्दकषत्राणां चरता नीतोर्जं चर्चमाणैकसारो न
तु मिद्वस्वभावः, तात्कालिक एव न तु चर्चणानिरिक्तकालावलम्बी, स्यादि-
विलक्षण एव रसः ।

एष च रसः सर्वथा अलौकिकः । तथा हि रस्यमाना सती रसव्यपदेश भजमाना
रति मागारभ्येनोपस्थितवान् यथा अलौकिकी, यथा च संतापटासमुजा-
सेपनज्जीमुकनादयः वाक्पकार्यमहकाण्डि । हेतव मागारभ्य भजन्त अलौ-

१ अभिनवभारत्या पृ. २८० ।

२. अभिनवभारत्या पृ. २८० ।

वर्गीकृत एवाय चर्चणोपयोगी विभावादिव्यवहारः । क्वान्वत्र इत्य दृष्टमिति चेन् भूषणमेतदस्माकम् अलौकिकत्वमिदं । पानकरमाम्बादोऽपि किं गुड-मरोचादिषु दृष्ट इति समानमेतत् ।"

विभावादीनां कारकहेतुत्वाभावेऽपि रमस्य च निष्पत्त्यभावेऽपि तद्विषयिण्या रमनायाः निष्पत्त्या रमनानिष्पत्तिं च रमे उपचर्य रसभूते 'रमनिष्पत्ति' इति प्रयोगः कृतः । तदुक्तम् 'नहि भूते निष्पत्तिरिति कथम्, नेय रमस्य अपि तु तद्विषयरमनायाः । तन्निष्पत्त्या तु यदि तदेकायतजीवितस्य रमस्य निष्पत्ति-रच्यते न कश्चिदत्र दोषः ।"

यद्यपि सामाजिकहृदि साधारण्येन अभिव्यक्ता अत एव तात्कालिकी अलौकिकी रतिरेव प्रत्यक्षानुमानमृत्यादिलौकिकप्रमाणभिन्नस्वमवेदन-सिद्ध-रमनाव्यापारविषयभूता रसः । तथापि सा रति लोकापेक्षया स्यायिभाव एव । अत एव आचार्येण भरतेन "नानाभावोपगता अपि स्यायिनो भावा रसत्वमाप्नु-वन्ति", "नानाभावाभिनयव्यजितान् वागङ्गमत्त्वोपेष्टान् स्यायिभावानास्वाह-यन्ति मुमनसः प्रेक्षका" इत्यादिषु वचनेषु, "भावाभिनयसबद्धान् स्यायि-भावास्तथा बुधाः । आम्बादयन्ति मनसा तस्मान्नाटधरमा स्मृता ॥" इत्यानुवस्यल्लोके च स्यायिभावस्य रसत्वमुक्तम् । स्पष्टीकृतञ्चैतदभिनव-गुप्तेन—'नानाभूतविभावादिभिरपि समीपं प्रत्यक्षकल्पना गता लोकापेक्षया ये ते स्यायिनो भावान् रसमानकत्रीविन रसत्व प्रतिपद्यन्ते । अत एतया दृष्टया स्यायिभावस्य रसत्ववचनमायुचिनम् ।"

रमादस्यास साधारणोक्ताया रते देगाद्यनियन्त्रणेन निर्विघ्नमुपचयात् भट्टलोल्लसन्मनः उपचयव्रतं, भावानुगामितया करणान् शकुनसम्मतः अनुकरणतावाद्, विज्ञानवादावलम्बनाच्च कस्यचिन् साक्ष्यदृष्टा सम्मतः मुक्तदुस्वजननशक्तिमुक्ता बाह्या विषयमामशी एव रम इति वादोऽप्यत्र मते अशतः स्वीकृतं शक्यते । अत एव अभिनवमुतेन रसस्वरूपविषये भट्टलोल्ल-टादीनां मतानि प्रत्याख्याय स्वमनप्रतिपादनान् पूर्वं एतत्स्पष्टमुक्तं यन्मया न रसविषयेऽपूर्वं किञ्चिदुच्यते, अपि तु पूर्वोक्तार्थाणां मतान्येव परिष्क्रियन्ते ।

१ अभिनवभारत्या पृ. २८५ ।

२. नाट्यशास्त्रे पृ. २८८ ।

३ तत्रैव पृ. २८९ ।

४ तत्रैव पृ. २९० ।

५ अभिनवभारत्या पृ. २८८ ।

मगययोगरूपनपमग्रन्थूहपगिहागय च 'विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिगयोमाद्
रमनिष्पन्निरिति सूत्रे मयोगपदमुपादीयते । शृंगारादिग्माङ्गानां विभावा-
दीनां प्रत्येक व्यभिचारित्वेन मगययोगे सत्यपि तेषां मयोगस्य कुत्रापि व्यभि-
चारित्वाभावेन मगययोगस्यायोगात् ।

एतेषां विघ्नानां च सर्वतः प्रथममभिनवमुपेनैव सविस्तरं निरूपणं
विहितमभिनवनारदयाम् । तच्च विस्तरमपान्नेहोद्घ्रियते ।

अस्मिन्मने रममूत्रम्यमशेषपदस्य व्यापद्वयकभावः सम्बन्धः निष्पत्ति-
पदस्य चाभिव्यक्तिरर्थः । प्रत्यभिज्ञादर्शनवेदान्तदर्शनानुसारिणी चैषा व्याख्या ।

अत्र रमसूत्रे रमपदं 'रम्यते आम्वाद्यने' इति व्युत्पत्त्या रम्यादिस्थानि-
भावपरम् । तस्माद् विभिन्नेषु मतेषु क्रमशः उत्पत्त्यनुमितिभूक्त्यभिध्यक्तयो
रम्यादिस्थानिभावानामेव न तु रमस्य । अनोऽभिनवमूत्रमतेऽभिव्यक्ति-
लौकिकस्य वामनारूपेण मामाजिज्ञामा चेतसि विद्यमानस्य रतिस्थायिभाव-
स्यैव । रमस्य तु नाभिव्यक्तिः तस्य सात्त्वालिङ्गत्वात्, स्थायिविलक्षणत्वात्,
पूर्वमिद्वत्त्वाभावाच्च । तस्य तु स्वमवेदनमिद्धा प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविलक्षणा
बोरह्या रमनैव ।

यथा पण्डितराज्ञेनोक्तम्, रत्नाद्युपहितां चिदेव रमः । अनो रमे रत्यादि-
स्थायिभावोऽहितस्य चिदान्मनोऽनुभूतिर्भवति बोधरूपया स्वानुभूत्यपरमार्थया
रमनया । तथा च रमोऽपि स्वमवेदनमिद्धा, रतेरिचिदान्मनश्चोभयमप्यपि मनो-
मात्रविषयत्वात् । किं तु मन्त्रागौ निर्विषयस्यात्मनोऽनुभूतिः । अत्र तु रत्यादि-
विषयमवहितस्यात्मन इत्येव विशेषः । अत एव रमाम्वादस्य परब्रह्माम्वादम-
विश्वत्वमुच्यते न परब्रह्माम्वादवम् ।

ये तु केचिदाधुनिका प्राहुः—रमस्य हृदयभावमन्वन्वित्वात् तस्य बुद्धि-
मन्वन्विभिर्दर्शनं सह सम्बन्धस्यापन भारतीयानामाचार्याणां मोक्षिनः प्रति-
भानोति ते सर्वथाजभिज्ञा देवानां प्रिया रमनत्त्वस्य । न हि केवलायाश्चिन्-
वृत्तेरास्वादो रमः अपि तु रत्यादिवृत्तवृत्तिविशिष्टस्याभनः । अन्यथा सर्व-
रत्नानामानन्दव्यभिचारित्वं न स्यात् । चित्तवृत्तीनां मुखदुःखोभयरूपत्वात् ।
अपि च 'देवदत्तः सर्वभूतानां हृदयेऽर्जुन निष्ठति' इति गीतावचनेनात्मनो
रत्यादिस्थानिभावानां चोभयोरपि हृदयवर्तित्वेन अन्तर्मुखमनोवृत्त्या तन्मयी-
भवनरत्नानामेकाकिनो रत्यादिस्थानिभावस्य ग्रहोऽनुमत्तवत्त्वात् । इति शम् ।

मम्मटाभिमतं लक्षणायाः षड्विधत्वं हेत्वलंकारश्च

छा० रेवाप्रभाद द्विवेदी

मम्मटाचार्यः—

“मूल्यायंदाधे तद्योगे वृद्धितोऽय प्रयोजनात् ।

अन्योऽर्थो लभ्यते यत् सा लक्षणाऽऽरोपिता क्रिया ॥ इत्येव काव्यप्रकाशे

“तद्वाधे वृद्धितोऽर्थाद् वा लक्षणीयस्तदन्वित” ।

इत्येव च शब्दव्यापार—

विचारे लक्षणामामान्य लक्षयित्वा द्वयोरप्यनयोर्धन्ययोस्तद्भेदाश्च—

‘स्वसिद्धये पराज्ञेय परार्थ स्वस्वामर्पणम् ।

उपादानं लक्षणं चेत्युक्ता दृढं वा सा द्विधा ॥”

सारोपाय्या तु यत्रोक्तौ विषयो विषयस्तथा ।

विषय्यन्तकृतेऽन्यस्मिन् सा स्यात् साध्यदसानिका ॥

भेदाविमौ च सादृश्यान् सम्बन्धान्तरतस्तथा ।

गौरी दृढी च विज्ञेयी ॥”

इत्येव प्रतिपाद्य

“लक्षणा तेन षड्विधा” इत्यन्या. षड्विधत्वं निगमयति । अत्र के नु ते षड् भेदा इति प्रश्ने काव्यप्रकाशटीकितारो नैकधा प्रतिष्ठन्ते । तेषु—

१ चण्डीदासादयः—शुद्धगौरीमारोपाध्यवमानयोत्पादानलक्षणाभ्या
भिन्नमानश्रमगीकृत्याष्टविधत्वमस्या आमनन्ति ।^१ मम्मटोक्ते षड्विधत्वे च
(१) वृद्धिः, (२) प्रयोजनम्, (३) उपादानम्, (४) लक्षणम्, (५) आरोपः,
(६) अन्यवमान चेत्येषा भेदकानां षड्विधत्वोपयिक्ता दर्शयन्ति । काव्यप्रकाश-

१. “जाति क्रिया गुण सत्ता वाच्योऽर्थः समित्वनि”-रित्यन्य पूर्वाह्वम् ।
ततस्तत्पदेनात्र वाच्योऽर्थः परामुश्यते ।

२ काव्यप्रदीपप्रभायाः काव्यमालानस्करणे पृ० ३६ ।

३. उपरुद्धं काव्यप्रदीपः, तत्रभा च ।

(१) शुद्धा सोपादाना, (२) शुद्धा मल्यवमाना, (३) शुद्धा सारोपा, (४) शुद्धा माध्यवमाना, (५) गौमी सारोपा, (६) गौमी माध्यवमाना चेति षोडशत्व तत्र सिद्धान्तयन्ति । जयदेव^१ अप्ययदीक्षित^२, पण्डितराजो जयन्नाथ^३, योविद्याचक्रवर्ती^४, हरिश्चक्र^५, त्रिवेन्द्ररश्मतेन^६ क्रमेण मनुष्यन्ति । मम्मट-
स्योपदीप्यतमो मट्टमुकुटोपि लक्षणाभेदगणनायाममुमेव क्रममाश्रियते ।^७
सोऽनूपम्यितो मतिक्लृह ।

वक्रमत्र तृतीयमेव मन मम्मटाभिमत प्रतिपाद्यामहे, प्रतिपाद्यामहे च प्रथमत्र प्रमाणम् (१) काव्यप्रकाश-शब्दव्यापारविचारयोः लक्षणाया प्रतिपादनक्रमः, (२) तत्रैव प्रस्तुतानि लक्षणानेदानामेषामुदाहरणानि, (३) उपयोगित्व चेति । तत्र—

१ प्रतिपादनक्रम पूर्वोद्धृताभि 'स्वमिद्वयं पराश्लेष' इत्येताभि लक्षणा-
भेदकारिकामिस्तु स्पष्ट एव, काव्यप्रकाश-शब्दव्यापारविचारयोः दीपेन वृत्ति-
ग्रन्थेनाभि न स्पष्टभूयिष्ठ । तत्र काव्यप्रकाशे श्रूयते "कुला प्रविशन्ति ...
उपादानेनेम लक्षणा" इत्यत्र आरम्भं गगाया घोष इत्यत्र नटस्य "लक्षणैर्नपा
लक्षणा"—इति यावद् उपादान-लक्षण-नाम्नो भेदयो निगूढ-निर्दिष्टं प्रदर्श्य,
"उभयस्याप्येव शुद्धा, उपचारेणामिथित्वान्" इत्येव तयो शुद्धात्व च निगमय्य

१. चन्द्रालोकस्य १।१०-१३—कारिकानु ।

२. वृत्तिवार्तिके । जन्माभावेका बहुद्वयल्लक्षणानान्ती "ग्रामो दग्ध"
इत्यादिषु ग्रामैकदेशाद्यर्थं प्रयुक्तेषु ग्रामादिगण्येषु मज्जमीमपि लक्षणा मनुते
ना च "अग्रहस्ते हस्त" इत्यादिभिन्नाहरणैः मम्मटेनोपदिशितायाम् अवप्रवाक्य-
विभाक्मूलस्या लक्षणानाम् अन्तर्भवतीति न ततो भी ।

३. रमणगारस्य लक्षणाप्रकरणारम्भे ।

४. काव्यप्रकाशस्य मजीविनीनाम्न्या टीकायाम् ।

५. नागेश्वरीटीकायाम् ।

६. काव्यप्रकाशस्य हिन्दोनापानुवादे ।

७. "शुद्धोपचारमिथरत्नलक्षणा द्विविधा मता । उपादानाल्लक्षणाच्च
शुद्धा सा द्विविधोदिता । आरोपाध्यवमानाभ्यां शुद्धगौपोपचारयोः । प्रत्येकं
निर्दिष्टानन्वाधुनचारश्चतुर्विधः ॥" ("—जनिनावृत्तिमानुका०—२-५) "एषा
च लक्षणात्रिन्वन्याशुद्धत्वात्, अन्तरोपाद्, अध्यवमानाच्चा तत्र शुद्धमन्वस्य
द्विविध्यम् उपादानलक्षणाभ्यामुक्तम्, आरोपाध्यवमानाभ्यामनोरपि प्रत्येक
द्विभेदेना शुद्धगौपोपचारमिथत्वात्" इति, इत अध्यवहितपूर्ववर्तिना
"एतेन चतुर्विधोपचारेण मह पूर्वोक्तो द्वौ लक्षणाभेदौ संकल्प्य षट्प्रकारा
लक्षणा वक्तव्या" इत्यनेन च वृत्तिग्रन्थेनाभिधातुनिर्मातृकाया तद्धमिद स्पष्टमेव ।

लक्षणाभेदः	काव्यभेद	उदाहरणम्
२. लक्षणलक्षणा	अत्यन्ततिरस्कृतवाच्यध्वनि	"उपकृतं बहु तत्रे"- त्यादि ^१
३. सारोपा गौणी	रूपकपरिणामापह्नुतय	"रात्रिकापालिकी" ^२
४. साध्यवसाना गौणी	निगौर्याध्यवसानानिगयोक्ति	कमलमनम्भसि कमले च कुवलये—० ^३
५. सारोपा शुद्धा		आमुर्धुतम्
६. साध्यवसाना शुद्धा ^४		आयु

१. काव्यप्र० उदा० २४ ।

२. काव्यप्र० उदा० ४२१ ।

३. काव्यप्र० उदा० ४४९ ।

४. निम्नलिखिताष्टोक्तिनारोपि तालिकामिमामनुमोदन्ते—

१. मुघामागरकारो भीमनेनदीक्षित । यदुक्तं तेन—“अत्रोपादान-
लक्षणाभ्याम् अत्यन्तिरमकमितात्यन्ततिरस्कृतवाच्यौ . . . ,
गौणीभ्यां सारोपमाध्यवसानाभ्यां रूपकानिगयोक्ती . . .
निरूपयिष्यतीति ।

२. म०म० गोकुलनायकम् । यदुच्यते तेन—“प्रयोजनवती तु
यद्युपादानं यदि वा लक्षणम् । उभययापि ध्वनिविशेषो
व्यजयति, “गगाया घोष” इत्यत्र तटे लक्षणलक्षणया गगाताद्-
रूपस्य तेन च पावनत्वरूपस्य अत्यन्ततिरस्कृतवाच्यध्वनेर-
मिव्यजनात् । “कुला प्रविशन्ती”त्यत्र कुलधरेपूपादान-
लक्ष्येषु कुलतादृश्यद्वारा निर्देशग्रहणत्वादेरत्यन्तिरमक-
मित्वाच्यस्य ध्वननात् सादृश्यमूला लक्षणा ।
गौर्वाहीक इत्यत्र रूपकम्, “गामिमा वारये”त्यत्राति-
शयोक्तिम्, “जडेन वाहीकगवेन दण्डमादाय मुक्ता धनिदस्य
गाव” इत्यत्र परिणामम्, “गौरय न तु वाहीक” इत्यत्रापह-
नुतिम् उत्पापयति ।”

३. नरसिंहमनीषाकारः । यदुच्यते तेन—“उपादानलक्षणार्था-
न्तरनक्रमितवाच्यध्वन्युपयोगिनी, लक्षण-लक्षणा चात्यन्त-
तिरस्कृतवाच्यध्वन्युपयोगिनी, गौणमारोपा रूपकालकारो-
पयोगिनी गौणसाध्यवसाना च प्रथमातिशयोक्तिप्रयोजिका ।
इति । २० वामनस्य वाल्मीकिनी ।

दाशैनिका' अपि तामेव भतिमृतिमनुसरन्ति । ततश्च^१ काव्यप्रकाश विधित्सु-
मम्मटोऽपि काव्यानुपयोगीनि लक्षणान्तराणि तितिक्षति चेद् वैज्ञानिकमेव
पन्थानमाश्रयति । ततश्च तृतीयमेव लक्षणाभेदगणनाक्रममगौ सिद्धान्ततयोररी-
करोति नान्यम् ।

ननु—“यदि काव्योपयोगिन एव लक्षणामेदा अत्र प्रतिपिपादयिषितास्तर्हि
प्रथमतः नास्वचार एव भेदा अत्र प्रतिपादनीया, तेषामेवोपयोगस्य मम्मटोदा-
हृतेषु काव्येषूपलम्ब्यन्वान्, ततश्च “लक्षणा तच्चतुर्विधे त्वेव निगमनीयम्,
न तु “लक्षणा तेन षड्विधे”ति । अन्यौ शुद्धारोपाध्यवसानमूलौ तु भेदौ
परिहृतव्यादेव मम्मटेन, तदुपयोगमात्रं काव्यम्यलम्ब्य तेनादर्शितत्वात्
न परिहृतौ चेत् काव्यम्यलम्ब्यपि तेन तदुपयोगमात्रं दर्शनीयानि । न च तानि
दर्शितानि प्रमत्तमत्र ग्रन्थरत्ने अवाच्यवचनम् वाक्यावचन' वः । यद्युच्यते—
“यूनायु, आयुरेवै”—न्याशैत्येव प्रयोजनं व्यञ्जयन्ति म्यलम्ब्यशोदाहरणतया-
भिमतानीति नास्ति तादृशदोषदृढमानीरिति नह्युच्यताम् “अस्त्यत्र वैचित्र्य
न वा, नास्ति चेत् कथमिदं काव्यत्वेन गण्यते, अस्ति चेत् कथमिदं गौणोपचार-
वदलकारकोटौ न निवेदयते, कथं च निवेशितमपि वक्ष्यमाणहेत्वलकारकोटौ
पुं, “हेत्वलकारो न लक्षित, आयुष्यं तमित्यादिरूपो ह्येव न भूषणता कदा-
चिद्वर्ति, वैचित्र्याभावादि” त्वेवनेतन्निराक्रियते । यद्युच्यते—“परिक्लृ-
तकार यावदेव काव्यप्रकाश निर्मास्य व्युपरते मम्मटाचार्ये शेषपूरणम्यालक-
भट्टमैष दोष, परिकृष्टदुर्ध्वमेव कारणमालाप्रकरणेऽप्य वैचित्र्याभाव
प्रतिपादयन्तौ वृत्तिद्वयम्योपलम्भादि”—ति, तर्हि चतुर्थं उल्लासे कस्य दोष,
यत्र काव्यलिङ्गस्य कृते हेत्वलकार' इति काव्यहेतुरिति' च व्यपदेशा क्रियते,

१. ३० न्यायदर्शननूत्रम्—२२।६४, व्याकरणमहामाष्यम् ४।१।४८—
सूत्रे, वाक्यपदीयस्य द्वितीय काण्डे च ।

२. शब्दव्यापाग्विचारेऽपि मम्मटो व्यवहारोपयोगिनीमेव लक्षणा
मीमांसते “इह ह्येवोपादेयानां हानोपादाने प्रमाणादेव, तच्च निश्चयात्मना प्रामाण्य
भवेत्, निश्चयमव शब्दमाहित्वेनार्थं विपरीकरोती' ति तेन तथैव प्रकान्त-
त्वात् । मुकुलमट्टोऽपि व्यवहारीययोगिनीमेव लक्षणामप्युच्यमानाभिधातज्ञया
लक्षयति ।

३. दोषान्दानान्ता ३० व्यक्तिविवेक अम्मन्मन्करणे पृ ३८७ ४३६, ।

४. काव्यप्रकाशे कारणमालालकारवृत्ति ।

५. ३० वामनाचार्यस्य काव्यप्रकाशभूमिका पृ० ८, म० ५० डा०
काणेहृत मम्भुनमाहित्वेनान्वेतिहामश्च ।

६. काव्यप्रकाशे उदा०—७१ महिलामह०, उदा० ९० पविमन्ती० ।

७. काव्यप्रकाशे उदा० ६५ केमेनु बलागोडिय० ।

हेतुलंकारस्य द्वैरूप्यं प्राधान्यमिति (१) अर्थाविशेषहेतुत्वकेन हेतुना सह हेतु-
मत्तो यद् वातन् तद्रूपमेकम् (२) एक च हेतुमता हेतोरग्निसन्नता यद्
वातन् तद्रूपम् । अनर्थोऽन् प्रथमं तत्र काव्यादर्थकारो दण्डी—“हेतुश्च
सूक्ष्मज्ञेयो च वाचानुत्तमनूपममि”ति मूयणोत्तमता पश्यति, प्रप्नोति च
तत्प्राधान्यं मायचतुर्विधमिति कारिकादाहृती । भाष्येऽत्रैव तत्र

“हेतुश्च सूक्ष्मो ज्ञेयश्च नान्तराकारतया मनः ।

समुदायानिधानस्य दण्डोक्त्यनभिधानतः ॥”

इत्येवमनलकारतां पश्यति, वातनादुभयद्वयान्धं न दर्शनं तथैवानुमोदन्ते,
हेतुमिममलकारकतां च न संनयन्ति । यद्यपि नामहस्य दर्शनमिदं सूक्ष्म-
ज्ञेयतां कृते स्मृतस्य मतिं न विदुस्तदपि, पश्यन्तेव स तत्रालंकारभावम् अत्रापि
हेतोः कृते दण्डिनः पदवीं भाष्येऽत्रैव कारिकायां मायचतुर्विधं न प्रभवति
तदर्थमनो —

हेतुमता सह हेतोरनिधानमभेदमहद् भवेद् यत्र ।

सौलंकारो हेतुः स्थाइत्येभ्यः पृथग्भूतः ॥”

इत्येवं निश्चयेन पश्यान्नुमोदन्त्य “अविरलकमलविक्रमः --- बाल” इत्यादिना
निदर्शयति, लभनेन चानुमोदनमुपार्जयताः महदरम्भमादा । अतः
प्रथमं काव्यालंकारानां जीवनिचारि विगोहोक्तपञ्चविक्रिपयाचार्यभट्ट-

१. काव्यादर्थस्य २।३५-५९ ।

२. काव्यालंकारे २।८६, अत्र मन्यमानं चात्र २६६ पृष्ठे प्रथमं पाद-
दिनतदना “मत्तानुत्तमं” इत्यादिकाङ्क्षा प्रप्नोति । समुदायानिधान-
वाक्यार्थप्रतिपादनम् ।

३. वातनादुभयद्वयानां काव्यालंकारेषु हेतुभेदस्यानुपलब्ध्यादित्य-
मुक्तिः ।

४. स्मृतः सूक्ष्मज्ञेयो न भवति, पश्यन्तेन चानुमोदकत्वमावहति ।
३० काव्यालं ३।८-१०२ । सूक्ष्मे काव्यप्रकाशहृदि अलंकारमात्रं पश्यति,
दण्डेन उच्यते “कुतोऽपि लभित” इत्यादिना लभनेनान्यत्वेन तनुदाहृत्यपि ।

५. स्मृतकाव्या ३।८२ । काव्यप्रकाशे कारामलाप्रकरणे “हेतुमता
सह” इत्यादिवाक्यमर्थं संश्लेषे, काव्योक्तिविचारो वाचनाचार्यः पुनरत्र उद्भेद-
मत्रं राशति ।

नामुपन्यासे परिकरविच्छित्तमभिमतुते—

“यद्यप्यपुष्टायस्य दोषताभिधानात् तन्निराकरणेन पुष्टायस्वीकारः कृतः
तथापि एकनिष्ठत्वेन बहुता विशेषणानामेवमुपन्यासे वैचित्र्यमित्यलकारमन्ये
गणितः” ।

इत्येव च ता दोषाभावात्तन्माविषयतेस्तथायं अलकारत्वस्य गजम्बन्धमविराजयते
तस्य “आयुर्धृतमि” त्यादिषु एकाकिहेतुहेतुमदभावम्यलेषु मा भूदलकारत्वयो

“आयुर्धृतं यशस्त्यागो भयं चौरः सुखं प्रिया ।

वरं द्यूतं गुरुजानं श्रेयो ब्राह्मणपूजनम् ॥”

इत्यादिषु, “अविरलकमले” त्यादिषु, “उल्लास” इत्यादिषु च तादृशानेकेहेतु-
हेतुमदभेदमास्तु काव्यरत्नेषु तु मा कथं न जायत इति यत्सत्य विम्बमावह-
मेव । एव प्रथम हेतुभेदमलकारतयागीकृत्य परत्र प्रत्यवतिष्ठमान श्रीमम्मट-
ज्यारिगणे बद्धश्रद्धश्चन्द्रमम सिपति, मद्यकप्रमाण इति बहुमन्यमान स्फटिक
जुगुप्सते, कलहानमानयोश्च बालि-मुग्रीवयो मुग्रीवमेव हिनन्ति, बालिनमेव
रक्षति । किमत्र तन्त्रमिति चेदिदम्—

हेतुहेतुमनोरभेदेन आयमाना विच्छित्तिरभेदमेवोपजीवति, न हेतुत्वम् ।
तत्रैव तस्या हेतुनाम्ना व्यपदेशोऽनुचिनः, विच्छित्तिजनकनाम्नैवाल्लकाराणां
व्यपदेशस्य निरारणात् । अत्र एव सत्यामपि मामग्र्याम् अनन्वय उपमापदेन
न व्यपदिश्यते, तत्र विच्छित्ते । द्वितीयमदृगव्यवच्छेदजनितत्वात्, एवमेव
उत्प्रेषोऽपि, तस्या तृतीयमदृगव्यवच्छेदाश्रितत्वात् । एव यदि विच्छित्ति-
निदातम् अभेदमूलज्य अभेदानुयोगिनी हेतुनाम्ना व्यपदेशं त्रियते तर्हि
तन्प्रतियोगिना हेतुमता किमपराद्ध, तन्नाम्नैव व्यपदेशं कथमत्र न त्रियते
हेतुमानिति शान्तिमानिति वन् । नाम्नि चात्र अभेदोऽपि विच्छित्तिकारणम्,
हेतौ हेतुमत्र आरोहस्येव तत्कारणतयानुभूयमानत्वाद् । अस्ति चामेदारोपयो-

१ परिकरालकारप्रकरणे काव्यप्रकाशवृत्ति ।

२. छट्टकाश्रयः ७।८२—कारिकायां नमिमात्रोऽविवृति । अत्र
विशतिवद् विषयग्रामप्यनेकान्, तेषु च प्रवृत्ताप्रवृत्तौभयान्मताकल्पनायाः
समवाद् दीपक-गुणयोगितान्तरमाकथं प्रमगो हेतुकंदस्य विषयतयानि एकनिष्ठ-
तया अनेकेषामभेदं प्रप्नुवन्ति “अविरलकमलविक्रम” इत्यादीन्पेवोदाहरणानि
समीचीनतराणि ।

कान्ता विरक्तस्ये'त्यादि, तदितरमवन्वमूलकाय च तस्मै

“उल्लामो लुतिकानामकालमूर्च्छा वियोगिवर्षस्य ।

प्रभवति दक्षिणवायुबहुजयो भवनमल्लस्य ॥” इत्येतत् पद्यरत्नम् ।

निराकरोति च सादृश्यमूल आरोपे रूपकत्वमाद्यजन जरतगनेवम्—

इहान्ये सादृश्यनिमित्त एवारोपो रूपक, न संबन्धान्तरनिमित्तकोऽपि, तेन संबन्धान्तरपूर्वक आरोपो वैचित्र्यमात्रम्, न त्वलंकार कश्चिदिति” मस्यन्ते, परन्ति च “उपमैव निरोद्धतभेदा रूपकमिष्यते” इत्यादि । तन्न निपुणहृदयादजंम् । तथा हि इह तावद् द्विविधा लक्षणा, प्रयोजनरहिता लक्षणा, तद्व्युत्ता च कार्या । तत्र लक्षणा प्रयोजन-व्यंग्यार्थाभावादभिधावद् वैचित्र्य-वाचनाविरहान्न रसपरिपोषकत्वमिति नालंकारता । कार्या पुनस्त-
द्वलक्ष्येन काव्यजीवितायमाना सर्वथा कविभिरादरणीयेति सर्वथा ध्वनि-
कारादीनामधिप्रतिपत्तिः । न च तस्याः सादृश्ये संबन्धास्तरे वा कश्चिद्
विशेषो, येनैकालंकारता, परत्र तदभाव इति स्यात् । न च संबन्धान्तर-
निमित्त आरोपोल्लंकारतया लक्षितः, नापि तद् युज्यते, रूपकसाक्षात्त्वेन
तदन्तर्भावस्यैवोचितत्वात् । अत एव ‘आरोपो रूपकमिति सामान्येनैव
नूत्रिनम्, न च सादृश्यमिन्यनुपवतम् ।’

संगृह्णाति चामु सर्वभेदानिदानमनना कारिकया—

“सादृश्यमवन्वनिबन्धनाया अलंकृतित्वं यदि लक्षणाया ।

साम्येऽपि सर्वस्य परस्य हेतोः संबन्धभेदेपि तयैव युक्ता ॥

अलंकारविभिन्नोक्तारो राजानन्द्याजपरयोपि रत्नाकरमिम प्रगुणवन्लकार-
भाष्या उकारानुसारिणीकृतो शुद्धारोपप्रसूनम्याप्यारोपस्य रूपकालंकृतित्वा-
यानुगुण भवतिदमेवमुपस्थापयति—

“केयाचित् संबन्धान्तरेतुरप्यारोपो रूपकागमेवेति मतम् । यदाहलंकार-
भाष्यकार—“लक्षणापरमार्थं यावन्ना रूपकम्” इत्युपक्रम्य “सारोपान्या च
सादृष्याद् वा संबन्धान्तराद् वा” इत्यादि । स तु यथा—

“अमृतकवलः शोभाराशिः प्रमोदरसप्रपा

सितिमशकटं ज्योम्नावाहो तुषारपरट्टिका ।

पण्डितरात्रोपि च “उल्लभ” इत्यादिनि^१ पद्ये । अत एव च रत्नाकरकारो हेत्वङ्कारस्य काव्यलिङ्गान्मक प्रथममेव हेतुभेद लक्षप्रति, काव्यलिङ्गमिति नाम विहाय च “हेतु”मन्देनैव त व्यपदिशति । द्वितीय चाभेदभूत हेतुभेद रूपक एव प्रागुक्तेन क्रमेण गतार्थयति । एवमेव चातिशयोक्तिप्रथमभेदेपि “आयुरेवं”त्यादिक सकलपितु तल्लक्षणं सादृश्येनरमपि सबन्वमुपादयान् । यदि च “आयुर्धृतम्” इत्यादावारोपापेक्षयाप्रतिशये चमत्काराविक्रमनुभूयेत तर्हि “कार्यकारणयो पौर्वापर्यविपर्ययतो” जायमानायामतिशयोक्तौ भेदमभू सकलयेन, तदर्थं च तल्लक्षण “कार्यकारणयोर्भेदक्रमयोर्पौ विपर्यय” इत्येव मगोचरेत् । अस्मि चात्र हेतुहेतुभद्भावाधिन एवातिशय, अत एव दण्डिना हेतुनाम्नैव व्यपदिश्यते भेद एषोतिशयोक्ते काव्यादौ^२ । अत एव च काव्यप्रकाशे नरसिंहमनीषा रचितवान् नरसिंहकृरोपि शुद्धमारोपाया अतिशयोक्तेरस्मिन् भेदे चातिशय्यं^३ पश्यति, यद्यपि पूर्वोक्तेन क्रमेण लक्षणमशोषयित्वा तेन स्वयं तत्र चातिशय्यं न लभ्येत, पौर्वापर्यविपर्ययमात्रेण कार्यकारणयोरभेदारोपनो प्रतिषेद्धमनक्यत्वान् ।

ननु—“शक्यतेनर शुद्धस्य आगेपस्य रूपके, अनिगयोक्तेश्चतुर्थे भेदे वा मग्रह कर्तुम्, तद्विगिष्टानाम् “अविरल-कमलविक्रम” इत्यादीना काव्यानामुपलब्धमानत्वात्, शुद्धाव्यवमानस्य तु का गति, तद्व्यतिरस्य काव्यस्योदाहरणतया अनुपम्यान्त्रादि”ति चेद्, अस्मि तस्यापि तादृशमेव भवत पुर एव स्कूत्रेमानमुदाहरणम् । किं तदिति चेदिदम्—

“आराध्यं न शरवणभवं देवमुल्लसिनाध्वा
मिद-दृष्ट-जलकणमपाद् दीणिनिर्मुक्तमागः ।

१. “उल्लभ” इत्यादे इत्येकस्य विवरणे “अत्र वृत्पनूपास-प्राघुर्पा-वोवोगुणप्रकाशकत्वाच्च शब्दस्य, प्रमादगुणयोगादनन्तरमेवाधिगतस्य रूपकस्य हेत्वङ्कारस्य वा वाच्यस्य चमत्कृत्योन्तुल्यस्वनत्वात् मममेव प्राधान्यमिति रसगोपारे काव्यस्यावमभेदस्तिरूपयान्ते पण्डितरात्रो रूपकत्वमत्र प्रतिपद्यते ।

२. “परप्रत्यायक लिङ हेतु” । (मू० ७९ अल० रत्ना०) । “लिङेन परप्रत्यायनं परार्थानुमानस्य काव्यलिङ्गमर्थो हेतु” इति (वृत्तिस्तत्रैव) ।

३. काव्यादौ २।२५३, २५७ ।

४. नरसिंहमनीषाया वात्रोपिन्यामुद्धृता इय पक्ति—“शुद्धमारोपा तु चतुर्थातिशयोक्तिरसिके”ति । ४० बाउत्रोपिनी “लक्षणा तेन पङ्क्तिरे”ति प्रकरणान्ते ।

परिचर्चा

पु ला मार्गव मन्मते तु 'स्वमिदमे पराशेष परार्थ स्वममर्पणम् । उपादान लक्षण चेत्युक्ता शब्देव मा द्विवा' इति कथयता मम्मटेन स्पष्ट कृत यदत्र तृतीय मतमेव मम्मटाभिसम्मत वर्तते । अस्मिन् विषये विवादस्य अवसर एव नास्ति ।

रे प्र द्विवेदी वस्तुतो नास्ति विवाद । प्रदीपवृत्तायमेव हेतुर्दत्त — "रुटि प्रयोजनाभ्या भेदे सभवत्यपि 'एव—'तु'— शब्दयोरनालोचनाविजृम्भितत्वादेनादेयम्" इति तु मया तस्य वाक्यानि उद्धृतानि । अत्र स एव भेदोऽस्माभि स्वीक्रियते । अत्र एक एव हेतुरस्माभि प्रतिपादित, उपादेयत्वरूप । अन्येऽपि तावद् हेतव सन्ति तेऽत्र नोपस्थापिता । तेषु अस्याप्यन्तर्भाव ।

अ न. जानी इयमपि मान्यतैका वर्तते पण्डितेषु यत् काव्यप्रकाश मम्मटेन-ल्लटमूरिणा चोभाम्या लिखित—“कृत श्रीमम्मटाचार्यवर्ये” परिकरावधि । प्रवन्व पूरित शेषो विद्याल्लटमूरिणा” । अत्र प्रष्टुमना अस्मि—अप्यय भाग अल्लटमूरिविरचिते भागे प्राप्यते उताहो मम्मटेन रचिते ।

रे प्र द्विवेदी अल्लटमूरिविरचितभागे ।

अ न जानी तदा तु मतद्वय वर्ततेव ।

रे प्र द्विवेदी पङ्क्तिरालङ्कारान् परम् अल्लटमूरिविरचिते भागे वर्तते कारण-मालालङ्कारस्य वर्णनम् । कारणमालालङ्कारस्य वृत्तौ एव वर्तते एतस्य हेत्वलङ्कारस्य खण्डनम् । किन्तु चतुर्थे उल्लासे मम्मट-कृतान् प्रयोगानेव दृष्ट्वा अल्लटमूरिणा हेत्वलङ्कारे चमत्कार-भाव स्वीक्रियते । मम्मटेनामकृत् चतुर्थे उल्लासे कथ्यते यत् अत्र काव्यालङ्कारमिति यद् वक्तव्यं तन् कैश्चिद् उच्यतेऽत्र हेत्व-लङ्कार इति । अत्र काव्यहेतु अत्र काव्यालङ्कारो वर्तते । हेतुहेतुमनोर्यत्राभेदो वर्तते ईदृश न किमप्युदाहरणमधिकृत्य तेनोक्तम् अत्र हेत्वलङ्कार इति । वस्तुतः कुत्रचनापि उदाहरणेषु मम्मटेन हेत्वलङ्कारस्य नामोल्लेखो न क्रियते । इदमेव मनसि कृत्वा अल्लटमूरिणा अपि उच्यते यदत्र एवविधेषु हेत्वलङ्कारस्यलेषु चमत्कारो नास्ति । सर्वेऽपि एतादृशा प्रयोगा अस्माभि ममु-पस्थापिता ।

कामिनी और कचन की आमक्ति से दूर करना पर अभिव्यक्ति में कुछ ऐसी त्वरा होती है, वह ऐसी लजीज और अजीज हो जाती है कि आमक्ति दूर तो क्या होगी वह और भी बढ़ने लगती है। हिन्दी में उग्रजी का साहित्य इसका उदाहरण है। उग्रजी की पुस्तकें “चंद हमीनों के खनूत”, “बुधुआ की बेटी”, “चाक्लेट” का यौम कोई बुरा नहीं, सब में नवयुवकों की चरित्रछाप्टता को दूर कर उनके पवित्राचरण की ही वकालत की गई है। पर उनकी शैली में कुछ ऐसी उग्रता है कि वह अपने आधार पर ही कुठाराघात करने लगती है, जिस चीज का विरोध करना चाहती है उसी के प्रति आसक्ति, आकर्षण उत्पन्न करने लगती है।

दूसरी ओर यह भी संभव है कि कवि या कथाकार युद्ध पर या अन्य किसी दुर्घट विषय पर रचना कर रहा है पर फिर भी उसकी अभिव्यक्ति इतनी सौम्य हो, मनुलिन हो कि उसे पढ़ कर या सुन कर हृदय में शान्ति के ही भाव उत्पन्न हों। गांधी जी वहाँ करते थे कि यदि अहिंसा-दर्शन एक व्यापक दर्शन है तो उसमें युद्धों को भी ममालने की शक्ति होनी चाहिये। उसी तरह कहा जा सकता है कि साहित्यिक अभिव्यक्ति सबको ही ममाल सकती है। जयवर्द्धन नामक उपन्यास का एक पात्र कहता है “मैं मान नहीं सकता कि आधी का चित्र शान्त नहीं हो सकता”। साहित्य में या दर्शन में युद्ध और विग्रह हो, पर साहित्य-दर्शन को स्वयं कभी विग्रहात्मक होने को नहीं कहा जा सकता। जिन्दगी जो दीखती है वही तक वर्णन का लाभ नहीं है। उसकी एक भूमिका, एक परिपात्र देकर प्रस्तुत करना पड़ता है। वही साहित्यदर्शन की विशिष्टता है। कुरश्रेष्ठ में सहस्र लक्ष व्यक्ति मारे गए लेकिन इस आख्यान पर रचे गए महापुराण ने इतिहास को और ममृति को और घर्म को जीवित रखा। वह युद्ध को भी, हिंसा को भी, हत्या को भी, अष्टाचार को भी इस तरह वर्णित कर सकता है, इस तरह अभिव्यक्ति दे सकता है कि वह भी साहित्य हो जाय, ‘सहस्य माव’ को जाभूत करने लगे। और वास्तव में देखा जाय तो साहित्य यही करता भी आया है। वहाँ शृंगार रस है, तो करुण रस भी है, वीररस भी है, वीर भी है, हास्य भी है। सभी का मूल रूप भिन्न-भिन्न है पर सभी साहित्य में आकर रम ही हो गए हैं, सब पारम्परिक भेदभाव को भूल कर एक माय बैठे हैं। साहित्य के ‘दीर्घ दाघ निदाघ’ ने जगन को तपोवन बना दिया जहाँ कहिलाने में अहि, मयूर, मृग, वाघ एकत्र रहने लगे हैं। यही काम साहित्य करता आ रहा है, आज भी उसे यही करना चाहिये।

जब में लोगों के बीच वैज्ञानिक दृष्टि का विकास हुआ और व्यक्ति पर भी मात्रिक दृष्टि से विचार करने की प्रवृत्ति जगी तब से यह सोचा जाने लगा कि जिस तरह का कर्ण विषय होगा उसी तरह की प्रतिक्रिया पाठक में भी जगेगी। अमूक भाति का विषय, अमूक भाति की प्रतिक्रिया। तुलसी ने नकिन-परक कविता

यहाँ पर साहित्यिक अभिव्यक्ति से मेरा क्या अभिप्राय है मेरा क्या तात्पर्य है और वह साधारण अभिव्यक्ति से क्यों कर थोड़ा है—इस बात को स्पष्ट करने के लिए मुझे जरा ब्रुवने दीजिये। दो प्रात ये, दोनो स्थानो मे आर्थिक मदी के कारण बेरोजगारी छा गई। निर्णय यही हुवा कि लोगो को आर्थिक वृत्ति तो दी ही जाय, इसके सिवा दूसरा कोई चारा ही नहीं है पर वृत्ति प्राप्त करने की शर्त ऐसी बड़ी कर दी जाय कि लोगो को इसके लिये उत्साह न रहे पर परिणाम जो सामने आया वह अति भयकर था। जब कभी जाब करने वाले निरीक्षक उनके यहा जाकर छोटी-छोटी बातों की पूछताछ करने तो उन्हें अचरता और वे समझते कि उनकी विपन्नता का उपहास किया जा रहा है। उन्हें लगता कि उनकी भिक्षुमगी पर उनकी पत्नियाँ, बच्चे आत्म-भ्रान्ति से गले जा रहे हैं। उनमे माहम नहीं रह गया कि वे समाज के अन्य भद्रम्यों मे आखें मिला सकें। कुछ ने तो आत्महत्या कर ली। कुछ ने इस विकृत जीवन मे चोरी करना और डाका डालना ही श्रेयस्कर समझा। दवा रोग से भी भयकर निकली।

दूमरे प्रान्त मे भी वृत्तिदान के द्वारा ही समस्या हल की गई। पर वहाँ पर इसे दान न कह कर दावा कहा गया। प्रायः समझा यही जाता है कि मनुष्य भावों से प्रभावित होता है, “भाव अनूठो चाहिये, भाषा काळ होय”। पर अब यह बात समझ मे आने लगी कि “भाषा” (अभिव्यक्ति) अनूठी चाहिये, ‘भाव काळ होय’। प्रभावितभाषा भाषा, अभिव्यक्ति, मे रहती है, भाव मे नहीं। वह भाषा-भरक है, भाव-भरक नहीं। कहा गया कि हम Risk Cover करने के लिये बीमा कराते हैं ही, थोड़ी थोड़ी अर्थ-राशि किस्तों के रूप मे जमा कराते हैं, जब पालिमी परिपक्व हो जाती है, हमें रकम मिल जाती है। वह तो दान नहीं, हम उनके दावेदार हैं। आज जो समाज मे समृद्धि है उसको बनाने मे सभी ने थोड़ी-थोड़ी निश्च जमा की है। वह ऐसे ही अवमरो के लिए तो किया गया था। आज अर्थसंकट रुपी दुर्भटना के कारण वह पालिमी मैच्यूर कर गई है और रुपये प्राप्त हो रहे हैं तो यह उचित ही है। यह सीधा सादा व्यापारिक मामला है, इस हाथ दे उस हाथ ले, अतः निश्च की अदायागी अर्थात् वृत्तिदान का प्रारम्भ बडे धूम-धाम से किया गया। इस ममारोह का उद्घाटन राष्ट्रपति के करकमलों के द्वारा किया गया। फोटो लिया गया। वृत्ति-प्राप्त व्यक्तियों का फोटो अखबारो मे प्रकाशित किया गया। जहाँ एक प्रान्त मे इस दान के कारण बराजकता फैली वहाँ दूसरे मे मुराज की स्थापना हुई। प्रश्न यह है कि यह जादू क्यों कर संभव हो सका।

दूसरा उदाहरण लीजिये। जब विश्वव्यापी द्वितीय महायुद्ध चल रहा था। तो एक ही समाचार दो रूप मे प्रकाशित किये जाते थे। French army in

उदाहरण के लिये उस स्थिति को ध्यान पूर्वक देखिये जब दो अपरिचित व्यक्ति आपस में मिलते हैं। प्रश्न यह है कि जो अपरिचित की दीवार उनके बीच खड़ी है वह कैसे टूटे और वे किस तरह समीप जायें? पर अब देखिये उनमें किस तरह बात प्रारम्भ होती है।

“Fine day, isn't it?” दिन बड़ा मुहावना है।

“It certainly is” हा, बवश्य (मिलन का प्रथम आधार विदु प्राप्त हुआ। आगे बढ़ने का मार्ग प्रशस्त)।

‘Altogether it has been a fine summer’ सब मिलाकर इस बार ग्रीष्म ऋतु बड़ी अच्छी रही।

“Indeed, it has been What a nice spring too मही है, इस बार बनस ऋतु भी सुन्दर रही (दो मिलनविदु प्राप्त हो ही गये है। दूसरी व्यक्ति तृतीय मिलनविदु पर सहमति होने का निमन्त्रण दे रहा है)।

“हा, बनस ऋतु भी सुन्दर थी” (तीसरे विदु पर सहमति प्राप्त)।

अब मंत्री का मार्ग प्रशस्त है जिस पर वे आगे बढ़ सकते हैं।

प्रश्न यह है कि अजनबीजन का, अपरिचित का, पृथक्त्व का चट्टान कैसे टूटा? दो लोक के प्राणी एक कर्म हुए?

उत्तर है शुद्ध अभिव्यक्ति। यहाँ अभिव्यक्ति पर ध्यान दें। यदि यह नहीं होती तो मारे मंत्रीभाव के बावजूद भी वहाँ पर पारस्परिक सम्मेलन की घटना नहीं घट सकती। कल्पना कीजिये कि एक व्यक्ति ने स्पष्ट शब्दों में दूसरे के प्रति अपने मंत्रीभाव की घोषणा की। यह सुनकर दूसरे के हृदय में तुरन्त शका पैदा हुई कि कुछ शल में काला है। यह व्यक्ति ठग है, इसकी दृष्टि मेरी धैली पर है और येन केन प्रकारेण वह मेरे विश्वास को प्राप्त कर मुझे अत में लूटना चाहता है। जन में आने आने बात यहाँ तक बढ़ सकती है कि वहाँ साम्प्रदायिक दगा हो जाय, पुलिस को गोली चलानी पड़े और कितने निरीह व्यक्तिओं की जान जायें। प्रश्न यह है कि घटनाओं ने यह विचित्र मोड़ क्यों लिया। प्रारम्भ तो मंत्री के प्रशन्न में ही हुआ था, एक ने दूसरे के प्रति प्रेम के ही भाव प्रगट किये थे। पर वहाँ पर यह दुन्द दृष्ट कर्म सामने आया? उत्तर है - शुद्ध अभिव्यक्ति। भाव तो मंत्री के ही थे। प्रेम के ही थे। बड़े सुन्दर भी थे पर वे जिन तरह अभिव्यक्त किये गये वह ढग उग्र था, हिमात्मक था, उसमें त्वरा थी और उसी में ध्वन के बीज छिपे थे। यही है मद्भाव की वहिमात्मक अभिव्यक्ति। चाहे तो इसे आप अनौचित्य कह सकते हैं।

जितना उसके आस्वाद पक्ष का, किन्तु यह आरोप तथ्यमूलक प्रतीत नहीं होता कि संस्कृत काव्य-समीशको ने काव्य के सर्जना-पक्ष की सर्वथा उपेक्षा की। अलंकारशास्त्र के विभिन्न ग्रंथों में काव्य-सर्जन के विषय में अनेक महत्वपूर्ण धारणाओं व विचारों का निरूपण मिलता है जिससे यद्यपि काव्य के निर्माण-पक्ष का समग्र चित्र तो नहीं उभरता, फिर भी काव्य के इस महत्वपूर्ण पक्ष के सम्बन्ध में संस्कृत काव्य-विवेचकों की सम्यक् अभिज्ञता का परिचय तो मिल ही जाता है। प्रस्तुत निबन्ध में संस्कृत आलंकारिकों के काव्य-सर्जना से संबंधित विचारों की एक संक्षिप्त रूपरेखा प्रस्तुत करने का यत्न किया जा रहा है।

संस्कृत में काव्य-निर्माता का सामान्य अभिधान 'कवि' है जिसकी व्युत्पत्ति 'कु शब्दे' या 'कुड शब्दे' या 'कवृ (वृ) वर्णे' या 'कवृ वर्णने' धातुओं से उणादि इ प्रत्यय के योग से मानी गई है। अतः कवि शब्द का व्युत्पत्ति-कर्म्य अर्थ है 'शब्दनीय' 'वर्णनीय' या 'कवि का कर्म'।^१ संस्कृत साहित्य में कवि शब्द का काव्य-रचयिता के अलावा स्तोत्रा, विचारक, विद्वान्, अन्तर्दृष्टि-सम्पन्न, सर्वज्ञ, स्रष्टा, ऋषि, ज्ञानदर्शी, भविष्यद्रष्टा आदि नाना अर्थों में प्रयोग हुआ है। शतपथ ब्राह्मण में कवि को ऋषि से अभिन्न माना गया है। ईशोपनिषद् में ईश्वर के लिए 'कवि' विशेषण का प्रयोग मिलता है—'कविर्मनीषी परिभू स्वयम्'। शंकराचार्य के अनुसार यहाँ कवि का अर्थ है 'ज्ञानदर्शी' या 'सर्वद्रष्टा'। आनन्दवर्धन ने कवि-प्रतिभा के लिए 'दृष्टि'^२ शब्द का प्रयोग करते हुए कवि को मुख्यतः द्रष्टा माना है। राजशेखर का भी यही मत है। उनके अनुसार प्रतिभायुक्त व्यक्ति परोक्ष पदार्थों को भी देख लेता है जब कि प्रतिभाविकल जन को प्रत्यक्ष वस्तुएँ भी अदृष्ट रहती हैं।^३ अन्यत्र राजशेखर ने महाकवि को दिव्य द्रष्टा बनलाने हुए कहा है कि त्रिलोचन शिव तथा सहस्रनेत्र इन्द्र भी जिसे नहीं देख पाते उसे कवि अपनी प्रातिभ दृष्टि से अनायास प्रत्यक्ष कर लेता है। राजशेखर के मत में कवियों के भक्तिदंष्ट्र में समस्त विश्व

१. अमरकोश, भानुजी दीक्षित कृत टीका, निर्णय सागर प्रेस, पृ. २५२
२. काव्यमीमांसा, अध्याय ३
३. काव्यानुशासन, अध्याय ८, सूत्र १
४. अभिनवभारती (शायकवाह ओरियन्टल सिरीज) भाग २, अध्याय १६, पृ. २९७ (प्रथम संस्करण)
५. ईशोपनिषद्, मंत्र ८ पर शंकराचार्य का भाष्य
६. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३
७. काव्यमीमांसा, अध्याय ४

वहाँ कवि-वाणी की अपरिसीम ।^१ मम्मट के मन में ब्रह्मा की सृष्टि नियति-कृत निम्नो से बढ़ है, सुख, दुःख तथा मोह में आपूर्ण है, उपादान आदि कारणों के परत्न है तथा केवल पङ्क्तियों से ही युक्त है, जब कि कवि-निर्मिति नैसर्गिक निम्नो ने रहित, एकमात्र वाह्य-स्वरूप, बाह्य कारणों में अतीत तथा नवरसों से आप्लावित है ।^२ इस प्रकार मङ्कृत काव्य-समीक्षकों ने काव्य को एक मौलिक व अपूर्व सृजन मानते हुए काव्यलोक में कवि के मार्गभौम स्वातन्त्र्य को स्वीकार किया है ।^३ कवि ब्रह्मा द्वारा नियमित जगत् का अनुकर्ता मात्र नहीं है, वह एक नूतन और विलक्षण सृष्टि का विधाता है । उसका विधान-त्व न केवल ब्रह्मा के समकक्ष है, अपितु उसने भी श्रेष्ठतर है ।

संस्कृत समीक्षा-शास्त्र में कवि व्यक्तित्व को पर्याप्त महत्त्व दिया गया है। काव्य कवि-व्यक्तित्व की सृष्टि है, उसी की आत्माभिव्यक्ति है । जिस प्रकार बीज ही वृक्ष के रूप में विकसित होता है उसी प्रकार कवि की अनुभूति ही काव्य का रूप ग्रहण करती है । अलङ्कारवादी और रीतिवादी आचार्यों की दृष्टि प्रचलित काव्य के बहिरंग के विष्लेषण-विवेचन तक ही सीमित थी अतः वे काव्य-निर्माण में कवि व्यक्तित्व के अर्थार्थ महत्त्व का समुचित मूल्यांकन नहीं कर सके, यद्यपि उनका एक अस्पष्ट निर्देश उन्होंने अवश्य किया है, किन्तु रस-ध्वनिवादी आचार्यों ने कवि-व्यक्तित्व तथा कृति के सम्बन्ध का विशद निरूपण किया है । अलङ्कारवादी मामह के अनुसार कवि का पायित्व रूप तो काल-व्यतिरिक्त हो जाता है परन्तु उनका काव्यमय रूप विरथायी रहता है ।^४ राजशेखर के अनुसार जैसे कवि का स्वभाव होता है वैसा ही उनका काव्य हुआ करता है ।^५ आनन्दवर्धन द्वारा उद्धृत एक धानुवन्धु श्लोक के अनुसार यदि कवि शृंगारी हो तो जगत् रम्य हो जाता है यदि वह वीरराग हो तो सब कुछ नीरस प्रतीत होने लगता है ।^६ कुन्तक ने भी वक्रोक्ति-सत्त्व को कवि-व्यापार-जन्य विच्छिन्ति या वैचित्र्य में युक्त भगीरथिनि कह कर कृतिगत सौन्दर्य के विधान में कवि-व्यक्ति का सीला स्वीकार किया है ।^७ इसी प्रकार रीतियों के वर्गी-

१. लोचन, ध्वन्यालोक उद्योत ४ पृ. ५२७

२. काव्य-प्रसंग, उल्लास १, कारिका १

३. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३, कारिका ४३ की वृत्ति, पृ. ४९८

४. काव्यालङ्कार (मामह इत) १, ६

५. काव्य-मीमांसा, अध्याय १०

६. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३, कारिका ४३ की वृत्ति, पृ. ४९८

७. वक्रोक्तिजीवित १७

चेत् कविः काव्ये' आदि श्लोक की व्याख्या में लोचनकार ने स्पष्ट कहा^१ है कि यहाँ शृंगारी का अर्थ स्त्री-व्यसनो नहीं है, वरन् 'शृंगाररसोचित विभाव, अनुभाव आदि की चर्चणा-रूप प्रतीति में युक्त' यह अर्थ लिया जाना चाहिए। इस प्रकार संस्कृत अलंकारशास्त्र ने कवि के सर्जनपर्याय अलौकिक काव्यात्मक व्यक्तित्व को काव्य का मूल उन्म स्वीकार किया है।

अब प्रश्न यह है कि कवि काव्य-निर्माण में क्यों प्रवृत्त होता है ? वह कौन-सी महनी प्रेरणा या उत्प्रेरक प्रयोजन है जो उसे सर्जनोन्मुख बना देता है। प्रायः सभी संस्कृत आलंकारिकों ने काव्य के प्रयोजनों पर विचार करते हुए उन्हें दो वर्गों में विभक्त किया है—(१) कवि के प्रयोजन, (२) महद्दय के प्रयोजन। अविक्तर आचार्यों ने कीर्ति, प्रीति, अर्थ-प्राप्ति, अनर्थ-निवारण तथा पुरुषार्थ-चतुष्टय को कवि की दृष्टि से प्रयोजन स्वीकार किया है। भामह के अनुसार महाकवियों के दिव्यगन्धर्व होने पर भी उनका काव्यमय कलेवर अक्षुण्ण रहता है।^२ जब तक कवि की अन्दर कीर्ति पृथ्वी और अन्तरिक्ष में व्याप्त रहती है तब तक वह दिव्य लोक में निवास करना है।^३ अतः भामह के अनुसार चिरस्थायी कीर्ति की वाछा हो तो मनुष्य को काव्यरूप प्रयत्न में दत्तचित्त होना चाहिए।^४

रुद्रट के अनुसार भी अलङ्कार व सरस काव्य के रचयिता महाकवि का यश आकल्प स्थायी रहता है।^५ मम्मट ने यश की काव्य-प्रयोजनता का निरूपण करते हुए कालिदास का दृष्टान्त दिया है।^६ रुद्रट व मम्मट ने अर्थप्राप्ति, रोग विमुक्ति या सिन्धेरक्षणों को भी काव्य-प्रयोजन स्वीकारा है।^७ किन्तु हेमचन्द्र ने अर्थ-प्राप्ति व अनर्थ-निवारण को अर्थकान्तिक बनलाते हुए केवल आनन्द और यश को ही प्रयोजन माना है।^८ भामह और विश्वनाथ ने पुरुषार्थचतुष्टय को भी काव्य-प्रयोजन के रूप में प्रस्तुत किया है।^९ अभिनवगुप्त ने अन्य प्रयोजनों को अस्वीकार करते हुए प्रीति या आनन्द को ही काव्य का प्रमुख व

१. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३ पृ. ४९८ का लोचन
२. काव्यालंकार (भामह कृत) १, ६
३. वही १, ७
४. वही १, ८
५. वही १, ४
६. काव्यप्रकाश १, २ की वृत्ति
७. काव्यालंकार (रुद्रट कृत) १, ८; काव्यप्रकाश १, २
८. काव्यानुमान, अध्याय १ सूत्र ३
९. काव्यालंकार (भामहकृत) १, २; साहित्यदर्पण अध्याय १

भाववेग की स्थिति में मनुष्य की चित्तवृत्ति स्वतः विलाप-प्रलाप आदि के रूप में प्रवाहित होने लगती है उसी प्रकार वाल्मीकि की वह तीव्र शोकानुभूति भी 'मा निपाद' आदि श्लोक के रूप में छलक पड़ी। शोक की यह शोक-परिणति आकस्मिक एवं स्वतः स्फूर्त थी जिसमें कि वाल्मीकि को बाद में यह विस्मय हुआ कि शत्रुति के शोक में आनं मेरे मुख में यह कैसी बाणी फूट पड़ी? यद्यपि आदि कवि की प्रथम बाणी का वाच्यार्थ शोक नहीं है, वह तो धापपरक ही है, तथापि वह व्यजना द्वारा कविगत साधारणीकृत शोक की ही अभिव्यक्ति है। अभिनव के अनुसार वाल्मीकि का यह (साधारणीकृत) शोक आवेश के कारण स्वतः स्फुरणा द्वारा श्लोक-बद्ध हुआ, न कि किसी प्रयत्न के द्वारा। करुण रस या अन्य रसों का स्वभाव ही उच्छलन या छटक पड़ना है। अतः कवि का रमावेग या भावावेग ही काव्य-मञ्जना की मूल प्रेरणा है। अभिनव ने अपने मत के समर्थन में भट्टनायक के हृदय-दर्पण का यह वाक्य उद्धृत किया है— 'यावत्पूर्णां न चेतनं तावन् न वमन्यमुम्' अर्थात् जब तक कवि-हृदय रस से परिपूर्ण नहीं हो जाता तब तक काव्य का उद्गार नहीं होता। इस प्रकार अभिनव व भट्टनायक दोनों ही काव्य को कवि का भावोद्गार या भावोच्छ्वास स्वीकार करते हैं। किन्तु यहाँ यह स्मरण रखना चाहिए कि रसवादी आचार्यों ने काव्य को कवि की व्यक्तिगत भावानुभूति का उद्गार नहीं माना है। अभिनव के अनुसार वाल्मीकि ने 'मा निपाद' आदि श्लोक में जिस शोक को अभिव्यक्ति दी है वह उनका व्यक्तिगत शोक नहीं था। यदि उसे व्यक्तिगत शोक ही माना जाय तब तो वाल्मीकि को भी कौञ्च के समान शोक से दुःखित मानना पड़ेगा। उन स्थिति में रस की आनन्दस्वरूपता खण्डित हो जायगी। साथ ही लौकिक शोक में संतप्त व्यक्ति की वंसी दमा नहीं सुनी या देखी जाती जैसी कि वाल्मीकि की हुई थी।

यहाँ अभिनवगुप्त का यह तात्पर्य प्रतीत होता है कि वाल्मीकि ने 'मा निपाद' आदि में जिस शोकानुभूति को अभिव्यक्त किया है वह उनकी साधारणीभूत अनुभूति है, व्यक्तिगत नहीं। अग्रिमाण कौञ्च को देखकर कौञ्ची के हृदय में जो शोक उद्बुद्ध हुआ वह एक लौकिक और व्यक्तिगत अनुभव था। किन्तु शोक-विह्वल कौञ्ची के अनुभावादि के अवलोकन में वाल्मीकि के मन में सहानुभूति-वस्तु जिस शोक का उदय हुआ वह वस्तुतः कवि का साधारणीभूत अनुभव था। 'मा निपाद' में कवि के इसी साधारणीकृत अनुभव का अभिव्यजन हुआ है।

अभिनव के पूर्वोक्त मत में यह भी लयता है कि वे साधारणीकरण की प्रक्रिया को महदय तक ही सीमित रखना नहीं चाहते, उनकी दृष्टि में कवि का संवेदनशील हृदय नौ अन्य प्राणियों के मुख-दुःख आदि का साक्षात्कार कर हृदय-

में उनके कर्तृत्व की गभीर व्याख्या की। रम व ध्वनिवादी आचार्य काश्मीर शैवागम के अनुयायी थे अन उनके प्रतिमाविषयक चिन्तन पर काश्मीरी शैव-दर्शन का गहरा प्रभाव पड़ा है। दार्शनिक दृष्टि में प्रतिमा ईश्वरीय सृजन-शक्ति का ही मानवगत प्रतिरूप है। वह कवि की सर्वना-शक्ति तो है ही, उसकी तत्त्व-दृष्टि, अन्तर्दृष्टि, मानस-चित्रों का विधान करने वाली कल्पना, काव्यात्मक अभिव्यञ्जना के कौशल, सौन्दर्यानुभूति, प्रातिभज्ञान, वस्तुओं में अपूर्वता का दर्शन करने वाली क्षमता आदि की पर्याय भी है। इस प्रकार संस्कृत आलंकारिकों ने प्रतिमा के रूप में काव्यनिर्मात्री शक्ति का बड़ा ही विघटन निरूपण किया है।

आनन्दवर्षण के अनुसार महाकवियों की वाणी दिव्य आनन्द रस को प्रवाहित करती हुई अशोकमामान्य व चतुर्दिक् स्फुरणशील प्रतिमा-विशेष को अभिव्यक्त करती है। यो तो इस समार में विभिन्न प्रकार के कवियों की एक अलङ्कार परम्परा रही है परन्तु प्रतिमा-विशेष के घनी महाकवियों की सख्या उँगलियों पर गिनी जा सकती है।^१ यदि कवि में शक्ति या प्रतिमा हो तो कवि के अभ्युत्पत्तिजन्य दोष भी आवृत हो जाते हैं किन्तु प्रतिमा के अभाव से उत्पन्न दोष छिप नहीं पाते।^२ ध्वनिमार्ग का अवलम्बन करने पर कवि की प्रतिमा नि सीम हो जाती है। यह प्रतिमा की ही देन है कि दृष्टपूर्व अर्थ भी काव्य में निरूप्य नवीनता धारण कर अवनीण होते हैं तथा हर कवि के लिए नूतन निर्माण का क्षेत्र अधुण रहता है।^३

अभिनवगुप्त ने प्रतिमा के स्वरूप की इस प्रकार व्याख्या की है—‘प्रतिमा अपूर्ववस्तुनिर्मातृप्रजा, तस्या विशेषो रमावेगवैभवाभौन्दर्यकाव्यनिर्माण-क्षमत्वम्’ अर्थात् अपूर्व वस्तु के निर्माण में समर्थ प्रजा का ही नाम प्रतिमा है। रमावेग, चित्त-सँभल्य, सौन्दर्यानुभूति व काव्य के निर्माण की क्षमता ही उसका विशेष है। कवि के हृदय-मन्दिर में सनत जाग्रत प्रतिमारूप सरस्वती के अनुग्रह से ही कवि को अपूर्व निर्माण की शक्ति प्राप्त होती है।^४ अन्यत्र लोचनकार ने कहा है—‘शक्ति प्रतिमान वर्णनीयवस्तुविषयनूतनोन्मेषशालित्वम्’ अर्थात् वर्णनीय वस्तुओं के सर्वथा नूतन पक्षों और विशेषताओं का उन्मीलन करनेवाली कवि-शक्ति ही प्रतिमा है।^५ यह प्रतिमा कवि की एक ऐसी विमलक्षण दृष्टि है

१. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत १, कारिका ६

२. वही उद्योत ३ पृ. ३१६

३. वही उद्योत ४।१-३

४. अभिनव-भारती भाग १, अन्वय १, पृ. ४

५. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३, कारिका ६ का लोचन

में काव्य-सर्जना की दृष्टि से प्रतिभा और व्युत्पत्ति को एक ही कोटि में रखा है।^१

कुन्तक ने पूर्वजन्म व इह जन्म के मस्कारों के परिपाक से प्रौढ़ता को प्राप्त करने वाली प्रतिभा को एक विलक्षण व अनिर्वचनीय तत्त्व माना है। उन्होंने कवि-व्यापार के रूप में काव्यगत कवि-कर्तृत्व को महत्त्व देते हुए कहा है कि प्रतिभा में तत्काल उदित एक अनिर्वचनीय परिस्पन्द के कारण लौकिक पदार्थों का स्वरूप एक विशेष उत्कर्ष या विच्छित्ति से आच्छादित हो जाता है।^२ यह विच्छित्ति ही कुन्तक की वक्रता है जिसे वे काव्य का जीवन स्वीकार करते हैं।

महिम मट्ट के अनुसार जब कवि रसानुकूल शब्दार्थ का चिन्तन करता हुआ एकाग्रचित्त हो जाता है तब सपनर के लिए उसे आत्म-माझात्कार की स्थिति प्राप्त हो जाती है। इस आत्म-स्पर्श में उत्पन्न प्रज्ञा को वे प्रतिभा कहते हैं। यह प्रतिभा कवि के लिए शिव के तृतीय नेत्र के समान है जिसके द्वारा वह लोक-श्रवणों पदार्थों का माझात्कार करता है।^३

हेमचन्द्र के अनुसार अज्ञानावर्ण का उपशम हो जाने पर उद्भामित आत्म-चैतन्य ही प्रतिभा है। उन्होंने व्युत्पत्ति और अभ्यास को प्रतिभा का सत्कारक मात्र माना है।^४

प्रतिभा सबन्धी उक्त विवरण में स्पष्ट है कि भारतीय काव्य-मीमांसकों ने काव्य-सर्जना के लिए प्रायः एक स्वर में प्रतिभा की सत्ता आवश्यक मानी है। माय ही उसके मस्कार के लिए व्युत्पत्ति व अभ्यास के महत्त्व पर भी उन्होंने बल दिया है। काव्य लोक के प्रति कवि का एक मग्नेषण या आत्म-निवेदन ही है। काव्यानुभूति का मूल आधार भी अन्तः लोक जीवन ही है। अतः कवि के लिए लोकव्यवहार का तथा लोक की बौद्धिक व भावात्मक परम्परा के मूर्त-रूप साम्प्रो एवं अन्य कवियों के काव्यों का ज्ञान प्राप्त करना आवश्यक है। काव्य एक कलात्मक अभिव्यञ्जना भी है अतः उनकी पद्धति व उपकरणों पर अधिकार प्राप्त करने हेतु कवि के लिए अभ्यास की आवश्यकता का भी निषेध नहीं किया जा सकता। इसीलिए दण्डी व मम्मट आदि ने प्रतिभा, व्युत्पत्ति व अभ्यास की मयूक्त काव्य-कारणता अंगीकार की है। केवल व्युत्पत्ति व अभ्यास द्वारा श्रेष्ठ काव्य की सर्जना समभव नहीं है, क्योंकि प्रतिभा के अभाव में ऐसा काव्य केवल निर्जीव शब्दार्थों की सघटना मात्र होता है।

१. वही अध्याय ४

२. वक्रोक्तिनीदिन १, ९ की वृत्ति

३. व्यक्ति-विवेक २, ११७-११८

४. काव्यानुमानन अ १, सूत्र ७

सर्जन में आरम्भ में अतः तक कवि का व्यापार रस से ही प्रभूत एवं उसी की अभिव्यजना में तत्पर रहता है—यह परिपाकवत्ता कवीना रसादिनात्म्यविग्रहे व्यापार एवं न शोभते।^१ जब कवि रसादि के प्रति तत्पर होकर सर्जन-कर्म में सलग्न होता है तब यह सम्भव नहीं कि कोई वस्तु उसके अभिमत रस का अंग न बने।^२

रसवादियों के मत में रस काव्य की आत्मा होने के कारण उसका अंगी है और अलंकार, रीति आदि अंग। जिस प्रकार शरीर आत्मा की अभिव्यक्ति है तथा उसके माध्यम से आत्मा ही स्वरूप को प्रकाशित करती है उसी प्रकार काव्यात्मक वर्णना व अभिव्यजना वस्तुतः कविगत रस का ही वहिःप्रकाश है। रस में आश्रित होकर ही काव्य में उन्हें औचित्य प्राप्त होता है।

कविगत रस का अभिव्यजन-रूप महज व्यापार या प्रयत्न ही अलंकारों का स्वतः विघात कर देता है। इस प्रकार में निष्पादित अलंकार ही ध्वनि-मय में स्वीकृत हैं। क्योंकि अलंकार का तो लक्षण ही यह है कि वह रस रूप अंगी का अनुभूत हो तथा कवि के भावाभिव्यजनरूप व्यापार या प्रयत्न से निर्वर्तित हो। जब कोई अलंकार रस के निबन्धन के लिए कृतमकल्प कवि की उस वासना का उल्लेखन कर यत्नान्तर द्वारा निष्पन्न होता है तब वह रस का अंग नहीं रहता। जो जब वाच्यार्थ लोग अलंकारों का निरूपण करने बैठते हैं तो वे बड़े दुर्घट प्रवीण होते हैं किन्तु जब कोई प्रतिभाशाली कवि रसमहाहित-चित्त होकर काव्य-सर्जन के प्रति उत्सुह होता है तब वे ही अलंकार मानों प्रतिस्पर्धा करने हुए वा आकर गिरते हैं। आनन्दवर्धन ने वाणहृत कादंबरी में चन्द्रापीड द्वारा कादंबरीदर्शन के प्रसंग का इसके दृष्टान्त के रूप में उल्लेख किया है। उनके मत में रसाभिव्यक्ति के कार्य में अलंकार आदि को बहिरंग मानना उचित नहीं है क्योंकि रसों का त्रिगुण वाच्यार्थ के द्वारा आक्षेप ही मन्त्र है। वाच्यार्थ का प्रतिपादन शब्दों द्वारा किया जाना है तथा वाच्यार्थ ही वस्तुतः रूपक आदि अलंकार बहे जाते हैं अतः वे रसव्यजना की दृष्टि से अन्तरंग ही हैं। इस प्रकार वस्तु और वर्णना, अनुभूति और अभिव्यजना दो पृथक् एवं स्वभिन्न वस्तुएँ नहीं हैं, वे एक ही जीवन्त काव्य-व्यक्तित्व के दो अविभाज्य पहलू हैं। जहाँ शृंगारादि रसों में कवि यमक, श्लेष आदि की योजना करने लगता है वहाँ निश्चय ही उनकी बहिरंगता सिद्ध है क्योंकि उनके निष्पादन के लिए कवि को अपने अनुभूतिप्रभूत, महज अभिव्यजना-व्यापार में

१. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत ३, कारिका ४२ की वृत्ति, पृ. ४९७

२. वही पृ. ४९८

३. ध्वन्यालोक, उद्योत २, कारिका १६ व उसकी वृत्ति

का वर्णन करें' इस प्रकार के वर्णना रूप द्वितीय व्यापार से काव्य में अलंकारों का सम्पादन होता है। 'भेद शब्दों को समुक्त अर्थों से सघटित करें', यह कवि के तीसरे व्यापार का स्वरूप है। इस प्रकार कवि-कर्म के तीन सोपान हुए— (१) प्रतिभा-रूप प्रथम परिस्पन्द से रस व गुणों की निष्पत्ति (२) वर्णना-रूप द्वितीय व्यापार से अलंकार-योजना तथा (३) तृतीय व्यापार से शब्दार्थ-सघटना।

यद्यपि उक्त विवेचन से काव्य-सर्जन की ममत्र प्रक्रिया का तर्कयुक्त प्रतिपादन नहीं होता तथापि रमवाद की दृष्टि से (और यही दृष्टि भारतीय काव्य-चिन्तन की प्रतिनिधि दृष्टि है) काव्य-सर्जन की समस्या पर महत्त्वपूर्ण प्रकाश पड़ता है। रमवादियों के अनुसार प्रतिभा ही काव्य की मूल सर्जन-शक्ति है। प्रतिभावादी कवि अपनी सहज सहृदयता द्वारा अन्य मनुष्यों व प्राणियों के साथ अपना हृदय-संवाद स्थापित कर तन्मयी-भवन की स्थिति का अनुभव करता है जिसके फलस्वरूप उनकी चित्तवृत्तियाँ साधारणीकृत रूप में जाग्रत हो जाती हैं। इन्हीं साधारणीभूत चित्तवृत्तियों का आस्वादन कविगत रस है जिसे अग्निवर्गुन ने काव्य का बीजस्थानीय माना है। यह रस कवि की अपनी विविष्ट प्रतिभा की ही देन है। तदनन्तर इस रमानुभव के तात्कालिक संस्कार या स्मृति की प्रेरणा से वह अपनी अनुभूति की वर्णना में प्रवृत्त होता है। इस कार्य में उसे कल्पनाशक्ति, जिसे भारतीय आचार्यों के अनुसार प्रतिभा का ही एक रूप कह सकते हैं, सबसे अधिक सहायता देती है। इस कल्पना शक्ति द्वारा वह प्रथम तो वर्णना का मानसिक साक्षात्कार करता है और फिर उसे शब्दार्थमयी अभिव्यञ्जना में परिणत कर देता है। काव्य-निर्माण की उक्त समस्त प्रक्रिया वस्तुतः कवि-प्रतिभा का ही क्रमिक उन्मीलन है। यह कवि-प्रतिभा काव्य-सर्जना की सभी अवस्थाओं को अनुप्राणित किये रहती है जैसा कि मट्ट तोन ने भी कहा है —

प्रज्ञा नवनवोन्मेषशालिनी प्रतिभा मता ।

तदनुप्राणनाजीवद्वर्णनानिपुण कवि ।

गुणोन्मूत व्यंग्य या मध्यम काव्य में कविगत रमभस्कार वर्णना को पूरी तरह अनुप्राणित नहीं कर पाता जिमने वस्तु (कवि की अनुभूति), और वर्णना में अननुपन्न उत्पन्न हो जाता है। फिर भी ऐसे काव्य में कवि की अनुभूति प्रत्यक्ष या अप्रत्यक्ष रूप से व्यक्त अवश्य होती है। चित्रकाव्य में कवि अपने रमानुभव के प्रति निरन्तर उपेक्षाशील रहता है जिमने उसके काव्य में मात्र रचना-कौशल का वैचित्र्य प्रकट होता है। अतएव ऐसे काव्य को अप्रम काव्य की संज्ञा दी गई है।

मानन्दवर्धन के अनुसार ध्वनि या व्यञ्जना ही एक मायं है जो कवि की प्रतिभा के गुणों को अनन्त बना देता है जिससे प्राचीन कवियों द्वारा दृष्टपूर्व विषय भी उसी प्रकार नूतन छटा धारण कर लेते हैं जिस प्रकार कि मधुमास में वृक्ष ।^१ उम दृष्टि से व्यञ्जना और कवि-प्रतिभा को पर्यायवाची सा माना जा सकता है ।

रसवादी आचार्यों ने लोक और काव्य की भूमिकाओं को पृथक् मानते हुए काव्यगत अनुभूतियों को अलौकिक स्वीकार किया है । लौकिक अनुभूति देश, काल व व्यक्तित्व के सीमित बोध से ग्रस्त रहती है जबकि काव्य में व्यक्त कवि की अनुभूति एक साधारणीकृत अतएव लौकिक बोध की सीमाओं से मुक्त चित्तवृत्ति है । काव्य में कवि का व्यक्तित्व लौकिक आवरणों से मुक्त होकर एक सार्वभौम, सार्वकालिक व विश्वजनीन रूप ग्रहण कर लेता है । तब उसकी वाणी केवल उसी का प्रतिनिधित्व नहीं करती अपितु वह समस्त मानवता का भावोद्गार बन जाती है ।

संस्कृत काव्यशास्त्र के अनुसार काव्य का सत्य वस्तु-व्यगत् के सत्य से भिन्न होता है । राजशेखर ने काव्य में निबद्ध वस्तुओं को 'प्रतिभासरूप' माना है । अवन्तिमुन्दरी के अनुसार काव्य में वस्तुओं का कोई निश्चित स्वभाव नहीं होता, विदग्ध कवि की वचन-वक्रता ही काव्य में किसी वस्तु को स्वभाव-विशेष प्रदान करती है ।^२ मम्मट ने कविभारती को नियति-कृत निषमों से रहित कहा है । अभिनव के अनुसार काव्य और नाट्य न अनुकरण हैं और न अनुभावन । वे वस्तुतः भावानुकीर्तन या अनुव्यवसाय रूप हैं ।^३ काव्य में लौकिक विषयों और भावों का साधारणीकृत रूप में साक्षात्कार कर सहृदयों द्वारा रसानुभूति प्राप्त की जाती है । इसी का नाम भावानुकीर्तन या अनुव्यवसाय-विशेष है । इस प्रकार काव्य मानवमात्र की मूलभूत एकता का, उसके देश, काल व व्यक्ति से अनिविद्ध रूप का दर्शन कराने में समर्थ होता है । इसलिए कवि को श्रान्त-श्रष्टा, सर्व-दर्शी या ऋषि कहा गया है, प्रत्युत कवि ऋषि से भी एक कदम आगे है । ऋषि में केवल तत्त्वदर्शन की क्षमता होती है जब कि कवि अपनी उस प्रतिभा-रूप तत्त्वदर्शिनी दृष्टि को वर्णना द्वारा सर्वगोचर भी बना सकता है —

नानृपि कविरित्युक्तमृपिश्च किल दर्शनात् ।

विचित्रभावधर्मांशतत्त्वप्रख्या तु दर्शनम् ॥

१ वही, उद्योत ४, कारिका ४

२ काव्य-मीमांसा, अध्याय ८

३ अभिनव-भारती, भाग १, पृ. ३५-७

रा. चं. द्विदेशी • आपने काव्य के सजनापक्ष का बहुत सुन्दर विवेचन किया है पर मैं समझता हूँ आप जयरथ द्वारा इस प्रसंग में कही गई कुछ मुख्य बातों को अपने निबन्ध में और सम्मिलित कर लेना चाहेंगे। हृदय-संवाद के उसने दो भेद किये हैं—चित्तवृत्तिमवाद और वस्तुमवाद। वस्तुमवाद में उन्होंने वस्तुमवन्वी रचना-प्रक्रिया-तथा अनुभूति को अलंकारादि में सन्निहित किया है—ईदृगिद वस्तु इति वस्तुमवादः। और दूसरे संवाद का अर्थ है 'परकीया-यादित्तवृत्तेः आत्मीयचित्तवृत्त्यभेदेन सह परामर्शः'। यदि सजनापक्ष की दृष्टि से जयरथ की आलोचना करें तो प्रतीत होगा कि जयरथ के मते कुछ तो ऐसे कवि हैं जो अलंकार रचना में ही तत्पर होने हैं और कुछ दूसरे के मनोभावों को अपने मनोभावों की भाँति अनुभूत करते हुए उन्हें काव्य में व्यक्त करते हैं। साथ ही इस बात का भी पर्यालोचन आवश्यक है कि प्रतिभा का सर्वमनोभावेन प्रामुख्य मानने पर भी संस्कृत का परवर्ती साहित्य व्युत्पत्ति और अभ्यास का उत्तरोत्तर दाम या घनी क्यों बनता चला गया जैसा कि भट्टिकाव्य, नैषध आदि की काव्यसजना से प्रमाणित होता है और इन काव्यों के कवियों ने अपने वक्तव्य भी हैं। मुझे तो ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि "श्रुतेन यत्नेन च वाग्पासिना ध्रुव करोन्येव कमप्यनु-ग्रहम्" में उल्लिखित अनुग्रह संस्कृत कवियों को अधिक प्राप्त हुआ, आनन्दवर्जन् द्वारा निर्दिष्ट—सरम्बन्धैरेषा घटयति यथेष्ट मगवती—सारस्वत प्रसाद कम उपलब्ध हो पाया।

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